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Series Preface
The Information Systems community has grown considerably since 1984,
when we began publishing the Wiley Series in Information Systems. We
are pleased to be a part of the growth of the ﬁeld, and believe that this
series of books is playing an important role in the intellectual develop-
ment of the the discipline. The primary objective of the series is to publish
scholarly works that reﬂect the best of the research in the Information
Systems community. We are also interested in publishing pieces that
cannot only help practitioners but also advanced students to understand
the myriad issues surrounding IS and, in particular, the management of
IS. To this end, the third edition of Strategic Planning for Information
Systems by John Ward and Joe Peppard is an excellent example. Previous
editions have been highly successful, and we believe the third edition will
be even more so.
The book adds new material on the latest developments in Informa-
tion Systems, in particular ‘e’ (e-business and e-commerce), knowledge
management, customer relationship management, enterprise resource
planning and outsourcing. But, fundamentally, the book is not simply
about technology or techniques but rather the strategic issues of how
such technology can be used successfully in organizations. Ward and
Peppard focus their attention on why and how to develop a strategy to
use IS eﬀectively. Such a treatment is important, and we believe this book
will be of interest to practitioners, students and academics alike.
Rudy Hirschheim
Preface to the Third Edition
Since the second edition of this book appeared in 1996, we have seen
Information Technology (IT) become an increasingly integral component
of everyone’s working life and personal environment. IT is now
ubiquitous and enables a degree of connectivity that was diﬃcult to
envisage even 10 years ago. The technology has evolved rapidly, pro-
ducing signiﬁcant advances in its capabilities and hence the business
options and opportunities now available. Without doubt, the Internet
has evolved into a signiﬁcant business opportunity—when the second
edition was published, Amazon.com, the doyen of the Internet, had
only just come into being. Indeed, since the second edition the so-
called ‘dot.com bubble’ has inﬂated and burst leaving much in its
wake. Apart from the spectacular failures, many companies are now
downgrading their forays into the world of cyberspace; many online
ventures are even dropping their dot.com names. Despite this, there is
no doubt that we have still only scratched the surface of the possibilities.
Interactive digital television (iDTV) oﬀers great promise in bringing the
Internet and new broadcast services directly into the homes of consumers.
Wireless technologies are poised to provide further opportunities to
organizations as both employees and customers become less dependent
on location in carrying out their jobs and conducting business.
In the six years since the last edition, the language of information
systems and technology (IS/IT) has also changed. E-commerce and e-
business have come into common business parlance and even entered
the home via TV advertising! While e is largely a relabelling of what
was previously known as IS/IT, there are a number of new dimensions
in the use of IT implied by e. These are considered in this edition. Perhaps,
most importantly, the introduction of these new terms attracted increasing
senior management interest in IS/IT and its importance to their organiza-
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tions. Unfortunately, the over-hyped promises have left many senior
executives more uncertain than ever before about what can actually be
achieved through IT use. One IT director summed up the dramatic
changes in sentiment by saying, ‘in 2000 you could get any amount of
money by putting an e in front; but in 2001 anything with an e had no
chance of funding!’
The late 1990s also witnessed a push to manage corporate knowledge,
as organizational success became increasingly dependent on its intellectual
rather than its physical assets. Technology is seen as a key enabler of
knowledge management (KM), yet many technology-driven KM initia-
tives have ﬂoundered. While managing information has proved diﬃcult,
we still have much to learn about how knowledge can be eﬀectively
managed before we can begin to understand how best to deploy technol-
ogy and ‘systems’ in this context.
Large enterprise-wide systems, such as enterprise resource planning
(ERP) and customer relationship management (CRM) applications, are
being implemented by organizations to improve the eﬃciency and eﬀec-
tiveness of their operations, by adopting new business models and through
greater integration of processes and information use. The scale and com-
plexity of these systems has proved a challenge to both IS specialists, in
terms of implementation, and business management, in terms of identify-
ing and managing the business changes essential to gaining beneﬁts from
these very expensive investments.
The greater use of ‘outsourcing’ for signiﬁcant aspects of IS/IT supply
reﬂects the increasing sophistication and maturity of the IT industry and
provides a challenge to optimize internal and external resourcing options
to meet the range of business IS/IT needs. Undoubtedly, the recession of
the early 1990s, and the resulting ﬁnancial pressures, focused management
on cost and supply issues, and perhaps increased the rate of outsourcing.
Application service providers (ASPs) are now on the horizon poised to
have an impact on the provisioning of applications. No longer is it neces-
sary to make a decision either to ‘make’ or ‘buy’, but now we must also
include ‘rent’ in the options. Experience has shown that, while outsourcing
is a valid part of any strategy, outsourcing the development and manage-
ment of the strategy itself can lead to serious business problems.
Over the same period, much more has been learned about the prac-
ticalities of managing IS/IT strategically and the issues and factors that
inﬂuence the success of the process in both the short and the long term.
This edition considers both the implications of the developments in IS/IT
and the most useful of the recent thinking and experiences concerning
IS/IT strategic management.
Although some things have moved forward since the second edition,
many of the issues that were relevant then remain so today. Managing
Preface to the Third Edition xi
IS/IT successfully is perhaps even more diﬃcult in today’s environment of
faster business change combined with greater choices in IS/IT supply. The
turbulence in both business and IS/IT environments may explain why,
despite the increasing criticality of IS/IT for business, surveys continue
to show that most IS/IT investments still fail to deliver the expected
beneﬁts to the organization. Many organizations are still concerned that
IS/IT expenditure does not produce demonstrable ‘value for money’.
As stated in the preface to the second edition, the following example
problems can still result from the lack of a coherent strategy for IS/IT
investment:
. Business opportunities are missed; the business may even be dis-
advantaged by the IS/IT developments of others. Systems and tech-
nology investments do not support the business objectives and may
even become a constraint to business development.
. Lack of integration of systems and ineﬀective information manage-
ment produces duplication of eﬀort, inaccurate and inadequate
information for managing the business.
. Priorities are not based on business needs, resource levels are not
optimal, project plans are consistently changed. Business perform-
ance is not improved, costs are high, solutions are of poor quality
and IS/IT productivity is low.
. Technology strategy is incoherent, incompatible options are selected
and large sums of money are wasted attempting to ﬁt things together
retrospectively.
. Lack of understanding and agreed direction between users, senior
management and the IS/IT specialists leads to conﬂict, inappropriate
solutions and a misuse of resources.
Some or all of these can occur when the organization does not have the
means to plan and manage IS/IT strategically (i.e. driven by the business
needs for the long-term beneﬁt of the organization). Much of the failure
of IS/IT to deliver consistent beneﬁts is often due to the short-term
business focus and the delegation of IS/IT strategy to IT specialists.
Over the long term, any organization will get the information systems
it deserves, according to the approach adopted to the use and manage-
ment of IS/IT.
It is against this background that this book considers how IS/IT
strategy development can be brought about and then sustained. The
intention is to provide a structured framework and practical approach,
expressed primarily in the language of business and management, which
can be adopted jointly by senior management, line managers and IS/IT
professionals to apply their various knowledge and skills most eﬀectively
to identifying what needs to be done and how best to do it. Developing a
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strategy is not a one-oﬀ exercise; it must be constantly improved and
reviewed as achievements are made, options alter or business and IS/IT
issues change. Deﬁning a strategy for any organization is a creative and
evolving process, which can be assisted by the use of tools, techniques and
models to identify and select the most appropriate options.
If there is an overall lesson that can be learned from experience it is that,
since new technologies continually come and go, the pursuit of opportu-
nities through IT must be driven, not only by what is technologically
feasible but by what is strategically desirable. A key objective of this
book is to provide this strategic focus for IS/IT. Clearly, an IS/IT
strategy is merely one component of the business strategy and, as such,
must be integrated with that strategy. This implies that IS/IT strategy
development must become an integral part of the business strategy
process. The IS/IT strategy must be understood by the business manage-
ment and owned by them if it is to be implemented eﬀectively.
In putting together this third edition, we have read a considerable
volume of recent research, articles, reports and books. However, some
of the seminal work in the IS strategy area is still very relevant today
even though it may have been written 10, or even 20, years ago. We
have drawn on this, together with the more recent research. On occasions,
we have modernized some of the language to reﬂect the vocabulary of
today better. One of us is old enough to remember the ﬁrst appearance of
‘e’ with eDP!
In developing the contents of this book, we have also drawn on the
work of many others. We recognize the contributions that these research-
ers and writers have made to the contents at appropriate points in the
book. We hope that we have been able to bring it all together in a coherent
and readable volume. Over the years, we have worked with hundreds of
business and IS/IT executives and managers. Their knowledge, insights
and experience and their use of many of the ideas, models and frameworks
in this book, has ensured that the approaches described can be applied
successfully in practice.
The previous editions of the book have been read by many thousands of
students, academics and practitioners. We have attempted to incorporate
some of their suggestions for improvement into this current volume. One
area, in particular, that we have attempted to improve is navigation
through the book. While the overall structure of the book is similar to
the previous edition, we have improved the layout of the chapters,
incorporated running headings indicating precisely where the reader is
and improved the index. We are aware that many readers dip in and
out of chapters rather than read the book from cover to cover. In this
edition, we have made extensive use of chapter endnotes. Some readers
may be interested in following up in more detail some of the points made,
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models used or research ﬁndings drawn upon—the endnotes will guide
them to the original source.
To help the reader navigate through the content of the book, Figure 0.1
illustrates the overall structure.
The book is essentially split into two parts. The ﬁrst part, Chapters
1–6, is concerned with introducing and describing the context, nature
and processes of IS/IT strategy and the associated tools and techniques.
Chapters 7–11 address the issues to be managed in delivering the
beneﬁts from having the strategy such as managing investments, making
resourcing decisions, organizing for IS/IT and the design of the IS
function, deciding about insourcing or outsourcing, and managing IT
infrastructure.
Any strategy must identify, as far as possible, ‘where the organization
wants to be’ in the future and assess accurately ‘where it is now’ in order to
decide ‘how best to get there’, given the alternative options and resources
available. The ﬁrst six chapters of the book consider how the organization
can assess where it is with regard to IS/IT, in the context of current
business environment, and what the business wants to achieve in the
future. One key aspect of any strategy is to obtain the maximum value
from past investments, which implies achieving an objective, consensus
view of the current situation before deﬁning new requirements.
At the same time, the business situation, the environment in which the
xiv Preface to the Third Edition
Figure 0.1 Book overview
organization exists, the competitive pressures and the future strategy must
be understood to enable the strategic planning process to be focused on
areas of criticality for the future. The business objectives and organiza-
tional issues must be interpreted, analysed and supplemented by creative
thinking, so that the IS/IT strategy not only supports the business strategy
but also enhances it where that is possible.
Chapter 1 sets the strategic context for IS/IT. It traces the historical
development of IS/IT in organizations, bringing it up to date both in terms
of e-commerce and e-business development and the latest thinking on the
strategic role of IS/IT in organizations.
Chapter 2 considers approaches and techniques involved in business
strategy formulation and strategic management and their implications
for IS/IT strategy development. Chapter 3 considers what is involved in
establishing an IS/IT strategy process and presents an approach to IS/IT
strategy formulation and planning.
Chapters 4 and 5 describe the tools and techniques that can be used in
the process; the focus is on the practical application of these tools.
Chapter 6 is a summary chapter and brings together the material intro-
duced in Chapters 2–5 to show how the ‘demand side’ of the strategy can
be coherently addressed.
Chapters 7 to 11 consider how the portfolio of requirements
and demands can best be satisﬁed in terms of ‘supply’ management stra-
tegies—the means by which the strategies are to be achieved. The various
ways in which the IS/IT resources can be obtained, developed, deployed
and managed most appropriately to satisfy the variety of demands are
considered. This must take account of the business and organizational
structure, in order to establish the appropriate balance between cen-
tralized and devolved roles and responsibilities. The aim is to produce a
relevant set of management policies and principles and a partnership
between business people and IS/IT specialists cooperating to achieve
common goals.
Chapter 7 describes ways in which the current and future applications
of IT can be assessed in terms of their business contribution, both indi-
vidually and as an overall portfolio of IS/IT investments. The appropriate
means of managing each element of the portfolio and the overall set of
applications can then be selected.
Chapter 8 considers a wide range of aspects related to structuring and
organizing IS resources and the governance of IS/IT activities. Chapter 9
presents approaches to managing IS/IT investments, setting priorities to
gain the best overall return from those investments and deﬁning and
realizing the business beneﬁts that IT-enabled changes can produce.
Chapter 10 focuses on information as a strategic asset and the require-
ments and activities involved in the development of an information
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management strategy. It also explores the requirements, issues and
options associated with the increasingly important role IS/IT needs to
play in the management of organizational knowledge. Chapter 11 con-
siders some of the key strategic issues associated with the management of
IT infrastructure and the provision of services to satisfy the organization’s
systems, information and technology requirements. Outsourcing is dis-
cussed in detail and the potential role of application service providers
(ASPs) is considered.
While the book concentrates on the strategic planning and management
mechanisms needed by most organizations today, the last chapter looks to
the future of IS/IT strategy development. The eﬀects of IS/IT on any
enterprise, its strategy, its operations and even its organization structure
have, steadily and inexorably, become more profound and complex over
the past 30 years, and this is more likely to increase than abate in the
future. Chapter 12 considers the longer-term implications of current
trends and emerging issues, which will have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on
organizations’ future business and IS/IT strategies and how they are
managed.
The overall purpose of the book is to demonstrate why strategic
planning for information systems is essential to organizational success
and that it is also feasible, even in times of increasingly rapid change.
To obtain the whole range of beneﬁts available from IS/IT and avoid
the potential pitfalls, every organization must establish the means to
manage IS/IT as an integral part of its approach to strategic management.
The approaches described in this book are intended to enable greater
understanding of both what needs to be done and how it can be done.
Acknowledgements: This book could not have been written without the
help and support of a number of people. Since the last edition was
produced, Pat Griﬃths has retired and the authors recognize the con-
tribution made by her to the previous editions and therefore to this one.
Colleagues in the Information Systems group at Cranﬁeld School of
Management, visiting academics Ed Fitzgerald and John Hoxmeier and
the many people who have attended IS Strategy courses and workshops
have directly and indirectly contributed a wealth of knowledge and prac-
tical experience to the contents. By applying the ideas and techniques,
they have not only helped in their development but have also demon-
strated the relevance and value of the approaches described. We also
acknowledge the contribution of many researchers and writers in the IS
ﬁeld, on whose work we have drawn and referenced throughout the book.
Finally, this book could not have been produced without the expertise
and diligence (not to mention hard work!) of Justine Cullen, who
prepared the bulk of the text and ﬁgures.
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1
The Evolving Role of
Information Systems and
Technology in Organizations:
A Strategic Perspective
Today, most organizations in all sectors of industry, commerce and
government are fundamentally dependent on their information systems.
In the words of Rockart1 ‘[i]nformation technology has become inextric-
ably intertwined with business’. In industries such as telecommunications,
media, entertainment and ﬁnancial services, where the product is already or
is being increasingly digitized, the existence of an organization crucially
depends on the eﬀective application of information technology (IT). With
the emergence of e-commerce, the use of technology is becoming just an
accepted, indeed expected, way of conducting business. Consequently,
organizations are increasingly looking toward the application of technol-
ogy not only to underpin existing business operations but also to create new
opportunities that provide them with a source of competitive advantage.
In order to manage information systems and information technology
(IS/IT) strategically, it is helpful to understand how the role of
technology-based information systems has evolved in organizations.
While organizations today want to develop a more ‘strategic’ approach
to managing IS/IT, many have probably arrived at their current situation
as a result of various short-term ‘tactical’ decisions regarding IS/IT.
Many organizations would no doubt like to rethink their investments,
or even begin again with a ‘clean sheet’, but unfortunately have a ‘legacy’
resulting from a less than strategic approach to IS/IT in the past. It is
rarely possible to start again—many banks and insurance companies still
depend on systems ﬁrst developed over 30 years ago; neither is it neces-
sarily advisable—there is no real reason to expect more success in the
future than has been the case in the past, unless ability and knowledge
have increased in the meantime. Learning from experience—the successes
and failures of the past—is one of the most important aspects of strategic
management. Earl has noted that much learning about the capability of
IT is experiential, and that organizations tend to learn to manage IS/IT
by doing, not appreciating the challenges until they have faced them.2
However, no one organization is likely to have been exposed to the
whole gamut of IS/IT experiences, and neither is it likely that what has
been experienced can always be evaluated objectively. This chapter
provides an appraisal of the general evolution of IS/IT in major organ-
izations, against which any organization can chart its progress and from
which lessons can be learned for its future management. This evolution of
IS/IT in organizations is examined from a number of viewpoints, using a
variety of models, some of which are further developed and used later in
the book, when considering the particular approaches required in
planning strategically for IS/IT investments.
A number of important forces aﬀect the pace and eﬀectiveness of
progress in using IS/IT and in delivering business beneﬁts. The relative
weighting of each factor varies over time, and will also vary from one
organization to another. These factors include:
. the capabilities of the technology;
. the economics of deploying the technology;
. the applications that are feasible;
. the skills and abilities available, either in-house or from external
sources, to develop the applications;
. the skills and abilities within the organization to use the applications;
. the pressures on the particular organization or its industry to
improve performance.
This list is not meant to be exhaustive and could be expressed in other
terms—but it is in a deliberate sequence of increasing ‘stress’, as the
complexity and criticality of the management decision-making process
becomes more strategic.
Most assessments of the evolution of IS/IT in organizations tend to
focus on one or two aspects of its development—organizational, applica-
tions, management of technology, planning, etc.—but, in this chapter,
these various perspectives will be brought together, as much as possible.
INFORMATION SYSTEMS (IS) AND
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (IT)
Before providing any strategic perspective, it is important that there is a
clear understanding of the distinction between the terms information
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systems (IS) and information technology (IT). While both terms are often
used interchangeably, it is important to diﬀerentiate between the two if a
meaningful dialogue is to take place between business and IS staﬀ and
ultimately successful IS/IT strategies are to be developed. It should be
remembered that information systems existed in organizations long
before the advent of information technology and, even today, there are
still many information systems present in organizations with technology
nowhere in sight.
IT refers speciﬁcally to technology, essentially hardware, software and
telecommunications networks. It is thus both tangible (e.g. with servers,
PCs, routers and network cables) and intangible (e.g. with software of all
types). IT facilitates the acquisition, processing, storing, delivery and
sharing of information and other digital content. In the European
Union, the term Information and Communication Technologies or ICT
is generally used instead of IT to recognize the convergence of traditional
information technology and telecommunications, which were once seen
as distinct areas.
The UK Academy of Information Systems (UKAIS) deﬁnes informa-
tion systems as the means by which people and organizations, utilizing
technology, gather, process, store, use and disseminate information. It is
thus concerned with the purposeful utilization of information technology.
The domain of study of IS, as deﬁned by the UKAIS, involves the
study of theories and practices related to the social and technological
phenomena, which determine the development, use and eﬀects of infor-
mation systems in organizations and society. Mingers3 notes that,
although technology is the immediate enabler of IS, ‘IS actually is part
of the much wider domain of human language and communication, that
IS will remain in a state of continual development and change in response
both to technological innovation and to its mutual interaction with
human society as a whole.’4
Some information systems are totally automated by IT. For example,
Dell Computers has a system where no human intervention is required,
from taking customer orders, to delivery of components to the Dell
factory for assembly, to shipment to customers. With this build-to-
order model, perfect information and tight linkages match supply and
demand in real time. The company can receive an order for a personal
computer (PC) directly from a customer via its own website (www.dell.
com). Indeed, Dell has built in an element of ‘intelligence’ into its site to
help the customer in making decisions regarding the conﬁguration of
components, ensuring that ‘non-optimal’ conﬁgurations or conﬁgura-
tions not technically possible are not selected. Customers can also
choose from a variety of delivery options. Once a customer order has
been conﬁrmed, purchase orders for components are automatically
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generated and electronically transmitted to suppliers. This has enabled
Dell to build exactly what the customer has ordered, resulting in a stock-
turn of 56–60 times per year compared with 13.5 for Compaq and 9.8 for
IBM’s PC business.5 Dell also feeds real-time data from technical support
and manufacturing lines directly through to suppliers on a minute-by-
minute basis. They also have links to many of their suppliers’ manufac-
turing lines so that they can see their yields. This information system (or,
perhaps more correctly, multiple information systems) is underpinned by
a variety of diﬀerent technologies—servers, storage, software, networks,
etc.
Another term that is frequently used along with IS and IT is appli-
cation. Essentially, an application refers to the use of IT to address a
business activity or process. There are essentially two types of application:
. general uses of IT hardware and software to carry out particular
tasks such as word processing, electronic mail or preparing presenta-
tion materials;
. uses of technology to perform speciﬁc business activities or pro-
cesses such as general accounting, production scheduling or order
processing.
These applications can be carried out using pre-packaged, pre-written
software programs for a particular business activity or be developed to
provide particular functionality. Some business-application software
packages can be tailored or customized to the speciﬁc requirements of
an organization. One of the key selling points of large enterprise resource
planning (ERP) packages from vendors like SAP, Baan, Oracle or JD
Edwards is that they can be conﬁgured, to some extent, to meet the
speciﬁc way in which an organization operates.
Checkland and Holwell6 have pointed out that many people ﬁnd
diﬃculty in distinguishing between IS and IT, because technology
seems to overwhelm their thinking about the fundamental information
system that the technology is to support. Checkland7 also notes that
information systems exist to serve, help or support people taking
action in the real world. He asserts that, in order to create a system
that eﬀectively supports users, it is ﬁrst necessary to conceptualize that
which is to be supported (the IS), since the way it is described will dictate
what would be necessary to serve or support it (the IT).
This gives a clue as to why organizations may fail to realize any beneﬁts
from their investments in IT—investments are often made in technology
without understanding or analysing the nature of the activities the tech-
nology is to support—either strategically or operationally—in the organ-
ization. For example, over the last few years, many organizations have
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built websites without suﬃcient thought to the rationale behind the
decision other than because everyone else seems to be getting on the
‘Net’. We have heard stories recounted of senior executives returning
from business trips abroad demanding that a new technology be pur-
chased or a new application be implemented because they have seen an
advertisement in an airline’s in-ﬂight magazine. It is important to
remember that IT has no inherent value—the mere purchase of IT does
not confer any beneﬁts to the organization; these beneﬁts must be
unlocked. We shall return to this point throughout the book.
E-business and E-commerce
There are two other concepts that we believe are important to discuss up
front, particularly given the prominence both have received: e-business
and e-commerce. Since the mid-1990s, both concepts have entered the
everyday vocabulary of managers and, having observed activity in many
organizations such as the appointment of ‘Directors of e’, ‘e-managers’
and ‘e-Czars’ and the fact that many have developed ‘e-strategies’,
suggests that e-commerce and e-business are being treated as something
new and diﬀerent from seeking out opportunities to deploy IS/IT. This
should not be the case.
Literally, e-commerce refers to the conduct of commerce or business
electronically—essentially using Internet technologies. In the 1980s, elec-
tronic commerce was already a reality, in this instance referring to inter-
company trading, speciﬁcally the exchange of business documents, using
electronic data interchange (EDI).8 EDI was a cumbersome technology,
requiring the use of a third party (a value-added network supplier or
VANS) to facilitate information ﬂow, but it did enable business
partners to reduce the costs of exchanging business documents such as
orders, invoices and price lists with each other. Indeed, the advent of
Financial EDI—the issuing of electronic payment instructions and receiv-
ing remittance notices electronically—was seen as closing the loop
between purchaser and supplier. Of course, all parties involved had to
adhere to particular technical standards in exchanging information and,
as has been the case throughout the history of IT, a variety of diﬀerent
EDI standards emerged. Industries such as automotive, banking and
retail had their own standards to deﬁne message structures. The United
Nations did attempt to bring some uniformity to these diverse standards
through UN/EDIFACT (United Nations/EDI for Administration,
Commerce and Transport), but with mixed success.
With the opening up of the Internet for commercial activity in 1991, a
vast new medium was emerging for the conduct of business transactions.
This ‘network of networks’ was based on open standards, facilitating
Information Systems (IS) and Information Technology (IT) 5
easier connectivity without the need for the use of VANS. More latterly,
the emergence of WAP (Wireless Application Protocol) has made it
possible for mobile devices (phone, personal digital assistant [PDA],
etc.) to connect up to the Internet, thereby permitting everything from
‘browsing the Net’ to engaging in business transactions while on the
move. M-commerce has been coined to refer to the use of mobile
devices for the conduct of business transactions while t-commerce refers
to a similar use of television.
E-business, on the other hand, has come to refer to the automation of
an organization’s internal business processes using Internet and browser
technologies. At one extreme, we have the ‘pure play’ dot.coms, whose
business models are often portrayed as being totally web- or Internet-
enabled, often reaching out directly to customers. However, unless the
product is digitizable, such companies do not exist totally in the virtual
world. In industries such as retailing, manufacturing and transportation,
the physical aspects overpower the virtual—logistics still wins the day,
not glossy websites as many dot.coms have found to their detriment.9 At
the other extreme, we have companies who have ‘web-enabled’ selected
business processes using Internet technologies. Such companies still
operate in the physical world and seek to develop a ‘bricks and clicks’
strategy to integrate the Internet with their mainstream operations.
Unfortunately, the potential beneﬁts and impact of those aspects of IS/
IT that have been labelled e-business, e-commerce and latterly m-
commerce and t-commerce have been exaggerated, resulting in tremen-
dous hype surrounding these concepts, much of it fuelled by technology
vendors and the media. In 1999, just issuing a press release stating the
company was embracing the ‘net’ or announcing an e-commerce strategy
was enough to send a company’s share price rocketing. Subramani and
Walden10 examined the impact of e-commerce announcements by ﬁrms
on share price and found that e-commerce initiatives did lead to cumu-
lative abnormal increases in shareholder value. Even changing a company
name to incorporate the ‘.com’ label had a signiﬁcant increase in the
share price and trading activity.11
Right up until the Nasdaq crash in March 2000, we could not fail to
pick up a newspaper or magazine without reading a story about the
Internet and its impact. Attention grabbing headlines such as ‘The
‘‘net’’ changes everything’, ‘Log on or log out’ or ‘The death of the
job’ and articles spotlighting the 21st century economy with promises
of change in the lives of everyone ensured that the Internet became a
popular topic of conversation. Acronyms such as B2B (business-to-
business), B2C (business-to-consumer), B2E (business-to-employee) and
P2P (peer-to-peer) entered the business vocabulary.
Coltman et al.12 have evaluated some of the early predictions about the
6 Information Systems and Technology in Organizations
Internet and what the reality is some years later. For example, Kalakota
and Whinston13 predicted that brands would die—this has not been the
experience. In fact, many ‘Internet brands’ have themselves become
extinct—as many banks have discovered as they attempted to launch
‘Internet brands’. The prediction that the middlemen would disappear
has again proved false. In fact, a new breed of ‘infomediary’ has
emerged.14 Evidence also suggests that being ﬁrst is not the key to
success as suggested by Downes and Mui.15 Yahoo!’s real advantage is
not that it was a ﬁrst mover, but a ‘best mover’. If Lycos or some other
portal is considered better, it is possible that Yahoo! will decline, as
switching costs are low. In many cases, the early follower has the advan-
tage of complementary assets, like brands, that form the real basis of
competition for customers. This is what occurred in many industries
when the incumbents took on the dot.com upstart. Yet, some predictions
have come to pass. The claim that the Internet represents a new nearly
‘frictionless market’ has some empirical support. In a study of books and
CD retailing, Brynjolfsson and Smith16 found that prices on the Net were
9–16% lower than prices in conventional outlets.
What we are essentially looking at is another technology—in this
instance, the Internet, including wireless technologies—to add to the
range of technologies that already exist. The fundamental challenge for
any organization is still to identify opportunities to deploy this new
technology, as with any other. As Porter17 noted ‘[w]e need to move
away from the rhetoric about ‘‘Internet industries’’, ‘‘e-business strate-
gies’’, and a ‘‘new economy’’ and see the Internet for what it is: an
enabling technology—a powerful set of tools that can be used, wisely
or unwisely, in almost any industry and as part of almost any strategy’.
It should also be noted that IT is not the business strategy. Statements
like ‘[i]n this new age, IT is not about the business—it is the business’18
are misleading and unhelpful.19 Rangan and Adner20 have dispatched
sound advice in this regard. ‘The sooner ﬁrms stop being distracted by the
hype of new technology, the sooner they can focus on the key strategy
lessons that business experience of the past couple of decades has
taught us: regardless of the industry that a ﬁrm operates in, it can
achieve and sustain proﬁtable growth to the extent that it grasps and
delivers on two strategy fundamentals—product advantage and produc-
tion advantage.’ In a similar vein, Hamel, in his book Leading the Re-
volution,21 is quite forthright in stating that ‘[t]he real story of Silicon
Valley is not ‘‘e’’, but ‘‘i’’, not electronic commerce but innovation and
imagination. . . . It is the power of ‘‘i,’’ rather than ‘‘e,’’ that separates the
winners from the losers in the twenty-ﬁrst century economy’.
Yet, this is not to say that the Internet is not diﬀerent. Apart from
its technical characteristics, three aspects make the Internet distinct
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from other technologies. First, it is pervasive. For example, it directly
reaches end consumers, facilitating the conduct of business directly
with consumers in new ways—something which has not been possible
before, except with dedicated systems like France’s Minitel. Interactive
Digital TV allows consumers to access Internet services directly from the
sitting room of their home. Second, it is interactive. This interactive
element is of crucial importance since much business activity consists
of interactions (human and technical communication, data gathering,
collaborative problem solving, negotiation).22 Third, its virtual nature
means that it is a new medium that has diﬀerent characteristics from
the physical world—often referred to as the marketspace as opposed to
the physical marketplace.23 The marketspace denotes the transformation
in business activity as moving from the physical marketplace with ﬁxed
locations, inventories and products to an information-deﬁned transaction
space. This shift ranges from basic business transactions such as ordering
and invoicing to utilizing sophisticated business-to-business (B2B) ex-
changes and electronic marketplaces24, bringing together industry
players in a neutral market setting. This has implications for organiza-
tions’ brands, for understanding trust, for product and service pricing,
for issues of location, for collaborative ventures, for collecting duties and
taxes, etc.25 All of this implies that IS/IT strategy has to be even more
tightly aligned to other strategies, especially the external relationships of
the enterprise.
EARLY VIEWS AND MODELS OF IS/IT IN ORGANIZATIONS
The use of computers in business began in the early 1950s but really only
became signiﬁcant in the mid- to late 1960s with the development of
multi-purpose mainframe computers. Major increases in processing
speed, cheaper memory and improved storage capacity aﬀorded by
magnetic disk and tape, plus better programming languages, made
‘batch’ data processing a viable option for many tasks and activities in
organizations.
During the 1970s, minicomputers of increasing power and sophistica-
tion were used for a variety of business applications that were either not
feasible or economic in a mainframe environment. However, the views
developed of the role of information systems and their expected evolution
were based strongly on a centralized, integrated concept derived from
mainframe origins. The most well known of these models, capturing
the evolution of IS/IT in an organization, was developed by Gibson
and Nolan26 during the 1970s.27 This model, in turn, used a hierarchical
application portfolio model described by Anthony,28 who deﬁned a
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structure for information systems in an organization, based on a strati-
ﬁcation of management activity into:
. strategic planning;
. management control;
. operational control;
Diﬀerent applications were built to support the diﬀerent levels of man-
agement activity—hence, it provided an early way of classifying applica-
tions. Typical systems developed to support this model are shown in
Figure 1.1.
Based on analyses of the use of IS/IT in a number of large US organ-
izations, Nolan and Gibson proposed an evolutionary model containing
initially four ‘stages of growth’. Later, two further stages were added by
Nolan. This six-stage model is summarized in Box 1.1. The analysis
involved considered six aspects or benchmarks of IS/IT and its
management in the organizations studied. These were (i) the rate of IS/
IT expenditure, (ii) the technological conﬁguration (e.g. batch/online/
database), (iii) the applications portfolio (as in Anthony’s model), (iv)
the data processing (DP)/IT organization, (v) DP/IT planning and
control approaches and (vi) user-awareness characteristics.
The validity and usefulness of the six-stage model have been explored
by a number of researchers since it was published. In a review of
past research on Nolan’s stage hypothesis, Benbasat et al.29 and King
and Kraemer30 found that empirical support is generally weak and
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Planning 
systems
examples
Operational 
systems
examples
Control 
systems
examples
              Sales analysis budgetary control, management
           accounting, inventory management, quality analysis, 
        expense reporting, market research/statistics, WIP
    control, requirements planning, supplier analysis, etc.
        Sales forecasting operating plans capacity 
     planning, profit/earnings forecasts,              
   business mix analysis, manpower
planning, financial modelling
               Order entry, processing, tracking shipping documents, vehicle
             scheduling/loading, invoicing, sales and purchase ledgers, cost 
          accounting, stock control, shop-floor scheduling, bill of materials,
       purchase orders, receiving, employee records, payroll, word 
     processing
Figure 1.1 Typical planning, control and operational systems
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Box 1.1 Stages of evolution of IS/IT in relation to expenditure
1. Initiation: batch processing to automate clerical operations to
achieve cost reduction, purely operational systems focus, lack
of management interest.
2. Contagion: rapid growth as users demand more applications
based on high expectations of beneﬁts, move to online
systems, high rate of expense as DP tries to satisfy all user
demands. Little control if any, except a drive to centralize in
order to control.
3. Control: in response to management concern about cost, systems
projects are expected to show a return, plans are produced and
methodologies/standards enforced. Often produces a backlog of
applications and dissatisﬁed users.
4. Integration: considerable expenditure on integrating (via
database) existing systems. User accountability for systems es-
tablished and DP provides a service to users not just solutions to
problems.
5. Data administration: information requirements rather than pro-
cessing drive the applications portfolio and information is
shared within the organization. Database capability is exploited
as users understand the value of the information.
6. Maturity: the planning and development of IS/IT in the organ-
ization is closely coordinated with business development.
inconclusive. Drury31 noted that, in practice, the benchmarks did not
map consistently on to the stages as suggested by the original model; in
particular, in the later stages, the complexity of the real world was not
reﬂected in the simplicity of the model. He concluded that, ‘Categorising
of DP from initiation to maturity may no longer be feasible with
the diﬀusion of new technologies and functions being introduced.’
However, he accepted that individual benchmarks could be usefully
adopted in assessing how eﬀectively an organization was coping with
the increasing importance of IS/IT.
King and Kraemer32 believed that the model had several weaknesses.
In particular, the empirical evidence for the stages was inconsistent and
many of its assumptions were too simplistic to be useful. But they equally
pointed out that many aspects of the model ring true to practitioners and
researchers and it has had a considerable inﬂuence on IS management
thinking since the 1970s. Its weakness—its simplicity—may be the key to
its popularity! It does suggest an evolutionary approach during which
diﬀerent forces control the destiny of IS/IT in an organization. By the
beginning of the 1990s, empirical research concluded that the model
provided little help for the CIO or IT director attempting to create a
successful IS unit within an organization.33 But despite its limitations,
the model continues to be used by practitioners today.34
More signiﬁcantly perhaps, Wiseman, in his book Strategy and
Computers,35 suggested that the inﬂuential combination of the Anthony
three-tier structural approach to deﬁning organizational systems and the
‘Nolan’ stage model inhibited the strategic use of IS/IT. He stated that,
‘up to 1983 at least, Nolan’s general purpose approach to information
systems (based in part on the Anthony model) is clearly incomplete, for it
oﬀers no guidelines for identifying or explaining strategic information
systems opportunities.’ Friedman,36 in analysing critiques of the Nolan
model, suggested that, while evolution through the ﬁrst four stages of the
model was generally observable, the arrival in the 1980s of ‘strategic
systems’ introduced a new stage that changed quite fundamentally the
concept of how IS/IT evolves to ‘maturity’ in organizations and indus-
tries. Indeed, it is worth highlighting that stages-of-growth models have
been applied to other areas of IS; for example, the evolution of the
‘information centre’, where there is empirical support for their evolution
through the stages of growth. It is suggested that the various stages of
information centre evolution are necessary in order for the information
centre to better serve the changing needs of end-users.37
In summary, a model of the evolving role of IS/IT in organizations is
of value and, while the Nolan model is a useful starting point, it is not
altogether satisfactory—it only really described events up to the 1980s
and since then much has changed. Perhaps a more serious problem with
Early Views and Models of IS/IT in Organizations 11
the Nolan model is in the detail of the four or six stages, and the undue
emphasis placed by others since on the ‘rate of expenditure’ associated
with each stage: Should it be more or less, increasing or decreasing, and
so on? Focusing attention on the trees, one often loses sight of the wood!
Viewed from a more distant perspective, the six stages of the model divide
into two larger ‘eras’, separated by a transition point between Stages 3
and 4 (Control and Integration). It can be summarized as a transition
from computer (DP) management to information (systems) management,
during which major changes occur in who managed what for whom, and
how. In essence, it was a fundamental change in how IS/IT resources
were managed, and how the role of IS/IT in the organization should be
evaluated. The changing relationships involved in the transition are
depicted in Figure 1.2.
During the early stages of computerization, the preoccupation was
with managing the activities—operations, programming, data collection,
etc. Later, a separate organizational unit was established that could cope
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IS Role in
the Enterprise
Managing the IS/IT
Department
Relationships with
other departments
Computer 
(DP)
Management
Information
(Systems)
Management
Managing the 
IS/IT activities
Figure 1.2 Transition between computer and information management:
relationships and emphases (source: partly derived from EDP Analyser—‘How
the management job is changing’, June 1984, Vol. 22, No. 6)
with a variety of types of application, over an extended life cycle, during
which the technology changed signiﬁcantly. This ‘department’ was
managed as a coordinated set of resources that were planned to meet
expected future requirements.
While this was evolving, relationships with users developed, the
eﬀectiveness of any relationship being determined by success to date
and the users’ awareness of the role computers could play in organiza-
tional activity—not because of business priorities, but due to the ease
with which computers could be applied. Accounting was likely to be far
more advanced in computer use than marketing, and if the ‘DP depart-
ment’ reported to Finance then that relationship was likely to be very
eﬀective—but possibly at the expense of relationships with more
business-critical parts of the enterprise. Occasionally, the role of IS/IT
in the organization was reviewed but the focus on current issues and
problems often prevented an overall picture being seen.
Up to this point, the main driving force had been managing computer
resources and activities, with the eﬀort applied, in proportion, to the
technical and application diﬃculties, without much regard for the value
to the business of the applications. To achieve eﬀective Information
(Systems) Management, a new top-down approach was required—a
‘strategy’ for the management of IS/IT, associated activities and re-
sources throughout the organization. This should be based on a
deﬁned role for IS in the enterprise—but that, in turn, depends on the
role of IS in relation to the outside world, as will be discussed later.
Research by Hirschheim and colleagues38 supported the rationale of
this transition, based on studying the evolving issues associated with IS/
IT management in organizations. They described it in terms of a three-
stage model. The stages are described as:
1. Delivery: IS issues are mainly internal—improving the ability to
deliver and support the systems and technology. Achieving top-
management credibility as a valuable function is a prime objective.
This means improving delivery performance, not necessarily provid-
ing users with what they really need.
2. Reorientation: establishing good relationships with the main business
functions, supporting business demands through the provision of a
variety of services as computing capability spreads through the
business. The issues focus is extended outside the ‘DP department’
and a key objective is to provide a valued service to all business
function management. Diﬀerent areas will beneﬁt diﬀerently with-
out regard to business importance.
3. Reorganization: the high level of awareness created both ‘locally’ in
the business area and ‘centrally’ in senior management creates the
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need for a reorganization of responsibilities designed to achieve in-
tegration of the IS investment with business strategy and across
business functions. A key objective becomes the best way of satisfy-
ing each of the diﬀering business needs through a coalition of respon-
sibilities for managing information and systems.
The last stage equates to the top-down, strategic view, while the ﬁrst two
describe the ‘climb’ to the position of considering the ‘role [of IS/IT] in
the enterprise’.
EARLY VIEWS AND MODELS: UP TO 1980
The evolutionary models used so far have considered the management of
IS/IT during the 1960s and 1970s and essentially from the inside—the
development of IS/IT management rather than exploitation of IS/IT in
the enterprise. During the 1970s, the types of application and how they
could be developed changed, thus making the application models used as
the basis of evolutionary analysis potentially obsolete.
Starting from the Anthony model of planning, control and operational
systems, Nolan and Gibson showed how the applications, developed
during the evolution of IS/IT, spread slowly up the hierarchy. Perhaps
more importantly, they spread at diﬀerent rates in diﬀerent functions of
the organization. These diﬀerential rates of evolution constrained the
potential for integration of control and planning systems, which by
their nature are cross-functional. Normally, a ﬁrm foundation of opera-
tional systems was built ﬁrst, function by function. On this foundation,
control systems were introduced by accumulating operational informa-
tion and analysing it to improve cross-functional coordination and
control. Finally, the portfolio was completed by transforming the infor-
mation so that planning systems could be developed to help senior
management deﬁne the future of the business. The control and
planning systems forced improvements to be made lower down the port-
folio structure, in order to realign information and its processing for
planning and control purposes.
By the mid-1970s, approaches to developing successful operational
systems, either centrally or on distributed minicomputers, were well es-
tablished. Control systems, usually centralized, were particularly well
understood and, especially in ﬁnancial areas, could be linked to the
required operational data, if only in a ‘read only’ mode. However, little
progress had been made on planning systems beyond crude forecasting.
Traditional, mainly operational and control, systems were essentially
of two types:
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. monitoring—transaction handling and control;
. exception—triggered reporting and/or action.
Although these provide management with information, they are primar-
ily focused on the processing of data, depending for success on the
predeﬁnition and consistency of requirements (i.e. data-processing
systems that are primarily operational in nature, but may enable some
control and planning).
In the early 1980s, the personal computer (PC) and a new set of
software tools such as spreadsheets, word processors, electronic mail
and presentation graphics, enabled ‘end-user computing’ (EUC) to take
oﬀ. EUC was originally viewed as the direct, hands-on use of computer
systems by users whose jobs went beyond entering data or transactions.
At about the same time, ‘oﬃce automation’ systems provided new means
of processing and communicating information.39 These advancements
permitted two new functions to be added to the repertoire of IS/IT:
. enquiry—ﬂexible access to data and information initiated by user
request;
. analysis—decision support, with ﬂexible processing of data and
information.
Here, application needs are not predeﬁnable, and often the applications
changed rapidly during a short but useful life. They therefore tend to be
characteristic of some control and planning systems, rather than opera-
tional systems. These applications essentially provide information to
managers and professionals who require it and the ability to process/
transform it to satisfy their information requirements.
The main diﬀerences between these types of application, named Data
Processing and Management Information Systems after their primary
objectives, are detailed in Table 1.1. Although these applications have
diﬀerent characteristics, they do to a large extent share a common in-
formation base and need to communicate—there is an obvious danger of
total separation. Therefore, in addition to managing two diﬀerent types
of application, it became critical that the organization eﬀectively organ-
ized its overall information resource.
It can be concluded that, from the 1960s to the early 1980s, IS/IT and
its deployment in organizations passed through a major transition, which
linked two eras. These two eras can be summarized as:
1. data processing from the 1960s onwards—the DP era;
2. management information systems (MIS) from the 1970s onwards—
the MIS era.
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Obviously, from this deﬁnition the two eras overlap—DP continuing to
mature as MIS emerges and grows. As will be discussed later, the 1980s
saw the beginning of a third era, which can be called the ‘strategic
information systems’ (SIS) era. This book will focus considerable atten-
tion on the applications and implications of the third era, but it must also
be remembered that:
. A considerable part of future investment will be in DP and MIS, and
these investments must be part of any strategic plan.
. Much can be learned from the experiences gained in the ﬁrst two eras
to improve the chances of success in the third, when the potential
prizes are greater, but the penalties for failure more severe!
. All organizations have to live with the legacy—asset or liability—of
the applications previously developed, and often developed for
reasons and using methods relevant to the past. Management and
user attitudes and understanding of the potential of IS/IT and the IS/
IT skills of the organization will in large part be determined by the
nature of that legacy.
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Table 1.1 Differences between DP and MIS
Control and planning
Operational and control systems (management
systems (data processing) information systems)
Objectives Eﬃcient transaction handling Eﬀective problem resolution
and eﬀective resource control and support for decision
making
Life cycles 3–12 years, depending on rate From hours to months and
of change occasionally recurring
Information time Recent history, current and Consolidated history,
frame short-term future current and extended future
Information Internal plus external Internal plus external
sources transactions ‘research’ data
Logical processes Strictly algorithmic Probabilistic and ‘fuzzy’
Users Operators, clerical staﬀ and Professionals and middle to
ﬁrst line supervisors senior managers
Technologies Mainframe/minicomputer- Local processing linked to
controlled processing at information resources
workstations
The implications for the organization are that a complex inheritance
must be appropriately managed, improved and replaced, while current
opportunities are exploited and future possibilities explored.
THE DP AND MIS ERAS: THE LESSONS LEARNED
There have been essentially three parallel threads of evolution that have
enabled more extensive and better information systems to be developed:
. Hardware—reducing cost and size, improving reliability and connec-
tivity, enabling the system to be installed closer to the business
problem.
. Software—more comprehensive and ﬂexible operating software and
improved languages, enabling business applications to be developed
more quickly, with greater accuracy and by staﬀ with less experience.
In addition, there was an increased availability of application
packages available ‘oﬀ the shelf ’.
. Methodology—ways of organizing and carrying out the multiplicity
of tasks, in a more coordinated, synchronized and eﬃcient way to
enable ever more complex systems to be implemented and large
projects to be managed successfully.
The ‘data processing’ approach is problem/task/process focused to ensure
that the ‘automation’ through IS/IT of those tasks achieves the required
eﬃciency improvements and thus beneﬁts—the required return on invest-
ment. The relationship to business strategy development is similar to that
of installing a new widget-making machine, which produces twice as
many in half the time, needs fewer operators and produces a better
yield from the material (i.e. enabling performance improvements). Simi-
larly, automation of a warehouse improves eﬃciency and can improve
inventory management, but does not fundamentally alter the business
process—it is a more eﬀective ‘implementation’ to support the achieve-
ment of strategic aims.
Automation through DP can, however, produce a competitive advan-
tage. For example, the Aalsmeer Flower Auction (Verenigde Bloemen-
veilingen Aalsmeer) in the Netherlands computerized their auction clocks
in the 1970s and linked the auction transactions to the time-critical
administration and distribution systems. The speed and integrity of the
systems enabled the auction to handle ever-increasing volumes, to the
satisfaction of both the ﬂower growers and the buyers—increasing
the auction’s market and market share.40 Over the years, the exchange
has developed a wider range of buying and selling systems, including
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FlowerAccess.com, an information and order system, developed with
exporters and wholesalers that enable ﬂorists worldwide to order
directly. The VBA has also launched a remote system that allows
buyers to take part in sales from oﬀ-site locations while watching
several auctions from computer screens in real time.41 Computerized
reservation systems (CRS) began life as DP systems to enable airlines
to manage their inventory of seats but were soon giving them signiﬁcant
competitive advantage as well as becoming more proﬁtable than their
owners.42
The problems of developing DP systems are generally well known, if
not fully resolved, in most organizations. Consequently, they have been
addressed most comprehensively. Even in the future, perhaps more than
50% of all IS/IT investments will be about improving eﬃciency—‘data
processing’ in their philosophy. Wiseman43 refers to the ‘hybrid nature’
of many major systems investments. He says that even so-called com-
petitive or strategic systems such as the electronic ‘point of sale’ (EPOS)
systems in retailing include a large data-processing component—data
capture, veriﬁcation, storage, processing, transmission—as well as
providing important information that may be employed to improve
competitiveness.
As more ‘data’ became stored in computer systems, managers realized
that using the information could increase the eﬀectiveness of decision
making in their departments. Database software seemed to provide the
means to give the necessary ﬂexible access to information via online
enquiry and analysis systems. Coupled with emerging modelling tools,
new decision-support systems provided managers with the facility to
manipulate data in ways not previously possible. This required
managers to think about the information they used and how they used
it. However, managers do not use data in predeﬁnable, structured ways.
Neither do managers rely solely on ‘hard facts’ in their decision
making.44 The methods used successfully to construct large volume,
structured DP systems did not work given the vagueness of the require-
ments. Neither could the cost involved be justiﬁed easily, given the in-
tangible nature of the beneﬁts and the potentially short life of the
systems. Return-on-investment calculations did not look as attractive
for MIS as they did for DP, even though both could be based on ever-
reducing hardware costs.
The legacy of process-based DP applications, each one optimized in its
construction to maximize eﬃciency, was often at best a fragmented data
resource, at worst a chaotic mess of data with little or no integrity.
Database disciplines required a heavy user involvement in data
deﬁnition—a tedious and diﬃcult task. Frustration developed as large
restructuring projects were undertaken to reorganize data and applica-
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tions into integrated data-based systems to enable MIS to be developed.
Even when this was complete, the databases often proved inﬂexible—the
users did not get the information in the way they needed it. IS specialists
spent inordinate amounts of time on data analysis and design, and then
still had to write mundane retrieval systems. The ‘response’ to the
problem by IT suppliers was to introduce new languages—fourth-
generation languages (4GLs)—which were easy to use on well-deﬁned
data, relational databases to overcome the constraint of rigid structures
and personal computers to free the user from the tangled web of IS
development. In particular, the personal computer brought with it the
‘spreadsheet’, which enabled considerable analytical scope without the
need for programming.
Most IT departments eventually identiﬁed the need for new user-
support services. A manifestation of this was the ‘information centre’.
This was, by whatever name, a new service whose prime purpose was to
support and encourage, but minimize the risks of, end-user computing.
New relationships were established with users who had previously been
on the verge of total rebellion! Many IT departments also adopted the
new software tools and used them to improve the responsiveness and
productivity of more conventional IS development. Agreement was
reached on user and IT roles—which ‘systems’ aspects were to be en-
trusted to users and which needed the disciplines already developed.
Appropriate organizational policies, rather than DP methodologies,
could be established.45
In some organizations, however, rifts between users and IT profes-
sionals developed, causing active antagonism and consequent failure to
resolve the issues of the MIS era. Often, the corporate information
resource, instead of being integrated via the database approach,
became fragmented as separate users either retained or regained control
of their data. Frequently, the MIS applications became divorced from the
DP systems—often resulting in, at best, unsynchronized and, at worst,
totally diﬀerent data being used to operate the business and manage it!
Into this arena, in the early 1980s, was thrust the concept of ‘oﬃce
automation’—an unfortunate misnomer, which sent shivers of appre-
hension through those whose world was apparently about to be auto-
mated and oﬀered a new opportunity for conﬂict between the IT
professionals and user management. The net result was that more
forms of information—not just data but text and potentially images
and voice—could be channelled through the same technology. In some
cases, this would enable more eﬃcient information processing and, in
others, provide better ways of communicating and presenting informa-
tion, providing a more comprehensive matching of technology to the
tasks of a typical manager.
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Unfortunately, two factors served to confuse the progress in evolu-
tionary terms that even the best-managed companies were achieving:
1. How was the large new investment required in hardware and
software—many hundreds of workstations, networking costs and
multiple licences for software packages—to be justiﬁed? This re-
focused management’s attention on technology rather than its
use—the much-quoted word ‘convergence’ distracted management
from a need to ensure that their systems and information were appro-
priate and eﬀective before throwing technology at the problem.
Those organizations who succeeded with oﬃce automation were
those who applied the lessons learned in successful DP and MIS
investments to the extension of technology use. The rationale for
investment had reverted, in many cases, from ‘business pull’ to ‘tech-
nology push’ and the management style often regressed accordingly.
2. How should the new applications and supporting technology be
managed and, even more critically, who should be responsible?
Should the role of the IT unit be extended or should such systems
be the responsibility of users? Were the new oﬃce systems an exten-
sion to a department level of personal computing or an integral part
of the organization’s information processing ability and resources?
How did the management of personal computing and oﬃce systems
relate?
As the new ‘strategic’ potential of IS/IT began to be appreciated in the
mid-1980s, most organizations were still wrestling with the problems of
managing concurrent DP and MIS applications based on rapidly-
evolving technology. Policies, planning, organization structures and pro-
cesses were established to control and coordinate the increasingly diverse
and complex requirements. Good practice in the planning and manage-
ment of DP and MIS was hard won after a long ﬁght. The extended
business role, now envisaged, did not undo that requirement—much of
the future investment would be of a ‘traditional’ nature and would
produce more beneﬁts if well planned and managed. DP and MIS appli-
cations might be less glamorous but management should equally expect
them to be more certain of success. Table 1.2 summarizes a number of the
key lessons from the ﬁrst two eras.
Paul Strassman, in his book The Information Payoﬀ,46 assessed the
contribution of IS/IT to businesses from a careful examination of the
essential premises of the ﬁrst two eras (i.e. that DP delivers increased
eﬃciency and that MIS improves management eﬀectiveness). From
his many observations and conclusions, the following are particularly
important:
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. IS/IT deployment has generally improved the eﬃciency of informa-
tion-based functions in organizations when technology is used to
automate discrete, structured, repetitive, stable information-intensive
tasks (e.g. invoicing, accounting, order handling, word processing,
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Table 1.2 Summary of lessons from DP and MIS eras
DP lessons: Need to understand the process of developing complete informa-
tion systems, not just the programs to process data.
More thorough requirements and data analysis to improve systems
linkages and a more engineered approach to designing system
components.
More appropriate justiﬁcation of investments by assessing the
economics of eﬃciency gains and converting these to a return on
investment.
Less creative, more structured approaches to programming, testing
and documentation to reduce the problems of future amendments.
More discipline was introduced with ‘change control procedures’
and sign-oﬀ on speciﬁcations and tests.
Extended project management that recognized the need for co-
ordination of both user and DP functions and the particular need
to establish user management in a decisive role in the systems
development—the user had to live with the consequences.
The need for planning the interrelated set of systems required by
the organization. Better planning produced overall improvements
in systems relevance and productivity.
MIS lessons: Justiﬁcation of IS investments is not entirely a matter of return on
investment/ﬁnancial analysis.
Databases require large restructuring projects and heavy user
involvement in data deﬁnition—data integration had been weak
based on the project by project DP approach.
The IS resource needs to move from a production to a service
orientation to enable users to obtain their own information from
the data resource—the information centre concept.
Need for organizational policies, not just DP methodologies.
Personal computers and oﬃce systems enable better MIS to be
developed, provided that users and IS specialists both focus on the
information needs rather than the technology.
etc.). However, the return on investment is lower than the often-
quoted ﬁgures such as 25–30%; a net 5–10% return is more likely,
although some isolated spectacular gains are possible. Eﬃciency
gains can and should be measured wherever possible, although
this can be diﬃcult if tasks are rationalized or integrated when
computerized.
. The results with regard to management eﬀectiveness are less consis-
tent. First, measuring eﬀectiveness improvements—‘value added’ of
managers—is diﬃcult. Strassman’s measurements considered man-
agement’s contribution in terms of proﬁtability or those aspects of
proﬁt that managers can inﬂuence against the costs incurred by
management. When IS/IT is added to this cost burden, how does it
aﬀect the value-added side of the equation? According to Strassman’s
research and analysis, the expected happens: good managers get even
better; bad managers get worse! This is explained as follows: good
management, with a high and improving value/cost ratio, will use
new resources to increase their eﬀectiveness further by focusing on
adding more value still—getting better at their job—or they will
discard the technology. Poor management will focus on improving
the value/cost ratio by reducing the cost component and will be
looking for IS/IT to produce eﬃciency savings—implying automa-
tion, but of tasks that do not lend themselves to automation. This
piecemeal automation approach misses the opportunity to improve
personal and collective eﬀectiveness. It could be argued that IS/IT in
these circumstances speeds up the mess! It is therefore important to
deal with the basic reasons for low management productivity and
eﬀectiveness before employing the technology.
More recent surveys and further work by Strassman, using the same
approach, have veriﬁed these observations, especially where IS/IT is
introduced into complex organization structures.47
THE THREE-ERA MODEL
Thus far in the evolution of the role of information systems and technol-
ogy in organizations, two eras have been identiﬁed and discussed. There
is, in fact, a third era that began in the early 1980s and provides a focal
point for this book. This third era can be referred to as the strategic
information systems era, and it will be discussed at length in the next
section.
Although it is tempting to simplify nearly 50 years of often-haphazard,
uncertain progress with the beneﬁt of hindsight into three, albeit over-
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lapping, eras, it must be remembered that it is never that simple. A ‘three-
era model’ is proposed from which a number of insights can be drawn
that help in planning or developing strategies for the future. While the
three-era model is easy to criticize as being oversimplistic, it has proved
popular with a number of IS/IT theorists and researchers. Hence, many
useful analyses are available from which a pattern of conclusions can be
drawn. It is ﬁrst worth clarifying the fundamental diﬀerences and inter-
dependencies of the three eras.
The prime objective of using IS/IT in the eras diﬀers:
. data processing to improve operational eﬃciency by automating
information-based processes;
. management information systems to increase management eﬀective-
ness by satisfying their information requirements for decision
making;
. strategic information systems to improve competitiveness by changing
the nature or conduct of business (i.e. IS/IT investments can be a
source of competitive advantage).
The objectives of DP and MIS are, strictly speaking, a subset of the SIS
objective—to improve competitiveness. But this tends to be achieved
indirectly by using IS/IT to improve current business practices. For
example, the focus of business process re-engineering (BPR) is often
seen as improving competitiveness, but this is achieved through process
redesign taking into account the capabilities of IT in providing new and
innovative design possibilities. While the SIS objective is more immedi-
ately related to the business, success in achieving the DP and MIS objec-
tives can contribute considerably to business success, and further
improvements are always possible as IT capabilities are enhanced and
the cost reduces.
Galliers and Somogyi, in the book Towards Strategic Information
Systems,48 plot the erratic progress of IS/IT, its use and its management
through the two eras (note that their Management Services era is what we
refer to as MIS) and into the then emerging third era of strategic informa-
tion systems. They recognized a number of important trends that
occurred during that evolution, including the move into the third era.
These trends are summarized in Figure 1.3, in the terms used above.
Wiseman49 has perhaps most succinctly described both the relationship
between the three eras and the evolving application portfolio and the
application objectives. His key points are:
. Just as good MIS systems rely on good operational DP systems for
accurate, timely information, strategic information systems (such as
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those linking the company directly to its customers via the Internet)
rely on good DP or MIS systems for appropriate information pro-
visioning or dependent processing. Many companies have established
websites permitting customers to place orders online, but not yet
integrated them with order processing and other back-oﬃce systems.
. Strategic information systems are not essentially diﬀerent applica-
tions—the functions are often the same as for DP or MIS applica-
tions—it is their impact on the business due to the changes they
enable or cause that is diﬀerent.
. The strategic applications may put considerable stress on the DP and
MIS applications that were developed for a less demanding environ-
ment—they may need to be redeveloped not because of intrinsic
shortcomings but because they inhibit the beneﬁts to be gained
from the SIS.
It must be emphasized that ‘eras’ is not perhaps the ideal word, suggest-
ing as it does a sequential relationship. The DP era is still with us, the
ever-improving economics enabling the technology to be applied to
extend the automation of processes involving documents, images and
voice. So, too, with MIS. A combination of improved economics, more
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Figure 1.3 Trends in the evolution of business IS/IT (source: adapted from R.D.
Galliers and E. Somogyi, ‘From data processing to strategic information systems:
A historical perspective’, in R.D. Galliers and E. Somogyi, eds, Towards Strategic
Information Systems, Abacus Press, 1987)TE
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powerful processing capability, sophisticated software and the availabil-
ity of external data enables the collection, analysis and presentation of
information to be made more comprehensive and eﬀective.
THE STRATEGIC INFORMATION SYSTEMS ERA
During the late 1970s, a number of organizations had began to use IS/IT
in ways that fundamentally changed how their business was conducted,
changing the balance of power in their industry with respect to com-
petitors, customers and/or suppliers. The use of IS/IT was thus directly
inﬂuencing their competitive position and had become a new weapon to
improve their competitiveness, implying a new relationship between IS/
IT investment and strategic development.
Among the earliest examples of competitive advantage from IS/IT
were the SABRE reservation system of American Airlines and the
direct terminal-based ordering system of American Hospital Supplies.
Both involved putting technology directly into the customers’ sites,
and, in the process, precluded similar competitive responses—who
wants two or more terminals on their desk?—but also caused fundamen-
tal changes in the ‘systems’ operating in their industries, to their advan-
tage. These two particular cases are extensively documented, along with a
number of others—United Airlines, Merrill Lynch, Thomson Holidays,
ICI, McKesson, and Dun & Bradstreet.
During the mid-1980s, an endless stream of examples were quoted in
many journals and books on SIS under the generic title of ‘how IS/IT
provides competitive advantages’. These articles often did more than
describe what organizations had done: they considered how the advan-
tage had been achieved and proceeded to suggest how any organization
might analyse its business and identify similar opportunities. In many
cases, a tool or technique was described and substantiated by selected
examples.50 Although these various approaches will be considered in
detail later, it is important to note at this stage that they are all funda-
mentally diﬀerent from the analysis approaches traditionally employed
regarding the deployment of IS/IT. They are therefore additional tools
and techniques that need to be included in the IS/IT strategy develop-
ment and planning toolkit. However, they need to be considered in the
overall context of both business strategy and IS/IT strategy, as will be
demonstrated later.
It is worth noting at this stage that, although some of the ‘classic’
competitive advantage examples resulted from a formal approach to
strategy development, most were the product of excellent exploitation
of situations that arose in the course of business. As a result of his
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research into strategic information systems, Ciborra51 asserted that
successful applications are often due more to serendipity than any
formal approaches to planning. The various tools and techniques that
have been developed subsequently should enable organizations to reduce
the amount of luck required.
Recently, attention has returned to some of these classic examples.
Kettinger et al.52 analysed some 30 of the best known examples, 10–20
years after their initial implementation, to determine whether the advan-
tages achieved by these systems were sustained. Clearly, over such an
extended period, many factors can aﬀect a ﬁrm’s performance, and the
results are at best indicative rather than conclusive. In general, they
found that, while some 40% of the ﬁrms had above-average performance
for a few years, only 20% could be said to have sustained the advantage
for 10 years or more. However, this is probably to be expected given the
advances in technology over the period and, hence, the relative ease of
replication (at lower cost) of many of the systems. We shall return to this
point again at the end of the chapter, as we believe that the lessons from
this and other research studies provide the background to a new fourth
era.
STRATEGIC USES OF IS/IT: CLASSIFICATION, FACTORS
FOR SUCCESS AND MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS
From a research base of over several hundred examples and case studies
spanning 20 years of claimed ‘strategic systems’, the following classi-
ﬁcation can be shown to be helpful in considering the implications of
strategic IS/IT use. In general, the examples can be classiﬁed into one of
four types, although some of the examples clearly exhibit the character-
istics of more than one type.
The four main types of strategic system appear to be:
1. those that share information via technology-based systems with cus-
tomers/consumers and/or suppliers and change the nature of the
relationship;
2. those that produce more eﬀective integration of the use of informa-
tion in the organization’s value-adding processes;
3. those that enable the organization to develop, produce, market and
deliver new or enhanced products or services based on information;
4. those that provide executive management with information to
support the development and implementation of strategy (in particu-
lar, where relevant external and internal information are integrated
in analysis).
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Other classiﬁcations are somewhat similar in their analysis. Benjamin
et al.53 divided the types of potential opportunity between those that
focus on either the competitive market place or internal operations.
Within each, IS/IT can be used to improve traditional ways of doing
business or to cause ‘signiﬁcant structural changes’ in the way the
company does business. Notowidigdo54 divided strategic information
systems into:
. internal systems that have direct beneﬁt for the company;
. external systems that have direct beneﬁts for the company’s cus-
tomers.
A similar approach was adopted by Venkatraman55 in assessing how the
strategic beneﬁts from IT resulted from increasing degrees of business
change (and risk!). He considered the early ‘evolutionary’ stages of IT use
in much the same way as described earlier in this chapter for DP and
MIS. However, he described three types of ‘revolutionary’ uses of IT,
which require considerable transformation in terms of what the organ-
ization does or how it does it:
1. business process redesign—using IS/IT to realign business activities
and their relationships to achieve performance breakthroughs;
2. business network redesign—changing the way information is used by
the organization and its trading partners, thereby changing how the
industry overall carries out the value-adding processes;
3. business scope redeﬁnition—extending the market or product set,
based on information or changing the role of the organization in
the industry.
While not identical, these options are similar to the classiﬁcation we have
developed, with a clear emphasis on the extent of the changes to achieve a
strategic advantage from IS/IT. Hence, the four categories suggested
above seem to cover many of the possibilities. Each of these types of
strategic IS/IT application has diﬀerent implications in terms of identiﬁ-
cation, planning and implementation.
Linking to Customers and Suppliers
The key people involved in the consideration of external linkage systems
will be sales/marketing and distribution management at the customer
end, or purchasing/receiving/quality-control managers at the supplier
end. The initiator of American Hospital Supplies’ strategic IS develop-
ments was a depot manager who provided a disorganized customer with a
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Box 1.2 Case examples of IS/IT and competitive advantage
through the decades
Merrill Lynch
In the USA, Merrill Lynch launched its cash-management account
back in 1978. This combined traditionally separate banking products
such as line of credit, cheque, investment and equity accounts into a
single monthly statement, with idle funds being swept automatically
into a high-interest-bearing account. The new accounts attracted
US$1 billion of assets in the ﬁrst year. Merrill Lynch set out to
change the shape of the ﬁnancial marketplace permanently by
taking several existing but separate services and tying them
together through information technology to create a new service
that shattered the traditional boundaries between the banking and
securities industries.
American Hospital Supply
American Hospital Supply competed in the wholesale health-care
industry in the 1970s and 1980s. To gain an important edge over
its rivals, AHS pioneered an order entry distribution system that
linked most of the ﬁrm’s customers to its computers. AHS-owned
terminals were placed directly in the purchasing departments of
hospitals, giving them an early mover advantage—hospitals didn’t
wish to have multiple terminals from diﬀerent vendors cluttering up
their oﬃces. In addition to ordering merchandise, the system allows
customers to control their inventories by having direct access to
AHS’s stock records, increasing the likelihood of their coming to
rely upon AHS as a key supplier. The fact that the company’s
initial move to electronic ordering was spearheaded by a regional
manager seeking to meet the needs of a single customer suggests that
starting small may be the key to success.
American Airlines
American Airlines gained a lead over the competition as the ﬁrst US
carrier to oﬀer an online reservation system to travel agents. This
system, Sabre, captured 10,000 of the 24,000 travel agents in the
USA. Sabre listed the ﬂight schedules of over 400 airlines, but,
when launched, it gave American a crucial edge by displaying its
own ﬂights ﬁrst. So eﬀective was this tactic that other US carriers
persuaded the Government to intervene. American still beneﬁted,
however, by charging for every booking made, bringing in signiﬁcant
revenue. In fact, Sabre was more proﬁtable than the airline itself.
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Otis Elevators
In the 1980s, Otis Elevators, the US manufacturer of elevators,
identiﬁed ‘customer services’ as being a key element of its
customer strategy. It decided that one of the aspects of its service
that would give its customers most satisfaction was a prompt lift
repair service. So, it built an automated system, called Otisline, to
dispatch repairmen. Where something started to go wrong with Otis’
lifts, they (the lifts!) automatically called in their complaint to a
computer—without human intervention. Otis’ rivals suddenly had
to compete on quality of service as well as the price and quality of
lifts themselves.
Schneider National Inc.
Schneider National Inc. is a large truckload carrier based in the
USA. 1980 saw the advent of deregulation in this traditional
industry and Schneider recognized, earlier than most, the strategic
potential of IT. Over the years, the company has developed many
applications in order to stay ahead of the competition. The company
moved from freight modelling applications, to EDI, to satellite tech-
nology with onboard terminals, to incorporating these satellite data
into customer communications and load scheduling processes. While
each application of technology gave them a signiﬁcant advantage in
the marketplace, their competitors soon developed similar applica-
tions and it quickly became standard for the industry. Yet, while the
competition was looking to imitate Schneider, they had already
moved on to develop a new strategic application. In essence, the
competition was continually playing catch-up. Schneider continues
to apply its IT capability as it moves into logistics outsourcing.
While logistics is an entirely diﬀerent business from trucking, it
similarly depends on fast, cost-eﬀective, strategic implementations
of IT. Schneider is not successful because of any particular
leading-edge technology, which is also available to its competitors,
but because it has developed a capability for applying IT to ever-
changing business opportunities.
Amazon.com
Amazon.com is an Internet venture that was launched in July 1995,
and has probably become the most famous site in cyberspace. It
initially started out with a mission to use the Internet to transform
book buying into the fastest, easiest and most enjoyable experience
possible. Jeﬀ Bezos, its founder, selected book retailing as it was a
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fragmented industry, with the two biggest booksellers at the time
accounting for less than 12% of total books sales. Unlike traditional
bookstores, there are no bookshelves to browse at Amazon.com.
From the website, customers can search for a speciﬁc book, topic
or author, or they can browse their way through the book catalogue.
Visitors can also read book reviews from other customers, the New
York Times and other newspapers and magazines. Customers can
browse and then complete the sale by entering their credit card
information—in the early days, customers placed their orders
online and then phoned in their credit card information. Orders
are processed immediately and books in stock, generally best-
sellers, are shipped the same day. Customers are contacted by
email when their order has been dispatched. Orders for non-best-
sellers are immediately placed with the appropriate book publisher
by Amazom.com. All contact with the company is done either
through their World Wide Web site or by email.
Over the years, the company has also expanded into other areas
and now sells CDs, consumer electronics, toys and games, and tools
and hardware. It has also branched out into electronic auctions. The
company has also pioneered technologies such as customer proﬁling
and ‘1-click’ shopping. The proﬁling technology has enabled
Amazon to recommend books based on previous purchasing
history and what other customers who have bought similar books
are also reading. In selling CDs, it permits shoppers to listen to
excerpts. Even today, the company strives to maintain their
founding commitment to customer satisfaction and the delivery of
an educational and inspiring shopping experience.
Bootsphoto.com
Boots the Chemist have developed a website Bootsphoto.com to
extend the company’s existing photo-developing business. The site
oﬀers customers the option to have photographs digitized, uploaded
and stored on the Bootsphoto.com website. Users can order reprints
or enlargements online and create web-based photo albums. By
sharing passwords, friends and family can independently view and
buy the same photos. While uploading and storage is free, prints are
charged for. Boots argue that putting the service online widens the
potential number of customers for prints—already a high-margin
business.
‘Once people have created their online albums, they are not going
to want to move them. It’s like setting up a bank account and that’s
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an incredible asset for customer loyalty,’ say Phil Douty, head of
Bootsphoto.com. Although customers can order and pay for prints
online, they will also be able to drop oﬀ and collect ﬁlms at any
store.
LeatherXchange.com
The worldwide leather industry is highly dispersed, ranging from
slaughterhouses and tanneries of developing countries to the manu-
facturers of luxury leather goods in France and Italy. It is also highly
fragmented, with thousands of agents and traders. The biggest
company has less than 1% of the market. The absence of common
standards in the industry means that the quality of skins and hides
varies a great deal. Up to 40% of international consignments are
often turned back by dissatisﬁed buyers, while tanneries are obliged
to carry large inventories to make up for the uneven quality of supply.
LeatherXchange.com was established as an online leather
exchange to capitalize on the opportunities that the state of this
industry oﬀered for an Internet exchange. Hundreds of suppliers
are posting their prices and products on the website. Users pay an
annual membership fee, plus fees based on their online transactions
and use of LeatherXchange’s search engines. The site has also devel-
oped standards that are now posted on the site to help buyers and
suppliers in their negotiations, as are industry contracts to govern
agreement between buyers and sellers. The exchange is also planning
to launch an inspection service that will provide quality certiﬁcates
for suppliers.
Ryanair
Ryanair is one of the world’s most successful ‘low fares’ airlines. To
support this strategy, the company has looked to the Internet to
provide a low-cost distribution channel for its seats. Its online
booking facility was launched in 1999, migrating customers away
from the more expensive travel agent and call-centre channels.
Customers can now search for ﬂights online and book them with a
credit or debit card. As a ticketless airline, the customers are
supplied with a reference number which is given to staﬀ at check-
in. Over 90% of ticket sales are now taken on the website, which is
also available in a number of languages including French, German,
Swedish and Norwegian. In addition, the site also sells travel insur-
ance, car hire and hotel accommodation. Competitors such as
easyJet and Go! have similarly attempted to migrate customers to
the Internet.
terminal through which he could place emergency orders. These applica-
tions require a strong drive from the sharp-end line management. Also,
they are not entirely in the organization’s power to control—since
suppliers, customers and competitors may take the initiative at any
stage—and obviously any such system will require the cooperation of
trading partners. e-Procurement and web-based ordering systems have
enabled new, but low-cost linkages with customers and suppliers, some
systems even permitting customers to track online the progress of orders.
Improved Integration of Internal Processes
To produce eﬀective internal integration of information requires the or-
ganization to overcome some of the traditional barriers to successful IS/
IT application in the DP/MIS eras: sharing information, reorganization
of roles, etc. For instance, telemarketing, for routine selling, can
dramatically reduce the cost of generating orders. But, imagine the
reaction of a good customer to a telephone call suggesting a reorder
when he has just received a ﬁnal-demand letter from the Accounts
Department for payments for goods he did not receive to use on a
machine that is idle due to a service engineer calling without the right
parts! All of the relevant information about the customer and the orga-
nization’s ability to deliver is required at the point of selling to make it
eﬀective. This is what organizations are seeking to achieve with the
implementation of customer relationship management systems (CRM).
Enterprise resource planning (ERP) are conﬁgurable information
systems packages that integrate information and information-based pro-
cesses within and across functional areas in an organization.
Senior management need to understand the organizational implica-
tions of this new information-based approach to the roles of people
and departments, since reorganization will probably be required if sig-
niﬁcant beneﬁts are to be obtained and any relative advantages sustained.
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ATC Bologna
HELLOBUS is the Short Message Service (SMS) created by Omnitel
Vodafone in collaboration with ATC, Bologna’s public transport
company. Travellers can ﬁnd out the exact time the bus they are
waiting for will arrive at any of ATC’s 1,300 stops, 24 hours a
day. All they have to do is send an SMS with the number of the
stop and the chosen line. In a few seconds, the reply arrives on their
mobile phone indicating the bus’s actual time of arrival.
Information-based Products and Services
The classic example of enhancing the product/service, based on informa-
tion, is the Merrill Lynch Cash Management Account, a consumer
service that combines cheque, credit, savings and investment facilities.
Unlike many of the examples, this concept resulted from strategic
planning in the corporate planning department, where it was realized
that a whole range of ﬁnancial services were converging. Merrill Lynch
realized that providing an information service to customers about what
are information-based products could be very lucrative. More recently,
online banking has incorporated a similar logic.
To achieve advantages in this type of application requires a thorough
knowledge of the products of the industry, their relative merits and, in
particular, what the customer uses them for and how the customer
obtains value from them. Obviously, an understanding of the organiza-
tion’s own products and services and the economics of providing them is
also required.
The ventures into ‘direct’ selling and servicing of ﬁnancial-service cus-
tomers from call centres, pioneered by First Direct and Direct Line, were
initially examples of Category 2 above (i.e. improved delivery based on
internal integration of processes and systems). The products were essen-
tially the same as those of competitors, but they were delivered directly to
consumers via the telephone rather than via agents or branches.
However, they could perhaps be considered as new types of product
based on the quality of service provided and the focus on the set of
banking and insurance needs of individuals. They clearly have made a
signiﬁcant impact on the market, given the development of similar
product/service oﬀerings by more traditional organizations such as the
Halifax and Canada Life.
In using the Internet, many organizations have looked to add more
value to the tangible products they sell by providing additional
‘information-based’ services. These can include online support, order
tracking, order history, etc. Many of these initiatives focus on deepening
the relationship with customers and suppliers. Others have moved their
trading platform either partially or entirely onto the Internet (e.g. the
auction house Christies and the Aalsmeer Flower Auction, mentioned
earlier). Using e-procurement, RS Components permits its customers
to ‘empower’ their employees to make purchases from RS’s website
of non-core, low value (less than c¼ 300) items, with RS managing the
total process, including establishing purchasing controls. These purchas-
ing control rules cover speciﬁc pricing, spending limits, baring the
ordering of particular products, cost codes, blanket orders, and order
passwords.
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Executive Information Systems
The ﬁnal type of strategic IS/IT application—to provide executive man-
agement with information to support strategic decisions—is dependent
on other factors for success. For strategic decisions, senior executives
need organized information about markets, customers and non-
customers; about technology in one’s own industry and others; about
worldwide ﬁnance, and the changing world economy. In addition, the
experience of the decision maker is also important. Often, intuition or
‘gut feeling’ plays a large part in some decisions.
Management information systems, historically at least, rarely satisfy
this information requirement and, thus, make little impression on top
management in the organization. There are two main reasons for this:
(i) the lack of external information included in the systems and (ii) the
simplicity of the systems, the rawness of the data, the lack of context (i.e.
they require knowledge, not just information).
Recent developments in external business databases, which are readily
tapped into using the Internet, plus the potential oﬀered by knowledge-
based (or expert-type) systems and scenario planning systems to process
and explore options based on information and experience, have made this
use of IS/IT more practicable. To date, this type of application provides
the smallest number of examples.
Figure 1.4 summarizes the diﬀerent views of strategic information
systems, their context and focus. The dimensions of Figure 1.4 show
the changing role of IS/IT—eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness of existing activ-
ities (i.e. improving how things are done, changing what the business does
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Purpose
Operational Management Business advantage
efficiency effectiveness through change
Focus
Internal 1. Data processing 2. Management 3. Internal business
automation of Information integration by
business tasks Systems (and process, job and
and processes ‘Executive and organization
Information redesign
Systems’)
External 4. Electronic links 5. Sharing information 6. External business
between organizations by direct access integration, changing
automating data fromone company the roles of the
exchanges to another’s information firms in the
resources industry
Figure 1.4 The information systems management environment
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or how the organization functions)—and the changing focus of invest-
ment, from internal to external. In the Figure, electronic data interchange
(EDI) or e-commerce, at its basic level of automating existing business
transactions, is not considered strategic since it merely improves the
eﬃciency of transaction handling. Also, executive information systems
(EIS) have been included under MIS since the majority are ‘higher-level’
versions of MIS; only a few ﬁt the ‘strategic’ description given above. The
other three components of the matrix reﬂect similar ‘transformations’ as
described by Venkatraman and others.
SUCCESS FACTORS IN STRATEGIC INFORMATION SYSTEMS
A second aspect of the analyses of our research base identiﬁes some of the
key factors that seem to recur frequently and underpin success. Few
strategic information systems show all of the factors, but many show a
number. Again, these factors are often at odds with traditional IS/IT
approaches and show more commonality with business innovation.
1. External, not internal, focus: looking at customers, competitors, sup-
pliers, even other industries and the business’s relationships and
similarities with the outside business world. Traditionally IS/IT
was focused on internal processes and issues. Toshiba is using
wireless technology for remote monitoring of photocopiers, so that
technicians can be dispatched as soon as there are signs of a problem.
This reduces servicing costs and, since machines are out of action less
often, increases usage and revenue.
2. Adding value, not cost reduction: although cost reductions may accrue
due to business expansion at reduced marginal costs, ‘doing it better,
not cheaper’ seems to be the maxim. This is consistent with the
requirements of companies to diﬀerentiate themselves from com-
petitors—better products, better services—to succeed. Historically,
IS/IT was seen as a way of increasing eﬃciency—doing it
cheaper—and, while this is obviously important in any business
environment, it is not the only way to succeed. At Svenska Cellulosa
Aktiebolaget, a Swedish pulp and paper company, foremen use a
wireless system to send instructions to loggers in the ﬁeld, specifying
which trees to cut and in what order. This enables the company to
coordinate harvesting decisions with inventory and transport re-
quirements and match those decisions to market needs.
3. Sharing the beneﬁts: within the organization, with suppliers, cus-
tomers, consumers and even competitors on occasion! In many
cases in the past, systems beneﬁts have not been shared even within
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an organization, but used instead to give departments or functions
leverage over each other. This reduces the beneﬁts and does not allow
them to be sustained. Sharing beneﬁts implies a ‘buy in’, a commit-
ment to success, a switching cost. Almost all of the examples involve
sharing the beneﬁts, with suppliers, customers, consumers and com-
petitors, to provide barriers of entry to the industry. For instance, the
introduction of debit cards to replace cheque books depended for its
success on banks sharing some of the reduced processing costs with
the retailers and consumers, since the beneﬁts that the bank could
gain depended on the commitment of retailers and consumers. Some
would argue that this was achieved by increasing the cost of the
alternative (i.e. cheques!).
4. Understanding customers and what they do with the product or
service: how they obtain value from it, and the problems they may
encounter in gaining that value. In the 1980s, McKesson, the
pharmaceutical wholesaler, followed this principle very closely in
providing a range of information-based services to drugstores,
starting from a simple problem of stock control, solved by delivering
products in shelf-sized batches. Black and Decker, a low-cost
producer, supplied a value-added service to retailers to enable them
to ‘swap’ goods they had over or understocked for the season. They
did not want returns, but the retailer could not be expected to predict
precisely how many lawnmowers, for instance, would be sold. It
helped to solve a customer’s problem. Federal Express has built on
its original customer-service system, which tracks every movement of
every package, and extended access direct to customers.
5. Business-driven innovation, not technology-driven: the pressures of the
marketplace drove developments in most cases. This tends to cast
doubt on the idea of competitive advantage from IT, but, in practice,
it means that new or existing IT provides or enables a business
opportunity or idea to be converted into reality. The lead or the
driving force is from the business, not necessarily a traditional
route to using IS/IT, which has often been driven by technology,
pushed by the IT suppliers and professionals, not pulled through
by the users. It is only relatively recently that the latest technology
has become of interest to business managers. But the business issue
does not change: why take two risks at the same time—that is, a new
business process based on new technology? It is a recipe for failure!
Keen56 summed it up well by saying, ‘Major failures in using IT are
often based on much better technology and bad business vision.
Successes come from good enough technology and a clear under-
standing of the customer.’ An early prediction of the demise of
many dot.com ventures?
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6. Incremental development, not the total application vision turned into
reality. Many examples show a stepped approach—doing one thing
and building on and extending the success by a further development.
To some extent, this is developing applications by experimentation
but also not stopping when a success is achieved but considering
what could be done next. This, again, is against the traditional
notion of clarifying all requirements, deﬁning all boundaries and
agreeing the total deliverables of the system before embarking on
the expensive, structured process of design and construction,
freezing the requirements at each stage. Prototyping of systems ob-
viously has a key role to play here.
7. Using the information gained from the systems to develop the
business. Many mail order and retailing ﬁrms have segmented their
customers according to the purchasing patterns shown by transac-
tions and then providing diﬀerent, focused catalogues or special
oﬀers. Product and market analyses plus external market research
information can be merged and then recut in any number of ways to
identify more appropriate marketing segmentation and product mix.
This aspect has been exploited particularly well by the ‘direct’
insurers, who are able to target the lower risk, more proﬁtable cus-
tomers very accurately. Through using the information gleaned from
customer transactions, the Britannia Building Society in the UK has
developed a sophisticated segmentation strategy based on creating
customer propensity models, which have helped the Society increase
the average number of products per customer from 1.3 to over 2.0.57
Before Safeway introduced its loyalty card scheme, they knew
virtually nothing about customers. They didn’t know who they
were, what they bought or even if they were the same customers
who shopped at the store the previous week. By introducing a
loyalty card scheme, it persuaded customers to tell them what they
bought, and yielded signiﬁcant information such as: most customers
aren’t proﬁtable; average shopping range is 250 lines; women are
50% impulsive, men 90%; customers shop for concepts not commod-
ities (e.g. Sunday lunch, kids treat, Italian meal); Feta cheese is the
298th most popular cheese on units sold, but leaps to 25th in terms of
basket size.58
As discussed above, these factors, in general, imply diﬀerent attitudes to
the use of IS/IT than have prevailed in the past, implying that we need new
ways of thinking about IS/IT techniques to uncover such opportunities,
and then new approaches tomanaging these applications to ensure success.
Another general observation can be made from these examples, by
considering what actually produces the success—information technology,
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information systems or information. Technology itself is the ‘enabler’,
which provides short-term advantage and the opportunity to develop new
systems and to capture and use potentially valuable information. But,
normally, competitors will be able to purchase the same technology, and
any advantages could soon be negated. However, the new information
systems that developed, utilizing the technology, could provide advan-
tages that may be less vulnerable to erosion by competitive copying. The
potential gain will depend on how conclusively and exclusively the
systems alter business processes and relationships.
In time, however, the existing competition or new entrants enticed into
the proﬁtable parts of industry could redeﬁne the relationships by intro-
ducing alternative information systems. If the ﬁrm wishes to sustain its
competitive advantage, it must use the information gleaned from its
systems to improve its products or services—to match the requirements
of the marketplace or inﬂuence its development.
THE MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS
By viewing IS/IT evolution another way, we can portray the management
implications ascending from the basement of the business to the
penthouse executive suite, from where strategic vision is possible and,
more importantly, IS/IT can be incorporated into senior management’s
‘theory of the business’.59 Figure 1.5 attempts to summarize the changing
focus.
The focus of data processing was, and still is, on the eﬀective applica-
tion of systems and technology to automating operations and thereby
increasing eﬃciency. The planning focus is therefore on the business tasks
involved in the project—the application and its successful design and
implementation. The main prerequisite for success is a design for the
system that carries out the operation to improve eﬃciency.
Management information systems involved user management in con-
sidering the information they used and how they used it. The IS profes-
sionals had to ﬁnd new techniques of information analysis (such as data
modelling and entity analysis) to devise ways of organizing and delivering
information for eﬀective use by management. Since managers rarely rely
on a single source for information, the focus of planning has moved to
the integration of individual systems into coherent sources of manage-
ment information.
Before the SIS era, the view of IS/IT in the business was an internal
resource, over which management had total discretion as to its use. The
portfolio models mentioned earlier described the overall structure and
logic of the process of IS/IT application to the business. It was very
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much an internally-driven choice as to whether, and how much, to invest
in IS/IT. IS/IT strategic management in the SIS era is diﬀerent for two
main reasons. First, the outside world (i.e. competitors, customers and
suppliers) may be the instigators of IS/IT uses that aﬀect the organiza-
tion’s own need for new types of applications—external as much as
internal factors drive the needs. Second, executive management have to
make judgements about such investments in terms of how they will aﬀect
the business strategy of the organization and, in some cases, how IS/IT
can be used to shape that strategy. Management need some way of assess-
ing the importance of IS/IT in business terms, and the opportunities need
to be elicited via business-based techniques to enable that management
judgement to be applied. These two needs have been grouped together
under the terms competitive impact analysis—ways of understanding the
potential of IS/IT from a business strategic perspective—and strategic
alignment of investment in IS/IT with the overall objectives and direction
of the organization.
In summary, the contribution and performance of IS/IT in the
business has become more signiﬁcant, hence the level of management
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Figure 1.5 The relationship between the business, SIS, MIS and DP
involvement required has been elevated to executive level—no longer is
their task to sign the cheque; they now have to understand and often
decide what is being purchased. However, a note of caution is needed to
avoid overstating the importance of IS/IT. As early as 1987, King60
expressed concern that he saw ‘evidence that the competitive advantage
argument is beginning to be used excessively—primarily to rationalise
projects that cannot otherwise be justiﬁed.’ This causes the idea to lose
management credibility. He noted that we must manage IS/IT and its
various applications in accord with the type of contribution it is
making—improving eﬃciency, eﬀectiveness and/or competitiveness
through business change—not elevate all aspects to a new and artiﬁcial
plane of importance. But, of course, an organization cannot aﬀord to
ignore the strategic opportunities that IS/IT may oﬀer, and, therefore,
‘the potential of information as a strategic resource should be incorpo-
rated as a routine element of the business planning process, so that all
managers become used to thinking in these new terms.’
Earl61 supports the argument that focusing on the technology itself
does not lead to its successful strategic application. He suggests that
the most eﬀective route to achieving strategic beneﬁt from IS/IT is to
‘concentrate on rethinking business by analysing current business
problems and environmental change—and considering IT as just one
ingredient of the solution.’ He called for the distinction to be made
between IS strategy and IT strategy.62 This he did as he found that
most of the IT strategies, at that time, were strong on technology
issues and technical terminology and weak on identifying application
needs and business thinking. He suggested that IS strategy be concerned
with the organization’s required information systems or application set,
in essence addressing the ‘what’ question; and the IT strategy be con-
cerned with the technology, infrastructure and associated specialist skills,
or the ‘how’ question. This relationship is depicted in Figure 1.6.
What can be concluded is that we should treat IS/IT like any other part
of the business, which—like marketing, production or purchasing, for
example—must be carried out eﬃciently and eﬀectively for the business
to survive but which can also provide competitive/strategic leverage for
the organization if it is managed astutely. This implies an approach to
developing strategies for information systems and technology that are
derived from and integrated with other components of the strategy of
the business.
If the organization were developing the marketing part of its business
strategy, then it would ﬁrst analyse its position in the marketplace (i.e.
have a marketing input to the process). After evaluating marketing re-
quirements and options in conjunction with other needs, opportunities
and constraints, a marketing strategy would result that would be aimed at
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achieving the appropriate eﬀects in the marketplace. That is all the
diagram shows—that we should do the same with IS/IT: identify the
potential impact ﬁrst, then evaluate what information and systems are
needed to enable delivery of the strategy and, then, determine how best to
achieve those information systems via the technology.
However, an additional complexity is the fact that information
permeates all organizational activity and is used by all organizational
employees—from senior management to front-line staﬀ to back-room
operatives—in the performance of their job. For example, although mar-
keting and production are business functions, they both demand the
processing of information from internal activity as well as from cus-
tomers, suppliers, regulatory authorities, ﬁnancial institutions, etc. In
addition, the internal information network binds the organization
together. Whereas organizations tend to plan other resources, little
eﬀort is generally devoted to planning the type of information needed,
when used, where it is to be collected and stored, how it will be used or
who is responsible for it.
This model is perhaps too simple to deal with complex businesses in
rapidly-changing environments and, in later chapters, it will be reﬁned
and further developed, but it serves as a good starting point to clarify key
relationships and issues.
An Applications Portfolio for the ‘Combined Era’
The applications in the overall DP, MIS and SIS portfolio need to be
planned and managed according to their existing and future contribution
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Figure 1.6 The relationship between business, IS and IT strategies
to the business. Traditional portfolio models considered the relationship
of systems to each other and the tasks being performed, rather than the
relationship with business success. A portfolio model for the combined
era can be derived from a matrix concept developed by McFarlan,63
which considered the contribution of IS/IT to the business now and in
the future, based on its industry impact. This variation on the matrix is
represented in Figure 1.7.
The model proposes an analysis of all existing, planned and potential
applications into four categories based on an assessment of the current
and future business importance of applications. An application can be
deﬁned as strategic, high potential, key operational or support, depend-
ing on its current or expected contribution to business success.
The original McFarlan Strategic Grid was devised as a way of plotting
the overall expected contribution of IS/IT to the business success. This is
of limited value, since every enterprise is likely to have some strategic,
some key operational, some support and some high-potential applica-
tions. Over time, the contents of the portfolio will change, and, for any
organization, the contents of segments of the portfolio will be inﬂuenced
by a variety of internal and external factors, as described later. The
usefulness of this derivative matrix is borne out by the ease with which
management is willing to and can categorize applications according to
their perceived business contribution and potential. The limitations of the
original Strategic Grid are also described by the research of Hirschheim
et al.,64 who found, when surveying the views of IS management, that ‘it
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Figure 1.7 Applications portfolio
was an unhelpful way of categorising (the whole) IS function since vir-
tually every company had systems in all four categories.’
This derivative model has, however, proved eﬀective in providing a
framework by which agreement on the portfolio of business applications
available and required can be reached from the often divergent views of
senior management, functional line managers and the IS/IT profes-
sionals. Once that agreement has been reached, the organization can
move forward along mutually agreed paths toward delivery of the
required portfolio. It is a simple concept, which enables consensus to
be achieved both as a strategy is developed and later, as the business
and its requirements evolve.
The four quadrants categorize information systems based on their
business contribution. While this portfolio will be discussed in detail
later in the book, brieﬂy these application categories are:
. Strategic applications that are critical to future business success.
They create or support change in how the organization conducts
its business, with the aim of providing competitive advantage. Note
that whether the technology used is ‘leading edge’ does not indicate
that the application is strategic—assessment must be based on
business contribution.
. Key operational applications that sustain the existing business opera-
tions, helping to avoid any disadvantage. It can be argued that, in
many industries, substantial numbers of applications (e.g. EPOS
[electronic point of sale], ATMs [automated teller machines] and
ERP) have become so pervasive that they have become ‘mandatory’
for survival in the industry.
. Support applications which improve business eﬃciency and manage-
ment eﬀectiveness but, in themselves, do not sustain the business or
provide any competitive advantage.
. High potential innovative applications which may create opportu-
nities to gain a future advantage, but are as yet unproven.
The portfolio, as described here, shows some obvious similarities to other
portfolio matrices used in other management disciplines, such as the
Boston Consulting Group’s ‘Boston Matrix’ for product portfolios.
Those similarities, concerning balancing the portfolio, life cycles, man-
agement approaches, etc., will be examined in detail in Chapter 7, when
the value of the matrix in IS/IT strategic management is explored. At this
stage, it is suﬃcient to point out that the four segments will require quite
diﬀerent strategies to achieve successful planning, development, imple-
mentation and operation of the applications—because they fulﬁl diﬀerent
roles in the business.
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WHAT IS AN IS/IT STRATEGY?
We have alluded to the concept of an IS/IT strategy, without actually
deﬁning exactly what is meant by the concept. Figure 1.6 provided a
glimpse of its fundamental components. Essentially, an IS/IT strategy
is composed of two parts: an IS component and an IT component. The
IS strategy deﬁnes the organization’s requirement or ‘demand’ for infor-
mation and systems to support the overall strategy of the business. It is
ﬁrmly grounded in the business, taking into consideration both the com-
petitive impact and alignment requirements of IS/IT. Essentially, it
deﬁnes and prioritizes the investments required to achieve the ‘ideal’
applications portfolio, the nature of the beneﬁts expected and the
changes required to deliver those beneﬁts, within the constraints of re-
sources and systems interdependencies. The speciﬁc components of an IS
strategy are addressed in Chapter 3. The focus of this book is on pre-
senting an approach for the development of an IS strategy.
The IT strategy is concerned with outlining the vision of how the
organization’s demand for information and systems will be supported
by technology—essentially, it is concerned with ‘IT supply’. It addresses
the provision of IT capabilities and resources (including hardware,
software and telecommunications) and services such as IT operations,
systems development and user support.
Throughout this book, we will often use the term IS demand to refer to
the IS strategy. Similarly, when we use the term IT supply, we are refer-
ring to the IT strategy.
Strategic Alignment
There is a diﬀerence between having an IS/IT strategy and having an IS/
IT strategy that is making a contribution to the creation of business
value. In the late 1980s, a number of models were developed to assess
the extent of alignment of business strategies and IS/IT strategies.
While the concept of strategic alignment has been in use for many
years, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Management in
the 1990s research project attached a particular meaning to the concept in
the context of IS/IT management.65 Their interpretation is based on the
premise that the inability of organizations to realize value from IS/IT
investments is, in part, due to lack of alignment between business and IS/
IT strategies. They developed a model that represented the dynamic
alignment between the business strategic context and the IT strategic
context. This model is based on the building blocks of strategic integra-
tion and functional integration. Henderson and Venkatraman66 argue
that the alignment perspective should—at minimum—involve four
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domains of strategic choice: business strategy, organizational infrastruc-
ture and processes, IT strategy and IT infrastructure and processes (see
Figure 1.8). Each domain has its own underlying dimensions. Box 1.3
presents the 12 components of alignment. The strategic alignment model
(SAM) assesses the range of strategic choices facing managers and
explores how they interrelate.
In an empirical study that explored business and IS/IT strategic
alignment in the Australian banking industry, Broadbent and Weill67
reported that central to alignment is the nature of the ﬁrm-wide
strategy formulation processes of the banks. They noted that a key
factor for the banks in developing a realized IS/IT strategy, consistent
with business needs, is a ﬂexible and issue-oriented strategy formulation
process, with concurrent processes taking place at diﬀerent organiza-
tional levels. In addition, their data indicated that those banks with the
most eﬀective management of IS/IT occurred when those resources were
managed by those closest to business needs.
Another conclusion from the application of the alignment model is
that management should not simply seek to identify and adopt the best
available technologies to restructure the organization or streamline the
business processes, without due consideration of the two relevant align-
ments that have IS/IT strategy as the driver: competitive potential and
service level.68 The former identiﬁes the potential impact of IS/IT on
business strategy with consequent implications for organizational infra-
structure. The latter seeks to provide the best possible supply of IT
resources—the IT strategy.
Luftman69 has developed a Strategic Alignment Maturity Assess-
ment instrument to assess the maturity of an organization’s strategic
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Figure 1.8 The strategic alignment model
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Box 1.3 The 12 components of alignment (source: J. Luftman,
‘Assessing business-IT alignment maturity’, Communications of
AIS, Vol. 4, reproduced with permission)
I. Business strategy
1. Business scope. Includes the markets, products, services, groups
of customers/clients and locations where an enterprise competes
as well as the competitors and potential competitors that aﬀect
the business environment.
2. Distinctive competencies. The critical success factors and core
competencies that provide a ﬁrm with a potential competitive
edge. This includes brand, research, manufacturing and product
development, cost and pricing structure, and sales and distribu-
tion channels.
3. Business governance. How companies set the relationship
between management, stockholders and the board of directors.
Also included are how the company is aﬀected by government
regulations, and how the ﬁrm manages its relationships and
alliances with strategic partners.
II. Organizational infrastructure and processes
1. Administrative structure. The way the ﬁrm organizes its busi-
nesses. Examples include centralization, decentralization,
matrix, horizontal, vertical, geographic, federal and functional.
2. Processes. How the ﬁrm’s business activities (the work per-
formed by employees) operate or ﬂow. Major issues include
value-added activities and process improvement.
3. Skills. HR considerations such as how to hire/ﬁre, motivate,
train/educate and culture.
III. IT strategy
1. Technology scope. The important information applications and
technologies.
2. Systemic competencies. Those capabilities (e.g. access to infor-
mation that is important to the creation/achievement of a com-
pany’s strategies) that distinguishes the IT services.
3. IT governance. How the authority for resources, risk, conﬂict
resolution and responsibility for IT is shared among business
partners, IT management and service providers. Project selec-
tion and prioritization issues are included here.
alignment. He rates maturity along ﬁve levels, beginning with an ad hoc
process rising to Level 5 where there is an optimized alignment process.
He notes that achieving alignment is evolutionary and dynamic, requiring
strong support from senior management, good working relationships,
strong leadership, appropriate prioritization, trust and eﬀective commu-
nication, as well as a thorough understanding of the business and tech-
nical environments. These aspects will be addressed throughout this
book.
Why Have an IS/IT Strategy?
We have been making a strong argument for organizations to have an IS/
IT strategy. Although we shall explore in depth how an organization can
go about developing this strategy, it is worth highlighting that there is a
considerable amount of research and practical evidence illustrating that
the consequences of not having an IS/IT strategy are severe. These
implications include:
. Systems investments are made that do not support business objec-
tives.
. Loss of control of IS/IT, leading to individuals often striving to
achieve incompatible objectives through IS/IT.
. Systems are not integrated. This can also lead to duplication of eﬀort
and data leading to inaccuracy and no coherent information
resource.
. No means of setting priorities for IS projects/resources and con-
stantly changing plans leading to lower productivity, etc.
. No mechanisms for deciding optimum resource levels or the best
means of supplying systems.
. Poor management information; it is either not available, inconsistent,
inaccurate or too slow.
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IV. IS infrastructure and processes
1. Architecture. The technology priorities, policies and choices that
allow applications, software, network, hardware and data man-
agement to be integrated into a cohesive platform.
2. Processes. Those practices and activities carried out to develop
and maintain applications and manage IT infrastructure.
3. Skills. IT human-resource considerations such as how to hire/
ﬁre, motivate, train/educate and culture.
. Misunderstanding between users and IT specialists leading to conﬂict
and dissatisfaction.
. Technology strategy is incoherent and constrains options.
. Inadequate infrastructure investments made.
. All projects evaluated on ﬁnancial basis only.
. Problems caused by IS/IT investments can become a source of
conﬂict between parts of the organization.
. Localized justiﬁcation of investments can produce beneﬁts that are
actually counterproductive in the overall business context.
. Systems, on average, have a shorter than expected business life and
require, overall, considerably greater IS/IT spending to redevelop
more frequently than should be necessary.
THE CONTEXT FOR IS/IT STRATEGY
Before embarking on developing an IS strategy, it is important to under-
stand the context within which this strategy is being developed. This
context is likely to be diﬀerent in diﬀerent organizations. In this
section, two perspectives are presented. The ﬁrst is largely an internal
perspective focusing on the role of IS/IT in the organization. The
second is an external perspective exploring the overall dynamics of IS/IT.
The Internal Context
Sullivan70 has suggested a simple matrix to explain how the IS/IT strat-
egic environment is being aﬀected by forces outside the control of any
individual organization. He describes two axes within which an organ-
ization can consider the implications of these forces:
. infusion—the degree to which an organization becomes dependent on
IS/IT to carry out its core operations and manage the business;
. diﬀusion—the degree to which IT has become dispersed throughout
the organization and decisions concerning its use are devolved.
These axes not only reﬂect the increasingly strategic nature of IS/IT but
also the changing economics of the technology and the ability to use it
without the need for highly-skilled technical staﬀ. Sullivan’s framework is
shown in Figure 1.9. By plotting high and low degrees of infusion and
diﬀusion, four essentially diﬀerent environments are established. Consid-
ering each one in turn:
. Low diﬀusion/low infusion—highly-centralized control of IT re-
sources, and IS is not critical to the business. This, Sullivan describes
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as a ‘traditional’ environment typical of companies using IT solely to
improve eﬃciency on a system-by-system basis.
. Low diﬀusion/high infusion—highly-centralized control, and IS is
critical to business operations and control. The business could be
seriously disadvantaged if systems fail. Therefore, high-quality
systems are needed with, normally, a high degree of integration.
The systems have become part of the ‘backbone’ of the organization,
in Sullivan’s terms.
. High diﬀusion/low infusion—largely-decentralized control, giving
business managers the ability to satisfy their local priorities. Any
integration of systems occurs due to user–user cooperation (a ‘fed-
eration’ of interests), not by overall business or IT design. The
management approach is essentially ‘opportunistic’, driven by
short-term priorities that may create business advantage in some
areas.
. High diﬀusion/high infusion—largely-decentralized control but the
business depends on the systems for success, both in avoiding dis-
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Figure 1.9 Environments of IS/IT strategy
advantage and in achieving its overall business objectives. Sullivan
describes this as a ‘complex’ environment that is diﬃcult to manage.
Too much central control to avoid poor investments will limit in-
novation, hence new strategic opportunities may be missed; too little
control and the core systems may disintegrate.
As organizations evolved through the DP and MIS eras, they tended to
move from the low–low quadrant into one or other of the high–low
quadrants. This often depended on the timing of their particular evolu-
tion and the availability of centralized (mainframe) or decentralized (dis-
tributed or PC) technology solutions to the DP and MIS needs. The
arrival of the SIS era forced organizations to enter the high–high
quadrant, and, depending on the direction taken in the previous eras,
the changes to be made will be diﬀerent. In both cases, however, senior
business management will need to make some key decisions about IS/IT
in concert, rather than allow local business managers total discretion or
the IT department to control the types of investment.
The overall implications are that, as the organization becomes more
dependent on IS/IT, essentially to avoid being disadvantaged, the more
centralized and structured the approach to planning and control should
become. But, to facilitate the innovative uses of IS/IT to create future
advantages, technology control needs to be close to the business user to
enable appropriate connections between business need and technology
solution to be made. Gaining advantage and avoiding disadvantage
implies both high diﬀusion and high infusion, and, hence, a complex,
balanced set of management approaches (described by Sullivan as
‘eclectic’). Most organizations are facing this situation, and both
internal and external pressures will increase, as indicated in Figure 1.9.
Probably the best interpretation of the word ‘eclectic’ is to say that every
organization needs approaches to IS/IT strategy formulation and
planning tailored to its individual circumstances, as determined by the
industry and business situation and the organization culture.
The External Context
The dynamics of IT and, hence, the consequences for both business and
IS/IT strategy development, are complex. Figure 1.10, however, attempts
to shed light on this complexity and capture these dynamics. The Figure
ﬁrst illustrates the duality of technology in that it not only supports the
strategy of an organization (arrow a—strategic alignment) but can also
deﬁne the business, as strategic moves may not be possible without tech-
nology (arrow b—competitive impact). For example, organizations
such as ebay, eSteel and Covisint all deploy business models that are
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fundamentally deﬁned by technology. Technology also facilitates new
ways of organizing, new process innovations and can enable the
creation of innovative ‘network-based businesses’. The Lotus Develop-
ment Corporation, for example, have a development strategy that
‘follows the sun’, where a virtual team work 24 hours a day on a
project: the day begins in Dublin, eight hours later the work is handed
over to Los Angeles and after a further eight hours the work is moved to
Singapore, eventually returning back to Dublin 24 hours after it ﬁrst
began. This way of organizing work is critically dependent on technol-
ogy.
However, an organization does not exist in isolation (unless it occupies
a monopoly position), but has competitors and is part of a wider industry
system and business environment. Competitors’ moves, including new
entrants, aﬀect the dynamics of an industry and, consequently, the
organization itself and its strategies (arrow c); at the same time, strategic
plays made by the organization eﬀect competitor moves (arrow d).
Technological innovations can have disruptive eﬀects on an industry
(arrow e), rewriting the rules of competition and even challenging tradi-
tional notions of industry structure. For example, many retailers and
utilities have entered the ﬁnancial services industry as they argue that
they know more about the customers of banks than the banks know
about their own customers. Consequently, we may deﬁne an industry
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Figure 1.10 The inﬂuence and impact
not by the Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC) code, as has tradi-
tionally been the case, but by the amount of customer information an
organization has.71
While this dynamic is driven by new technological innovations, it is less
of a technology revolution than a revolution in the economics of informa-
tion and how information is captured, processed, stored, planned and
used in an organization. This point has been eloquently made by Micro-
soft founder Bill Gates who noted, ‘I have a simple but strong belief. The
most meaningful way to diﬀerentiate your company from your com-
petition, the best way to put distance between you and the crowd, is to
do an outstanding job with information. How you gather, manage, and
use information will determine whether you win or lose.’72
It is within this context that management must determine how the
organization can best utilize technology to leverage information disconti-
nuities, asymmetries and imperfections for business advantage.73 For
example, recent research has presented evidence suggesting that the
control, dissemination and manipulation of CRS information by the
owning airlines continued to allow them, despite legislative restrictions,
to capitalize on their investment at the expense of competitors during the
1990s.74
TOWARD A FOURTH ERA:
AN ORGANIZATIONAL IS CAPABILITY
Both the IS research literature pre-1990 and media reports reﬂected a
general optimism concerning IS/IT’s potential for creating advantage.
More recently, there has been interest in exploring the essence of ‘sustain-
ability’ from IS, as few organizations continuously achieve advantage
from their IS/IT investments and the exemplars often quoted tend to
be from diﬀerent organizations. Although organizations may gain some
‘ﬁrst mover advantage’ with an innovative application, it can be quickly
copied and does not produce an advantage that is sustainable,75 particu-
larly when patent protection for IS applications is almost non-existent
and where keeping an IS innovation secret is diﬃcult, especially for
systems used by customers or suppliers. Indeed, there is a strong
argument that the use of standard applications packages such as those
developed by vendors (e.g. SAP, BaaN or JD Edwards), a common
strategy today, can limit an organization’s ability to innovate.76 At the
same time, investments made in technology infrastructure are becoming
increasingly signiﬁcant and inappropriate decisions in this area can
severely aﬀect an organization’s ability to respond swiftly and ﬂexibly
52 Information Systems and Technology in Organizations
to changing market conditions and can, in fact, become a signiﬁcant
competitive liability.77
The strategic management discipline has long sought to elicit the
sources of sustainable competitive advantage78 and there is a signiﬁcant
body of research that has focused on this objective, some of which will be
discussed in the next chapter. Yet, what is often not made obvious when
reading this literature is that a clear distinction between sustainability and
competitive advantage must be drawn. Competitive advantage is an
outcome; sustainability is an ongoing state existing ‘after eﬀorts to
duplicate that advantage have ceased’.79 As an outcome, a particular
competitive advantage may be short-lived, and is increasingly likely to
be so in today’s technological world. When competitive advantage is
enduring,80 it is not that a particular outcome is enduring, but that
there is ‘something’ in the very fabric of the organization contributing
toward creating ongoing and continuous advantage.
Sustainability, from an IS perspective, can be deﬁned as an organiza-
tion’s ability to continually deliver explicit business value through IS/IT,
thus leading to advantage. The challenge that both practitioners and
researchers face today is to understand what contributes toward the
development of this sustainability. Some insights have been provided
by recent research literature. Box 1.4 highlights some relevant extracts
from these studies. Box 1.5 describes how Bankinter, a mid-sized Spanish
Bank, has deployed IS/IT over the years to achieve continuous advantage
through combining innovative business thinking with IT-based opportu-
nities and an ability to deliver new applications and business changes.
In an analysis of some of the early examples of IS/IT and competitive
advantage, Kettinger and colleagues81 concluded that the attainment of
sustained IS/IT-based competitive advantage may be more a process of
building organizational infrastructure in order to enable what they
referred to as ‘innovative action strategies’. More recently, Powell and
Dent-Micallef 82 investigated the linkages between IT and the perform-
ance of ﬁrms in the retail industry, asserting that ‘IT alone is not enough’.
From their study, they concluded that some ﬁrms have gained advantage
by using IT to leverage intangibles, complementary human and business
resources such as organizational ﬂexibility, integrating business-strategy
planning and IS/IT strategy, and supplier relationships.
In a conceptual analysis of IS/IT and competitive advantage, Mata et
al.83 concluded that only IS management skills are likely to be a source of
sustained advantage. They described these skills as the ability of IS
managers to understand and appreciate business needs, their ability to
work with functional managers, their ability to coordinate IS activities in
ways that support other functional managers and their ability to antici-
pate future needs. They suggest that, in the search for IS/IT-based
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Box 1.4 Extracts of ﬁndings from recent research studies on IT and
competitive advantage (listed in chronological order).
. When every leading ﬁrm in an industry has access to the same
technology resource, the management diﬀerence determines
competitive advantage or disadvantage (Keen, 1993).
. The attainment of sustained IT-based competitive advantage
may be more a process of building organisational infrastructure
in order to enable innovative action strategies as opposed to
‘being ﬁrst on the scene’ (Kettinger et al., 1994).
. Successful application of IT are often due more to serendipity
rather than any formal planning (Ciborra, 1994).
. Only IT management skills are likely to be a source of sustain-
able competitive advantage (SCA) (Mata et al., 1995).
. Some ﬁrms have gained advantage by using IT to leverage in-
tangibles, complementary human and business resources, such
as ﬂexible culture, strategic planning–IT integration, and
supplier relationships (Powell and Dent-Micallef, 1997).
. What distinguishes companies deriving signiﬁcant value from
IT is not technical wizardry but the way they handle their IT
activities (Dvorak et al., 1997).
. Companies must do more than excel at investing in and deploy-
ing IT. They must combine those capabilities with excellence in
collecting, organising and maintaining information, and with
getting their people to embrace the right behaviours and
values for working with information (Marchand et al., 2000).
. Results from this study . . . suggest that inconsistent statistical
ﬁndings about the relationship between IT and ﬁrm perform-
ance may be attributed to our incomplete understanding of the
nature of a ﬁrm’s resources and skills and to the fact that IT
investment dollar serves as a poor surrogate for assessing a
ﬁrm’s IT intensiveness. IT-capability is not so much a speciﬁc
set of sophisticated technological functionalities as it is an en-
terprise-wide capability to leverage technology to diﬀerentiate
from competition (Bharadwaj, 2000).
P.G.W. Keen, ‘Information technology and the management diﬀer-
ence: A fusion map’, IBM Systems Journal, Vol. 32, No. 1, 1993,
17–39; W. Kettinger, V. Grover, S. Guha and A.H. Segars, ‘Strategic
information systems revisited: A study in sustainability and perform-
ance’, MIS Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 1, 1994, 31–55; C. Ciborra, ‘The
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grassroots of IT and strategy’, in C. Ciborra and T. Jelessi, eds,
Strategic Information Systems: A European Perspective, John Wiley
& Sons, Chichester, UK 1994, pp. 3–24; F.J. Mata, W.L. Fuerst and
J. Barney, ‘Information technology and sustained competitive ad-
vantage: A resource-based analysis’, MIS Quarterly, Vol. 19, 1995,
487–505; T.C. Powell and A. Dent-Micallef, ‘Information technol-
ogy as competitive advantage: The role of human, business and
technology resources’, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 18, No.
5, 1997, 375–405; R.E. Dvorak, E. Holen, D. Mark and W.F.
Meehan, ‘Six principles of high-performance IT’, The McKinsey
Quarterly, No. 3, 1997, 164–177; D.A. Marchand, W. Kettinger
and J.D. Rollins, ‘Information orientation: People, technology and
bottom line’, Sloan Management Review, Summer, 2000, 69–80; A.
Bharadwaj, ‘A resource-based perspective on information technol-
ogy and ﬁrm performance: An empirical investigation’, MIS
Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 1, 2000, 169–196.
Box 1.5 Evolution of IS/IT leadership at Bankinter
Although the Spanish banking system ranks as one of the most
eﬃcient in the world, Spain is not a technologically-advanced
country; Internet penetration is low and the telecommunication
system still lags behind its European counterparts. Yet, it is in this
environment that Bankinter, a medium-sized bank, has ﬂourished as
one of the best Internet banks in Europe. In 2000, Euromoney
ranked Bankinter, as ‘Best European Internet Bank’. Similarly,
Salomon Smith Barney included Bankinter as one of the leading
Internet banks, ready to take advantages of the opportunities that
the Internet oﬀered.
Bankinter was founded in 1965 as a wholesale bank, a joint
venture between Bank of America and Banco Santander. Supported
by sophisticated information systems and a ﬂexible commercial
approach, it has entered into a series of new businesses, thereby
changing the bank’s business proﬁle throughout the years for
middle-market banking to private banking and ﬁnally to retail
banking. It has been a pioneer in the Spanish banking market in
oﬀering competitive conditions to customers not only in terms of
price but also in terms of speed, quality and ﬂexibility of services.
The bank has one of the most sophisticated customer bases.
It addresses the high end of the retail market by attracting
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ﬁnancially-sophisticated clients wishing to receive a diﬀerent
customer service and a more intelligent product oﬀering.
Bankinter is the most developed example of a multi-channel bank
in Spain, and possibly in Europe, operating through the following
channels:
. branches located in urban areas across Spain;
. virtual branches located in large corporations;
. telephone banking;
. a network of independent agents;
. Internet.
The changing distribution of transactions by channel since 1995 is
clearly visible in the table below:
Bankinter has always maintained a high level of investments in
technology. Nonetheless, in 2000, as a result of its strategic focus
on Internet-enabling the entire bank, Bankinter made signiﬁcant
additional investments in this area (24% of total operating cost).
The objective of this focus was to migrate all banking products
and services to the Internet. According to the Chairman, ‘2000 was
. . . a transition from the traditional banking model to a new multi-
channel structure focused on customer service quality and on the great
opportunities opened by the new technologies to the banking business
. . . an enormous transformation eﬀort at the bank to consolidate . . .
our leadership in Internet banking in Spain and Europe’ (Jaime Botin,
Chairman of the Bank, Chairman’s letter, Annual Report, 2000).
Bankinter’s main competitive strengths are its light and ﬂexible
operating structure, superior information and technology systems,
and proven ability to adapt to changing market conditions by
oﬀering new banking services. It has illustrated how it is possible
to compete with limited resources through innovation, intelligent
marketing and superior customer service.
Bankinter has always invested heavily in technology—10% of
operating costs during the 1990s. These investments, signiﬁcantly
Distribution by channel (%) 1995 2000
Branches 69 39
Electronic banking 14 13
Telephone banking 13 16
Internet 0 27
Cards 3 5
(Source: Annual Report, 2000)
sources of sustainable advantage, organizations must focus less on IT, per
se, and more on the process of organizing and managing IT. Further
support for this position is provided by Dvorak et al.84 who concluded
that what distinguishes organizations with high-performance IT is not
technical wizardry but the way they manage their IS/IT activities. Keen85
noted that the ‘wide diﬀerence in competitive organisational and
economic beneﬁts that companies gain from this information technology
rests in a management diﬀerence and not a technical diﬀerence. Some
business leaders are somehow able to ﬁt the pieces together better than
others.’ Ross et al.86 and Bharadwaj87 have argued that, for an organ-
ization to apply IT to enhance competitiveness, it must develop an eﬀec-
tive ‘IS capability’.
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higher than its competitors, have allowed the bank to become the
market benchmark in innovation and technology. The implementa-
tion of a multi-channel approach has also relied heavily on technol-
ogy. As CEO Juan Arena repeatedly states, ‘This [Bankinter] is not a
bank. This is a technology company that happened to do banking.’
With its objective of achieving technology leadership, the follow-
ing initiatives show how it doggedly approaches this objective:
. Launched ﬁrst full service telephone-banking operations in
1992, rated as the best and most successful operating model in
Spain.
. Opened its Internet-free access service to customers in 1996—its
ISP is ranked seventh in Spain with 180,000 customers. This
movement revolutionized the ISP market in Spain from a
monthly-fee business model to a free-access business model.
. Launched the ﬁrst Spanish online broker in 1997. Currently,
more than 95% of securities transactions pass through this
service.
. Full range of online banking completed in 1999. The ﬁrst bank
to support a full online mortgage oﬀering, achieving a market
share of 6%.
. Between 1999 and 2000, it created an Internet-enabled organ-
ization and migrated all products and services to the Internet.
. Opened virtual branches in the most visited portals and ﬁnancial
portals in 2000 (Lycos Spain and Invertia.com).
Through a combination of innovative business thinking and an IS
capability, Bankinter has managed to pave the way in Spanish
banking and consistently holds an advantage over its rivals.
However, to date, no one has clearly deﬁned ‘IS capability’ beyond an
expression of its core objective of enabling an organization continuously
to derive and leverage value through IS/IT. This presents a serious
challenge for organizations who seek to understand and develop an
ongoing IS capability, as there is little guidance about how organizational
resources contribute toward both its development and deployment.
Remember that Dell, Cisco, Bankinter, Amazon.com and the many
other companies mentioned in this chapter have gained advantage by
using technologies that are non-proprietary and widely available to all.
In the ﬁnal chapter, this concept of IS capability is further explored and
developed, and we suggest that it does represent the emergence of a
new era.
SUMMARY
The evolution of information systems and technology in a business and
organizational context has been erratic, but, without doubt, IS/IT has
inexorably increased its importance as the economics and capability have
enabled more to be achieved. Increasingly, competitive business environ-
ments have provided a motivation to invest in more eﬃcient and eﬀective
ways of carrying out business processes and managing the business.
Although the progress has been ﬁtful and unsynchronized, patterns can
be observed.
The two major ‘eras’ of DP and MIS are well established and much can
be learnt from them—in particular, that the best ways of planning for
applications, given the contribution they can make to the business, were
only discovered well into the eras, from painful experience in many cases.
Often the secret of better IS/IT planning was only discovered after initial
enthusiasm had turned to frustration—just before disillusion was about
to occur; necessity perhaps being the mother of invention of better
approaches!
We are now well into the third era, with bigger prizes and, reciprocally,
greater risks, when the business can become critically dependent on its
investment in systems not just for its success but for its very survival—
planning for information systems has become strategic for many com-
panies. That does not mean that previously-developed, good IS/IT
strategy formulation and planning practice is obsolete, merely inadequate
for the new era. Can companies aﬀord to wait to ﬁnd the appropriate
strategy approaches until the enthusiasm has faded into frustration? It
may then be too late. The SIS era implies winners and losers with IS/IT,
not just relative success and failure, which may not reﬂect directly in the
overall business performance.
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In this new millennium, increasing business pressures and the improv-
ing capabilities and price/performance of IT have led to the consideration
of more radical strategies than previously. These can require the trans-
formation of business processes, organizational structures and relation-
ships to achieve major improvements in business performance. Clearly,
changes to the organization’s information systems will be an integral
component of this ‘industry re-engineering’—in creating and implement-
ing the new processes and enabling new organization structures to
function. But, also, innovations in the use of information and new tech-
nologies are essential ingredients in creating the options for change.
Hence, strategies for IS will have to be more radical and more adaptable
in the future than they have been in the past.
The last obvious conclusion about the evolution of strategic planning
for IS/IT is that it is now clearly a process that depends on users and
senior management involvement for success. It has become diﬃcult to
separate aspects of IS/IT strategy from business strategy. Hence, it is
important to use the tools and techniques of business strategic analysis
and planning to ensure that approaches to IS/IT strategy formulation
and planning are knitted into the pattern of business strategic manage-
ment. Indeed, the emerging fourth era seeks to embed an IS capability in
the very fabric of the organization. Chapter 2 starts this integration
process by considering the processes and tools of business strategic
management.
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2
An Overview of Business
Strategy Concepts and the
IS/IT Strategy Implications
As discussed in Chapter 1, most organizations are today aware that
information systems strategies must be developed within the wider
context of the corporate and business strategy formulation and imple-
mentation processes. Further, it has become increasingly important, in
the last decade, that investments made in information systems and tech-
nology throughout an organization are directed toward the achievement
of business objectives and plans. This does not imply that IS/IT is only a
means of implementing chosen strategies; IS/IT can also be an enabler of
new business strategies, strategies that are not possible without the
application of IT. However, in the past, a signiﬁcant proportion of the
money spent on information systems and technology has had little
relationship to those objectives, which is one of the many reasons why
the potential beneﬁts from investments made in IT have frequently not
been realized. Success in managing IS/IT involves both maximizing the
return on the money invested in acquiring, processing and using
information within an organization, and enabling the strategic use of
information either to gain competitive advantage or to repel competitive
threats.
Consequently, it is vital that business managers are involved in the
process of developing information and systems strategies, which means
that this process must be clearly understood by those managers.1 It must
be related to their business issues and be conducted using tools and
techniques that are familiar to them, in a language that they understand,
completely avoiding the jargon that surrounds IT.
Formal approaches to business planning began in the 1950s and, since
then, a wide range of approaches and planning tools and techniques have
been developed. These continue to evolve in response to the increasingly
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complex and rapidly changing business environment. In this chapter
some of these well-established business strategy and planning concepts
and techniques are brieﬂy outlined. As each of the concepts or techniques
is discussed, implications that can immediately be derived for the devel-
opment of IS strategies are considered. The approaches adopted by
organizations for the strategic planning IS/IT are discussed in more
detail in the next chapter.
THE EVOLVING NATURE OF STRATEGY AND STRATEGIC
PLANNING IN ORGANIZATIONS
All organizations have some form of strategy, whether implicit or
explicit, and the essence of business strategy lies in creating future com-
petitive advantages faster than competitors. Yet, formal strategic
planning, as we know it today, is a relatively recent phenomenon and
arose as a result of developments in program planning and budgeting
developed during World War II. During the 1950s, a second stream of
thought, pioneered at the Harvard Business School, highlighted the im-
portance of having an overall corporate strategy to integrate the various
functional areas.
Yet, as early as 1976, Ansoﬀ et al.2 recognized the failure of strategic
planning, at that time, to resolve the problems of the ﬁrm in the post-
industrial era. They suggested strategic management, within which formal
planning would be but one component of a much more complex socio-
dynamic process that brings about strategic change in an organization.
Exploring the evolution of strategy and strategy planning in organiza-
tions, Gluck et al.3 developed a model to describe its increasing maturity.
Although there have been many changes in the business world, particu-
larly since 1980, the model describes how the core issues have evolved,
along with the need for new approaches to developing and implementing
strategies. The basic model is depicted in Figure 2.1.
In Phase 1, the focus is on cash ﬂow and annual ﬁnancial planning, and
involves relatively simple techniques to develop medium-term budgets.
These exercises are usually carried out internally, department by depart-
ment, and consolidated. The focus of planning is to reduce everything to
a single ﬁnancial issue—meeting the budget.
At Phase 2, the focus is on trying to predict, or forecast, what is likely
to happen within, say, a three to ﬁve-year planning horizon, usually by
reference to historical performance, analysed and projected into the
future using internal trends and external parameters such as economic
and market research data. It forecasts sales and market growth and
predicts the eﬀect on income and expenses and changes to the balance
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sheet. Plans, though, are still quantitative and internally orientated,
focusing on the gap between what is targeted and the resources that
are available.
Within Phase 3, the organization, for the ﬁrst time, considers the
external environment to gain a thorough understanding of the nature
of competition in its industry, in order to assess and consider potential
threats and position itself to gain advantage. The organization might
need to revise its product portfolio to match demands in more attractive
market sectors, or increase the value-added features of existing products
and services, or signiﬁcantly reduce its unit costs. Each of these situations
implies the identiﬁcation of new product development, sourcing or mar-
keting options and their evaluation to ﬁnd those that not only suit the
organization, but also best satisfy the pressures and demands of the com-
petitive marketplace.
By Phase 4, the organization is driven by innovation and becomes
capable of creating its own business environment, at least to some
extent. This phase implies that, while products and competitive position-
ing are clearly important, they are only so at a given point in time.
In today’s dynamic business environment, products quickly become
obsolete and the only real source of competitive advantage is the
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Figure 2.1 Evolution of strategic management maturity
ability to respond consistently to changing markets with new products
and ever-improved competitiveness. The organization’s values, culture
and structure will reinforce the processes and competencies required to
develop and sustain a leading role in the industry thus enabling it to have
signiﬁcant control over its own destiny. Obviously, sustaining this leader-
ship will require continuing innovation.
While some organizations are capable of a truly creative strategy, at
least for signiﬁcant parts of the business, they also have to monitor the
competitive environment, forecast eﬀectively and deliver an annual
proﬁt. Progressing to Stages 3 and 4 implies that 1 and 2 are handled
eﬀectively, so that strategic thinking can be converted to the required
ﬁnancial results. The major step change depicted in the move from
Stage 2 to 3 reﬂects the reorientation to adopt an external perspective
and obtain the new knowledge required by the organization, to assess
realistically what it does and how well it does it in the context of its
competitive environment. The model is not time dependent; unfortu-
nately, some organizations still remain in Phase 1.
It is worth making a few observations about the evolving nature of
strategic management issues based on this maturity model:
. The approach to IS/IT strategy development is often, despite the best
of intentions, ‘behind’ the approach adopted for business strategy
formulation. While the organization may well be managing overall
in Phase 3 or even 4, the approach to IS/IT strategy may, in reality,
still be in Phase 1 (the current project plan and annual IT budget
driving the plans) or perhaps Phase 2 (IT management planning
future resource requirements based on a forecast of likely needs).
Where this occurs, the IT unit is often seen by the business as
‘living in a world of its own’ and unable to react to the rapidly
changing environment. In many ways, the purpose of this book is
to realign the processes and thinking of IS/IT strategic planning with
the real-world pressures and requirements in Phases 3 and 4.
. During the early 1990s, many organizations actually regressed down
this maturity curve as recession deepened and they were forced to
focus on short-term ﬁnancial survival. In the UK, government
policies saw the introduction of privatization, devolvement to
agencies and market trading (e.g. in the National Health Service
[NHS]), forcing many organizations to plan on a much shorter
time horizon, often based on one-year ﬁnancial measures. As a
result, many public and private sector organizations that had
perhaps been planning for the long term now had to produce im-
provement in ﬁnancial performance year on year. This seriously
aﬀected those investment plans, including IS/IT, that cannot often
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easily deliver demonstrable improvements within a 12-month time
horizon.
. During the 1990s, the business environment changed at a faster pace
than ever before, creating increased uncertainty and making forecast-
ing more diﬃcult. Except in a few, relatively stable industries, it was
no longer possible to interpret the past as a reliable indicator of
future trends. Even though the period saw the longest sustained
period of economic growth in history, increasing globalization,
rapid technological advances and increasingly sophisticated cus-
tomers meant that ﬁrms not adept in Phases 3 and 4 of the model
suﬀered badly. Even household names such as Marks & Spencer in
the UK and Sears in the US found the retail clothing market
increasingly diﬃcult to understand and predict. Since the 1980s,
shareholders have been demanding more certain and higher
returns, making strategic planning more diﬃcult, given the increasing
uncertainty about future forecasts. This has also, therefore, shor-
tened the planning horizon causing management to focus on
shorter-term, ﬁnancial performance but also change strategies more
frequently.
. It is not coincidental that the focus on creating distinctive brands and
brand strategies has increased over the last 20 years. Brand manage-
ment is aimed at achieving success in Phase 4—external recognition
of real or perceived uniqueness, plus the clarity of strategy required
to marshal and align all the internal resources and capabilities
‘behind the brand’.
. In the late 1990s, the commercialization of the Internet and the
reduced cost of information technologies oﬀered many opportunities
to create ‘new’ strategies—to reach new markets and oﬀer new
products and services. As is usual in such circumstances, it was
diﬃcult for many large incumbent companies to adjust their strate-
gies to become more creative and less risk averse. Most of the ‘new
economy’ developments were initiated by start-ups, the ‘dot.coms’,
who had no legacy of business structure or existing IS/IT environ-
ment to inhibit them. But, as rapidly became clear, neither did most
of them have the full set of organizational competencies, those
acquired in Stages 1–3, to succeed in highly competitive markets
and industries. However, the speed with which new competitors
could emerge through innovative applications of IT has forced
many, more conservative organizations to realize that astute invest-
ment in IS/IT can enhance a business strategy, or at least that a lack
of investment could leave the organization at a serious disadvantage.
While it is oversimplistic to state that the arrival of ‘e-business’ at last
made senior management realize the importance of IT, it was only in
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the year 2000 that companies’ share prices were aﬀected by whether
or not they had an e-business strategy!4
Strategy versus Planning
Recent debates around strategy and planning have highlighted a miscon-
ception and confusion that exists in many organizations regarding the
two terms.5 Mintzberg6 asserts that ‘strategic planning’ is not ‘strategic
thinking’. He writes, ‘when companies understand the diﬀerence between
planning and strategic thinking, they can get back to what the strategy-
making process should be: capturing what the manager learns from all
sources (both the soft insights from his or her personal experiences and
the experiences of others throughout the organisation and the hard data
from market research and the like) and then synthesising that learning
into a vision of the direction that the business should pursue.’
Similarly, Hamel7 asserts that planning is about programming not
discovering, that strategy making must be democratic and is not the
sole preserve of senior managers. He wryly poses the question of how
often has the monarch led the uprising? Given the creative nature of the
strategy process, he notes that you ‘cannot see the end from the begin-
ning’, a situation that is similar when embarking on developing an IS/IT
strategy.
Porter suggests many organizations have confused operational eﬀec-
tiveness with strategy. While not rejecting the need for operational eﬀec-
tiveness, he argues that it is a necessary but not a suﬃcient condition.
Operational eﬀectiveness means performing similar activities better than
rivals perform them. In contrast, strategic positioning means performing
diﬀerent activities from rivals’ or performing similar activities in diﬀerent
ways.
This implies that ‘strategy’ is not the result of strategic planning but the
product of a number of processes. Strategy can therefore be deﬁned as: an
integrated set of actions aimed at increasing the long-term well-being and
strength of the enterprise relative to competitors.8
There are essentially three interrelated processes that can contribute to
the establishment of such a strategy:
. strategic thinking—creative, entrepreneurial insight into the ways the
enterprise could develop;
. strategic planning—systematic, comprehensive analysis to develop a
plan of action;
. opportunistic decision making—eﬀective reaction to unexpected
threats and opportunities.
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To achieve any or all of these, a thorough understanding of the business
environment, pressure groups, stakeholders and the enterprise’s capabil-
ity is required. Having an eﬀective combination of coherent planning,
incisive thinking and astute opportunism is probably best described as
strategic management, which includes not only setting the strategy but
also implementing and adapting it.
Notwithstanding these arguments, organizations require a framework
to guide strategizing and strategic decision making. Indeed, tools and
techniques can be useful in provoking the thinking necessary to
develop insights, visions and innovative strategies.
THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK
Many of the analysis techniques of strategy formulation are used to focus
on a particular strategic issue such as the analysis of competitors, the
strength of the existing portfolio of products or the relative merits of
diﬀerent courses of action. However, there exists a far broader context
within which the techniques and tools are applied, described here as the
‘strategic framework’. Any organization in Stages 3 and 4 of the above
model will need to consider most aspects of this framework to succeed.
The framework considers the factors involved in business strategic
management in three layers (see Figure 2.2):
. the external environment;
. pressure groups and stakeholders;
. internal business strategizing and planning.
Each of these is considered brieﬂy below, before some of the approaches
and tools that can be used to analyse their impact and formulate appro-
priate strategies are outlined.
External Environment
Businesses or enterprises operate within a broadly-deﬁned external en-
vironment, many aspects of which need to be thoroughly analysed, un-
derstood and interpreted early in the business strategy process. The six
factors that are of enduring importance and relevant to most industries
and organizations are considered here.
These environmental factors are normally considered together, in the
early stages of strategic thinking, using a PEST (Political, Economic,
Social and Technological) analysis approach (legal factors are normally
included with political factors and ecology with social factors in a
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standard PEST analysis). These are important because of the speed with
which they are changing and the eﬀect they have on an increasingly
‘global’ business marketplace. Careful monitoring of these factors may
lead to signiﬁcant business opportunities or identiﬁcation of potential
threats in time to take action to mitigate the eﬀects. Some examples
will serve to illustrate the need for analysis.
Economic
The swing in emphasis to monetarism and the economics of free market
could not have been predicted before the end of the 1970s. However,
today, this is a feature not only of the Western world but also of
Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union republics, China and other
ex-communist countries. The opportunities for increased trade are un-
deniable, as are the opportunities for sourcing products from countries
with signiﬁcantly lower costs.
The impacts of Third World debt on the Western ﬁnancial system and
the vigorous performance of the newly-industrialized countries with their
strong trading surpluses had led Western countries to focus their atten-
tion on the Far East and away from Africa and South America.
However, during the 1990s, many of those ‘tiger’ economies suﬀered
severe recessions, due mainly to ﬁnancial and currency problems resulting
from an inability to adapt to the demands of an increasingly ‘free market’
for trade. Protectionism in many of their home markets had concealed a
lack of real competitiveness in earlier years. As a result, companies have
looked to Eastern Europe and at an increasingly attractive Latin
America, due primarily to political stability, for both markets and
sources of supply—although the 2001 monetary crisis in Argentina high-
lights that the situation requires continual appraisal.
The eﬀects of the relative strengths of diﬀerent currencies, inﬂation
rates, money market rates and tax legislation impose increasingly
complex challenges on global business. They aﬀect decisions on where
to invest and develop new markets and where to take proﬁts.
It was argued (by some!) during 2000 that, due to the commercializa-
tion of the Internet and the restructuring of industries that was predicted,
the ‘old economy’ logic no longer prevailed and that the economic ‘rules’
had been changed.9 It seems this was due to ‘new millennium euphoria’,
and not based on substantive evidence or analysis, given the rapid return
to the old economy in 2001. However, investment in new economy stocks
created a short-lived boom for high-tech companies, many of which
invested too much in high-risk options. The licence fees paid by
telecom companies for ‘3rd generation’ mobile operations (so-called
3G) have left them with high levels of debt as income streams from
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existing operations reduced. Others, like Marconi, reconﬁgured their
business from ‘old’ to ‘new’ economy activities, with devastating results
when the predicted explosive growth did not materialize.
Social
The social environment can exert a major impact on strategies and strat-
egic options. For example, within the social environment, there is a
growing awareness of the problems and opportunities aﬀorded to organ-
izations by the increasing numbers of retired people and their relative
aﬄuence. As the general population is living longer, there is a consequent
demand on pensions and geriatric health-care services. On the other
hand, this part of the population has a high level of disposable income,
with few commitments. It is anticipated that a large proportion of
children born in Western Europe in 1988 will live to be 100. The
impact of this is going to be enormous. Governments will have to
contend with supporting a large number of retired people from a shrink-
ing taxable labour force. On the other hand, there is ample scope for
changing the face of the leisure and consumer retailing industries to cater
for the tastes of the older population. IT itself has now become a ‘social
factor’, in terms of social inclusion or exclusion being aﬀected by indi-
viduals’ access to the Internet as both an information source and channel
of communication. Management philosopher Charles Handy10 talks
about the ‘information haves’ and the ‘information have-nots’ and the
social implications of a group that are becoming increasingly margin-
alized. Many companies now have strategies for social responsibility.
Vodafone Group’s CEO has noted that, by extending the company’s
customer base, expanding geographically and developing innovative
services, the company has achieved a global reach that brings worldwide
responsibilities. ‘Fulﬁlling our passion for excellence involves reaching
the highest standard of social responsibility, just as much as providing
outstanding service to our customers.’11
Political
Although the European Economic Community had existed for 30 years
before 1992, the Maastricht Treaty forming the European Union was one
of the most signiﬁcant changes to take place in Europe for many years,
with the dismantling of trade barriers between member states and the
removal of restrictive legislation. This has been followed by a synchroni-
zation of taxes on purchases, elimination of tariﬀs and, from 1 January
2002, a common currency across the majority of member states.
Combined with the legislation that provides for free movement of
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labour within the Union, the EU will soon be a market of suﬃcient
buying power and size to be able to oﬀer a real competitive threat to
the US domestic market.
On the wider front, there is also a similar strengthening of economic
ties between the USA and its North and South American and Paciﬁc Rim
trading customers. It is very important, clearly, that enterprises should
take note of these developments in their strategizing.
The 1990s were a period of (relatively) political stability across the
world, following the dramatic changes at the end of the previous
decade. The future may not prove as conducive to global trade develop-
ment if major ‘new’ economies become politically unstable, as is currently
the case in Indonesia. The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the USA
have also resulted in further destabilization of the geopolitical environ-
ment and heightened levels of uncertainty.
Legal
In direct response to the impact of IT, many countries have introduced
some form of Data Protection or Privacy Act, in an attempt to protect
the interests of individuals from inappropriate use by corporations and
governments of information about them (see Box 2.1 for an overview of
UK legislation). However, the extent of coverage varies across countries.
The Internet has raised issues related to privacy as it provides unpre-
cedented opportunities to proﬁle the browsing and consumption habits of
website visitors.12 In the USA, privacy advocates led an outcry over
disclosures that DoubleClick, the biggest Internet advertising company,
was quietly accumulating masses of personalized information on people’s
surﬁng and purchasing habits. Many companies do not realize that there
are legal limits to what they can do with the data they collect.
The status and validity of ‘paperless trading’, via e-commerce, is an
area where the laws of diﬀerent countries have to cope with new situa-
tions and also need to be more consistent. Internet-based trading has
created new legal problems regarding the point of transfer of ownership
and where tax on purchases is to be paid and by whom. The music
industry is the ﬁrst to ‘go to court’ to resolve the increasingly sensitive
issues of intellectual property and royalties for material sold (or other-
wise) across the Internet. It is suggested that computer-based fraud is
now frequent and is costing organizations billions of pounds—but detec-
tion is diﬃcult, and successful prosecution has proved nearly impossible.
Ecological
The ecological lobby has become increasingly vocal throughout the
world. The emergence of the Green movement and Green political
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parties in Western Europe are clear signs of an increasing awareness of
the need to protect the environment. This has had substantial eﬀects on
such diverse activities as commercial whaling and the generation of
power, with a swing away from nuclear power generation back to hydro-
carbons (with the consequent problems of carbon dioxide and acid rain
emissions) and an increasing emphasis on the search for alternative
sources of power.
The more radical environmentalists or ‘eco-warriors’ extended their
scope, in the late 1990s, to address social and economic issues. The
Reclaim of the Streets movement brought the protest into urban areas
to highlight both government and corporate neglect of the environment
and people in the pursuit of economic goals. Tens of thousands of
protestors lobbied the World Trade Organization summits and
meetings of the Global Forum to demand action to stop environmental
damage and exploitation of the people and resources of developing
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Box 2.1 Data Protection Act
The European Union’s Directive on Personal Data, implemented in
the UK as the Data Protection Act 1998, restricts the use of personal
information and, in some cases, makes it illegal. The act limits the
use of personal data by requiring ‘data controllers’ to process such
information in accordance with eight data-protection principles.
These principles provide that data must be:
. fairly and lawfully processed;
. processed for limited purposes;
. adequate, relevant and not excessive;
. accurate;
. not kept longer than necessary;
. processed in accordance with the data subject’s rights;
. secure;
. not transferred to countries without adequate protection.
Personal data are any data relating to individuals, not only UK
citizens. Such data include basic details such as names and addresses,
perhaps collected when gaining access to a website or in a purchase
transaction. E-mails can also be included as they may have registered
domains and Internet protocol addresses identifying users’ term-
inals, regarded as personal identiﬁers and, therefore, within the
scope of the Act.
countries by global corporations. The Internet was used to mobilize the
protestors and organize the demonstrations. Technology has enabled
protest movements to orchestrate campaigns around the world and
become ‘global’ themselves in order to lobby against the adverse con-
sequences of economic globalization. In the Philippines, the country
where text messaging is most popular, the use of the technology by
protesters is credited with helping to overthrow the country’s former
president, Joseph Estrada.
As well as trying to impose limitations on companies, these pressures
can lead to increasing activity in research and development, and new
business opportunities. Environmental groups argue that a more environ-
mentally-conscious view of the world would create many millions of new
jobs as well as ‘save the planet’.
Technological
The technological environment, in general, is changing faster than ever
before, creating innovative products and services and facilitating new
ways of doing business and, in the process, making ‘old’ products
obsolete more quickly. Consider the major changes in the information
technologies in the past 15 years. These have included:
. Changes in telecommunications, including ﬁbre optics, satellites and
wireless networks, now enable companies and people to communi-
cate far more quickly and extensively, particularly as bandwidth has
increased. This has no doubt increased the intensity and speed of
business activity as well as enabling more eﬀective interchange and
use of information.
. The unceasing improvements in price/performance of computers and
software has meant that, for a few hundred pounds, anyone can have
access to an immense variety of information resources and the ability
to ‘process’ that information. This eﬀectively ‘empowers’ the indi-
vidual, who is able to carry out a greater range of tasks and com-
municate with far more people. Harnessed properly, this power can
enhance an organization’s strategic ability, creating agility in the
workforce; mismanaged, it can lead to organizational chaos, and
the misuse of time and resources.
. As computers become ever more portable, individuals are less desk-
bound, and some organizations are questioning the need for oﬃces at
all. For many companies, the traditional concept of the oﬃce has
been redeﬁned as merely places to plug-in to a network or meet other
people.
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. The ability of individuals, as customers, to search for alternative
product sources and the emergence of online buying groups,
who aggregate the purchasing requirements of many customers,
has undoubtedly increased the power of buyers in many consumer
industries.
. The advent of digital television oﬀers even further options; not only
for commercial organizations but also for provision of services by
public sector organizations to members of the communities they
serve.
. Further major advances have occurred in the areas of document and
image processing, new standards like XML (eXtendable Mark-up
Language) will facilitate exchange of all forms of digital images
and documents among all types of access devices including the vi-
deophones that will arrive in the next decade.
Signals from the external environment must be monitored constantly and
interpreted quickly in order to be able to position the enterprise both
oﬀensively and defensively for the future. To assist management in ob-
taining and understanding the implications of such signals, many public
databases and other online information sources are now available, pro-
viding hard data and commentary on many of the factors described. A
key problem is often ﬁnding the appropriate sources for relevant, up to
date, reliable information.
With very few exceptions, an individual enterprise can only react to its
environment, and cannot, by itself, control or change the environment.
However, by grouping together with others in the same industry or with a
common interest, it is possible for the group to exert inﬂuence over its
external environment either by direct action (e.g. the establishment of
standards and protocols), or indirectly via trade associations that,
through eﬀective lobbying, can change or inﬂuence laws and regulations.
In some cases, a large enterprise can shape the external environment to its
particular requirements (e.g. by establishing de facto standards), thus
creating signiﬁcant, sustainable, long-term competitive advantage.
Pressure Groups and Stakeholders
The enterprise functions within the context of the external environment
and also under the direct inﬂuence of two sets of forces. These two groups
are represented in Figure 2.2 and are categorized as pressure groups and
stakeholders. Examples of the two categories are considered in Box 2.2.
Pressure groups are characterized by making demands of the organ-
ization. They require that the enterprise acknowledges their existence and
the eﬀect they can have, and they expect appropriate responses from
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Box 2.2 Examples of the inﬂuence of pressure groups and stake-
holders
Pressure groups Stakeholders
1. Shareholders: can exert considerable 1. Shareholders: who expect increased
pressure on companies in terms of dividends year on year and an
how they conduct the business as increased stock market valuation
well as what they do with (i.e. income and capital growth, the
shareholders’ funds. Annual general former having become more
meetings are more frequently an important over the past few years
opportunity for individual shareholders to meet the cash-ﬂow needs of
and shareholder groups to demonstrate pensions). There has also been a
their power by voting down proposals, change in the type of shareholder.
rejecting nominated directors and Institutional investors and pension
strong questioning of company policies funds still control signiﬁcant blocks
and objectives. Recently, small of shares, but, with privatization of
investors have questioned the nationalized industries taking place
justiﬁcation for large pay rises and on a worldwide basis, there are now
valuable share options for senior millions of private individuals who
executives—who were ‘saved’ from are shareholders. During the
censure by institutional shareholders. dot.com boom and bust of 2000, it
A bank had to change its policy on was often small shareholders,
communicating account changes trading online, who created or
following an orchestrated campaign by ampliﬁed market price ﬂuctuations.
discontented members. Some
shareholder groups such as pension
funds control signiﬁcant votes and
will only invest if they are assured of
long-term prospects, based on
properly developed long-term plans.
2. Competitors: the most obvious 2. Competitors: are stakeholders to
pressure group, whose activities are the extent they share an interest in
designed to reduce each other’s the success of the industry overall,
success, but also in combination and the successs or failure of an
determine the overall economics and organization can inﬂuence the view
development of the industry in the of investors of the whole industry.
short and long term. In reality, successful industries need
strong constituent ﬁrms.
3. Customers/suppliers: are obvious 3(a). Customers: who are constantly
pressure groups, each exerting direct requiring higher-quality products
business pressure in its own particular or services from the enterprise at
way due to their mutual the same or lower cost, in order to
interdependence; each of them being improve their own ﬁnancial
part of the ‘value chain’ involved in performance.
bringing a product or service into the 3(b). Suppliers: who are always looking
market. These are dealt with in more for an increase in the volume and
detail later in this chapter. price of the goods that they sell to
or via the enterprise.
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4. Government: exerts pressure in a 4. Government: would expect to
number of diﬀerent ways by framing beneﬁt from the success of the
legislation and then monitoring enterprise by way of increased
conformance. This includes taxation, overall economic growth,
monopolies and mergers, health and provision of more jobs, training for
safety legislation, taxation levels and employees, etc. Equally, much of a
laws, product liability, and both country’s infrastructure is now
industry regulation and deregulation. provided directly or indirectly by
Pressure may also be exerted by other private enterprises and
groupings such as the United Nations government depends on ﬁrms
or the European Parliament and making suﬃcient proﬁts to make
Commission, particularly in those investments.
respect of international standards,
trade embargoes and tariﬀs.
5. Employees: the pressure that 5. Employees: who expect to share in
employees can exert can take many the success of the organization
forms, including the needs for through improved ﬁnancial reward
comparability across job functions, but also via other demonstrations
job enrichment, personnel appraisals of success of the company such as
and evaluations, and less directly in pensions, additional holidays and
terms of their overall attitude to work. other beneﬁts. Their personal
future depends on the success of
the company.
6. Unions: these exert pressure, 6. Unions: who negotiate for better
particularly when it comes to conditions of service, a better
grievances and working practices. quality of working environment,
This type of pressure was historically including investments for safety of
very high during the 1970s but has employees, more sick pay, more
diminished, in the UK particularly, holidays and, of course, higher
with the advent of much higher wages.
unemployment in the 1980s; and
changes in the law. In other
countries, unions are seen as more
constructive and are often represented
on ﬁrms’ boards.
7. The public: can exert pressure, for 7. The public: the general public
example, through the boycotting of would expect to see beneﬁts from
certain consumer items, and through the success of an enterprise. For
the unpredictable nature of fashion. example, a successful company in a
The impact of fashion goes beyond small town might feel obliged to
clothes to many other products, donate a community centre to the
including foods, as was shown in the town for the beneﬁt of the people
move to more organic food products living there. Many communities are
in the 1990s. Consumer pressure dependent on the success of large
inspired by Greenpeace caused Shell ﬁrms for both economic viability
to change its plans to dispose and their social and recreational
of an obsolete oil rig. infrastructure. It is not just
employees who gain but also the
management to satisfy their particular interest. The interfaces with each
of the pressure groups must be constantly monitored not only because
they pose a potential threat if mishandled, but also because they oﬀer
opportunities that can be exploited to the advantage of the organization.
The stakeholders have a direct ﬁnancial interest in the organization,
and demand a fair share of the wealth created. All stakeholders expect
some form of material and ﬁnancial beneﬁt from the success of the or-
ganization. It is a characteristic of those companies that have been most
successful in the past that the rewards of their endeavours have indeed
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many small retailers and service
companies in the area. This can be
seen from the rapid economic
decline of many towns when large
factories close. In reverse, when
ﬁrms are attracted to an area, the
value of property rises and new
amenities are created.
8. Financial institutions: exert pressure 8. Financial institutions: who are
by demanding increasing amounts of individually funding an
information to enable the increased organization and collectively
level of analytical ability within the setting the expected rate of return
institutions. It is important for to be delivered by the enterprise.
enterprises to meet the needs of these The institutions in the UK are
ﬁnancial analysts in order to keep a often criticized in terms of their
reasonable stock market valuation short-term focus, lack of
and debt rating. This can be commitment and risk aversion, in
self-defeating: enterprises must comparison to institutions in other
perform to ﬁnancial analysts’ countries, especially Germany and
expectations, or risk reducing their Japan.
valuation and rating, putting more
strain on them for ever-increasing
performance.
9. The media: where business planning
is concerned, the inﬂuence of the
ﬁnancial press is very strong indeed.
This is possibly strongest in the UK,
where the standard of investigative
and analytical journalism within the
ﬁnancial media is probably the
highest in the world. It is common
for companies to report substantial
increases in turnover and proﬁt, but
media-reported issues about the
company’s long-term prospects can
still cause negative eﬀects on the
company’s share price.
been passed on, not just to the shareholders by way of increased divi-
dends, but also through to the community at large and especially their
customers, suppliers and employees. Increasingly, legislation has been
introduced to protect the interests of some stakeholders, to ensure their
fair treatment13 (e.g. investment customers in ﬁnancial services).
It is important to note that some groups can be both pressure groups
and stakeholders (e.g. shareholders, customers and employees). The most
sophisticated planning mechanisms take account of each group and
recognize that the signals can be those of divergent and often conﬂicting
needs, depending on the environmental circumstances prevailing at the
time. In a competitive environment, the company that understands the
needs of external parties and reacts to or, better still, anticipates them
most eﬀectively will succeed in the longer term. All these external parties
increasingly require businesses to provide more information to address
their interests and hence become more accountable. Equally, following
‘privatization’, many public sector organizations now have to accommo-
date these external pressure group and stakeholder perspectives, as well
as internal preferences, in their strategies.
Business Strategy Formulation and Planning Processes
Having considered the signals coming from the external environment and
the threats and opportunities posed by the pressure groups, the organ-
ization has to identify, evaluate and decide the strategies it is going to
pursue. It then has to establish how to achieve these strategies by
planning for the required actions and by eﬀective development and use
of resources. The key components of a business planning process are
considered below and their relationships are depicted at the core of the
framework in Figure 2.2. The process as described here is highly struc-
tured and procedural, to aid understanding of what needs to be done. The
limitations of this approach and the need for alternative, more ‘ﬂexible’
versions have been outlined earlier, and how this can be achieved for IS/
IT strategies is discussed in Chapter 3.
A key issue of any strategy process is to determine the scope. Should it
cover the organization as a whole, or should the organization be con-
sidered in smaller, discrete parts where it may be more appropriate and
easier to develop coherent strategies and plans? These organizational
components are often called ‘strategic business units’ (SBUs). A
business unit can be deﬁned as: a unit that sells a distinct set of
products or services, serves a speciﬁc set of customers and competes with
a well-deﬁned set of competitors.
Most major organizations have moved more toward business units and
away from functional structures over the past 20 years. An advantage of
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the SBU approach, as far as developing strategies is concerned, is that it
encourages creativity and innovation, both of which are important
aspects of Phase 4 in the maturity model described earlier. This usually
results in better responsiveness to markets, greater operational ﬂexibility
and clear accountability for results.
Clearly, in the derivation and development of strategies, it is important
to consider both the enterprise, as a whole, and the individual business
units. This can be reconciled by considering the enterprise strategy as the
combination of achievement of corporate objectives via the contribution
of the SBUs. The strategy processes used also have to reﬂect the cor-
porate/SBU relationships and the possible inter-SBU relationships.
Objectives
A key element in any business planning process is to set business or
organization objectives. These are usually described by reference to
proﬁtability, growth, market share, customer satisfaction, new product
development, employment, social responsibility, etc.
Objectives are not simply plucked out of the air, but reﬂect the values
held by the organization, by management and by major stakeholders.
These values are often expressed in terms of the ‘mission’ of the organ-
ization, which is usually a statement of its long-term aims and purpose.
Examples of mission statements and objectives are considered in more
detail in Chapter 4, as part of the process of identifying how IS/IT
investment can be aligned to the business strategy.
The mission or vision statement may be relevant for many years, until
stakeholder interests change. Objectives will change from year to year,
and may evolve quite signiﬁcantly over a period of time. The objectives
will set speciﬁc measurable targets to be achieved in a given time period.
It would seem more logical to set objectives following the ‘situation
analysis’ stage described below, but, in most organizations, the objectives
are set ﬁrst, then the situation is reviewed in the light of those objectives.
Later, the objectives may be amended if they appear unattainable or are
insuﬃciently challenging. Often, however, the objectives are left un-
changed in spite of evidence to suggest that they are inappropriate.
Situation Analysis
‘Where we are now’ consists of two essential elements, one looking inside
the organization and one looking outside. The ﬁrst concerns the current
strategy and an understanding of the enterprise’s strengths and weak-
nesses. This involves a thorough analysis of:
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. the resources available within the organization in terms of their
capability to make and deliver the products and services, both
existing and those being developed;
. the ﬁnancial health of the organization in respect of its debt, liquid-
ity, assets;
. the employees, their skills, training, experience, motivation and the
resulting business competencies possessed by the organization;
. the physical assets, their age, the technology employed, its usefulness;
. research and development, the proportion of turnover reinvested into
researching new products and markets, the number of new products
awaiting development, the quality of the past history of research and
development (R&D) activity;
. the organization, its structure and relationships, attitudes and
culture, and the eﬀectiveness of the operational and management
processes, and its ability to adapt to changing circumstances.
The second element involves analysis of the competitive environment so
that the enterprise can quite clearly identify its position in the market-
place and possible future strategic options. This will involve looking at:
. market segments and market shares within those segments, to
identify options for increasing the share of the market, increasing
the total size of the market or targeting diﬀerent segments;
. the organization’s position in the product life cycles by considering
products that are maturing or declining toward obsolescence,
products where demand is still growing and those of future impor-
tance coming from research and development, and whether the
product life cycles themselves need to be shortened or can be
extended;
. an examination of all current and potential competitors to under-
stand their current and potential strategies, their strengths and weak-
nesses in the various markets in terms of products, services,
marketing, ﬁnance, people and processes;
. future competitive actions that may take place to introduce potential
substitute products or whether the current environment enables new
entrants access to the enterprise’s chosen markets.
This type of analysis is often called SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses,
Opportunities and Threats). Then, using more creative thinking (e.g.
brainstorming sessions) the enterprise searches for ways in which it can
use its strengths to exploit opportunities, while addressing its weaknesses
and defending against threats.
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Future Strategies
Once the organization has a good understanding of what it is trying to
achieve by way of objectives, and exactly where it is by reference to its
current strengths, weaknesses and analyses of the competition, then it still
has to identify future strategies, both to avoid being at a disadvantage
and to create advantages wherever possible. While, historically, these
could mainly be derived from the knowledge of people within the organ-
ization, based on past experience, this has become increasingly limiting in
recent years. Many organizations now seek to discover future options by
undertaking scenario planning to identify ‘discontinuities’ and predict the
potential implications or bring in outside experts to facilitate ‘break-
through thinking’.
These future possible strategies should be evaluated against a number
of criteria, to enable both the most beneﬁcial and most feasible to be
selected. For example:
. the risks, both ﬁnancial and managerial, and the likely responses of
the main competitors;
. the degree to which the organization needs to create new capabilities
to be oﬀensive or improve control in order to be more defensive;
. whether the current organization structure is appropriate for
achieving the intended strategies or if major reorganization is a pre-
requisite;
. the ability of the organization to implement the strategy in terms of
competencies, resources, processes and culture;
. the implications for customers and other trading partners, since more
aspects of strategy rely heavily on the intentions and capabilities of
others;
. whether the organization requires or should create alliances or joint
ventures to enable or secure the strategy.
It may sound obvious, but, in any evaluation of options, it is important
to determine priorities and also decide which are not going to be pursued!
Many strategies fail to explicitly prevent undesirable courses of action.
And many others are too ambitious and create ‘initiative overload’ in the
organization leading to poor implementation of many of the important
components of the strategy.
Summary
In an ideal world, this strategy framework would be suﬃcient for the
organization to use to address the planning needs at all levels and across
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all functions in the organization. However, it is evident that such frame-
works are not widely used, perhaps due to the high degree of formality
implied in this approach. It need not be bureaucratic or prescriptive, but
each of the elements should be addressed. Instead, it would appear that
many organizations use a number of diﬀerent strategy tools, but often
without an overall framework, resulting in inadequate synthesis of the
outputs from the various analyses and processes.
STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION
Strategies are only a means to an end, to achieve anything they need to be
implemented! This requires that adequate resources are obtained, and
allocated eﬀectively; that the appropriate organization and responsibil-
ities are in place and that people are motivated to contribute to the
achievement of the strategies.
As these strategies are being implemented, it is obviously important
both to monitor performance and to control activities to ensure actions
taken are producing the speciﬁc results that will lead to achievement of
the overall set of objectives. The results of this performance measurement
will be used in a feedback loop to reﬁne the objectives of the organiza-
tion, whether the strategies are being realized or not.
Other models of strategic management reﬂect this real world, in which
strategy ‘formation’, based on an evolving situation, prevails over a
strategy ‘formulation’ approach as described on page 81. A model devel-
oped by Johnson and Scholes14 perhaps describes these processes and
how they relate most clearly (see Figure 2.3).
While, at any one time, an organization can use all its knowledge and
experience to devise its intended strategy and plan for its implementation,
things will not turn out as predicted.15 Unexpected constraints or new
options will occur, changes will be enforced by the actions of others, new
opportunities will arise that could not have been predicted and some
parts of the strategy will fail to be implemented successfully. By having
the combination of processes, the organization will be more able to ‘craft’
its strategy,16 such that a diﬀerent but realizable strategy can emerge. The
organization must also consciously accept that when aspects of the
original strategy become unrealizable, it must stop pursuing them. This
is often easier said than done in large organizations! Having a strategic
management process that can adapt in this way to changing circum-
stances is not a substitute for initial strategic analysis and planning, it
is a way of making it work! This approach also, perhaps, enables the
talent of the people in the organization to become involved in its strategic
Strategy Implementation 85
development, rather than merely used to implement a strategy devised by
a small group of senior management.
STRATEGY TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES
In formulating strategy, there are many tools and techniques used in
practice. In this section, some of those most commonly used in Phases
3 and 4 of the strategic management evolution (described in Figure 2.1)
are introduced. Most of these techniques have been developed since the
1960s in response to the uncertainties and complexities of commercial
and industrial environments. In reality, most of the techniques apply to
Phase 3, since Phase 4 requires not just analysis and synthesis but also
creativity, which few tools or techniques can produce. However, inspira-
tion or creativity with no relation to the organization’s real situation will
probably create problems, not opportunities!
As the various techniques are considered, the implications for IS/IT
strategy formulation that can immediately be derived are discussed.
Achieving eﬀective alignment of IS/IT and business strategies will
happen more easily if the thinking processes are intimately linked as
early as possible in the derivation of the intended business strategy.
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Figure 2.3 The realities of strategy development (source: G. Johnson and
K. Scholes, Exploring Corporate Strategy, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New
Jersey, 2002)
Portfolio and Planning Matrices
The Boston Consulting Group Business Matrix
The Boston Matrix (or Boston Square) is one of the earliest examples of
the use of portfolio matrix techniques. It is essentially based on two
precepts—a product life cycle and the relationship between market
share and proﬁtability. It also reﬂects the rationale of the ‘experience
curve’, whereby the more times something is made the lower the cost
will become due to continuing improvements in the process and the
achievement of economies of scale. The experience curve is more
relevant to manufacturing than service industries.
While the model applies to many types of product and many industries,
it does not work in certain circumstances. For instance, in some com-
modity markets, there is a high degree of government intervention, which
distorts the market by artiﬁcial control.
The product life cycle (shown in Figure 2.4) explains how the market
for a product evolves over time from ‘testing’ the market acceptance
through growth to saturation (maturity) and eventual decline according
to customer demand. In a similar way, the types of customer who buy the
products at diﬀerent stages of the life cycle can be used to identify market
segment strategies for products through time. Not all products follow the
same cycle: some never get oﬀ the drawing board; others never gain
market acceptance. Life cycles can be very diﬀerent in duration. Some
products, like whisky, are still successful, if declining, after more than 100
years. Mobile phones emerged in the early 1990s, were high growth for
nearly 10 years, but the market (in the USA and Western Europe) is now
maturing—most of the major manufacturers have announced plans to
cease production, in the near future, of the current generation of mobile
phones. Others, including many toys, go through the whole cycle in a few
months. The model does not work well in cases where the industry is
dominated by consumer fashions or fads, producing very short life cycles.
Whole industries also go through life cycles of emergence, growth,
maturity and decline, although, with improving economic conditions,
new markets have opened up for products in decline in more advanced
economies (e.g. cigarettes and electrical goods).
Relating the product life cycle to the market position produces the
2 × 2 matrix that plots market growth against relative market share
(see Figure 2.5). The four cells in the matrix reﬂect two of the stages
(growth and maturity) in the life cycle and the relative success of the
product vis-a`-vis competitive products. It is important to remember
that the matrix considers relative, not absolute market share. In high-
growth markets, demand exceeds supply and a price premium can be
obtained. High-growth markets attract many competitors and, hence, it
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is possible for many players to have proﬁtable products with a relatively
low market share due to the high prices obtainable. As markets mature,
prices are depressed since supply exceeds demand and the less successful
companies leave the market. Only those products able to compete on
price, due to low costs of production or by providing features valued
by customers, will still succeed. Maintaining a high relative share, by
increasing actual share, is essential to both customers’ perception of the
product and achieving necessary economies of scale. The position of a
product, or a whole business, on the matrix gives indications as to appro-
priate future strategies.
The ‘stars’ are products with high growth in demand and the best proﬁt
potential, provided a high market share is achieved. Star products
generate signiﬁcant revenue, but also require substantial investment in
order to establish themselves in the markets and provide the production
capacity or service delivery.
Products in the quadrant where market growth is high, but current
market share is low, are called ‘problem children’ or ‘wildcats’. These
products require a signiﬁcant investment but generate little cash in return.
The cash is sourced from the cash cows and is used to develop and
promote some of these wildcats, in the hope that they will achieve
higher market share and become tomorrow’s stars and future cash
Strategy Tools and Techniques 89
Figure 2.5 Product portfolio (source: Boston Consulting Group)
cows. Other wildcats should be disinvested, because they will never turn
into stars and may even become ‘dogs’ straightaway!
When the demand slows down as the market matures, the product is
well established and, although fewer new customers buy it, it generates
repeat sales. At this point, the previous star products require less cash to
be injected and should, given a strong market share, generate signiﬁcant
positive cash ﬂow. These are called ‘cash cows’. During this period, the
ﬁrm endeavours to maintain a level of product and service quality and
suﬃcient marketing to preserve its share of the market, but seeks lower
costs of supply, production and distribution to maintain the net cash
generation for as long as possible.
If a proﬁtable market share is never achieved or market share is eroded
as the product is superseded by new, better or cheaper products or by the
eﬀects of fashion, the product is becoming obsolescent and the company
must be wary of putting more money into the product with a consequent
reduced rate of return. These products are called ‘dogs’ and, ideally,
should be disinvested or targeted more precisely at those sectors of the
market where demand still exists.
The model emphasizes a few key issues in strategy:
. the need to manage products according to market opportunities and
pressures, not internal factors;
. the need to reinvest net cash inﬂows into future products to ensure
continuing sources of revenue;
. the need to have a complete and balanced portfolio if the business is
to thrive in the long term.
Increasing pressure from shareholders to dispense a greater share of the
proﬁts (from the cash cows) in dividends has created problems for even
successful companies, by reducing their ability to reinvest in the devel-
opment of future products and services.
Although the Boston Matrix is a useful analysis and planning model,
because it provides focus for key issues such as cash ﬂow, market share
and industry growth, it may oversimplify many of the factors involved in
achieving business success. Its underpinning rationale, derived from man-
ufacturing of products, is less valid in the service industries that now form
the majority of US and European organizations. Growth rate and market
shares are only two aspects of industry attractiveness and competitive
position, respectively, and more variables need to be considered. A
number of such matrices, their pros and cons and the detailed business
and management issues implied by the various segmentations are de-
scribed in detail by Higgins.17 Some are summarized here to give an
overview of the diﬀerent variables accommodated.
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Other Planning/Policy Matrices
These all extend the number of variables considered and hence the
options available, resulting in a 3 × 3 or 3 × 5 matrix, as shown in
Figure 2.6. Some matrices consider more of the stages in the product
and industry life cycles. As mentioned earlier, the Boston Matrix is
only really useful in the growth and mature stages in the full four-stage
cycle of emergence, growth, maturity and decline during which strategies
must change. High-growth markets are inherently more attractive but
other factors that make industries more or less attractive are: size,
market diversity, existing competitive structure, prices, proﬁtability, tech-
nology development eﬀects, and legal, social and environmental factors.
Market share obviously is a reﬂection of a company’s strength, but other
factors are important such as technology position, people, brand image,
ﬁnancial structure, capacity and strengths in related markets.
The ﬁrst stage in using any of the matrices is to understand the current
position of the business unit or product—x in Figure 2.6. Then, two
options exist for growth, by (i) developing the industry, perhaps also to
the beneﬁt of others, by product or service innovation or by attracting
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Figure 2.6 Policy/portfolio matrices
new types of customer, or (ii) gaining market share from competitors.
Equally, strategies need to be considered to defend the existing position
against industry decline or competitive pressure. In general, any strategy
must enable manageable moves through the matrix—then, new options
will open up as the business migrates over time. But, it is not realistic to
jump dramatically across the matrix unless some major innovation is
achieved that others cannot copy.
All of the matrices are useful in describing the current position of a
business and its products in relation to the market and the position of
competitors, and the consequent issues the strategy needs to address.
They help management to select feasible options from those potentially
available, both to improve the position and to counter threats from com-
petitors. They also enable changing positions to be monitored, the causes
and implications to be understood and the organization’s resources to be
allocated or reallocated to achieve the maximum overall beneﬁts to its
stakeholders.
Implications for IS/IT Strategy
Figure 2.4 shows typical aspects of the stages of a product life cycle,
especially those key business activities that could be enhanced by more
eﬀective IS/IT deployment. Industries can also be considered as having a
life cycle and most industries can be described as being in one of the four
stages at any particular time (e.g. the car industry is ‘mature’, whereas
mobile telephony is in ‘growth’, biotechnology is ‘emerging’ and agricul-
ture in Western countries is in ‘decline’). As strategies for a business will
be diﬀerent in emerging, growing, mature and declining industries, IS/IT
investments should be targeted diﬀerently, as with other investments. For
a particular product, investments in its promotion, distribution channels
and production capacity would be for diﬀerent purposes, at diﬀerent
stages of the life cycle and will vary in accordance with its market
position:
. For a wildcat product (low market share in a high-growth market),
the route to eventual success is likely to be through innovation in the
general marketplace or selecting a clearly-focused niche in the
market—a size of market segment that can be addressed eﬀectively.
Thus, the IS/IT strategy is likely to focus on product and/or process
development or, alternatively, be used to identify potential cus-
tomers, segment customer types and, then, ensure that eﬀective in-
formation exchanges occur about the product/service with the chosen
segment of customers, to enable exact speciﬁcation of service and
product requirements.
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. Star products and businesses (strong market position in an attractive
or high-growth market) imply a leading role for the company.
Keeping ahead of, or at least in pace with, developing customer
requirements and competing product oﬀerings is vital to success, as
is matching sales growth with market growth. Systems and informa-
tion focus will be toward the customer—identifying customers and
their requirements to achieve a better understanding of demand than
actual or potential competitors. The systems might also be aimed at
allowing growth in business, handling greater order volumes or
variety of product mixtures, or types of customer service. The main
emphasis will be on business innovation—to satisfy market require-
ments and diﬀerentiate the ﬁrm in that marketplace. Systems invest-
ment focus should therefore be to add value and cope with growth.
. Cash cow products and businesses (strong market position in mature,
lower-growth markets) are to be ‘milked’, by defending the current
position, ensuring that costs are lower than, or at least as low as,
those of competitors and that demand is satisﬁed in the optimum
way. Matching the details of supply and demand volumes is impor-
tant to keep customers satisﬁed, as is organizing resources and pro-
cesses to obtain maximum capacity utilization. Business productivity
and control of customers and suppliers to defend a market position is
the main aim—not to allow competitors to gain advantage—and
systems will tend to focus on control of the business relationships
and activities rather than innovation.
. Dog products and businesses (weak position in a low-growth or
declining market) are unlikely to attract much corporate investment
funding, unless it can clearly be seen to increase market share and/or
improve deliverable proﬁts. Divestment may be the eventual aim
and, so, it is often undesirable to consider integration of IS
strategy with the rest of the business. Alternatively, a niche market
may be carved out by segmenting the products/markets. In general,
IS/IT investment should follow the business direction—selective,
strongly ﬁnancially-justiﬁed investments to improve proﬁt perform-
ance by reducing costs or securing customers. Very little innovative
IS/IT use can be expected.
These suggestions may seem rather generalized, if only because the
matrices themselves make no claim to precise investment guidelines—
they are ways of helping understand situations, enabling the assessment
of diﬀerent options. If nothing else, they can help sharpen the debate
between managers. During the industry evolution cycle, a ﬁrm will
change its business focus from customers to products to customers, etc.
as the cycle evolves, in order to achieve market growth and improved
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market share (see Figure 2.7). Growth is more manageable if, at any
particular time, either the product or customer base is relatively stable.
Either existing products are marketed to a wider customer base or new
products are developed for a known set of customer needs. Information
systems focus can be expected to follow this pattern, being used to
attract, and establish channels to, potential new customers and support
the logistics of servicing those customers, or to enable the development
and delivery of new, better or lower-cost products or services to achieve
growth through existing market links. At no stage will the other param-
eter be ignored, but, at any one time, the emphasis is likely to be on
product or customer ‘development’.
Figure 2.7 only shows products and customers, whereas the model can
have a third dimension—distribution channels. The Internet has opened
up electronic channels to all types of customer, including directly to end-
consumers. Selecting the appropriate channel to serve target customer
groups or for delivery of the product or service is a key strategic
decision. The newer channels, call centres and the Internet are IS/IT
based and the development and operation of these customer links is an
integral part of both the business and IS/IT strategies. Managing the
channel mix (e.g. in a bank with branches, call centre and online
banking) is not just a matter of matching delivery to customers’ needs
in each channel, but also requires decisions on the extent of cross-channel
service integration to be provided.
Obviously, once a product or customer base has been extended, the
scope of the ﬁrm’s coverage has moved. Once a wider range of products
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have been developed for a known market, it probably means that a
broader market is now available. Equally, given that a broader market
for a restricted product range has been established, a wider variety of
needs are known and can be economically satisﬁed, justifying further
product investments.
Historically, diversiﬁcation—new products to new customers—has
usually proved unsuccessful, unless achieved in the steps above or by
acquisition. More recently, two approaches have proved more successful.
First, the establishment of ‘superbrands’, such as Virgin and Nike, has
enabled organizations to develop both new products and target new
market segments under the brand ‘umbrella’. Second, organizations
such as HSBC and the Prudential have set up separate new businesses
to sell, exclusively, telephone or Internet-based banking products to
customer segments where they are traditionally weak. In these cases,
the IS/IT strategy is very speciﬁc to that business unit and would not,
at this ‘wildcat’ stage at least, be linked to strategies elsewhere in the
business.
Competitive Forces and Competitive Strategies
The portfolio models described on pages 87–91 were the main tools of
strategic analysis in use in the 1960s and 1970s. They are still proving
useful today, but other approaches developed during the 1980s, mainly
by Porter,18 have had signiﬁcant inﬂuence in strategy formulation over
the last 20 years.
An enterprise exists within an industry, and, to succeed, it must eﬀec-
tively deal with the competitive forces that exist within the particular
industry. For example, the forces in an emerging industry such as bio-
technology or genetic engineering are considerably diﬀerent from those of
a growth industry, say leisure or ﬁnancial services, or the more mature or
declining industries such as automobiles or coal mining. In addition, the
pressures of operating globally, as in the software industry, are very
diﬀerent from those in localized industries, like DIY retailing, where
international competition is very limited at present.
The enterprise interacts with its customers, suppliers and competitors,
but, in addition to these interactions, there are potential new entrants
into the particular competitive marketplace and potential substitute
products and services. To survive and thrive in this environment, it is
obviously vital to understand these interactions and the implications, in
terms of how to avoid being disadvantaged and to understand the
opportunities to gain competitive advantage. Figure 2.8 outlines these
ﬁve forces—buyers, suppliers, competitors, new entrants and substitute
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products—and overlays some typical questions about the potential
impact of e-commerce on these forces.
At any one time, one or more of the forces may be exerting particular
pressure on the competing ﬁrms. The existing rivals may be competing
viciously via a price war and/or aggressive in new products and services
or advertising campaigns. Alternatively, competitors may be ‘cooperat-
ing’ to ward oﬀ an external threat. The buyers or suppliers may be
powerful enough to bargain away much of the proﬁtability available to
the ﬁrm and its immediate competitors. Increasing buyer and supplier
switching costs, making a change of relationship expensive, can reduce
that power. New companies may be a threat in terms of new entrants to
the industry because of low entry barriers or weak competitive rivals.
Substitute products are always possible, not just in terms of replacement
products or services but also as alternative ways for buyers to spend their
money (e.g. holidays versus luxury goods).
If all the forces are exerting intense pressure at the same time, the
company faces serious problems! But, if it addresses the competitive
forces according to their potential impact now and in the future, it can
establish a better business position than its rivals. Figure 2.8 suggests
some ways in which IS/IT can aﬀect these forces and this is considered
in more detail on page 103. Table 2.1 brieﬂy outlines the types of factor
that determine whether the forces will have a major inﬂuence on a
business.
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Figure 2.8 E-commerce in relation to industry competitive forces
Achieving long-term success in any competitive environment, accord-
ing to Porter’s rationale, results from being the lowest-cost producer of
the product or service or by diﬀerentiating it from those of competitors in
terms of its value, as perceived by the customers. Lowest cost is normally
associated with volume production (i.e. high market share), or by ﬂexible
manufacturing or distribution systems. These two strategies can either be
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Table 2.1 Factors affecting the impact of competitive forces
New entrants will be inhibited by:
. capital requirements;
. patents and specialist skills required;
. distribution channels available;
. achieved/required economies of scale and resultant cost advantages;
. number and size of existing rivals and intensity of competition;
. diﬀerentiation and brand establishment/loyalty;
. access to raw materials/critical resources, etc.
Substitute products/services (implies achieving a higher priority for customer
spend):
. customer awareness of needs and means of satisfaction;
. customer sensitivity to value for money and ability to compare;
. existing loyalty of customers—impact of ‘industry’ promotion;
. ability to diﬀerentiate products, etc.
Competitive rivalry will be intensiﬁed by:
. market growth slow (or in decline);
. small number of similar sized competitors dominate;
. high ﬁxed costs and/or high exit barriers for all rivals;
. overcapacity, and/or capacity increments are large units;
. commodity-like, undiﬀerentiated products, etc.
Buyers’ power will be increased by:
. concentrated/few buyers making high volume and/or high value of pur-
chases;
. low switching costs across suppliers;
. price sensitive and many alternative sources of supply;
. weak brand identities, products not diﬀerentiated;
. buyers capable of backward integration due to low ‘entry’ costs, etc.
Suppliers’ power will be increased by:
. few suppliers—high switching costs for rivals and suppliers deal with many
small customers;
. potential substitute supplier/resources not easily available;
. supplied goods make up large part of ﬁrms’ costs;
. suppliers capable of forward integration or bypass to customers, etc.
followed overall or by focusing on particular segments of the market—
‘niches’.
An example of these generic strategies can be seen by reference to
Mercedes. The Mercedes limousine is regarded in most parts of the
world as being the type of car that a successful businessman should be
driving. The company has consistently advertised its cars in that way,
with the emphasis always on high quality, high reliability and high
price—Mercedes is diﬀerentiating itself from its competitors in the execu-
tive car market. However, within Europe, the Mercedes is probably the
most common car to be seen in taxi ﬂeets. Taxi operators are not known
for their proﬂigate expenditure on executive cars, but are usually very
careful to assess the long-term costs of running their taxi ﬂeet. In this
regard, Mercedes comes out extremely well due to the emphasis of the
company on high reliability, low maintenance costs and high resale value,
thereby making their cars the most attractive, on average, for a taxi ﬂeet
operator. In this way, Mercedes is operating in the niche market of the
taxi ﬂeet operator by being the market leader using a low-cost strategy.
More recently, Mercedes has developed models to compete in the small
car market, where price competition is ﬁerce. It remains to be seen
whether it can achieve success in diﬀerentiating its product in a price-
sensitive mass market.
Some of the major requirements for an enterprise to be able to adopt
the two basic generic strategies are shown in Table 2.2. The key aspects of
each are quite diﬀerent and would imply diﬀerent organizational struc-
tures, types of people employed and management styles, resulting in quite
diﬀerent corporate cultures. The most common error that organizations
make is to get stuck between strategies by not deciding on their market
scope and basic source of advantage—low cost or diﬀerentiation. Con-
sequently, costs are too high and prices cannot be sustained, leading to
low margins.
Implications for IS/IT Strategy
These basic concepts of analysing competitive opportunities, threats and
strategies have been used by a number of people as a basis for considering
IS/IT and its potential impact. In the 1980s, Parsons,19 McFarlan,20
Cash21 and others used Porter’s models to examine how IS/IT had and
could impact certain industries and aﬀect any particular ﬁrm in that
industry, depending on its business position in the industry and its
adopted business strategy. More recently, Porter22 himself has applied
these models to explore the impact of the Internet on ﬁrms and industries.
This implies that the opportunities and threats that IS/IT can oﬀer and
pose will vary over time in an industry, partly due to the role IS/IT can
98 Business Strategy Concepts and the IS/IT Strategy Implications
play and partly due to the economic and competitive situation of the
industry. But, as with product innovation, IS/IT innovation can stimulate
new industry growth or, in some cases, hasten the decline of certain
industries. While the arrival of Amazon.com has had a serious impact
on traditional book retailers, the total sales of books have increased
signiﬁcantly. In some cases, IS/IT impact can be immediate and
obvious but, in others, the eﬀects are secondary and require other
changes in business economics and social behaviour or parallel develop-
ments in other ﬁelds before they become fully eﬀective. This is the case
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Table 2.2 Characteristics of generic strategies
Commonly required Common organizational
Generic strategy skills and resources requirements
Overall cost leadership Sustained capital Tight cost control,
investment and access frequent, detailed control
to capital reports
Process engineering skills Structured organization
and responsibilities
Intense supervision of Incentives based on
labour meeting strict
quantitative targets
Diﬀerentiation Strong marketing abilities Strong coordination
and creative ﬂair among functions in
R&D, product
development, and
marketing
Product-engineering skills Subjective measurement
and incentives instead of
quantitative measures
(market-based
incentives)
Strong capability in basic Amenities to attract
research highly-skilled labour or
creative people
Corporate reputation for Looser, more trusting
quality or technological organizational
leadership relationships
Strong cooperation from
distribution channels
with e-retailing in 2002, the predicted eﬀects being dependent more on
costs of distribution and changes in shopping preferences and habits,
than on the ability to browse and purchase online—the demise of
online grocer Webvan being indicative of this.
Industry Analysis
Both Parsons and McFarlan address this area by posing questions: ‘Can
IS/IT . . .?’, suggesting that management should ask questions regarding
how IS/IT could aﬀect the essential industry ingredients:
. the products and services;
. markets, distribution channels and customer behaviour;
. economics of production, distribution or servicing.
Obviously, if IS/IT can have a major eﬀect on any of these, the implica-
tions for all the competing ﬁrms are signiﬁcant, and management must
consider, in more depth, how those eﬀects will or could manifest them-
selves.
1. How can/could IS/IT aﬀect the nature and value of the product or
service and its life cycle?
. Financial and business information services such as Dun &
Bradstreet and Reuters have developed new services for commer-
cial organizations to interrogate directly, as have brokers and
banks, enabling new ways of trading shares and securities and
making new types of bank account available to consumers.
. Online journals are rapidly replacing printed versions. The
new products can be customized to meet the needs of
particular groups and provide links to topic coverage across
editions. Search engines, based on new sophisticated algorithms,
can greatly speed up inquiries. Consequently, many university
libraries are now mainly network access points to electronically-
published papers.
. Life insurance companies can develop new insurance and
pension policy types, providing complex investment combina-
tions from concept to the target market in weeks rather than
months. This can render older products uncompetitive very
quickly, creating problems of long-term commitments to sup-
porting obsolete products.
. Many recruitment services now operate exclusively via the
Internet. Job applications can only be submitted electronically
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in many cases, even if the job advertisement is posted in the
traditional media. The initial response and ﬁlter of applications
is often done via computer systems, rather than people—an
essential feature given the global reach of online job adverts
and the potentially high volume of interest!
In general terms, the questions to be asked are: can IS/IT generate a new
product or a new line of business, or enable, or be used to add additional
features or services to increase the product’s value—as perceived by the
consumer/customer—to change the basis for purchasing? This is gener-
ally more feasible if the product has a very high information content.
2. How can/could IS/IT aﬀect the demand for products and services,
segment markets more eﬀectively, extend them geographically, or
provide new distribution channels to reach the market?
. Well-known examples are the new ‘direct’ ﬁnancial service com-
panies such as First Direct and Direct Line insurance; and, more
recently, the online-only banks such as Egg, Cahoot and IF are
able to oﬀer consumers ﬁnancial products by telephone and the
Internet, removing the need for branches and intermediaries. By
doing so, they have a signiﬁcant cost advantage over traditional
rivals and are also able to gather information from customers to
understand their needs better. In particular, younger customers
are attracted to these ‘modern’ products and services, whereas
they would probably not consider the traditional services oﬀered
by the same companies.
. Feeny23 cites a number of examples of successful online market-
ing, including Amazon’s prompting customers about new books,
based on their proﬁle of previous purchases. Dell not only oﬀer a
product conﬁguration service online, plus product purchasing,
but also conﬁgurable support services for corporate customers.
. Most auction-based markets had been revolutionized over the
past 20 years by IS/IT, even before the arrival of the Internet.
The eﬀects on share dealing, securities and currency markets are
well known—parochial markets are now global and the ﬁrms
dealing in those markets are no longer dependent upon the
services of specialist or ‘licensed’ traders. Much of the trading
is actually done by the computer systems, implying that the
systems are causing market behaviour!
The use of the Internet has produced new kinds of auction, both
consumer and commercial, thereby changing the buying and selling
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processes for many products and services, not just ‘information’
products. Euronext, the result of the merger of the Amsterdam,
Brussels and Paris stock exchanges, has launched exchange-traded wine
futures while BordeauxIndex.com and WorldwineXchange.com have de-
veloped derivative products.24 Electronic marketplaces or trading hubs
now exist in most industries and are forecast to handle a large proportion
of trading transactions over the next 10 years.25
Again, the typical questions to be asked are: Can IS/IT enable us to
reach more, or more appropriate, customers or to match our diﬀerent
products/services to customers more appropriately or enable the product
or service to be distributed in new ways? Or can we use IS/IT to get closer
to the marketplace rather than deal through intermediaries? These ques-
tions are considered again, in more detail, in the context of the industry
value chain and the role of information in Chapter 5.
3. How can IS/IT aﬀect the cost base of the key processes in the industry
or change the balance in the trade-oﬀ between ﬂexibility and standar-
dization?
. An obvious example is the publishing industry, where the use of
IS/IT from the basic preparation of material by authors to the
ﬁnal printing process has dramatically changed the basic eco-
nomics of producing newspapers, journals, magazines and
books. The revolution in newspaper production is well documen-
ted. Journalists can produce stories remotely and transmit them
electronically, the edition of the paper can be set on ‘desktop’
publishing systems and transmitted for printing to as many loca-
tions as necessary. Not only has the production cost base been
dramatically altered, so have the economics of distributing the
newspapers. The revolution in book production may not be so
obvious but, given the reduced set-up time per book, the
economic batch runs become much smaller, enabling:
– lower-selling books to become proﬁtable;
– more books to be available on the market due to lower
launch costs;
– the ability to respond to demand changes more quickly and
accurately.
. Automated warehouses, linking physical goods access to logistics
and inventory systems, enable some wholesaling companies to
stock much wider ranges of goods and respond to customers’
orders more quickly and anticipate changing demand earlier.
Delivery routes and order proﬁtability can also be optimized.
Tracking systems enable carriers to identify the exact location
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of any consignment at any time and provide more accurate
delivery information to the customer. Much of this can be
made directly accessible by customers over the Internet.
. Digitization of documents and images has enabled the automa-
tion of many back-oﬃce processes in information-intensive
industries, such as insurance. When combined with workﬂow
technology, both productivity and customer service can be
improved in handling both new business applications and
approvals and claims. This has kept costs down and allowed
the organizations to deal with business volumes barely foreseen
10 years ago.
Once more, these are only examples, but they should prompt the follow-
ing types of question: Can IS/IT enable the product/service to be
produced more economically or enable production and associated logis-
tics to be integrated to produce greater ﬂexibility of resource use? Or can
improved logistics and control change the basic working capital structure
of the industry? Or can IS/IT enable a higher quality of product or service
to be oﬀered at a much lower cost than traditionally?
This ﬁrst level of ‘interrogation’ of IS/IT potential in the industry
focuses on products, markets and economics and considers options avail-
able to all the ﬁrms in the industry and, importantly, to potential new
entrants, including start-up companies, who can exploit new technology
to develop and sell new products or services, or create new channels that
address the needs of some or all the industry customer base, or both.
Gaining an advantage at this level is diﬃcult for others to counter except
by copying or by risking even more dramatic and eﬀective innovation.
Consequently, many of the anecdotes of sustained success derive from
companies who have fundamentally changed one of these aspects. These
changes are irreversible in that, if the factors for success in the industry
and the relevant capabilities required by companies wishing to succeed in
the industry are fundamentally altered, the competitive game will have a
new set of rules!
Analysis of Competitive Forces to Identify IS/IT
Opportunity and Threats
Each of the ﬁve forces described on page 96 should be examined by
questioning whether IS/IT can aﬀect the nature and degree of impact
that force has on determining the future of the industry or the balance
of power of the ﬁrms in the industry. These factors were outlined in Table
2.1.
In the airline industry, all competitive forces have been and are still
being aﬀected by the use of IS/IT, as described in Table 2.3. IS/IT has
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had a considerable impact on all forces in the industry because of the
nature of the ‘product’, how it is purchased and the information needed
to be exchanged in order to complete a transaction. Other industries,
such as ﬁnancial services and publishing, are even more information
intensive in that the product itself is information. Even in other indus-
tries, where the bases of competition are not as dependent on information
as airlines, travel, ﬁnancial services and publishing, one or more of the
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Table 2.3 The airline industry: how IS/IT has affected competitive forces
1. How can IS/IT build barriers By increasing IT entry cost for reservation
to entry? systems (£20m+)
By tying in distribution channels (travel
agencies)
By sharing capacity and ticketing costs via
alliances and integrated systems
2. How can IS/IT build in By linking purchasing and remittance
switching costs for customers? systems to reduce overheads of customer
Discount/volume packages to discourage
piecemeal purchase
3. How can IS/IT change the Lower costs: optimize yield per aircraft
basis of competition?
Diﬀerentiate service: reconﬁguring aircraft
due to demand
Niche/focus service into high yield sectors
(e.g. business travel)
Low-cost/low-price ‘no frills’ service with
online direct booking, bypassing agents
4. How can IS/IT change the Agent is constantly aware of seat
balance of power in supplier/ availability of competing airlines
customer relationship?
Airline can readily promote unsold capacity
via chosen agents or direct to customers via
online booking with variable pricing based
on sales patterns
5. How can IS/IT generate new Integrated travel package to high mileage
products/services? business customers, bypassing agencies
New routes/schedules to cater for demand
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forces has been signiﬁcantly impacted by an enterprise using IS/IT quite
deliberately to achieve a competitive advantage.
Over the last 20 years, food supermarkets have built barriers to entry
through Electronic Point of Sale (EPOS) systems linked to purchasing
and logistics—the size of the investment and control of the supply chains
reducing the potential for new entrants. More recently, via loyalty cards,
Tesco and other retailers have increased consumer switching costs as well
as obtained valuable information on buying patterns, enabling both
higher leverage over suppliers and the tailoring of store layout and
product mix to the local market. In addition, by building basic ﬁnancial
products through the loyalty cards they have become new entrants in the
ﬁnancial service industry. Finally, the same infrastructure has facilitated
a move into online e-tailing, extending the range of options to the
customer, and limiting the scope for new entrants or substitute services
to gain a foothold.
The Internet has changed the competitive landscape in many
industries and new business and industry models are beginning to
emerge. In general, three eﬀects seem to happen across most industries.
Buyer power increases as more choice becomes available online, through
portals and search engines; buying groups, normally based on a common
interest, have emerged to produce collective rather than individual buying
power. Both disintermediation (cutting out existing intermediaries by
selling direct via the Net) and reintermediation (new ﬁrms providing
information-based services connecting buyers and a range of sellers)
can occur through the industry supply or value chain. As mentioned
earlier, trading hubs, auctions and e-market places are expected to
have a major inﬂuence over both selling and procurement processes in
the next decade and may lead to restructuring in some industries.
Combined with the inherent global reach of online trading, actual and
potential competitors are no longer restricted by geography; these
changes imply a wider view of the competitive issues has to be taken.
The response in most cases is to tighten the links, especially information
sharing, between the sellers and their customers to increase switching
costs and prevent ‘gaps’ appearing that new entrants can exploit.
For any ﬁrm in any industry, the questioning process, according
to Porter and Millar26 and others, should proceed in two stages.
First, what forces are determining the future of the industry and our
potential success? Who dominates the industry and by what strategy?
For example:
. Who might enter the industry, why and what would the eﬀect be?
. What substitute products might aﬀect the market for existing
products?
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. On what basis are we currently competing and how might that
change?
. What leverage do suppliers exert and how could the control of key
resources aﬀect success?
. How much power and discretion do buyers (customers) have and
how will this change market/product possibilities?
As indicated in Figure 2.8, the potential of IS/IT to cause these changes is
increasingly important in the analysis. However, these are all business
questions, the result of which may be that only one or two of the
forces are critical at any particular time. Once that has been established,
more speciﬁc IS/IT questions should focus on these areas of concern—
both opportunities and threats—to identify the available options. A ﬁnal
stage should then be to reverse the thinking process by looking at the
other, less critical, forces to identify whether IS/IT could change their
importance in the future. Cash27 takes this view and suggests a general set
of actual or potential implications. A modiﬁed version of his analysis is
presented in Table 2.4. While this analysis dates from the 1980s, the
options and issues it suggests have become even more relevant today.
Generic Business Strategies
Companies that succeed in an industry in the long term need to outper-
form the competitors, either by achieving lower costs or by diﬀerentiating
themselves in the view of the customer, enabling them to obtain a price
premium. Some companies, for a period of time at least, can achieve
both. For instance, Kodak in the 1960s and early 1970s achieved this
in the colour ﬁlm market and IBM in the 1970s with mainframe com-
puters. Most companies, however, have to strive for one advantage or the
other, at least in the short to medium term.
The other critical decision is to deﬁne the extent of the market within
which the company wishes to gain that advantage. The scope can be
deﬁned as ‘industry wide’, implying that the company must have a
range of products to meet the requirements of the majority of potential
customers. Ford and General Motors in the car industry are good
examples, as are the big four UK banks in the ﬁnancial services
industry. Other companies choose a segment of the marketplace, focus
on a particular niche to obtain an advantage by matching their products
and services to the needs of a subset of the potential customers. BMW,
Volvo, Jaguar and Mercedes are all examples of companies focusing in
the motor industry. The UK’s Giro Bank, while oﬀering similar services
to the major banks, has tended to focus its services on the lower-income
end of the consumer market.
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Table 2.4 Impact of competitive forces and potential IS/IT opportunities (source:
adapted from J. Cash, ‘Interorganizational systems: An information society oppor-
tunity or threat?’, The Information Society, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1988, 98–110)
Key force impacting
the industry Business implications Potential IS/IT eﬀects
Threat of new entrants Additional capacity Provide entry barriers/
Reduced prices reduce access by:
New basis for competition – exploiting existing
economies of scale
– diﬀerentiate
products/services
– control distribution
channels
– segment markets
Buyer power high Forces prices down Diﬀerentiate products/
Demand higher quality services and improve
Require service ﬂexibility price/performance
Encourage competition Increase switching costs,
of buyers
Facilitate buyer product
selection
Supplier power high Raises prices/costs Supplier sourcing
Reduced quality of supply systems
Reduced availability Extended quality control
into suppliers
Forward planning with
supplier
Substitute products Limits potential market Improve price/
threatened and proﬁt performance
Price ceilings Redeﬁne products and
services to increase value
Redeﬁne market
segments
Intense competition Price competition Improve price/
from rivals Product development performance
Distribution and service Diﬀerentiate products
critical and services in
Customer loyalty required distribution channel
and to consumer
Get closer to the
end-consumer—
understand the
requirements
The role of IS/IT in enabling and supporting each of the fundamental
generic strategies—low cost and diﬀerentiation—will be considered ﬁrst.
The essential business characteristics of these two strategies were de-
scribed in Table 2.2.
Low-cost Strategy
Cost leadership strategies require the organization to identify the lowest-
cost approaches to the direct activities of the business, minimize the
indirect/overhead expenses and provide management with detailed re-
porting on all aspects of ﬁxed and variable costs incurred and their
recovery. Low cost is achieved through structure and conformity and
‘value engineering’ the processes of the business, plus accuracy in
control and measurement of performance, and early identiﬁcation and
action when variances occur from expected results—a ‘systems’ environ-
ment. Traditionally, IS/IT has been employed process by process, often
causing ineﬃciency between processes. If that ineﬃciency is moved into
the customer and passed back to the supplier, then the low cost may be
oﬀset by other problems. But, again, IS/IT oﬀers potential solutions.
Black and Decker, for instance, achieves low costs by moving stock
into dealers early in the product season (e.g. lawnmowers) and does
not want returns! Dealers, however, may well misjudge demand and
either end up with too many or not enough to satisfy their customers.
Black and Decker did not want dissatisﬁed customers and provided a
network for dealers to exchange shortage/surplus stock information,
which the company would then help in redistributing—anything to
avoid returns! Ryanair, the no-frills airline, uses the Internet to support
its low-cost strategy. It sells over 90% of seats over the Internet, bypass-
ing more expensive channels such as call centres and travel agents.
In such an environment, systems will be required to deal with basic
business information processes eﬃciently and link them together eﬀec-
tively, not necessarily to produce a highly-integrated information
resource. Flexibility in systems increases their cost of development and
operation; simple systems, often standard packages implemented without
change, are more cost-eﬀective and force user adherence and conformity.
Integration can reduce the opportunities to improve the eﬃciency of any
particular process as technology oﬀers further, speciﬁc cost savings. In-
formation is not seen as a key resource for exploitation, but as an
overhead cost to be processed eﬃciently with minimum additional IS/
IT overhead! Integration produces added-value potential but incurs over-
heads. Electronic commerce, for example, will probably provide cost
advantages if it is used to avoid processing paper—orders, invoices,
statements—(i.e. more eﬃcient transaction handling). It also enables
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invoices to be rendered unnecessary by triggering funds transfer at a
certain period after goods receipt (to be reconciled later). The relative
costs to both customer and supplier of paperwork processing and debtor
funding can be optimized. This is linking two systems together to produce
greater eﬃciency in both. Similar relationships can also be continually
improved by better systems within the organization.
Diﬀerentiation Strategy
The majority of organizations have to follow a diﬀerentiation strategy,
since, theoretically at least, only one company can have cost leadership of
a product or service at any one time. The essential emphases are innova-
tion and creativity, market orientation and people-driven rather than
systems-driven management controls. For instance, incentive schemes
will be market or sales based, not production based. Often, key com-
ponents of diﬀerentiation will be the creation of strong brand and cor-
porate images and close, mutually beneﬁcial links with distribution
channel ﬁrms. The strategic use of IS/IT will focus on enabling new
things to be achieved or existing things to be done better. That is not
to say that opportunities to use IS/IT to reduce cost will be ignored.
In the 1980s, pharmaceutical distributor McKesson diﬀerentiated itself
in serving drugstores by taking over many of the systems aspects of
running a small business—stock control, ordering, sales analysis, pre-
scription insurance processing, etc. These systems became most eﬀective
when the drugstore dealt with only one supplier! Other distributors took
the matter to court, crying foul over ‘one supplier agreement’. The drug-
stores supported McKesson, denying that they were under any obligation
to buy only from McKesson—they just preferred to!
While basic business process systems will need to operate eﬃciently in
dealing with the bulk of transactions and basic calculation and reporting
requirements, the value of having ﬂexibility to extract information from
an integrated database or comprehensive data warehouse will drive the
systems toward sophistication and user tailoring rather than standard
solutions. Even where major packages such as ERP or CRM software
are implemented for core processes, it is likely that additional function-
ality will be needed to address the organizational subtleties that lead to
diﬀerentiation. If mismanaged this can, of course, lead to unnecessary
spending on IS/IT.
The opportunities for strategic advantages will derive from asking such
questions as how can IS/IT help:
. ﬁnd out more about customer requirements?
. monitor customer perceptions of service?
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. enable rapid and accurate response to customer queries?
. provide a range of delivery options to meet customer needs?
. reduce new product introduction lead times?
. enable knowledge sharing across the organization to facilitate
innovation?
Companies that achieve greatest success realize that costs must be
controlled and value must be added. For IS/IT this means that, in any
organization, cost-reduction and value-adding opportunities will exist—
but the driving forces will be diﬀerent depending on the prevailing generic
strategy.
Niche/Focus Strategy
Within a market niche, an organization will need to adopt a diﬀerentia-
tion or low-cost strategy to achieve long-term success in that niche. All
that has been said in the previous two sections will then apply. However,
in addition, IS/IT may be a competitive weapon in identifying and then
establishing a strong hold on a particular niche.
An example quoted by Meyer and Boone28 is of a relocation service
ﬁrm that developed systems to enable them to provide comprehensive
services to people who were moving house due to company relocation in
New England (i.e. a market sector of ‘enforced moves’). The service not
only located suitable housing but could satisfy other speciﬁc requirements
such as schooling, leisure facilities and mortgage arrangements. Not only
was it a service to buyers, but also to sellers where houses on oﬀer could
be channelled towards ‘enforced movers’, who would be likely to be more
reliable purchasers. The total service advantage to an individual both
buying and selling was signiﬁcant. Companies were keen that employees
used such a service to minimize the delays and stress involved in moving
employees around locations. The service would not have been possible, at
an economic service cost, but for a comprehensive system linked through-
out the oﬃce network. On the Internet, many estate agents now provide
similar services.
In general terms, the uses of IS/IT to achieve success in a limited subset
of a general market will be in:
. identifying the target market, and developing a unique base of in-
formation about the selected market and its needs; and/or
. establishing a specialist process via systems to produce a clear cost
advantage or distinctive customer value proposition vis-a`-vis general
market servers; and/or
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. linking the organization via systems into the business processes of
customers to increase switching costs and establish potential barriers
to re-entry from general market servers.
A RESOURCE-BASED VIEW OF STRATEGY
It was stated earlier in the chapter that these planning tools have evolved
since the 1950s and are continuing to evolve. Until the 1990s, the
approach to deﬁning strategies was based on establishing objectives
and then deﬁning how to achieve them—the traditional ‘ends–ways–
means’ approach. In the 1990s, many strategic thinkers, building on
the work of Wernerfelt,29 Barney30 and others, started to develop new
ways of considering strategies. Is there value in the concept of looking at
means, then ways, then ends; that is, deﬁning what resources are available
to the enterprise as a basis for deﬁning what can be achieved by the
enterprise? Or, equally, consideration of the ways the organization does
things uniquely or exceptionally well—its abilities or competencies—may
lead to deﬁning more appropriate ends or the procurement and develop-
ment of improved, more valuable resources.
Over the past few years, the approach to strategic management has
evolved toward a balance or reconciliation between competitive position-
ing and resource or competence-based strategic development. While many
of the tools and models described earlier in this chapter enable organiza-
tions to understand their competitive environment and strategic options,
the resulting strategy is essentially reactive. As ‘strategic thinking’, as
opposed to strategic analysis or planning, began to emerge, the suggestion
was that longer-term success would result from a realignment of the
organization’s resources and capabilities to match the demands of the
environment. This implies a closer examination of an organization’s
assets, skills, knowledge processes, culture, etc. and how each of those
attributes needs to be realigned. In some cases, the mismatch was con-
siderable and radical readjustment was necessary and, in the early 1990s,
‘re-engineering the business’ became a hot topic. Business re-engineering is
not a strategy, it is the means of changing strategies in response to a
changing environment, where continuous or incremental change is insuf-
ﬁcient. Unfortunately, many organizations only require changing
radically because they have not been adjusting continuously over time.
It is clearly diﬃcult to achieve radical change successfully in an enterprise
that has not changed for a considerable time. Either by incremental,
continuous realignment or radical change, organizations are essentially
trying to establish a set of competencies that will deliver future success. To
be successful in Stage 4 of the maturity model by sustaining advantages,
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can create (see Figure 2.1) an organizational need to develop a unique set
of resources or competencies that others cannot easily acquire or replicate.
Inherent in this argument is that the knowledge an organization possesses
is both a resource and a source of competence. The term ‘knowledge
management’ emerged in the last decade and, while it is not a ‘technical’
issue, it implies an extended role for IS/IT in creating organization
capabilities.
Creating a sustainable advantage in that environment, through some
unique business capability, requires a further form of assessment. Porter’s
generic strategies are a starting point, since he argues that ‘low cost’ or
‘diﬀerentiation’ provide that sustainable advantage. However, these
concepts do not seem to address all the options available and also
leave many questions about how lowest cost or diﬀerentiation can be
achieved.
Competencies and Competitive Advantage
Based on the concept of resource-based strategies, Treacy and Wiersma31
suggest that there are ‘three paths to market leadership’, each of which
require diﬀerent sets of competencies and in each of which IS/IT has a
critical role to play. That is not to say that there are only three routes,
although the three—‘Operational (or Process) Excellence’, ‘Customer
Intimacy’ and ‘Product Leadership’—probably cover a signiﬁcant range
of the possibilities. They are simple yet useful concepts in enabling
business managers to deﬁne medium-term business strategy and establish
an appropriate IS/IT strategy. They are a way of expressing quite suc-
cinctly a necessary alignment between internal capabilities and ambitions
and the requisites for success in a particular environment, at a certain
time (see Figure 2.9):
1. Operational Excellence—enabling products and services to be
obtained reliably, easily and cost-eﬀectively by customers. This
implies a focus on business processes to outperform others and can
deliver both low costs and consistent quality of customer satisfaction.
Treacy and Wiersma quote examples such as Dell Computers, Wal-
Mart and Federal Express as leaders in operational excellence in their
industries. In all cases, the companies’ information systems invest-
ments are a critical component enabling business simpliﬁcation and
eﬃcient processes that are highly integrated throughout the core
activities of the business. An example of such a strategy is General
Electric (GE), which eﬀectively reinvented the supply chain for white
goods with new information systems. Instead of encouraging dealers
to hold stock of GE’s products by oﬀering discounts for bulk
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purchase, GE refuses dealers purchases for stock, but provides de-
monstration models, against which customers can order for next day
direct delivery through GE’s ‘Direct Connect’ system. GE holds all
the stock and dealers can order any model online, on behalf of the
customer. Dealers are now eﬀectively paid commission on sales made
rather than items purchased. This enables GE to encourage cus-
tomers to buy the latest models rather than the often older models
stocked in large quantities by dealers. The system has helped smaller
dealers to compete more eﬀectively with large discount warehouses,
enabling them to meet more of the customers’ needs, and has reduced
stock holdings in the supply chain by about 12%. Also, since GE has
to arrange delivery, it gathers useful consumer data. The direct
insurers, led by Direct Line, have had a dramatic impact on the
general insurance industry by simplifying the processes for selling
policies and handling claims. By carrying out most transactions by
telephone (and now online) and having integrated systems, it has
both reduced costs and hence premiums and improved customer
satisfaction with the responsiveness and eﬃciency of the service.
2. Customer Intimacy—targeting markets very precisely and tailoring
products and services to the needs of particular customer groups.
The purpose here is not just to ‘satisfy’ but to ‘please’ customers
by understanding their needs and meeting them on every occasion.
This can obviously be expensive but it can build long-term customer
loyalty. Examples quoted include Home Depot, a DIY retailer whose
purpose is to ‘solve the consumer’s home-repair problems’ rather
than merely sell products, and Kraft and Frito Lay in consumer
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Figure 2.9 Forces that shape strategy
packaged goods, who both oﬀer an extensive range of products to
match the preferences of many diﬀerent types of consumer. Their
information systems enable a retail outlet to tailor the ‘product
oﬀer’ to the locality through ‘micro-merchandising’ programs aﬀect-
ing product range, promotion, pricing and store layout. Within such
a strategy, information systems will focus on collecting and analysing
customer information, covering not merely purchases but also other
relevant attributes and feedback on products and services. This
enables careful segmentation of the marketplace and targeting of
the desired segments. In almost all the examples quoted, deciding
who not to sell to, especially those who buy merely on price, is as
important as targeting desired customers. In the UK, an example of
customer intimacy is RS Components, who sell by mail order elec-
trical and other components to engineers. The ‘customers’ are the
engineers, not the organizations they work for, and RS eﬀectively
provide a problem-solving and rapid delivery service, for which the
engineer, and consequently his organization, is happy to pay a
premium. The extra cost is easily oﬀset by the time the engineer
saves in determining what he or she needs to buy and where to
get it.
3. Product Leadership—continuing product innovation meeting cus-
tomers’ needs. This implies not only creativity in developing new
products and enhancing existing ones, but also astute market knowl-
edge to ensure that they sell. The strategy involves delivering a con-
tinuous stream of new products and/or services, where what is new is
valued by the customers. Johnson & Johnson are quoted as a good
example of a ‘product leader’, and a particular instance quoted is its
contact lens business, where it pioneered the introduction of dis-
posable lenses. The rapid gain of market acceptance and market
share were due not only to the innovative product itself but to new
systems to control the manufacturing and distribution of the
product, which is more akin to fast-moving consumables than tradi-
tional eye-care products. 3M has traditionally followed a product
leadership strategy in the adhesives and coating market, and the
story of Post-it notepads is now legendary—how a ‘failed’ new
adhesive became the basis for a best-selling product—what would
we do without it?
Although these three competence-based strategies are not the only routes
to success, they can be used to:
. Understand and agree the main direction, rationale and focus of the
business’s strategy. Although Treacy and Wiersma quote examples of
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companies succeeding in more than one dimension, most organiza-
tions can be successful by excelling in one of them. Most strategies
imply ‘majoring’ on one of these areas for the next stage of develop-
ment—probably one to two years ahead. At the same time, the
business must not become uncompetitive in the other two. Action
may well be needed to (say) ensure that its processes do not become
markedly less eﬀective than those of its competitors while it develops
its new products, or costs will increase too quickly. Alternatively, it
must not dissatisfy its customers while making major improvements
in operational eﬀectiveness. Figure 2.10 attempts to show this in
terms of the relative degree of competence required to achieve ad-
vantage (prosper), sustain its position (succeed) or avoid merely
ﬁghting for survival.
. Gain consensus and agreement among the business management
about what has to improve and why, which can be critical in estab-
lishing the ‘themes’ behind both the business and IS strategy, as
described in Chapter 3. The set of planned investments on IS/IT
should relate to overcoming deﬁciencies in existing capabilities and
to developing the organization’s future competencies. Otherwise, the
organization will be unable to link the priorities for IS/IT investment
to other business-development initiatives and change programs that
are essential to achieving the strategy.
These aspects of strategic management have signiﬁcant implications for
the overall role of IS/IT, which can be a diﬀerentiating competency or
may be an essential ingredient to support, enable or enhance other
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Figure 2.10 Advantage and disadvantage—dimensions of competency (source:
M. Treacy and F. Wiersma, The Discipline of Market Leaders: Choose Your Cus-
tomers, Narrow Your Focus, Dominate Your Market, HarperCollins, London,
1995)
competencies. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the development of an ‘IS
capability’—a combination of competencies and resources—that can be
instrumental in creating, delivering and sustaining advantage is discussed
in later chapters.
SUMMARY
It is vital that the IS/IT strategies and plans be linked directly to the
objectives and strategies of the business unit and of the corporation as
a whole. There are now a number of examples where IS/IT strategy
formulation and planning takes place within the same process as cor-
porate strategy formulation and planning, and, indeed, the entire
strategy process is now fully integrated. However, the evidence, as
quoted in Chapter 1, is that this applies to a minority of organizations,
as yet.
Each of the tools and techniques described above has been shown to
have value in the various strategy development and planning processes. If
there are going to be close links between IS/IT and business strategies,
then these same tools and techniques should have direct relevance in IS/
IT strategy formulation and planning, if only because they enable
business managers to become positively and actively involved.
Traditionally, IS/IT was seen as an instrument of implementation of
strategy. In many of its uses, it is still exactly that; however, as described
in Chapter 1 and shown in Figure 1.5, IS/IT now has to be considered as
an input to business strategy, in terms of its potential to change this
strategy or create new strategies. It must be remembered that the same
IS/IT-based opportunities may also exist for competitors and, therefore,
IS/IT can constitute a threat, just like a new competitive product.
The next task is to establish that context for IS/IT strategy more
coherently. Chapter 3 will develop models and approaches to IS/IT
strategy development—but all those models and approaches recognize
the need to link eﬀectively to the business strategy, its determination
and management, both to achieve alignment of the strategies and to
take advantage of the strategic opportunities IS/IT can create.
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3
Developing an IS/IT Strategy:
Establishing Effective
Processes
Developing an IS/IT strategy is taken to mean thinking strategically and
planning for the eﬀective long-term management and optimal impact of
information in all its forms: information systems (IS) and information
technology (IT) incorporating manual and computer systems, computer
technology and telecommunications. It also includes organizational
aspects of the management of IS/IT.
A concise but somewhat narrower deﬁnition oﬀered by Lederer and
Sethi1 is ‘the process of deciding the objectives for organizational com-
puting and identifying potential computer applications which the organ-
ization should implement.’ A further perspective, underpinning the close
relationship between business and IS strategies is: ‘An IS strategy brings
together the business aims of the company, an understanding of the
information needed to support those aims, and the implementation of
computer systems to provide that information. It is a plan for the devel-
opment of systems towards some future vision of the role of IS in the
organization.’2 A more recent deﬁnition, which ﬁts with the approach of
this book, is ‘the process of identifying a portfolio of computer-based
applications to be implemented, which is both highly aligned with
corporate strategy and has the ability to create an advantage over
competitors.’3
The most common aims for organizations adopting an IS/IT strategy
process are:
. alignment of IS/IT with the business to identify where IS/IT con-
tributes most, and the determination of priorities for investment;
. gaining competitive advantage from business opportunities created
by using IS/IT;
. building a cost-eﬀective, yet ﬂexible technology infrastructure for the
future;
. developing the appropriate resources and competencies to deploy IS/
IT successfully across the organization.
This chapter is concerned with establishing a framework and process for
developing IS/IT strategies. It assumes that it must be closely integrated
with business strategy, and that, to be eﬀective, it must be a continuous
process, with a ﬂow of deliverables that dovetail with the outcomes of
business strategic thinking and planning.
Where an IS/IT strategy-formulation process has not become estab-
lished, it may be necessary to undertake initiatives in one or more areas of
the business, to foster awareness of the importance of delivering real
beneﬁts to the business through the deliberate application of IS/IT in
support of its critical business needs, and to achieve the transition in
an acceptable timescale. This will also oﬀer the opportunity to ensure
that old, inappropriate planning methods are stopped, and better, more
comprehensive approaches are adopted. The process should introduce
the required disciplines, controls and new techniques, establish good
relationships, and identify tasks and responsibilities and thus deﬁne
planning resource requirements. However, as soon as possible, the IS/
IT strategy process needs to become an integral part of the development
of business strategy, business plans and their subsequent implementation.
One of the most compelling arguments for integrating business and IS
strategy formulation and planning is so that the ﬁnite resources of the
business can be allocated in a coherent manner to achievable strategies
and plans that collectively will deliver beneﬁts to the business.
The IS/IT Strategy Process: Some Deﬁnitional Clarity
The writings in the area of IS/IT strategy can be a little confusing, not
least because of the variety of terms encountered and the inconsistent
usage of language for seemingly similar concepts. In the research litera-
ture, ‘strategic information systems planning’ (SISP), ‘information
systems planning’ (ISP), ‘information systems strategy planning’ (ISSP)
and ‘business systems planning’ are just some of the terms frequently
encountered. Examining the meanings of these concepts as they are
used reveals that they are essentially similar. Indeed, the emphasis on
‘planning’ probably originates as a consequence of portraying IS/IT as
part of the implementation of the business strategy—IS/IT investments
were planned once the business strategy had been formulated. With IS/IT
increasingly shaping the strategy of a business, the strategizing aspect
must be emphasized.
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In this book, a distinction is made between IS/IT strategy formulation
and IS/IT planning—this diﬀerence between ‘strategy’ and ‘planning’ was
addressed in Chapter 2. Formulation is concerned with developing the
IS/IT strategy and is addressed in this book through a process of align-
ment and competitive impact. Once that strategy has been formulated, an
implementation plan can then be constructed—IS/IT planning. The IS/IT
strategy process refers to both formulation and planning (see Figure 3.1).
While the IS/IT strategy drives IS/IT planning, constructing the IS/IT
plan may reveal aspects that cause the IS/IT strategy to be reconsidered.
THE EVOLUTION OF THE IS/IT STRATEGY PROCESS:
FROM TECHNOLOGY FOCUS TO STRATEGIC FOCUS
Research has highlighted that, in many organizations, approaches to IS
strategy formulation have tended to follow an evolutionary process. In
Stage 1, the focus is on planning to deliver technology. At Stage 5, the
organization has reached a stage of maturity where the emphasis is on
assessing the competitive impact of IS/IT and in ensuring the alignment
between business strategies and IS/IT investments. This evolution can be
explained as follows:
. Stage 1—typical early data processing (DP) planning—the IT de-
partment need to plan the interfaces between applications developed
separately, project by project, in order to make them work eﬀectively
and eﬃciently, both in business operations and the utilization of
technology. Obtaining management understanding of the increasing
dependence of the business on its systems is the key objective, to
enable a more coherent, less piecemeal, approach to be adopted.
Essentially, support applications are being built and management
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formulation
IS/IT planning
IS/IT strategy process
Figure 3.1 IS/IT strategy process
perceives IS/IT in that limited role, but the dependence is steadily
increasing.
. Stage 2—management, now aware (often because of some crisis or
key system failure), initiate a top-down review of IS/IT applications
in the light of business dependence—priorities are agreed based on
the relative importance of business needs. For example, should the
order processing redevelopment take precedence over the new sales
analysis system? The approaches used are very methodological,
normally based on derivatives of IBM’s ‘Business Systems Planning’4
or similar methodologies, and involve gaining a management con-
sensus of criticalities and priorities. An extended, prioritized
‘shopping list’ of key operational type applications for both opera-
tional and management information requirements will generally
result.
. Stage 3—the next stage is centred around detailed IS/IT planning, to
determine the best way of implementing the applications and
supporting technologies or, in some cases, reimplementing existing
systems in more appropriate, integrated and perhaps less costly ways.
The portfolio needs to be better balanced—greater attention is paid
to the now (perceived to be critical) key operational systems and less
resource is dedicated to support applications, each having been
‘prioritized’ in Stage 2. An ‘Application Support Centre’ or ‘Help
desk’5 concept may be implemented for support-type systems, and
application packages will probably be introduced to rationalize and
replace internally-developed systems. Stage 3 can take considerable
time to implement eﬀectively and, while this is going on, nothing else
can really happen, since all IT resources are budgeted against a
known detailed 2–3-year plan.
Through Stages 1 to 3, the evolution from isolated ‘eﬃciency’-driven
applications to integrated ‘eﬀectiveness’ systems has been occurring—
but the objective has not yet been overt use of IS/IT for competitive
advantage; the main purpose is to stop IS/IT being problematic and to
ensure that it is causing no disadvantages.
. Stage 4—the users take the reins, not necessarily encouraged by
senior management, but not discouraged either, because they do
not wish to prevent business-led, entrepreneurial use of IS/IT by
users seeing new opportunities, using information in new ways to
provide business leverage/competitive advantage. This may start
during Stage 3 as frustration builds up in the ‘jam tomorrow’ stage
of detailed planning and implementation. It is important that users,
unfettered in any way by IS/IT procedure or control, exercise this
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freedom to innovate, even if 90% of the ideas are of little strategic
potential. It is the source of tested ideas that, with later IS/IT
support, can be turned to advantage—literally, high potential oppor-
tunities driven by the business. Many strategic applications originate
this way.6
. Stage 5—this is the diﬃcult stage to reach, particularly if Stage 3 is
delayed and Stage 4 is more user-rebellion than business stimulated
innovation. It requires bringing it all back together—not just IS/IT-
based strategy formulation as in Stage 2, but also the formulation of
business strategy. In essence, the innovation ideas of Stage 4 require
evaluation in the business context along with the opportunities now
made available from the key operational infrastructure (i.e. the
knowledge of what to do and the ability to deliver it eﬀectively).
Linking IS/IT potential to the business strategy is the main task,
and this requires the simultaneous attention of senior executives,
line management and IT specialists—the ﬁrst time in this process
that they have all acted as a coalition together. There is no ‘method-
ology’ available—multiple methods implies business strategizing and
planning methods plus IS/IT top-down and bottom-up approaches.
Strategic applications can be identiﬁed and agreed upon in the
context of the business strategy.
The ‘process’ does not always occur sequentially in an organization, and
there will always be overlap across the stages. In large organizations,
diﬀerent businesses or functions may be at diﬀerent stages in their evolu-
tion. What is surprising, in some ways, is how often the stages are
followed quite sequentially as an organization gets more sophisticated
in its application and deployment of IS/IT. All these variations on the
IS/IT strategy process will be discussed in more detail later in the book,
with special focus on the latter stages, which most organizations now
have to address successfully.
APPROACHES TO IS/IT STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT
There is a diﬀerence between having an IS/IT strategy and having an IS/
IT strategy that is closely aligned and integrated with the business
strategy. Over the years, organizations have adopted a variety of
approaches in planning IS/IT investments; unfortunately, these have
not always resulted in the organization deploying IS/IT strategically.
Earl7 has studied the changing focus and increasing maturity of the IS/
IT strategy process in a number of organizations and has identiﬁed ﬁve
main types of approach. The chief characteristics of these ﬁve types are
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summarized in Table 3.1, adapted from Earl’s more detailed assessment.
The analysis considers the main task that is carried out, the main objec-
tives, who drives the planning forward and the approaches adopted. By
looking at each of these aspects, the eﬀectiveness of the linkage between
IS/IT strategy and business strategy can be determined, and consequently
how likely the organization is to gain competitive advantage from IS/IT.
This implies that, although an organization should develop more
‘mature’ approaches to IS/IT strategy formulation and planning in
order to achieve a full and relevant portfolio, some earlier approaches
need to be maintained in order to manage the total matrix of applica-
tions. Not every application of IT needs all the complexity implied in
Stage 5. However, one thing is certain, if the organization is poor at
formulating business strategy, it will have considerable diﬃculty devel-
oping an IS/IT strategy.
An organization can identify from the types of planning approaches in
place (i) where it is in relation to the eventual need for integration of IS/
IT and business planning, and (ii) which approaches it needs to adopt in
the short term to move it toward that eventual goal.
The names given by Earl to the dominant rationale at each stage (see
the summary description in Table 3.1) imply the following:
1. Business led—carried out mainly by IT specialists who deﬁne an IS/
IT investment plan based on the current business strategy. While
acknowledging IS as a strategic resource, with this approach the
organization is taking the view that business strategy should lead
IS/IT strategy and not the other way around. The business strategy
is not challenged and the approach does not explore competitive
opportunities through IS/IT unless incorporated in the business
strategy.
2. Method driven—the use of techniques (often a consultant’s method-
ology) to identify IS needs by analysing business processes—an
‘engineering’ philosophy based on top-down analysis of information
needs and relationships.
3. Technological—IS/IT planning is seen as an exercise in process and
information modelling. Here, IS professionals use analytical model-
ling and tools (e.g. Computer Aided Software Engineering [CASE])
to produce IS plans in the form of blueprints—perhaps one each for
applications, data, communications and computing. Earl noted that
the word ‘architecture’ may replace ‘plans’ or ‘strategies’.8
4. Administrative—the main objective is to establish IT capital and
expense budgets and resource plans to achieve approved IS applica-
tions, usually based on a prioritized wish list from users. Business
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plans, usually at a functional level, are analysed to identify where IS/
IT is most critical in meeting short to medium-term needs.
5. Organizational—the development of key themes for IS/IT investment
derived from a business consensus view of how IS/IT can help
meet overall business objectives, agreed by the senior management
team.
It is not too diﬃcult to align these approaches to the characteristics of the
planning environments described by Sullivan (see Figure 1.9). The ﬁt is
not exact but the Technology led, Method driven and Administrative
approaches are more appropriate and practical where diﬀusion is low
(i.e. low decentralization of IS/IT control) and ﬁt the needs of the tradi-
tional and backbone environments best. Business led and Organizational
appear more relevant to high degrees of diﬀusion, the former being most
appropriate for creating new opportunities and the latter for providing
the eclectic type of planning for the ‘complex’ part of the matrix.
In an empirical study using Earl’s descriptions, Doherty et al.9 found
that the Organizational, Business-led and Administrative approaches
could be identiﬁed and clearly distinguished in the sample of 267 com-
panies. The study also showed that the organizations believed they were
more successful in IS planning if they followed the Organizational
approach; of the three, Business-led came second and Administrative
was third. They argued that the Organizational approach had, based
on the survey evidence, very similar characteristics to the ‘rational adap-
tation’ mode of planning that Segars et al.10 had observed as the most
successful approach in their study.
Doherty and colleagues, however, could not clearly distinguish
between Method led and Technology led, even in their large sample,
and suggested that the two, together, formed an intrinsically IT-led
approach they called ‘systematic’. This is a reasonable conclusion,
given that, over the last decade, many large application and utility
software packages have eﬀectively become part of the infrastructure.
Application software and technology plans cannot always be separated,
but require highly integrated, detailed planning (i.e. systematic). In the
survey, the systematic approach had a similar level of perceived success as
Business led.
PROBLEMS AND BARRIERS
Despite an understanding of the importance of strategic planning for IS,
in the past decade many organizations have developed perfectly sensible
IS strategies that have been left to gather dust, or have been implemented
Problems and Barriers 125
in a half-hearted manner, because they did not have enough management
commitment invested in them. These were not merely uplifted user ‘wish
lists’ that had been renamed ‘strategies’, nor IT-inspired total systems—
information and technology architectures—that never deserved to gain
business backing. Rather, they were derived from a thorough investiga-
tion of business needs and priorities, driven from business strategy and
objectives, and constructed by business teams. They may have even
obtained the sought-after sign-oﬀ from the board, but were then left
with the IS function to implement them, while management got on
with its ‘real’ job of running the business.
A number of surveys have attempted to identify criteria for successful
IS/IT strategy development. Lederer and Mendelow11 surveyed 20 US
companies to determine the senior management problems preventing
eﬀective development of IS/IT strategic plans. An earlier survey had
shown that obtaining top-management commitment was a prerequisite
for success, but that it was often diﬃcult to obtain. Their research iden-
tiﬁed the following reasons for this, in order of frequency of occurrence:
1. Top management lacked awareness of the impact IS/IT is having
generally and did not understand how IS/IT oﬀered strategic advan-
tages. They tended to see ‘computers’ in purely an operational
context—still essentially a DP era view.
2. They perceived a credibility gap between the ‘hype’ of the IT industry
as to what IT can actually do and how easy it is to do it, given the
diﬃculties their organization had had in delivering the claimed
beneﬁts.
3. Top managers did not view information as a business resource to be
managed for long-term beneﬁt. They only appreciated its criticality
when they could not get what they needed.
4. Despite the diﬃculty in expressing all IS beneﬁts in economic terms,
top management still demand to see a ﬁnancial justiﬁcation for
investments.
5. Finally, and an increasingly apparent problem today, is that top
managers have become action orientated with a short-term focus
that militates against putting much eﬀort into long-term planning,
especially of IS/IT, given the other issues above.
In a similar UK survey, Wilson12 identiﬁed a number of barriers that
prevented an eﬀective IS/IT strategy being developed and then implemen-
ted. Organizations claiming to have an IS/IT strategy (73 of the total of
186 surveyed) were asked to identify barriers inhibiting, ﬁrst, the devel-
opment of the strategy and, second, implementing it. In this survey, top-
management commitment was less critical than the ability to measure
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beneﬁts from the overall plan, to deal with major business issues such as
diversiﬁcation or growth and to provide appropriately-skilled user and IT
resources. The factors cited seem to reﬂect views based on the past
evolution of IS/IT, rather than its future implications. The survey also
highlights one or two of the ‘softer’ issues—politics and middle manage-
ment’s insecurity in the face of change. Ninety per cent of respondents
claimed that the IS/IT strategy was either a formal, documented part of
the business strategy, or that the strategy was aligned to strategic aims.
In a more recent survey of senior IS executives, Teo and Ang13 identi-
ﬁed the major problems associated with the IS/IT strategy process.
Dividing the process into three phases (the launch phase, the plan devel-
opment phase and the implementation phase), they reported that, in all
three phases, failing to secure top management support is the most
serious problem. Not having free communication ﬂow and not being
able to obtain suﬃciently-qualiﬁed personnel are the other two major
problems in the ﬁrst phase. In the second phase, respondents reported
ignoring business goals and failing to translate these goals/strategies into
action plans as major problems as well. Table 3.2 summarizes the top
problems in the ﬁrst two phases.
Earl’s survey of 21 UK companies, referred to earlier, ranked the
unsuccessful features of strategic IS planning as: resource constraints,
the strategy not implemented fully, lack of top management acceptance,
length of time involved, and poor user–IS relationships. In research
exploring the enablers and inhibitors of alignment between IS and
business strategies, Luftman and Brier14 identiﬁed the six most important
enablers and the six main inhibitors (see Table 3.3). What is striking
about these is that the same topics (executive support, understand the
business, IT–business relations and leadership) show up as both enablers
and inhibitors. Our research supports these conclusions.15
All these surveys indicate that several of the prime requirements for the
eﬀective formulation of IS/IT strategy revolve around people. Undoubt-
edly, it is essential for knowledgeable, experienced, highly skilled and
well-motivated staﬀ to be involved and for them to be committed to
the work. This was borne out by the ﬁndings of Lederer and Sethi16 in
their survey of 80 companies. The pitfalls in establishing an eﬀective IS/
IT strategy process relating to people, which were among the most fre-
quently cited, are listed in Table 3.4.
While all the foregoing problems and barriers focus on IS strategy, a
number of them originate in the business strategy, and many of the same
problems could be cited for business strategy development and planning.
This is partly because the strategic developments required for organiza-
tions to meet the challenges facing them are often poorly served by
traditional, functionally orientated business plans. For example, many
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organizations have an impressive array of mission statements, objectives,
values, critical success factors and performance targets, but when the task
of translating the strategy into eﬀective and coordinated action plans has
been left to the functional directorates, it has all too rarely been con-
solidated and managed as an integrated business-wide program. The
functions have been, on the whole, too focused on current problems to
be able to put a satisfactory strategic perspective into their plans.
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Table 3.2 Problems encountered in the IS strategy process (source: adapted from
T.S.H. Teo and J.S.K. Ang, ‘An examination of major IS planning problems’,
International Journal of Information Management, Vol. 21, 2001, 461)
Problems in launching the IS strategy Problems with the IS strategy
process process
1. Failing to get top management
support
2. Not having free communication
and commitment to change
throughout the organization
3. Being unable to obtain
suﬃciently qualiﬁed personnel to
do a proper job
4. Delegating responsibility to an
individual without suﬃcient
experience, inﬂuence or time to
do a thorough job
5. Not investing suﬃcient ‘front-
end’ time to ensure that all
strategy and planning tasks and
individual responsibilities are
well understood
6. Not having a steering committee
that is highly committed
7. Not having a clear-cut business
strategy to guide the IS strategy
eﬀort
8. Failing to anticipate new
developments in IT that might
aﬀect the strategy
9. Ignoring the people and politics
side of strategy formulation and
planning
1. Failing to involve top
management suﬃciently
2. Ignoring business objectives
3. Failing to translate business
objectives and strategies into
action plans
4. Failing to involve users
suﬃciently
5. Relying exclusively on user ‘wish
lists’ for application ideas
6. Neglecting to assess realistically
internal weaknesses of the IS
function in determining
capabilities to implement the
recommended strategy
7. Not performing a top-down
analysis to identify critical
functional areas that the IS
strategy has to support
8. Failure to consider and explicitly
evaluate alternative IS strategies
in order to give top management
a meaningful choice.
9. Failing to review the IS strategy
with all managers so as to
obtain support and cooperation
for its implementation.
THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE IS/IT STRATEGY
The requirement to determine the information systems strategy over an
extended period demands that a consolidated approach should retain the
ﬂexibility to respond to changing business and organizational needs and
incorporate new IS/IT options. In order to do that, the processes used to
analyse situations and assess opportunities must be capable of being
revisited in part, at any time, to assess the implications without a
major rethink of the whole strategy.
In Chapter 1, a simple model relating business, IS and IT strategies
was described (see Figure 1.6). In Chapter 2, a view of the business
strategic process that considered the realities of attempting to plan in
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Table 3.3 Enablers and inhibitors of strategic alignment (source: J. Luftman
and T. Brier, ‘Achieving and sustaining business–IT alignment’, California
Management Review, Fall, 1999, 109–122)
Enablers Inhibitors
. Senior executive support f IT/business lacks close
for IT relationships
. IT involved in strategy f IT does not prioritize well
development f IT fails to meet commitments
. IT understands the business f IT does not understand business
. Business–IT partnership f Senior executives do not
. Well-prioritized IT projects support IT
. IT demonstrates leadership f IT management lacks leadership
Table 3.4 Pitfalls to planning, in relation to people (source: adapted from A.L.
Lederer and V. Sethi, ‘The implementation of strategic information systems plan-
ning methodologies’, MIS Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1988, 445–461)
Problems, listed in order of severity
1. Diﬃculty in obtaining top management commitment for implementing the
plan
2. Success of the approach is greatly dependent on the planning team leader
3. Diﬃculty in ﬁnding a team leader who meets the criteria speciﬁed for the role
4. Diﬃculty in convincing top management to fund the planning exercise
5. Diﬃculty in ﬁnding team members who meet the speciﬁed criteria
6. The exorbitant number of hours demanded from top management
7. Failure to establish a permanent planning group as a result of the planning
exercise
8. Time and expense involved in ﬁnding planning support staﬀ
an ever-changing environment was also described (see Figure 2.3). Com-
bining this view from Johnson and Scholes17 with the earlier, simpler
model, a more comprehensive and pragmatic model can be deﬁned,
which describes the environment within which IS/IT strategy formulation
and planning takes place.
Figure 3.2 shows that, while, at any one time, a comprehensive analysis
of the business and IS/IT internal and external environments can be
carried out to deﬁne an intended set of strategies, it is unlikely that all
aspects of these strategies will be realized. Changes will occur in both the
business and IT environments, and these will cause changes to be made to
the IS strategy. The ‘intended’ IS strategy may also fail to be implemen-
ted successfully and hence will have to be revised either in timescale or
content.
In addition, changes in the business or IT environments may impose
constraints on the IS strategy or open up new IS opportunities. These
factors, which force changes from the intended strategies, will not always
occur at convenient moments in the planning cycle! All three strategies,
business, IS and IT, must be realigned whenever new opportunities or
constraints emerge. Equally importantly (and this is often overlooked),
these changes to the strategy will make parts of the old strategy redun-
dant. In many organizations, considerable IS/IT eﬀort and resource can
be consumed pursuing eﬀectively obsolete requirements because the
plans, derived perhaps a year earlier, have been overtaken by events—
events that have not been interpreted in terms of their eﬀects on the IS/IT
developments already under way. This problem can be compounded
where large IS/IT projects are involved and the majority of the money
has been spent—‘we’ve started, so we’ll ﬁnish’ seems to be the rule, even
if by ﬁnishing the system development no actual beneﬁts will now occur!
Even in such circumstances it is best to stop work and redirect the
resources to the new emerging needs.
The need to be able to revisit and revise any aspect of the strategies
implies that, as far as possible, all facets of the internal and external
environments that can aﬀect the strategies are included in the initial
derivation. Then, if any of them change, the implications of the
changes can more easily be identiﬁed and understood in order to revise
the strategies appropriately.
THE CHALLENGES OF PLANNING STRATEGICALLY FOR
IS/IT TODAY
The necessity to improve return on investments, coupled with the high
risk potential of investing very substantial sums unwisely, have long been
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key objectives for developing a strategy for IS/IT. Prominent among
them are the vast sums of money that organizations have spent on
‘e-commerce’ or ‘Internet’ strategies that have, on average, delivered
little business value to date. In addition, an ever-increasing number
of examples, cited as demonstrating improved competitive success
resulting from implementing computer and telecommunications
systems, has also boosted awareness and interest. American Airlines,
Merrill Lynch, American Hospital Supplies, Thomson’s Holidays and
several others were reported so extensively, in the 1980s and 1990s,
that they have been elevated almost to legend status. More recently,
the exploits of some organizations on the Internet such as Amazon.com,
Lastminute.com, eBay.com and Betdaq.com, coupled with the media
hype, has also raised awareness. There are many other examples that
have so far received less widespread coverage but are equally signiﬁcant
as sources of ideas for other organizations. Many of these are referred to
throughout this book.
As the focus on delivering customer value and improving customer
service becomes ever more critical for so many enterprises, and com-
petitive, economic and regulatory pressures mount, there is a recognition
by enlightened businesses that incremental and disconnected improve-
ments will not be good enough. There is also the growing recognition
that delivering satisfactory performance is dependent on robust business
processes. This is the environment in which gaining control of key pro-
cesses has become a popular focus of attention, and many major change
programs revolve around improving the performance of core business
processes. In this environment, business process redesign gained a strong
foothold, which continues today. Hammer18 cautioned against ‘paving
the cow paths’ with IT, and called on managers to look for opportunities
to redesign processes to take account of the opportunities provided by IT.
In this context, a fully-integrated business strategy framework is
needed that can encompass the development and implementation of
major change programs, a series of supporting strategies in response to
key business drivers, and the management of a coordinated program of
strategic and tactical projects (see Figure 3.3).
Developing an IS/IT strategy in today’s competitive environment is not
easy to achieve. By deﬁnition, it must be deeply embedded in business
issues, since it promotes IS/IT as direct tools of competitive strategy. At
the same time, it must continue to meet information processing and
managerial information needs, but its primary orientation has turned
from merely cost reduction to direct value adding; from mainly admin-
istrative eﬃciency and organizational ﬂuency to delivering competitive
impact, both to gain advantage or avoid being disadvantaged. A key
point is that its objectives and priorities are derived from business
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imperatives. Long-term beneﬁts are sought from the strategic exploita-
tion of information and it has a formulative part to play in advancing
business strategy.
The business environment and approaches to strategy formulation and
planning were examined in Chapter 2, which laid out in some detail the
elements that make up the wider business environment and the more
speciﬁc aspects of strategy. If the contribution from IS/IT is to be max-
imized, it is necessary not only for IS specialists to understand business
issues but also for business people to have an awareness of the potential
oﬀered by technology. Unfortunately, this close working relationship
does not always exist in organizations. In Chapter 8, we explore how
an organization can begin to improve this relationship: failure to do so
will severely impact any attempt to develop a more strategic perspective
of IS/IT.
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Figure 3.3 Integrated business strategy framework
There is no standard approach that can guarantee success, and this
book is not attempting to put forward a prescriptive methodology for
conducting IS/IT strategy formulation and planning. It would be fool-
hardy to attempt to do so, since each situation is unique, warranting
careful consideration, and requiring its own tailored approach. Rather,
a framework and ‘tool box’ of techniques for IS/IT strategy formulation
and planning are proposed that can be adapted to ﬁt a wide spectrum of
environments from the most to the least sophisticated, and which
responds to the many external and internal, business and technical
drivers.
Similar views about the need for ﬂexible and evolutionary approaches
to the IS/IT strategy process were expressed almost two decades ago by
Sullivan.19 He proposed a number of key elements within eﬀective
planning approaches that were needed to enable the realization of the
competitive potential of IS/IT. Even today, they are still valid, and are
embedded in the approach advanced in this book. He proposed:
. The search for competitive advantage through the application of IS/
IT.
. A broader scope for planning, which incorporates a wider spectrum
of technologies, rather than just traditional uses of IT for processing
data and information.
. The need to unite technologies, as they emerge, as well as with the
installed base.
. The development of information, systems and technology architec-
tures to guide the introduction and integration of new and existing
systems and technologies.
. A shift away from traditional, formal structured plans toward much
more ﬂexible approaches, whose aims are to ﬁnd and implement the
most important initiatives for the beneﬁt of the business, and epitom-
ized by their:
– responsiveness in being able to shift resources to where they are
needed;
– increasingly creative use of IT by users;
– ability to evaluate options;
– use of benchmarking to establish standards of performance of
external and competitive organizations.
Similar conclusions have been reached by Earl, Segars, Lederer, Doherty
and others.
The framework and outline of the process for developing IS/IT
strategies are described in this chapter, and the techniques for assessing
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the environment and identifying information needs and future opportu-
nities are covered in Chapters 4 and 5.
ESTABLISHING AN IS/IT STRATEGY PROCESS
A Continuous Process
Once a strategic perspective on IS/IT is established and a strategy process
is instituted, it should become a continuously evolving process, where the
strategies and plans are refreshed regularly and even frequently, accord-
ing to external forces, business needs and opportunities, the planning
timetable, culture of the organization, and the beneﬁts delivered by im-
plementation of the strategy. Depending on the scope of the strategy
process, the main deliverables, hard or soft, may be virtually unchanged
or may be completely revised. For example:
. plans arising from the IS/IT strategy need to be updated as required,
the frequency determined by the underlying pace of change;
. development or acquisition of applications takes place in response to
prioritized demands, tightly linked to broader business initiatives;
. the supporting IT infrastructure, once deﬁned to meet a business
strategy, should have a relatively long lifespan;
. mechanisms for monitoring internal and external business and IS/IT
perspectives are essential elements of the strategic management
process and, once put into place, are likely to stay in place,
although the parameters monitored will vary.
A Learning Process
As well as being a continuous process, strategic IS planning is also a
learning process. Both IS specialists and business people are becoming
more aware of business and technology issues, and learning to identify
and exploit opportunities within a cooperative environment. At best, the
culture of partnership between the IS function and the rest of the organ-
ization reorientates itself to treat information, systems and technology as
core resources in the day-to-day life of the business and its continuing
development. This also takes place alongside a continuing evolution in
the maturity of the IS function.
For the organization that does not have a strategic perspective on IS/
IT and has not begun to develop an IS/IT strategy, there is an under-
standable problem in not knowing how to go about it. It is a far from
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trivial change to go from the tactical planning used to develop informa-
tion systems based on catalogued users’ demands—usually referred to as
‘wish lists’—or from IT technical infrastructure planning, to developing
an IS/IT strategy closely aligned with the business strategy, especially
since the outcome of such an approach is very likely to have far-
reaching impacts on the future role of the IS/IT in the business and the
role of the IS function.
When the move is from traditional developmental planning, focusing
on technology delivery, to IS/IT strategy development, where the target
applications portfolio is more balanced and where the emphasis is on
future strategic importance, then several characteristics need to change.
Typically, timescales for the planning horizon move out from one to two
or more years, and development and provisioning plans are driven by
current and future business needs rather than being incremental exten-
sions from earlier developments or recorded backlog lists. Alternatively,
the shift may not entail an extension of the planning horizon, but a
radical change to achieve rapid strategic moves, where the focus is on
ﬂexibility, responsiveness and fast delivery.
Initiating the Strategy Cycle
Before embarking on the development of an IS/IT strategy, whether for
the ﬁrst time or as part of a continuous strategic management process,
there are many aspects to be considered, so that a clear brief and Terms
of Reference (TOR) can be agreed for the planning activity. These will
not be set in stone, but should give a sound foundation to build on.
It is crucial that an adequate amount of time and eﬀort is spent in the
process of planning for planning, since the eﬀort spent here can determine
whether ‘success’ is achievable. How to go forward depends on the
maturity of the process, particularly experiences to date, the starting
point, the purpose of planning and the targets being sought, if they can
be deﬁned. It is also markedly aﬀected by the issues and stimuli prompt-
ing the activity. Box 3.1 contains a list of questions that require answering
before embarking on an IS/IT strategy process. The key questions are
examined in the following sections, although, clearly, the answers will
vary widely within diﬀerent organizational contexts.
It should be re-emphasized that there is no one ‘best’ way to tackle
strategy formulation and planning for IS/IT. It is essential to assess the
situation and the needs carefully, and then to deploy the most appro-
priate people, methods and techniques to suit this context. Each organ-
ization merits a diﬀerent approach, which will vary according to its
current circumstances, and the stimuli prompting the need for strategy
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development. Once the questions are answered, the TOR can be created
and senior management’s role in the process established—their active
involvement is essential from the start, as it signals that ‘strategy and
planning’ is actually going to happen.
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Box 3.1 Questions that need to be answered before embarking on
IS/IT strategy formulation and planning
. What are the purpose and the main stimuli prompting the
need for planning, and what are the key business drivers to be
addressed?
. What aspects of the current business and technical environment,
and what issues, constraints, underlying problems and risks are
likely to aﬀect the conduct and outcome of the process?
. What should be the scope of planning, and where should
planning be focused—on the corporate organization as a
whole, at strategic business unit level or on speciﬁc core
business processes?
. How can the IS/IT strategy process be eﬀectively integrated with
business strategy?
. What are the expectations and objectives to be met, and what
deliverables are required?
. How should the IS strategy be ‘marketed’ and consolidated with
the other elements of the business strategy to ensure that optimal
support and cooperation are obtained from the organization?
. Should the approach employed be totally prescriptive, tailored
or a mixture of both, and how can the organization build on its
previous experience of IS/IT strategy formulation and planning?
. What are the most eﬀective approaches, and which techniques
achieve the best results (e.g. determining the critical success
factors associated with top-level business functions or employ-
ing business analysis down to a very detailed level)?
. What resources, from which areas of the business, fulﬁlling
which roles and responsibilities, and with which skills, should
ideally be involved in the process and are they available? What
training will be required?
. What other resources are required (automated tools, adminis-
trative support, physical facilities)?
. How long will the strategy process take and what will it cost?
. How should the process be steered and managed?
Establishing Success Criteria
What is a good approach to IS/IT strategy development and how can
success be ensured and measured? Assuredly, the impact of an IS/IT
strategy is not instantaneous, and it may, in fact, take some time—
often two or more years—between embarking on an IS/IT strategy for-
mulation and planning process, for the ﬁrst time, and demonstrating any
signiﬁcant impact on business practices and results.20 The outcome of
strategizing and planning varies widely with:
. the starting point (how comprehensive or how constraining is the
current application portfolio and how appropriate are IT supply
services);
. the opportunities (whether to search for some ‘early winners’—
easily-achieved, high-impact applications—or to build or acquire a
portfolio of applications that meet the current and future business
requirements);
. the degree to which top management is involved in and committed to
the process;
. the history of IT, particularly ‘IS/IT success’ in the organization.
These and other issues such as deﬁning and implementing an appropriate
relationship between the IS function and the business, and establishing
objectives for IS/IT, have to be addressed.
At the outset, it is important to distinguish between IS/IT objectives
and implementation issues. The objectives for an IS/IT strategy should
not be concerned with object orientation, relational database technology,
the Internet, HTML, hardware speciﬁcation, or with end-user or central
IT development. These are prominent implementation issues. Any objec-
tives set for IS/IT must be similar to those for the business, focusing on,
for example, improving customer service, enhancing productivity or pro-
viding the means for product diﬀerentiation.
At the same time as deﬁning objectives for the strategy process, it is
helpful to sharpen the perspective on these by establishing criteria for
how success will be measured. Clearly, it is impossible to give a general
set of success factors for any strategy process, as these will be dictated by
a number of factors including objectives, stimuli and perception of the
business community. Establishing success criteria is likely to reveal any
‘hidden agenda’ behind the stated TOR and objectives (e.g. understand-
ing and meeting the expectations of executives, or ‘achieving and main-
taining credibility of the IS function in the business environment’). They
may also include one or two reminders to the strategy team (e.g. to avoid
delving into too much detail at any point, or to keep the ﬁnal product in
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mind). Once success criteria and measures are agreed, they can be
reviewed regularly; at least, at every progress meeting, to ensure that
they are being satisﬁed.
The primary objective of developing an IS strategy is to identify a
value-added portfolio of applications that will have a strategic impact
on the organization and increase its performance. Yet, a key challenge is
how to deﬁne and measure strategic impact and how to relate the
approach to IS strategy formulation to organizational performance.
There are a number of reasons that this is diﬃcult, including the long
lead time before beneﬁts are realized, the intangible nature of certain
beneﬁts and diﬀerent purposes for engaging in an IS/IT strategy process.
There are a number of ways in which IS strategy success can potentially
be operationalized and measured.21 In a conceptual treatise, King22
suggested a framework to measure success, arguing that the measurement
of success should be multidimensional, and based on both judgemental
and objective assessments. Dimensions proposed by King include the
eﬀectiveness of the strategy approach, its relative worth, the role and
impact of IS strategy, the performance of IS/IT plans, and the relative
eﬃciency of the strategy process, the adequacy of resources made avail-
able and strategic congruence.
Ramanujam and Venkatraman23 conducted an empirical study involv-
ing 207 organizations in the USA, aimed at examining the relationship
between the IS strategy process and success dimensions. The IS strategy
process dimensions include contextual dimensions (resources and resist-
ance levels) and systems design dimensions (internal, external, functions
and techniques). IS strategy eﬀectiveness dimensions include system cap-
ability, objective fulﬁlment and relative competitive performance. The
study found evidence of a strong relationship between the strategy
process dimensions and strategy eﬀectiveness dimensions. The ﬁndings
also indicated that the most important inﬂuence on the eﬀectiveness of
the IS/IT strategy process is the extent of stakeholders’ resistance,
followed by the resources committed to the exercise.
More recently, Segars and Grover24 conducted an empirical study in-
volving 253 senior IS executives in the USA, aimed at exploring and
examining success dimensions and measurements. Using the earlier
work of Ramanujam and Venkatraman, they described four common
approaches to measuring IS/IT strategy success: goal-oriented judge-
ment, comparative judgement, normative judgement and improvement
judgement. Goal-oriented judgement refers to the assessment of the
degree of attainment in relation to the goals of the strategy process.
Comparative judgement refers to the comparison between a particular
system of planning and other similar systems. Normative judgement
refers to the comparison between a particular system of planning and
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an ideal system. Improvement judgement refers to the assessment of how
the strategy process has evolved or adapted in supporting organizational
strategic planning needs. Segars and Grover note that comparative judge-
ment and normative judgement have a narrow focus and, therefore, are
more relevant to assess a speciﬁc approach to strategy formulation,
whereas goal-oriented judgement and improvement judgement have a
wider focus and, therefore, are more relevant to assess the broader pro-
cesses involved in developing this IS/IT strategy.
From analysis of the research literature,25 the following success dimen-
sions can be gleaned:
. improving the contribution of IS/IT to the performance of the
organization;
. extent of alignment of IT investment with the business strategy;
. gaining competitive advantage through deployment of IS/IT;
. identifying new and higher payback applications;
. identifying strategic applications;
. increasing top-management commitment;
. improving communications with users;
. better forecasting of IT resource requirements;
. improved allocation of IT resources;
. development of an information architecture;
. increased visibility for IS/IT in the organization.
Figure 3.4 illustrates a model that relates resource inputs to the IS/IT
strategy process and the objectives of the process. IS strategy process
dimensions can be summarized in three aspects: resource eﬃciency,
process enrichment and process eﬀectiveness. This multidimensional
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Figure 3.4 Success criteria
perspective of the IS strategy process provides a more comprehensive
method of assessing success.
Resource eﬃciency refers to the eﬃcient use and management of input
to the process or resources required for the process. This dimension, in
some respects, is similar to ‘the relative eﬃciency of IS planning system’
and ‘the adequacy of IS planning resources’, as described by King. It
deals with the ability of the strategy process to manage the input re-
sources in order to maximize their use. Resources involved in the IS/IT
strategy process include ﬁnancial resources and time and eﬀort of IS staﬀ,
users and management.
Enrichment is process-oriented and refers to the improvement, en-
hancement and adaptability of the IS/IT strategy process, enabling it to
be responsive to continuous changes in the environment and to produce
incremental learning. It focuses on communications, interaction, innova-
tion, learning, commitment, motivation, control, change and improve-
ments, advanced by conducting a strategy exercise.
Eﬀectiveness is output-oriented and refers to the eﬀectiveness of the IS/
IT strategy process in meeting the intended goals. Goals of the process
include predicting future trends, evaluating alternatives, avoiding
problem areas, enhancing management understanding and knowledge,
improving short-term and long-term performance, IS–business alignment,
agreement concerning development priorities, viable implementation
schedules and clarifying managerial responsibilities.
PURPOSE AND STIMULI DRIVING IS/IT
STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT
The purpose in developing an IS/IT strategy is to ensure that the best
possible value can be delivered from IS/IT investments. This can be
achieved by tightly aligning the IS demand to the business strategy—
strategic alignment—and by exploring opportunities for IS/IT to shape
the business strategy where it is possible to improve the overall competi-
tiveness, productivity and ﬁtness of the organization to meet the forces
acting upon it—competitive impact.
The arrival of threats and opportunities cannot be forced into a con-
venient timetable to suit the business strategy cycle. An organization that
is setting out to be ﬂexible and responsive needs to be prepared to
respond to fast-moving stimuli and to change its plans accordingly,
and the IS strategy needs to be able to respond in the same way.
Figure 3.5 shows how the pace of change in the external environment
can prompt business responses. The eﬀect can mean activity in all four
quadrants, with IS/IT following the business lead. There is always the
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danger that all of the activity falls into the ‘Defend’ box, but IS/IT
can help to strengthen the ability to respond by building up strategic
capability.
There are a number of sources of stimuli for IS/IT strategy develop-
ment, or revising the existing strategy, any of which may have an eﬀect on
the aims and objectives of planning.
External Business Factors. These factors drive the development and
revision of business strategy. They were discussed at some length in
Chapter 2, and were mentioned above.
External Technology Factors. These sometimes pose threats or oppor-
tunities that directly stimulate IS/IT strategy activity. For example:
. competitive opportunities and threats (real or potential) based on
new IS/IT developments (e.g. the Internet and wireless technologies);
. new products or markets created by IS/IT;
. major cost-factor changes giving real or potential competitive advan-
tage, producing an urgent need to improve productivity via technol-
ogy or risk losing business.
If the emphasis in the strategy is on exploitative and entrepreneurial use
of technology, it probably implies new attitudes to the use of IS/IT are
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Figure 3.5 Dimensions of change
required, as well as for new skills and for diﬀerent people to become
involved with new types of technology. It is important that the IS
function keeps abreast of technology trends, innovative use of technology
and how competing or similar organizations are applying IS/IT, so that
they recognize when signiﬁcant and achievable opportunities emerge, or
when to respond to technology threats.
Internal Business Factors. Changes in the nature of the business or the
structure and organization of the enterprise may result in the need to
revisit or reconsider the IS/IT strategy. The stimuli may be as diverse as:
. response to the regular business-planning cycle or budgeting cycle;
. takeover by a new owner(s) or the appointment of a new CEO or
management team—this may simply mean a new attitude to technol-
ogy, or it may herald more drastic change if it occurs as a result of a
merger or takeover;
. major rationalization caused by, for example, downturn in the
economy, necessitating a severe trimming of IS/IT budgets;
. restructuring—often resulting from corporate strategic planning (e.g.
changing a business from a production-led to a marketing-led
orientation, and leading to radical business re-engineering);
. new products or markets or channels-to-market—where there is a
recognition that the present infrastructure is incapable of adapting
to new requirements;
. recognition of the importance of strategy formulation and planning
for IS/IT, based on the need to increase its direct contribution to the
business.
Internal Technical Factors. These factors may arise from the need to
deliver increased value for money, to cut costs, to improve the working
relationship between the IS function and the business, the recognition
that the current environment and legacy systems are starting to ‘creak’
and numerous other factors. They may all prompt IS management or
business management to recognize the need to reassess the role of IS/IT
and its current strategy. For example, the inability of many legacy
systems to handle the new millennium dates absorbed the greater part
of many IT budgets for up to two years to solve the so-called Y2K
problem.
Assessment of the Current Organizational Environment
During the initiation stage of strategy formulation, the current organiza-
tional environment and any pertinent issues will need to be understood,
so that the planning activity is set up to deal with these factors. While the
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precise issues will be speciﬁc to the organization at the time of planning,
there are common factors worth assessing so that the IS strategy process
is properly positioned and set up to be successful such as:
. A broad overview of the business perspective, as far as it is avail-
able—its long-term mission, goals, vision for the future, strategy,
drivers for change, proposed change initiatives, structure, values,
culture, management style, performance monitoring and any short-
term critical demands. Detailed analysis and interpretation of all
these will take place later on in the planning process.
. How eﬀective IS has been in supporting business strategy in the past,
and the composition and strengths and weaknesses of the current
application portfolio.
. The current role of IS/IT in the organization, its eﬀectiveness,
coverage, structure, skills and maturity, and the role IS/IT is
playing in comparable external organizations in the same industry
or similar businesses.
. The views held by business managers regarding IS/IT.
. How IS/IT strategies have been developed in the past, their deliver-
ables and the beneﬁts derived.
SCOPE, OBJECTIVES AND EXPECTATIONS
Having conﬁrmed the purpose of the IS/IT strategy process and assessed
the current organizational environment, it is then necessary to determine
clearly the scope and objectives of the planning activities, and to ensure
that the business has clear expectations of what will emerge as a result. In
establishing the scope, it is important to reiterate a point made in
Chapter 1. While most IS/IT practitioners understand that their objec-
tives have shifted, there is still a tendency to consider technology issues
alongside business needs in such a way that confuses the supply (technol-
ogy as a means of delivery) and demand (business needs expressed as
information systems requirements). This is why it is critical to make the
distinction between IS strategy and IT strategy.
IS strategy deals with what to do with information, systems and tech-
nology, and how to manage the applications from a business point of
view. It thus focuses on the close alignment of information and systems in
support of business needs and on identifying and exploiting competitive
opportunities for IS/IT. IT strategy designates how technology is to be
applied in delivering information and how the technology resources are
managed to meet the range of business needs.
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The Strategic Business Unit (SBU)
In a large organization, where there are likely to be a number of distinct
business units, it is probable that each should have its own IS strategy,
tightly coupled to its business strategy. The available evidence suggests
that organizations that have done this achieve and recognize a more
direct contribution from IS/IT to business performance. It does not
necessarily follow that there should be IT strategies one for one with
IS strategies in that organization. A single IT strategy may be appropriate
for the whole organization, especially if there is centralization of other
corporate functions. On the other hand, it may be more eﬀective to focus
IT support at divisional, regional or even unit level in a diverse and
highly-distributed enterprise (see Figure 3.6).
A PIMS/MPIT study26 showed that IS/IT is, generally, more eﬀec-
tively deployed in organizations where vertical integration is between
50 and 75% (i.e. 50–75% of total business costs are under the control
of the business unit), enabling management to control the degree of
systems integration across functions. Second, the study showed it is
more feasible to develop a coherent IS/IT strategy for a strategic
business unit than for any other organizational grouping. Given the
arguments above, this would seem to follow.
In practice, information ﬂows through the business, along its primary
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business processes, to and from customers, across logistics and product
processes, and to and from suppliers, to enable supply and demand and
the use of resources to be reconciled. The primary systems requirements
depend on eﬀective linkages through these processes. The secondary/
supportive control and planning systems can be overlaid on that struc-
ture, although, in the past, these types of system have often driven the
primary systems requirements. This aspect will be considered in more
detail when the value chain analysis techniques are discussed later in
Chapter 5, and also when business process redesign and business re-
engineering approaches are discussed.
Implications of Focusing IS Strategy Formulation on the SBU
Considering the implications of focusing strategic planning activities at
the business unit level, as reﬂected in Figure 3.6, some conclusions can be
drawn:
. Historically, ‘strategies’ were essentially the cumulative total of func-
tional and/or departmental systems ‘strategies’, which often lacked
integration with the business and each other. Personal computing, in
the 1980s, often caused an even lower set of ‘individual’ strategies to
develop, as discussed in Chapter 1. The senior management and IS
management reaction was often to attempt to develop a ‘corporate
IS/IT strategy’. There is little evidence that this can be achieved.
Most case histories of the attempts of large companies to develop
an overall, comprehensive ‘corporate IS/IT’ strategy from the centre
show that lengthy planning blights descend on the units and then
nothing results! It can work where all the units are replicas of one
another, operating in diﬀerent locations. Unless the corporation is
essentially a single business-unit company, or the units are nearly
identical, the task is almost impossible.
. Developing IS/IT strategies at ‘group level’ is equally unlikely to be
successful, unless it is a group of very similar businesses. There are
potential dangers associated with attempting to develop common
systems across group companies. Unless the whole organization is
very similar in terms of its products, operational strategies and
markets, then each unit is likely to have very diﬀerent business
needs. In this case, an IS strategy that meets one unit’s needs is not
likely to be optimal for another’s. Even when the individual business
units are very similar, they are still likely to have diﬀerent IS
priorities. For example, their market penetrations may be diﬀerent,
or their customer base has a diﬀerent proﬁle or, because of scale
factors, their unit costs are very diﬀerent. Even where organizations
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have ‘imposed’ common strategies for ERP or CRM applications,
the implementation in each unit may vary considerably, producing
little commonality in terms of systems, although the software
package is the same. Often, group reorganization can occur such as
the refocusing and restructuring of many organizations in the 1990s
from a manufacturing- or product-based structure to more market-
based, making a nonsense of any previous group systems synergy.
. In conglomerates, where the buying and selling of businesses is a key
part of the corporate strategy, it obviously makes most sense to align
the strategy to each business unit, and it is probably impossible, in
reality, to do much else.
IS Strategy for the ‘Corporate’ SBU
The ‘corporation’, in many cases, is best seen as a business unit in its own
right—it will have information system needs based on the way it chooses
to manage the component businesses, whatever at any one time they are.
At one end of the scale, a holding company may only be concerned with a
very limited number of objectives and, as such, may only need a few
elementary enquiry and modelling systems, to access, say, proﬁt and
revenue ﬁgures. Alternatively, there may be a need for an IS strategy
to meet corporate information requirements, which are entirely diﬀerent
from those of the business units, whose interests are in supporting their
own particular business strategies. Corporate information needs support
long-term planning and allocation of resources, and draw on consoli-
dated information from the business units. Frequently, common
policies for IT across the whole organization are implemented to
achieve economy of supply and consistency across internal interfaces.
The focus of strategies at the corporate, business and IS/IT levels and
the relationships between these levels are illustrated in Figure 3.7.
Selecting a Starting Point
While the scope may be obvious when there is only one SBU under
consideration, it may be more diﬃcult when there are several. A few
pointers that are worth considering in making the choice of starting
point, for example, when choosing an SBU where:
. strong management commitment and involvement are assured;
. clear business plans and direction are known and available;
. the role of IS/IT is already respected;
. strategic business planning is well established.
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In cases where an IS/IT strategy process is not well established, it might be
more appropriate to scale down the scope of the exercise so that the
learning curve can be contained and the new techniques and processes
of IS strategy formulation and planning can be exercised on a small scale
to demonstrate their validity, before being applied to a larger organiza-
tional unit.
Consolidation across Business Units
If more than one unit is engaging in an IS/IT strategy process, and
especially if the units are similar in their business proﬁle, then cross-
referencing during the strategy process is a good idea. Alternatively,
planning activities can be staggered to take advantage of common
elements. There may well be common factors emerging from the
outputs for each unit. Opportunities for mutual support can be as
diverse as:
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Figure 3.7 Relationships and information demand/supply
. Acting as sounding boards during analysis, perhaps holding some
joint-opportunity identiﬁcation workshop sessions.
. Sharing tools or, at least, using common tools for capturing planning
output.
. Sharing application portfolios or individual applications. Similar
portfolios do not necessarily emerge from what, at ﬁrst sight, are
similar businesses. Synergy is most likely to occur when the
product/industry proﬁles are in comparable stages of maturity,
when their generic strategies are similar and when there are suﬃcient
common features in their business competitive strategies.
. Sharing software developments, if appropriate. When environments
and implementation policies diﬀer, this may only be for requirements
analysis.
. Building common conceptual models for selected parts of the
business. This may occur even when the application portfolios
diﬀer considerably. There may still be substantial overlap in the
information architecture, and beneﬁts from transferring ‘best
practice’, as well as saving in cost and time from sharing high-level
models, common naming standards and data dictionary deﬁnitions.
This is covered further in Chapter 10, which considers information
management. Some rationalization may be needed between models
for diﬀerent units.
. Allowing for eﬀective intercommunications, by using consistent in-
formation deﬁnitions. This could facilitate sharing databases, or pave
the way for sharing systems, implemented in diﬀerent environments,
or to make them available to other businesses in the organization.
Some large businesses have well-deﬁned, comprehensive corporate IS/IT
management strategies, which impact all the business units. Such strate-
gies can include policies for consolidation (e.g. to combine business data
models across the corporation). However, if corporate headquarters are
only interested in, say, ﬁnancial considerations, then the potentially-
massive task of rationalizing models across a large enterprise would
not be sensible or justiﬁable, except for the ﬁnance functions.
Objectives
The objectives for IS strategy development and planning are primarily
derived from the business objectives and drivers for change. It is neces-
sary to ensure that these objectives are sensible and achievable given the
current situation and available resources. A very general set of objectives
may be set as in Table 3.5. They could form a blueprint set of objectives
for introducing a strategy process for IS/IT into an organization, but they
Scope, Objectives and Expectations 149
hardly meet the real-world conditions normally encountered. Usually,
there are pressing stimuli and obvious problems to be resolved. These,
in turn, predetermine the focus and critical requirements. Clearly, every
case is diﬀerent and must be examined on its merits, balancing needs,
starting position, resources, etc.
Even when the primary objectives are the alignment of business and IS/
IT, and the pursuit of competitive advantage, it is likely that the recom-
mendations will include the creation of an integrated architecture,
coupled with the stabilizing of the information resource and minimizing
maintenance, among other things.
Expectations
It has been stated several times that no two strategy formulation and
planning initiatives will have the same objectives. The variations arise
because of factors such as:
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Table 3.5 General set of objectives for IS/IT strategy formulation and planning
To build a robust framework for the long-term management of information,
information systems and information technology and to:
. Identify current and future information needs for the organization that
reﬂect close alignment of business and IS/IT strategies, objectives and func-
tions. Recognize that the needs of the business will evolve, and that long-
term needs are likely to change.
. Equip the IS function to be responsive to fast-changing business needs, and
to be able to meet urgent requirements.
. Determine policies for the management, creation, maintenance, control and
accessibility of the corporate information resource.
. Reposition IS function more centrally in the business, with representation at
top management level.
. Ensure that a sound information systems architecture is created so that high-
quality systems can be built and maintained.
. Identify a portfolio of skills that will be required over the lifetime of the
plans, and develop migration plans to overcome weaknesses and exploit the
skills in the IS function.
. Determine an eﬀective and achievable organization structure for the IS
function.
. Ensure that the IS function is outward looking and not focused internally on
technology issues, and that the aims of the function are not only clearly
linked to business needs but also widely communicated.
. Ensure that there is an acceptance of shared responsibility between IS/IT
and business people for the successful exploitation of information and
technology.
. the size of the business unit under consideration;
. the sophistication of the current application portfolio and current IS/
IT operation;
. the stage of development of the organization’s strategic processes—
as discussed in Chapter 2;
. the immediate problems facing the management team.
Depending on the reasons that prompt IS/IT strategizing in the organ-
ization, diﬀerent emphasis may be placed on certain activities and deliver-
ables. For example, a set of common scenarios that reﬂect varied
expectations are given in Box 3.2. They illustrate how the focus of
strategy and planning may vary from business to business. There are
others that are rather more ‘tactical’ in nature—for instance:
. Justiﬁcation of the IT budget—it is quite common for IT manage-
ment to be under attack from senior management for the seemingly
endless rapid increases in IT budgets. If the budget can be directly
related to the business strategy, these attacks can be avoided.
. How to select new technological environments for the future.
. How to distribute data and systems development capabilities to end-
users.
It is also often wise to state clearly the reverse of objectives and scope (i.e.
what the strategy process will not do), for example:
. no recommendations will be made concerning speciﬁc hardware and
software products;
. overseas and branch companies are outside the scope.
AN IS/IT STRATEGY FRAMEWORK AND APPROACH
The process of strategy formulation for eﬀective exploitation of IS/IT is
complex, if tackled comprehensively. It needs to address several dimen-
sions within its overall scope, and, thus, a combination of approaches
and tools are required. It seeks to satisfy eﬃciency, eﬀectiveness and
competitive or value-adding objectives. Its implementation timescales
encompass the immediate future and a time horizon in keeping with
the horizon for the business strategy. While the critical future applica-
tions are probably ‘strategic’ systems, it is likely that the planned devel-
opment portfolio will include entries in all quadrants. In addition, there is
a high probability that improved integration of information and systems
is needed. Because of the legacy of current information and systems
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Box 3.2 Common scenarios indicating expectations from IS/IT
strategy process
. Gradual evolution of IS/IT strategy: where alignment with
business strategy is relatively new, or being pursued for the
ﬁrst time, one focus of IS strategy may be to eﬀect a gradual
reorientation from a technology-based to a business-based
focus.
. Gaining management understanding: in an environment where
there is a low level of awareness of the potential of IS/IT
among the business community and a history of disappointed
expectations from the business viewpoint, the focus may be to
determine objectively the value of the contribution made by
existing systems to the current and future needs (where
known) of the business.
. Determining priorities for allocation of budget and resources:
frequently, one of the main objectives of strategy is to develop
prioritized plans for provision of information and systems. These
could stem from new systems, enhanced existing systems and
more accessible integrated information. Invariably, this is
coupled with the need to budget and resource from an
insuﬃcient supply of funds and skills.
. Gaining a competitive edge: seeking out opportunities for using
IS/IT as a competitive weapon, directly or indirectly, in oﬀensive
or defensive competitive activity is often quoted as an objective.
It would appear that few organizations, including it for the ﬁrst
time in their planning, know how to go about ﬁnding the most
promising opportunities.
. Finding an early winner: a high-risk objective for strategic
planning may be taken up by the IS/IT group to ﬁnd one or
two ‘prizewinner’ ideas that can be implemented quickly,
bringing signiﬁcant beneﬁt to the enterprise. The underlying
reason may be to win over reluctant supporters within the ex-
ecutive controlling body to commit to IS/IT taking a more
central role in the business.
. Deﬁning a global information architecture: the focus here is the
creation of a global architecture for each business unit, where
the purpose is to instil consistency and integrity throughout the
information resource and to provide a springboard for compre-
hensive and ﬂexible provision of information from an integrated
resource.
infrastructure, this could be a very complex and costly operation, and
requires careful justiﬁcation.
As far as recommending an approach to IS/IT strategy formulation,
this book supports a mixture of the formal and informal. Formal tech-
niques are used if the requirements demand that all appropriate elements
of the business are explored in a structured manner, and the business
drivers are applied to achieve eﬀective prioritization within a consoli-
dated program of business IS initiatives. But, informal techniques are
also included to capture innovative ideas where they arise in the
business, both during the initial strategy process and thereafter. The
overall approach put forward in the book consists of a composite
model in which business planning, business analysis, information
analysis and innovative thinking all have a part to play.
While giving guidance and structure to the process, the emphasis is
on suggesting a wide variety of techniques, and providing an adaptable
framework that can meet most eventualities for delivering a good strategy
and plan. The most important ingredients are a well-balanced high-quality
team, endowed with a good balance of knowledge, strategy and planning
skills, experience and more than a pinch of common sense.
The IS/IT Strategy Formulation and Planning Framework:
Overview Model
An overview model, shown in Figure 3.8, illustrates the building blocks of
the strategy formulation and planning framework—the inputs, outputs
and essential activities. Brieﬂy, these are:
Inputs
1. The internal business environment: current business strategy, objec-
tives, resources, processes, and the culture and values of the business.
2. The external business environment: the economic, industrial and com-
petitive climate in which the organization operates.
3. The internal IS/IT environment: the current IS/IT perspective in the
business, its maturity, business coverage and contribution, skills,
resources and the technological infrastructure. The current applica-
tion portfolio of existing systems and systems under development, or
budgeted but not yet under way is also part of the internal IS/IT
environment.
4. The external IS/IT environment: technology trends and opportunities
and the use made of IS/IT by others, especially customers, com-
petitors and suppliers.
They are described in some detail in Chapter 4.
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Outputs
1. IS/IT management strategy: the common elements of the strategy
that apply throughout the organization, ensuring consistent policies
where needed.
2. Business IS strategies: how each unit or function will deploy IS/IT in
achieving its business objectives. Alongside each of them are applica-
tion portfolios to be developed for the business unit and business
models, describing the information architectures of each unit. The
portfolios may include how IS/IT will be used at some future date to
help the units achieve their objectives.
3. IT strategy: policies and strategies for the management of technology
and specialist resources.
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These and other ‘soft’ outputs are described under the heading ‘Deliver-
ables from the IS/IT Strategy Process’, later in the chapter.
Selecting, Deﬁning and Implementing a Strategy Approach
Having conﬁrmed the scope, the objectives and the deliverables, the
next step is to ensure the IS/IT strategy process is linked eﬀectively to
business strategy formulation activities and existing business strategies
and plans. This will in part depend on the comprehensiveness of the
existing IS/IT strategy, how long since it was updated, how much
change is needed and how well that strategy was integrated with the
business strategy.
The process needs to be understandable and acceptable to all con-
cerned, and it must not be too complex or constrained by unnecessary
bureaucracy. No approach will, by itself, guarantee success. Responsi-
bility for a successful outcome rests heavily on the leader of the strategy
process and the people involved. It is their responsibility to understand
why each step in the process is being done and why each document or
diagram is being produced. Failure to do this could result in the endless
‘diagram production’ syndrome. This commonly arises because the team
is using a generalized method and diligently produces the diagrams men-
tioned, simply because ‘the method says to do it’.
In any strategic process, some sort of structure to the approach and
clear principles are obviously necessary. Box 3.3 contains a set of char-
acteristics that are recommended in any approach adopted. Whichever
approach is chosen, it will have to be suitable for the explicit needs, and
the environment, culture, organizational maturity and skills available.
In summary, the approach chosen should have the following
characteristics:
. ﬂexible, modular and able to pick up deliverables from earlier or
parallel activities;
. emphasis on deliverables;
. clear checkpoints;
. recognition of the interactive and cyclic nature of the process;
. recognition of the importance of the human side of the process;
. simple diagramming tools.
Without attempting to constrain the process, it is nevertheless helpful to
propose a framework that enables all the essential elements to be incor-
porated. Once IS/IT strategizing and planning is established in an organ-
ization, several of the deliverables will be available from the previous
cycle, and in need of review and update only, rather than building
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Box 3.3 Characteristics recommended to be included in any IS/IT
strategy approach
1. Overview: the approach chosen should include a way of obtain-
ing an overview, or top-down view, of the whole area to be
studied, although one may be available from an earlier
activity. One of the biggest dangers in IS strategy development
is the attraction of using a detailed tool (e.g. normalization for
data analysis) that is a very good tool in itself but completely
inappropriate for the top-down view needed in strategic
planning.
2. Consistency: the philosophy of the approach and the techniques
used need to be consistent between the various stages of the
process and any earlier strategy deliverables. It would be inad-
visable, for example, to be obliged to redraw diagrams contain-
ing essentially the same information simply because a particular
approach advocates using one schematic diagram and another
advocates a diﬀerent one in two separate stages. Furthermore,
the outputs from the various stages in the process should be
consistent with other company methods (e.g. the process may
need to take output from a parallel business process redesign
project) and the outputs should be in a form that can be used as
direct input to any encyclopaedia of information and process
objects, used in application development.
3. Communication: one of the major reasons for using a standard
approach is to facilitate communication between team members
and the business community. This means that the approach and
techniques advocated should be relatively easy to learn and use.
In particular, they should not be so complex as to dominate the
whole process.
4. Documentation: the hard deliverables of the process are reports
and business and portfolio models. This implies that any
approach should give clear guidance as to the contents and
form of these ‘deliverables’ and their supporting appendices.
5. Rationalize decisions: any strategic planning approach should
provide management with a vehicle to make rational decisions.
These decisions should be made at logical and clearly-deﬁned
checkpoints, which break the whole process up into easily-
comprehended units of work and prevent wasting time on
unwanted deliverables.
from scratch. For example, the business model could be unchanged,
except in minor details, unless the business is undergoing major
revision of core processes. On other occasions, the requirement may be
to focus on one short-term need and to adapt the existing strategy to
accommodate this. Figure 3.9 illustrates the main components of the
framework, brieﬂy described below.
Initiate Strategy Process
This is the set-up stage of the process, in which:
. The purpose, objectives, scope and deliverables are conﬁrmed.
. The approach is determined and resources acquired, such as auto-
mated tools.
. Business participants are identiﬁed and the team assembled and, if
necessary, trained.
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Figure 3.9 Framework for IS/IT strategy formulation and planning process
. The steering and management mechanisms for the process are
created.
. How the work will interface with and feed into business planning.
. The people who are needed to participate are identiﬁed. This gives an
indication of the time needed for the fact-ﬁnding and analysis stage,
since, on average, it takes 1.5 to 2 elapsed days to conduct an inter-
view, including its planning, writing up, analysis and feedback.
Organizing and conducting workshops and documenting the results
takes even longer.
. Plan for the work, tasks, timing, roles and responsibilities, and
checkpoints deﬁned.
One of the most important aspects of the initiation stage is that it enables
the sponsor to develop an understanding of the business needs and
drivers that prompted the IS/IT strategy process. This is required in
order to ‘sell’ the need for IS/IT strategy formulation and planning to
take place, not only to other senior management, but also to operational
management and professional staﬀ whose knowledge is vital to the
process, but who all have a full-time ‘day job’ to do. Some may see
‘planning’ as a threat to their current independence of action concerning
IS/IT. In the case of the strategy process, it must be shown that its
conduct and the resulting strategy will assist all levels of management
in achieving their objectives and resolving key problems.
It is also important that management accept that the costs involved are
merited. In the case of the strategy, the cost should be repaid by focusing
future investment in IS and IT more precisely on the achievement of
corporate objectives, by undertaking projects with clearer, deliverable
beneﬁts. It also ensures that management avoid doing ‘the wrong
projects’—which have no chance of success or are not of any strategic
value. The costs of undertaking the process are relatively easy to derive—
they are people costs for the team, consultants (if they are used) and the
time of participants in workshops and interviews.
A checkpoint at the end of this stage is to ensure that the TOR are
clear and acceptable to the senior management and key participants,
that adequate resources are allocated, and that interdependencies and
consolidation plans with the rest of the business strategy and plans are
achievable.
Team education is essential to ensure that everyone has a common
basis and adequate understanding to proceed. Some time is probably
required in order for the team to:
. understand the principles behind the IS/IT strategy process;
. understand the approach being adopted and learn how to use the
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techniques of IS/IT strategy formulation such as determining critical
success factors, information analysis, value chain analysis, organiza-
tional modelling and interviewing;
. agree on individual tasks and review the analytical tools and tech-
niques available;
. understand deliverables and take responsibility for speciﬁc report
activities and outputs.
Given the mix of people involved, some of the team members will have
absolutely no knowledge of any information analysis methods or
procedures. Conversely, some of the more technical people will have
little or no knowledge of the business world of the organization. This
means that education will be a continuous on-the-job process for all team
members.
Understand the Current Situation and
Interpret Business Needs
This step can take various forms including studying existing documents,
interviewing users, holding workshops and brainstorming sessions with
groups of users. Its purpose is to develop an extensive understanding of
the business in its environment, and to interpret its current, planned and
future potential needs. These fall into three categories:
1. Analysis of the business strategy, objectives, critical success factors,
critical problems and processes, in order to determine the current
situation, its strengths and weaknesses, and the information needs
and thus the focus for investment in systems to meet these needs.
This is covered in Chapter 4.
2. Evaluation of the current IS/IT operation, its systems, information
provision, resources, organization, skills and services, to determine
coverage and contribution and where improvements would be bene-
ﬁcial. This aspect is also addressed in Chapter 4.
3. Analysis of the external and internal business environment to identify
business-based innovations that depend on potential applications of
IS/IT. This is considered in Chapter 5.
Tools such as high-level information analysis, critical success factor and
balanced scorecard analysis, value chain analysis and creative techniques
for identifying opportunities are put to use here. They are described in
subsequent chapters.
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Determine the Business IS Strategy
The accumulated business IS demand is turned into recommendations for
the deployment of IS/IT at SBU level and throughout the organization.
These are documented in the management and business IS strategies.
Conceptual information systems are consolidated and mapped onto an
applications portfolio, representing the current, required and future
potential position, for each SBU considered.
They are described brieﬂy in this chapter in the section headed
‘Deliverables from the IS/IT Strategy Process’, and are considered in
some detail in Chapter 6.
Deﬁne Information and Systems Architecture
This step takes the results of the analysis of processes and information
needs in order to build a proposed business model for the business. It
represents the future ‘ideal’ in terms of process, information and systems,
and is necessary in order to plot a direction when developing migration
plans. The work can commence once analysis of the environment begins,
and continues up until the end of the formulation of the business IS
strategy. The development of the architecture is described in Chapter 4.
Formulate IT Supply Proposals
The remaining tasks are to deﬁne the elements of the IT supply proposals.
They are listed in this chapter under ‘Deliverables from the IS/IT
Strategy Process’, and are addressed in detail in Chapters 7–11.
In practice, at this point the IS strategy and the IT supply proposals
can be fed back into the business strategy process for consideration, and
ultimately for consolidation. Senior business management can then
decide on the most beneﬁcial and feasible investment program for the
business. Outline plans can then be constructed to plot a route map and
milestones for the main initiatives established. This is likely to entail close
cooperation with the business areas to pull together the IS/IT and
business aspects of the ‘approved’ developments to produce an outline
migration plan and a high-level business case for each. Detailed business
cases will still need to be prepared for each element of the program when
development funding is actually requested.
Analytical and Creative Techniques
While the strategy framework and its essential components have been
described, it is important to understand the use of both analytical and
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creative techniques in order to ensure that the necessary dimensions are
explored adequately, and the deliverables are achieved. The former takes
a structured route through the upper levels of the organization, system-
atically analysing and decomposing the business requirements into their
constituent parts, and delivering a structured view of the business objec-
tives, strategy, activities and information needs. The latter, enabled by
techniques that facilitate more lateral thinking, focuses on areas of likely
high potential and relies more on sharing knowledge and creative
thinking. There is a good deal of crossing over since, in the initial
analysis of the business environment, it is likely that embryonic ideas
for future winners may emerge. Figure 3.10 illustrates the approaches
and their common roots:
. Top-down techniques are used to examine and decompose the
business requirements into their constituent parts and to extract
information needs, from which the required applications portfolio
is derived.
. Top-down information and process modelling to assess current
business models. These continue the top-down analysis of the
business, with the emphasis on core processes and the information
needs and activities that are already in place, or need to be imple-
mented to support objectives and strategy.
. Bottom-up examination of the information and processes reﬂected in
the existing application systems portfolio ﬂeshes out the systems and
information requirements.
. Creative techniques are used to identify business opportunities that
can be sustained, strengthened or created by application of IS/IT.
Increasingly, innovative proposals are based on the systems and
technology themselves where the product or service has an intrinsic
IS/IT element or is delivered via the technology.
The creative element provides additions to the portfolio, since it looks for
opportunities (or threats) within the business, and especially at the
boundaries with the external environment, where innovative information
systems or use of technology may be possible. Searches for such oppor-
tunities are not appropriate in all circumstances and probably not at all if
the culture of the organization is risk-averse or not sympathetic to in-
novation, preferring to copy others in its use of IS/IT. It may be that one
or more creative ideas can be brought to fruition very quickly, and it is
often one of the aims of the strategic process to ﬁnd and implement such
ideas in order to demonstrate the potential contribution of IS/IT. In
Chapter 1, the main types of strategic systems and commonly-observed
characteristics of such systems were described.
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DELIVERABLES FROM THE IS/IT STRATEGY PROCESS
The outputs stemming from the IS/IT strategy process are a mixture of
hard and soft deliverables. The hard outputs are documents deﬁning
strategies and plans, and frequently include computer-based material in
the form of dictionaries, matrices and information analysis models. Soft
outputs relate to human factors such as skills, awareness and motivation.
The main purpose of the hard outputs is to document:
. the current situation;
. the vision and rationale for what is being put into place—informa-
tion, systems, technology, people and so on;
. the plans for how it is going to be achieved, with the milestones along
the implementation route.
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Figure 3.10 Analytical and creative approaches to interpret business strategy
The timescale for the vision and plans has to be consistent with the
business vision and its plans, and similarly will be reviewed in line with
business strategy and planning reviews.
Structure for the Deliverables
Every organization will decide on the best structure to use for its
purposes, depending on house style and how ‘strategy’ is communicated
in the organization. However, whatever structure and format an organi-
sation may choose to document its strategy, the objective is to ensure that
users, management and IS professionals all understand the key elements
of the strategy and each thoroughly appreciate those parts of the strategy
they have to carry through. The structure described below is consistent
with the model for the strategy process shown in Figure 3.8.
The following are a few general points relating to the deliverables:
1. The statements of demand, in terms of requirements for information,
systems and technology, are contained in the business IS strategy and
the accompanying application portfolio. The supply elements are
contained in the IT strategy, while the IS/IT management strategy
contains the overall policies for satisfying and balancing the demand
and supply.
2. There should be one IS/IT management strategy for any organiza-
tion where consistent policies for IS/IT are applied throughout the
corporate body. However, there may be several business IS strate-
gies, one for each SBU, or even separate strategies for deﬁned func-
tional or geographic units. There may only be one IT strategy for the
whole organization, although there could be separate hardware and
IT services dedicated to certain business units (see Figure 3.6).
3. The executive summary is a short paper comprising summaries of
conclusions and recommendations, drawn from all the elements of
the strategy. This may be the only paper to be read by the executive
management team, and needs to be succinct and underpinned by
eﬀective presentations and discussions. (If possible, an executive
summary should be avoided to encourage a more detailed under-
standing of the strategy by senior management.)
4. The strategy needs to record the current business and IS perspective,
and their respective issues, as a record of the starting point in any
planning cycle. The ‘library’ of deliverables is also valuable in provid-
ing supporting evidence of the rationale for choices made.
5. The IS perspective is important due to the pace of change in the
industry in general. This pace of change may be in stark contrast
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with the innate conservatism of many an IS function, which is often
resistant to change while expecting user departments to accept
change willingly!
IS Strategy: Management of Demand
The business IS strategy states how the business will deploy IS/IT in
achieving its objectives, and the responsibility for its relevance and com-
prehensiveness lies with the executive management of the business unit.
Its purpose is to link IS/IT clearly and ﬁrmly to the business strategy. The
strategy, deﬁned by the business management and users, states the appli-
cations and service requirements, with reference to the business plans and
activities, and any associated priorities for development of infrastructure
or application systems. Not all the requirements will be for new applica-
tion developments. Some will demand extensions to existing operational
systems to improve their eﬀectiveness. Box 3.4 shows the contents of a
typical business IS strategy.
If the organization is contemplating or undertaking business process
redesign, then it is very likely that its information needs and information
systems requirements will display a much higher degree of integration
than formerly. It is also likely that freer ﬂows and access to information
along end-to-end processes and across external boundaries will become
priority IS requirements.
‘Soft’ Factors
These consist of the unit’s management style, corporate values and
cultural factors, as well as its skills, resources and competencies. Such
information may already be documented in the corporate or business unit
strategies; if not, this is an appropriate time to determine these details. In
the context of deﬁning IS and IT strategies that have considerable
impacts on the business, organizational dynamics play a signiﬁcant
role, since it is necessary to be able to assess the eﬀect of a strategy
that runs counter to the culture of the business. In this case, it is necessary
to assess with great care whether to implement the recommendations or
whether it may be better ﬁrst to focus on changing the underlying
contrary behaviours. If they cannot be changed, then it is unlikely recom-
mendations will deliver their potential beneﬁts, and it may be better to
revise the strategy, taking a more incremental approach to change.
One engineering business, managed jointly by two managing directors,
embarked on developing an IS/IT strategy using external consultants.
The sponsor—one of the two managing directors—was taken ill during
the course of the planning process and was forced to retire. Having lost
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Box 3.4 Basic structure/contents of IS strategy documents
1. Purpose of IS strategy—reasons for new/updated strategy—key
changes in business and IT context since last strategy: it is
feasible for the IS strategy to be an annual update of the
previous one.
2. Overview/summary of business strategy—to provide context for
IS strategy: objectives and Critical Success Factors (CSFs), if
known, plus analysis of competitive forces and/or similar
analyses (e.g. strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats
[SWOT], competencies) and resulting issues aﬀecting the IS
strategy. These tools will be described later in Chapters 4 and 5.
3. Argument for:
. new IS opportunities (to gain advantage);
. critical improvement areas (to avoid disadvantage).
These should be based on Item 2 above but with further detailed
analysis of competency issues, value chains (external and
internal) and CSFs/balanced score card to determine the oppor-
tunity/problem areas and reasons for investment in them.
Details of methods (e.g. value chains) should be included in
Appendices.
4. Summary of opportunities/problem issues—‘1 page’ for each—
explaining the application/opportunity/issue: outline descrip-
tion, the rationale, potential beneﬁts from investment, any
critical dependencies and initial action to be taken in the
context of an overall estimated time frame for the investment
(more detailed plans can be included if known). These opportu-
nities/issues should be separated into:
. strategic, high potential, key operational (and possibly
support); and
. prioritized high/medium/low based on business timescales
(e.g. H = within 6 months, M = 12 months, L = 2 years).
For each application, the business managers responsible should
be identiﬁed.
5. Review of current application—portfolio and status of current
projects (i.e. other investments currently in hand) and the
overall resource implications of:
. completing outstanding work and ongoing commitments
(major components should be described in Appendices);
. resources available to address new work from Item 4 above;
his very vigorous commitment, the positive attitude hitherto displayed by
the directors and senior managers collapsed, prompted by the second
MD, who had not shared his former colleague’s optimism and active
leadership.
Application Portfolio
Brief details of application systems requirements are recorded within the
business IS strategy. The portfolio is categorized in terms of the applica-
tions and their role in supporting current and future business strategy
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. any critical issues requiring resolution within the existing
strategy.
6. Future application portfolio—incorporating the output from
Item 4 above to show the intended/potential investments, with
priorities, and the implications for the rest of the portfolio (e.g.
replaced systems, etc.).
Initial resource estimates (and costs) of the investments should
be appended to the portfolio, with an initial plan (including a
simple Gant chart).
(It is often useful to show how the balance, in using resources, is
changing as the portfolio evolves.)
7. Issues arising from the IS strategy—these are things that require
senior management attention (e.g. the establishment of a
steering group) to enable decisions aﬀecting the strategy (prio-
rities, resources, organization, other initiatives, etc.) to be made
in the required time frame. These may also include issues to be
addressed by the IT strategy in order to provide the infrastruc-
ture to support the future applications portfolio.
How the document is used/ratiﬁed will depend on the organizational
management processes, but it is likely that a ‘draft for discussion’
will be needed, probably its key aspects presented to senior manage-
ment and subsequently an agreed version produced as the basis for
detailed planning (and budgeting) and progress review.
(N.B. No executive summary is suggested here—if one is deemed
necessary, it should be at the end, not the beginning, since it dis-
courages busy managers from understanding the real content! The
strategy is the summary of a lot of work/discussion, etc. and further
summary often loses the important details.)
in the four categories already described—strategic, high potential, key
operational and support.
The portfolio not only contains stated requirements but may also
include potential applications and propositions for enhancing the
business strategy in the future. These proposals are most likely to
address customer-related and competitive activities, and may well be
described in outline only at this point, since signiﬁcant further work
may need to be undertaken before they are introduced within a com-
petitive initiative. It may turn out that the way to proceed is to develop
one or more small pilot ideas, with the intention of adding increments as
the ideas prove themselves.
IT Strategy: Management of Supply
The IT strategy should not only cover the responsibilities of the ‘central’
IS function but also the responsibilities of users, where appropriate. Its
prime purpose is to deﬁne how resources and technologies will be
acquired, managed and developed to satisfy business IS strategies
within the management strategy framework. In addition, it should
reﬂect current trends and developments in IT that could cause future
opportunities or constraints.
Many of the elements of the required IT infrastructure may have
already been deﬁned separately, in which case there are also likely to
be procedures for reviewing and updating the strategy. Nevertheless, a
review of the IT policies, methods and standards in place, and adherence
to them is needed. The IT strategy will then focus on the areas where
change is necessary due to business requirements, or where new options
are available due to changes in technology, experience or capability,
which may not have been previously recognized and pursued.
Whether deﬁned during the IS/IT strategy process or separately, the IT
strategy will normally address the following supply factors:
. application portfolio management;
. organization of IS/IT, the management of its resources and admin-
istrative matters;
. managing the information resources and provision of information
services;
. managing application development;
. managing technology.
These are considered in detail in Chapters 7–11.
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IS/IT Management Strategy
The management strategy covers the common elements of the strategy
that apply throughout the organization, ensuring consistent policies
where needed. It is particularly necessary where several SBUs develop
their own business IS strategy and may or may not operate their own IT
supply function.
Where there is a high degree of centralization in the organization, then
the number of issues addressed in the management strategy and the
degree to which common policies are imposed will be considerably
higher than in an organization where the central corporate body is
small and each unit operates virtually autonomously. Even then, it is
quite likely that the autonomous units will share centralized support
functions, of which IT services are quite likely to be one. It may cover
technology directives that state mandatory factors concerning the IS/IT
infrastructure and other principles that should be followed (e.g. portabil-
ity of applications around the group).
Any information systems needs of the corporate body can be addressed
in a business IS strategy treating the corporate body as if it were an
SBU. Clearly, some of its information needs will be closely linked to
the other SBUs and frequently derived by consolidation of output from
applications run in the SBUs. Aside from its information needs, the
management strategy should state known corporate objectives and
critical success factors (CSFs) relating to corporate activities and
needs. The strategy should also contain a concise summary of the indi-
vidual business IS strategies and any IT strategies derived for the organ-
ization. It should also relate them to its own stated corporate aims and
CSFs.
In a single SBU organization, or one with complete autonomy, the IS
management strategy can be amalgamated with the business IS strategy.
A minimum number of common issues may also be addressed in the
management strategy, namely:
1. Scope and rationale—it will need to lay out the business background,
scope and rationale for the directives it is stating, and preferably
describe a vision of the corporate IS/IT environment and its
expected impact on the business community. If major changes are
in the oﬃng, it will need to describe them and give a timetable for
their introduction.
2. IS function—organization, resourcing and the allocation of respon-
sibility and authority for IS/IT decisions. This includes both formal
and informal structures and any steering group or management com-
mittee overlay structures to provide coherence. The allocation of
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authority and responsibility indicates how much control is retained
in the corporate body and how much is devolved into the business
and functional units.
3. Investment and prioritization policies—implementation of the strate-
gies will require many separate decisions on investments to be made.
Management cannot consider each one in detail and certainly not
continuously allocate and reallocate priorities. Rules must be
deﬁned—pertinent to each of the elements of the portfolio (strategic,
key operational, etc.)—stating how investments should be appraised,
the need for ﬁnancial evaluation and acceptance of business judge-
ment of line and IS managers and the balance and discretion
expected. They should state how the budgeting for expense and
capital items and later project or capital expenditure allocation
processes tie together. They also need to deﬁne a mechanism that
reﬂects the investment decision-making process, for day-to-day
priority setting for resource allocation to ensure that the best
return on investments is obtained from the actual resources avail-
able. Some measurement of results and any control and audit pro-
cedures should be incorporated here. This is covered in detail in
Chapter 9.
4. Vendor policies—these may state speciﬁc vendors, or the parameters
that must guide choice of vendors, such as interconnectability, ﬁnan-
cial soundness, service provision, etc. They should also cover diﬀer-
ences in policies where central approval is needed or where local
decisions can be taken.
5. Human impact policies, including education—it is only too easy to
jeopardize IS/IT strategies due to mismanagement of the people
issues—new job content, reorganization, even redundancy. Some
organizations have ‘technology agreements’ with unions or staﬀ
groups. Where organizational issues are seen as critical to success,
this must be adequately addressed at a corporate level. A common set
of policies and guidelines must be laid down to avoid evolution by
precedent and a negative, reactive stance by those aﬀected. Each
project, in each area, with each new technology should not need
separate negotiation—progress will be slow and inconsistent, the
strategy will undoubtedly be continually disrupted.
6. IS accounting policies—in many organizations, strategies can fail due
to insensitive or inappropriate accounting policies for the charging of
IS/IT resources. The objectives of such policies should be clearly
stated and understood. While they initially appear to be management
accounting systems for cost allocation, once implemented they
become ‘transfer pricing’ systems on which users will make decisions.
The policies will depend on, among other things:
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– other cost accounting/transfer pricing policies for other services;
– proﬁt/cost centre management of organizational units (including
IS unit);
– the cost of administering the charging system itself, which, when
the budgeting complexity is added, may prove very expensive to
carry out.
For each of these, and any other elements of the IS management strategy
considered at a corporate level, there should be a clear statement of
rationale, objectives, policy and procedures for review and exception
handling.
It is quite likely that the IS/IT management strategy has been deter-
mined in a separate phase before any individual SBU conducts its own
IS/IT strategy process. In this case, it has to ensure that the policies laid
down in the management strategy are consistent with the business needs
being addressed and that there is a mechanism for feeding back into the
IS strategy management process any anomalies or troublesome con-
straints uncovered during the strategy process.
‘Marketing’ the IS/IT Strategy
As well as the hard deliverables, there are a number of other beneﬁts to be
gained from a well-conducted and well-received strategy process. The
people who have been heavily involved are likely to be well motivated
and well versed, not only in the planning process, but also with a very
broad understanding of the business, its people, direction and environ-
ment. They should continue to motivate the organization toward
maximum exploitation of IS/IT from wherever they are based, be it
managing the IS/IT strategy, in business planning or in their management
or professional role. The other ‘soft’ output should be an enthusiastic and
committed senior management. This is most likely to be gained if the
enthusiasm and commitment was earned before the process began and
has been courted throughout.
The Audience for the Strategy
It is not possible to generalize about who should be informed and kept
informed, and at what stage or to what depth, since this depends on so
many factors in each situation. But, it is likely that the audience should
include:
. senior management;
. IS/IT management and staﬀ;
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. all participants in the planning activities;
. line and functional management and user area representatives;
. individuals in existing project teams;
. other interested parties within the organization (e.g. corporate
strategy and planning groups, human resources, etc.);
. in some cases, major shareholders and non-executive directors may
also be part of the audience;
. in the public sector, the audience could also include elected represen-
tatives and other government departments, etc.
It may also be useful to include certain external bodies such as suppliers
of systems and technology, or selected suppliers or customers of the
business, particularly if proposed systems emphasize communication
between them and the ﬁrm.
There are substantial beneﬁts to be derived from eﬀectively commu-
nicating the strategy. First and foremost is the need to obtain demon-
strable and actual commitment across the organization to implementing
the recommendations and to providing the resources to do so. It is also
important to obtain agreement from all concerned on how the impacts on
the organization will be absorbed. Other beneﬁts from communication
can be obtained by asking for feedback from people who did not parti-
cipate directly in the planning process (usually for straightforward prac-
tical reasons). They may be able to identify problems that were not
exposed during the process and perhaps introduce potentially better
options than those proposed.
The strategy needs to be communicated in a consistent fashion so that
the right items are emphasized and so that misunderstanding and false
impressions are avoided. It should reach audiences at diﬀerent levels,
with diﬀerent interests and over an extended period, possibly several
months. It is therefore worthwhile developing high-quality ‘marketing’
presentation material and collateral that can be tailored to each type of
audience.
Managing the Process and Resources
A suggested structure for managing and steering the process is shown in
Figure 3.11.
Management Sponsor
This person, who is preferably a director or senior executive of the or-
ganization, should fulﬁl the following functions:
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. chairing the steering committee and approving the budget and plan
for any IS/IT proposals;
. assuring management participation and commitment, through active
backing and allocation of the right resources;
. representing the interests and priorities of the planning process in the
business;
. heading the ‘marketing’ eﬀort (which should not be underestimated);
. acting as the focal point for decisions about the scope, TOR and
conduct of the work.
Steering Committee
Depending on the scope of the planning process, it may be necessary for
this group to meet once every month, or simply to be present at the
appropriate checkpoints. A minimum requirement is that the manage-
ment sponsor should function as a one-man steering committee and
report to the board of directors where necessary. Typical steering com-
mittee functions are:
. providing strategic direction and guidance on business requirements,
and priorities to the planning team;
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Figure 3.11 Strategy process management structure
. reviewing and approving plans, and taking up risk management
issues;
. conducting checkpoint reviews;
. authorizing continuation of work on the next planning activity;
. reviewing and contributing to ﬁnal strategic plans, before submission
to the business executive team.
Other roles are shown in Box 3.5.
Team composition and modus operandi
. The enterprise, as a whole, needs to be convinced that the strategy
and planning exercise is important. If the most senior executives
work on the planning activities, then this message will come across.
. The participants in discussions will be from very senior levels. They
must know and respect the team or they will not have conﬁdence in
the resulting strategy.
. During discussions or workshops, the strategy team must recognize if
they are being deliberately or unconsciously misled or the resultant
strategy will be rejected.
. A large part of the information requested and given will be sensitive
and conﬁdential. This will be more readily given to peer group
members than to subordinate group members.
. During analysis and strategy formulation, team members have to
be capable of taking decisions that will ultimately aﬀect the whole
organization, so the organizational level of these team members has
to be high, for both the user and IT team members. These people,
with the qualities mentioned above, are precisely those executives
who do not have time to spend on such work!
In addition to the senior end-users and IT staﬀ, it is often beneﬁcial to
include one or two IT staﬀ who are experienced in documenting inter-
views and workshop outputs using diagramming tools and in undertak-
ing the subsequent information analysis. Also, if the strategy process is
new to the organization, it may be appropriate to retain a consultant who
specializes in this area.
Usually, if the management committee has agreed to ﬁnance the
strategy process, they will recognize the importance of the type of
person on the team and provide the requisite managerial backing. The
acid test of involvement is the decision physically to relocate the prospec-
tive team member for a signiﬁcant portion of his working time. This
avoids the syndrome where a manager will say that he is available any
time, but in practice is impossible to contact in his native habitat.
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Box 3.5 IS/IT strategy team composition and roles
Strategy team leader
. Plan, manage and do much of the day-to-day work. As such,
this role involves a major time commitment on his or her part.
Strategy team members, drawn from both the user and the
IS communities
. At least two full-time members are needed, in general. They may
require the assistance of other part-time members like technical
specialists. The number of people required will vary with the size
of the project and the desired completion date. A critical factor
is the number of people to be interviewed, if this is a major
requirement of the process, as this is a most time-consuming
process.
. There is a further factor to consider in team selection. Accep-
tance and commitment from the members of the ‘formal’ man-
agement team is obviously needed. What is not so obvious is the
need to involve people who, although they do not have formal
titles, are the eﬀective powers behind the throne. Such a person
could, for example, be the bright young economics graduate in
the ﬁnance department who has set up an elementary, but much
admired, budgetary system for the directors on his semi-legal
PC. These people are sometimes known as ‘gatekeepers’ be-
cause they eﬀectively control the gate of acceptance or rejection
of any information systems proposals. Whether or not they are
included in the team is a matter of judgement, but the team must
be aware of their existence and importance.
. Another point to consider is that, although it is possible and
perhaps necessary to use external personnel in the team, it is
essential that the organization itself provides at least one full-
time team member, if not from the user community then from
the IS function. This is because the strategy process should result
in the speciﬁcation of a number of subsequent projects, and
someone from the organization, who has participated in the
process, is needed to guide these projects during implementa-
tion.
Business participation
. It is necessary to identify, right at the start of the strategy
process, those members of the organization who will participate
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Another catch here is the person who is only available for, say, 30% of
the time. This occurred during one strategy exercise where, right up to the
start, all of the planning had been done assuming that the person in
question would be a full-time team member. His explanation, and his
manager’s explanation, was that, as he thought he knew only about
one-third of the business, he would only be needed for one-third of his
time! It should be impressed on all concerned that a substantial commit-
ment is needed from all team members, with the exception of the sponsor-
ing management and steering committee members, who are required to
read reports, attend review meetings and be available for ad hoc discus-
sions when required.
Automated Support Facilities
The conduct of an IS/IT strategy will require the use of basic automated
tools such as word processing, spreadsheet and drawing tools. In particu-
lar, the graphical ability of drawing tools to construct any necessary
diagrams (e.g. matrices, ﬂow diagrams and data models) should be
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in discussions, interviews or workshops. They can be briefed
about what is involved, sold to, if necessary, and appointments
may be set up in their diaries.
. Other participants may be identiﬁed later, but the great majority
should be prepared at the start. A few of them may be included
purely for political reasons, rather than for any positive contri-
bution they can make.
Strategy team composition and skills
The quality of the products depends on the quality of the team
selected. The team leader and members should come from diﬀerent
parts of the organization and have:
. Broad knowledge of the business and its organizational objec-
tives, management styles, culture, processes and people.
. Good communication skills.
. Ability and authority to make and implement plans and deci-
sions that may aﬀect the whole organization.
. Respect of management and staﬀ.
. An interest in areas other than their own and an ability to
analyse objectively.
. Experience of IS/IT strategy formulation and planning in at
least some of the team.
assessed. In addition, the provision of a suitable data dictionary structure
for the recording of such things as descriptions of data and activities,
interview results and deﬁnition of business objectives is a general require-
ment for any drawing tool selected.
Before deciding on the use of any automated tool, the team must
decide on what information it wishes to record and how this information
is to be structured (i.e. connected). For example, it is important to know
such things as: How much detail is to be recorded from each interview? Is
a standard interview record format required (normally, the answer is
yes)? What is to be recorded about each major business activity and
data group?
Physical Facilities
At the very least, there needs to be one room dedicated to the team. It is
usual to keep lists, tables and diagrams of general interest (e.g. company
structure charts and process models) permanently on the walls of this
room for easy reference. The information collected, both from desk
research and from discussions, is usually highly conﬁdential and sensitive.
Therefore, the strategy process room must be secure at night or facilities
provided for the locking away of such sensitive material.
It is preferable to have rooms set aside for discussions, equipped with
manual and printing whiteboards, ﬂip charts, etc. and arranged so as to
be conducive to good interviews and workshops. It is inﬁnitely preferable
if meetings and workshops, especially with senior executives, can be held
physically away from their own oﬃces, reducing the likelihood of any
interruptions and getting the executive away from ‘today’s’ problems.
SUMMARY
Devising a strategy for the role of IS/IT in the SIS era is accepted as a
major issue, and despite a plethora of methodologies, automated
planning tools and brigades of consultants willing to propel organiza-
tions into strategic systems developments, is still more of an art than a
science.
This chapter has focused on an overall approach to strategizing and
planning for IS/IT and emphasized the continuous nature of that process,
involving the combined knowledge of key business and IS/IT staﬀ, thus
facilitating genuine, lasting and productive partnerships between business
and IT.
Experience has shown that the most eﬀective strategy process takes
place at the strategic business unit level, with appropriate rationalization
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and consolidation across the whole organization. In addition, there is no
‘ideal’ approach to IS/IT strategy formulation and planning, but there
are a number of factors that could be considered critical for its success:
. Using the ‘best’ people available from the business, IS function,
external advisers—they provide the invaluable knowledge of the
industry and the business, the IS/IT relevance and, above all, the
creativity, none of which can be derived from a methodology.
. Gaining the enthusiasm, commitment and involvement of top man-
agement.
. Getting a thorough understanding of the internal and external
business and IS/IT environments, the business imperatives and
culture and the real stimuli driving strategy and planning.
. Setting objectives consistent with experience and maturity, and
tailoring the approach to meet them, employing a mixture of
analytical and creative techniques.
However, it should be remembered that having a good strategy is only a
means to an end—its implementation is when the value of the strategy is
actually realized. A key aspect of the formulation process is ensuring the
organization is both willing and able to implement its chosen strategy.
This will depend as much on how the strategy was derived, and who was
involved, as it will on the actual content of the strategy.
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4
IS/IT Strategic Analysis:
Assessing and Understanding
the Current Situation
The ﬁrst three chapters have considered the evolution of IS/IT in
organizations from a strategic perspective and outlined approaches to
developing business and IS/IT strategies that can enable the required
improvement in the integration of both. More speciﬁcally, in Chapter
3, ‘what is involved’ in establishing an IS/IT strategy process and its
deliverables were examined against a background of the various issues
aﬀecting the process. This and the following chapter concentrate
on determining the content and main deliverables of the IS strategy,
comprising:
. analysis of the existing and expected future business and IS/IT en-
vironments and strategies;
. the organization’s IS requirements arising out of the current business
strategy, by aligning these requirements with stated business needs
and initiatives;
. the future potential from IS/IT through identifying opportunities to
impact the business strategy and signiﬁcantly raise its competitive
performance.
If both strategic alignment and competitive impact are being pursued,
then, in practice, there will be considerable overlapping of the two
threads of analysis. However, for ease of exposition, they are treated
separately in this book. The derivation of the IS strategy by alignment
with the business strategy is covered in this chapter. This is established
through a combination of analytical and evaluative methods, although it
should be remembered that creative ideas can arise at any time in the
strategic analysis. Chapter 5 will introduce concepts for the more creative
dimension, by exploring external IS/IT opportunities, the competitive
environment and the industry ‘value system’. The techniques used in
these analyses may in turn provide new insight into results from the
more internally-focused analysis presented in this chapter.
In pursuing both alignment and impact, a thorough understanding of
the business and technology environments, and of the apparent and
expected opportunities and threats, is required, as well as a sound knowl-
edge of how IS/IT may be applied innovatively to change the business
along any one of a number of dimensions—strategy, structure, processes,
culture, etc. It is also essential to build up a picture of the expected
outcome, both in terms of the changes to be brought about through
business and IS/IT initiatives, and the required changes to the IS/IT
environment, both the application portfolio and the supporting IT infra-
structure. An objective assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the
business overall and its IS/IT capability is also required.
Based on a clear understanding of the starting position, the future
business perspective and the IS strategy, the gap in terms of IS/IT
requirements can be analysed and an achievable migration plan con-
structed. This point is picked up in Chapter 6, where we bring together
the various approaches considered in both this chapter and the next into
an overall framework to determine the prioritized information systems
requirements for the organization. It must be remembered that the focus
at this stage is primarily on the business IS strategy (i.e. what is
required—the needs and priorities from a business perspective). Later,
the IT strategy (i.e. how to deliver it) will be addressed. Nevertheless, as
the requirements are identiﬁed, the current ability of the organization to
‘supply’ or satisfy those requirements will inevitably be assessed. Hence,
this part of the analysis will also focus on the capability of IT resources as
reﬂected in the existing organization and practices, and in the current
applications and information resources of the organization. The result of
the IS strategy formulation is a target application portfolio that meets
corporate and business needs and can be sustained in terms of tech-
nologies and resources. Various techniques can be used to achieve the
mixture of fact ﬁnding and analysis that goes into determining the IS
demand, and several of them are described in this chapter.
BUSINESS RE-ENGINEERING AND IS STRATEGY
One of the hottest concepts to arrive on the management agenda in recent
years is that which has been labelled business process re-engineering or
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BPR for short.1 First articulated in the late 1980s as a result of research
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,2 it has become the means
by which many organizations are seeking to emulate the transformations
achieved by the early pioneers. Companies such as Ford, Hewlett
Packard, First Mutual, Taco Bell, Hallmark Cards were shown to have
achieved signiﬁcant improvement in the performance of selected areas of
their business by redesigning the processes through which work in organ-
izations is performed.3
The redesign of business processes continues to be a popular approach
taken by organizations to improve performance. While the concept has
attracted negative press over the years, some of it warranted,4 we ﬁnd
today that it often appears under a number of guises such as customer
service initiative, e-procurement project or major cost reduction—all
demanding signiﬁcant redesign of business processes. While this book
is not setting out to cover re-engineering approaches in any depth,5 it
is nevertheless pertinent to consider the subject alongside the develop-
ment of an IS strategy, for a number of reasons:
. In developing the IS strategy, a thorough understanding of the
business strategy is essential. Most re-engineering initiatives will
spring from, and be part of, the business strategy.
. In many instances, the early work in developing an IS strategy is
ﬁrst to ﬂesh out the details behind the headlines in the business
strategy, and this means working with the business areas to help
determine what those business initiatives will be and their expected
contribution to business objectives. These could include re-engineer-
ing initiatives.
. Most, if not all, re-engineering initiatives have a signiﬁcant IS/IT
element, which will be accommodated in the IS strategy, and need
to be allocated the same priority that the business places on the
change program.
. There is a common need in both IS strategy development and
business re-engineering to build up a model of the business as it
currently exists and other potential models of how it will look follow-
ing transformation or evolutionary change.
. Success in re-engineering, as with the development and implementa-
tion of an IS/IT strategy, demands a strong business–IS function
partnership.6
. Designing or redesigning business processes to take advantage of IS/
IT capabilities is essential if the traditional problems of automating
poorly-designed processes or ineﬃcient work practices through IT
are to be avoided.
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Much has been written about the role of IS/IT in business re-engineering.
In particular, there are conﬂicting views as to whether IT is the driver for
re-engineering, or an enabler or one of the means of implementation.
Davenport and Short7 argued for the ﬁrst of these, although they recog-
nize its role in the other two, insisting that two key questions must be
asked:
. How can business processes be transformed using IT (based on a full
understanding of the capabilities of IT)?
. How can IT support business processes?
Many organizations have not adequately or systematically addressed the
ﬁrst question, such that IT has barely been exploited at all in such situa-
tions. Teng and colleagues8 suggest that IT is an enabler, but that its
potential role should be overtly recognized and incorporated in an ‘in-
tegrated business process redesign planning model’. This they describe as
a ‘policy loop’, which combines business strategy and IS/IT strategy.
Within this overall process are two subsidiary ‘loops’, one concerning
business innovation (with little IS/IT involvement), the other dealing
with implementation, where IS/IT becomes critical for achieving the
beneﬁts of change.
The relationship between IS/IT and BPR can be summed up as shown
in Figure 4.1, whereby IS/IT has to be considered in diﬀerent ways at the
diﬀerent stages of identifying, evaluating and implementing ‘radical’
process change. This enables a reconciliation of the fundamental ques-
tions of impact and alignment of IS/IT strategy development with the
rationale for ‘re-engineering’ initiatives. Table 4.1 summarizes these ques-
tions.
In the past, the most eﬀective IS strategies have assiduously sought to
be developed in line with the business strategy, so that change initiatives
could be worked out on as broad a basis as possible, and certainly not
conﬁned to IT development work. The main diﬀerence between these and
current business re-engineering schemes is often in the name applied to
the program.
UNDERSTANDING THE CURRENT SITUATION
Understanding the current situation involves obtaining an in-depth
understanding of the business strategy, the business and technology en-
vironments and the current status of IS/IT in the business. This makes it
possible to determine the opportunities, threats and requirements
inherent in the business strategy, and to recognize the strengths and
182 IS/IT Strategic Analysis
weaknesses of the business and its IS/IT operations. This is vital, because
the current situation represents the starting point from which any change
programs begin.
Determining the IS/IT Requirements:
The IS Demand
One way of determining the IS strategy is to ask each area of the business
what their requirements are. This is likely to deliver a comprehensive
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Figure 4.1 The role of IS/IT in business process re-engineering
Table 4.1 Reconciling IS/IT and BPR
Business process IS/IT strategy formulation
Questions re-engineering and planning
Formulation 1. How can we re-engineer 1. How can IS/IT be exploited
our business to provide to provide business
advantage? advantage? (impact)
Implementation 2. How can we improve our 2. How can IS/IT ensure the
processes to ensure success of the business
success of the strategy? strategy? (alignment)
‘wish list’, but would result in no insight into the relevance, or genuine
priorities, and little knowledge of the inherent IS/IT requirement in the
strategy of the business.
Another way is for a group, charged with deﬁning or updating the IS/
IT strategy, to absorb every written strategy statement and interpret them
into relevant IS/IT principles and critical success factors (CSFs), applica-
tion requirements associated with major planned initiatives, and a set of
supply criteria to deliver the service demanded by the business. This
would be possible if the strategy were documented in suﬃcient detail
and the business strategy documents contained comprehensive descrip-
tions of the current and planned business activities and environments. Its
main defect would be in the inability to feed into the development of the
strategy and initiatives the opportunities for exploiting IS/IT to its fullest
potential. In practice, this level of documentation rarely exists, unless it
was built up in an earlier business or IS strategy cycle and has been
updated to reﬂect the current situation and requirements.
Undoubtedly, the best course is for the IS strategy to be developed in
parallel with the business strategy, feeding trends, opportunities and ideas
into the business strategy process, and then working closely with all
areas of the business in building up a set of achievable business and
associated IS/IT initiatives that will deliver the targeted performance.
The IT strategy—supply—can follow directly from this analysis.
To achieve the desired results, it is necessary to obtain a complete
understanding of the drivers for change and the current situation
(‘where we are’) and then to articulate the situation being sought
(‘where we want to be’) and start to propose how the gaps might be
closed (‘how to get there’). This will include both business and IS/IT
initiatives. These are identiﬁed through a mixture of fact ﬁnding and
analysis focused on the elements of the business and technical environ-
ments. This is illustrated in Figure 4.2. Table 4.2 contains an extensive list
of fact-ﬁnding and analysis tasks that could be undertaken, and the
purpose or deliverables associated with each of these.
Gathering the Relevant Data
The quality and value of any IS/IT strategy that is ultimately developed is
dependent upon the depth of understanding of the business and its needs,
and the constructive interpretation of these needs into appropriate in-
formation, systems and IT services. To this end, if the information is not
readily available and accessible to address the areas in Table 4.2, some or
all the tasks in this table should be undertaken. Whatever techniques and
approaches are used, the results are more useful if they are recorded in a
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manner that facilitates analysis. The approach described here relies on
constructing a clear, structured set of information, and, where appropri-
ate, constructing models showing the organizational, business and infor-
mation requirements. A potentially signiﬁcant problem with IS strategy
development is of being engulfed by a surfeit of data. What is required is
suﬃcient understanding of the business and information environments to
be able to develop sensible and realistic strategies—but not the type of
exhaustive analysis associated with detailed design and development of
systems.
Much of the key information required is often in the heads of employ-
ees at all levels in the organization and needs to be elicited through
discussion. However, discussions and workshops will be wasted eﬀort
and frustrating for business people if used to establish facts that can be
obtained from available documentation. Not only does it waste time but
it also means that important opinions expressed will not be seen in a
factual context. Such problems can be avoided by reviewing as much
available documentation as can be found ahead of any discussions.
These may include business strategy documents, or at least formal state-
ments of objectives and key performance indicators (KPIs). Other useful
documents are likely to include annual plans, budgets and forecasts.
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Table 4.2 Fact ﬁnding and analysis tasks and deliverables
Task Purpose or deliverable
Analysis of the business strategy Identify its components and the
associated information needs derived
from it
Analysis of the current and expected Determine how IS/IT can contribute to
future external business environment, strengthening the business’s
and analysis of the current and competitive positioning
future portfolio of the business, and
its competitive strategy
Analysis of the internal business Understand the relevant organizational
environment characteristics, SWOTs and other
factors
Identiﬁcation of the critical success Crystallize the essential characteristics of
factors of the business. These are success in meeting the objectives stated
frequently the drivers for change in the strategy
Information analysis Model the logical activities and inherent
information elements of the business
Evaluation of the eﬀectiveness of the Identify where changes need to occur,
current processes and how IS/IT can improve the
performance of the processes
Identiﬁcation and analysis of the Identify the most important information
internal and external value chain ﬂows through the business and across
its value chain partners
Further value chain analysis Bring into focus potential opportunities
for improving the value delivered by
information, or identify potential
hazards, where success may be
jeopardized by poor interfaces
Creation of a conceptual architecture Ensure maximum contribution to
showing how the enterprise’s performance targets. Modelling future
information and processes might be processes is a key element in business
restructured process redesign if it is being
undertaken as part of re-engineering
the business
Compilation of a catalogue of all the An input into migration planning
hardware and software being used
by the organization, and the
principal functions performed by
each of the systems
Evaluation of the current application Determine the inventory of information
portfolio systems in use and in development, and
assess their contribution and potential
Evaluation of current IS/IT policies, Assess their applicability to meet current
organization, processes, services, and future business needs
capabilities, etc.
INTERPRETING THE BUSINESS STRATEGY
A framework for developing an IS/IT strategy was described in Chapter 3
and illustrated in Figure 3.8. Two of the inputs relate to the business
perspective—internal and external. The elements of both these perspec-
tives should be identiﬁed and analysed, so that the demands they place on
IS can be derived and that ways of exploiting opportunities or countering
the threats they contain can be determined. The majority of information
needs are internal, generated in the operational activities, in pursuit of
ever-improving performance and the measures that are needed to
monitor it, and in the communications passing between activities.
Others relate to external factors and are of particular signiﬁcance in
areas concerned with customer and supplier relationships and com-
petitive activity.
Internal Business Environment
The elements of the internal environment that need to be identiﬁed,
analysed and understood are:
. the business strategy, not just the objectives but the intended means
of achieving them;
. the current business processes, activities and the main information
entities (e.g. customer, stock item, account) and how they relate to
other entities;
. the organizational environment, covering its structure, assets and
skills, and the less tangible factors such as knowledge, competencies,
values, style, culture and relationships.
From these, the information, systems and technology needs arising from
the business strategy and the current activities of the business can be
assessed and prioritized. This can be illustrated by considering two
types of activity driven by the business strategy, and how they determine
information needs:
. Activities that must be performed in order to contribute directly to
the achievement of the business objectives, and their supporting
information needs, have to be identiﬁed. For example, the business
objectives may include ones to increase market share and improve
customer satisfaction. One of the initiatives proposed to achieve this
may be to launch a new product or service. Associated information
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requirements include market size, competitor products and services,
and customer requirements.
. Secondary activities that have to be performed in order to measure
performance toward achieving those objectives must be identiﬁed.
For example, once a new product has been launched, it is necessary
to monitor the take-up of the product or service to see if additional
funding is required for advertising and to plan the resourcing levels
required to sustain the sale of the product in its particular market
and meet customer demand.
The Business Strategy
In analysing the business strategy, the main requirements are:
. To identify the current strategy and, in particular, any emergent new
elements since the previous strategy development cycle.
. If necessary, to interpret and analyse the strategy, and describe it in a
structured manner. This is best tackled by a mixed group with both
business and IS disciplines and skills represented.
. To compile and conﬁrm the consequent IS requirements.
The business strategy may exist in a variety of forms: as formally
recorded corporate, business unit or functional area strategy documents
or less formally in other documents and/or in the heads of individuals. In
the latter case, it can usually be understood and conﬁrmed through
discussions with senior management. The main constituents are deﬁned
and described in Box 4.1.
The best context for IS strategy development and implementation is:
. Deriving the IS strategy alongside all other component strategies
such as marketing or product development, or within a business re-
engineering program or redesign of business processes.
. Implementing a program of initiatives to deliver the business strategy
that includes the critical IS/IT developments alongside and within
other business initiatives. Business re-engineering is again a good
example.
However, in many instances, business strategies and objectives are not
recorded formally, are not well constructed or not well communicated.
Then, they can only be identiﬁed through questioning, analysis and
creative prompting. In such cases, it may be necessary to work back
from current actions and derive an implied business strategy. Indeed,
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Box 4.1 Core constituents of a business strategy
Mission
An unambiguous statement of what the organization does and its
long-term, overall purpose. Its primary role is to set a direction for
everyone to follow. It may be short, succinct and inspirational, or
contain broad philosophical statements that tie an organization to
certain activities and to economic, social, ethical or political ends.
Often called ‘strategic intent’. Values are also frequently stated
alongside the mission. Three widely-diﬀering examples of missions
are:
. ‘To be the world’s mobile communications leader, enriching the
lives of individuals and business customers in the networked
society’ (large global telecommunication company).
. ‘To eradicate all communicable diseases worldwide’ (World
Health Organization).
. ‘The company engages in the retail marketing on a national
basis of petroleum products and the equitable distribution of
the fruits of continuously increasing productivity of manage-
ment, capital and labour amongst stock holders, employees
and the public’ (a large public company).
Vision
Increasingly found in business strategy deliverables, this gives a
picture frequently covering many aspects that everyone can
identify with, of what the business will be in the future and how it
will operate. It exists to bring the strategy to life and to give the
whole organization a destination that it can visualize, so that every
stakeholder has a shared picture of the future aim.
Business Drivers
These are a set of critical forces for change that the business must
respond to. They may represent short, medium and long-term
factors on which the business must focus in order to meet the objec-
tives and satisfy the CSFs. They are frequently weighted and can be
used in prioritizing improvement proposals. For example, the main
short-term driver may be reduction of the cost base, the main
medium-term driver may be increased market share and the main
long-term driver may be zero-defect quality.
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Objectives
The targets that the organization is setting to take it toward achiev-
ing its vision. They are usually small in number, but embody the
most important aspects of the vision such as ﬁnancial returns,
customer service, manufacturing excellence, staﬀ morale, social
and environmental obligations. They are statements of future
results or steady states that an organization wishes to achieve at
its global or strategic business unit level. They are normally quanti-
ﬁed with associated values and deadlines. Ideally, they should
display the following characteristics:
. unambiguous and results orientated;
. measurable, veriﬁable and not too numerous;
. established by those involved in their achievement;
. relevant, achievable and encouraging high performance;
. consistent with any higher-level objectives.
Examples are:
. ‘Reduce manufacturing costs by 10% each year for the next ﬁve
years’
. ‘Achieve zero overdue orders within 12 months’
. ‘Reduce staﬀ turnover to less than 15% per annum within 2
years’
. ‘To lead in each local market by customer and brand loyalty,
lowest-cost position, share of proﬁt pool and employee satisfac-
tion’
Usually, the mission and the organization’s strategic objectives are
cascaded down through the business, and each business function or
core process is given the opportunity to develop its own objectives in
response to the high-level ones. They are frequently tactical in nature
and give rise to short-term IS requirements.
Strategies
They deﬁne the way in which objectives will be met. They may
reinforce existing policies (e.g. the steering committee structure for
approving capital expenditure) or initiatives that will continue to be
pursued, perhaps with expanded resources (like a customer care
programme). They may also state a new set of policies and new
initiatives that will be put into practice like the redesign of the
production processes of the business.
Frequently, they do not exist, and one of the ways in which the IS
the main achievement of the IS strategy process may be to focus attention
(subtly, if necessary!) on the inadequacies and, at best, assist in formulat-
ing a business strategy that considers technological opportunities as sig-
niﬁcant elements.
There may be no business strategy at all and objectives that only point
at the ‘bottom line’. In this case, probably the best that can be achieved is
to analyse and record current activities, tactics and operational needs,
from a top-down viewpoint. Analysis of the business and of its critical
components will provide invaluable input into any future formulation of
business strategy. In the interim, short-term IS planning can focus on
supporting current high-priority business needs and on identifying and
alleviating critical problems that threaten the business with competitive
disadvantage. The main techniques, in this case, revolve around under-
taking a detailed analysis of implications of current critical success (or
failure) factors (CSFs, CFFs).
Information needs may arise from all the elements in the business
strategy and they are a signiﬁcant source of requirements in the compila-
tion of the IS strategy. For example:
. The mission, vision, strategic and tactical objectives and key per-
formance indicators set the targets for deﬁning or assessing current
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strategic process can help is in facilitating the identiﬁcation and
documentation of candidate schemes for achieving the objectives.
Critical Success Factors (CSFs)
CSFs are the few key areas where ‘things must go right’ for the
business to ﬂourish. It is very important to identify them when
aiming to obtain a profound understanding of the business. The
very act of determining CSFs may help to crystallize objectives
and strategies, and certainly to emphasize priority activities. CSF
analysis is considered in more depth later in this chapter.
Business Area Plans
They are the plans of the various areas of the business, which
document their response to the business strategy. In many cases,
this may reﬂect a continuance of business as usual, with a focus
on the key targets being introduced or reaﬃrmed. Though not
part of the strategy, they contain pointers to information needs
and need to be investigated.
initiatives; the external business drivers supply the basis for new or
potential initiatives.
. The strategies or initiatives, if they have been articulated, are increas-
ingly likely to have an IS/IT content that is often essential to
achieving the desired result. These usually represent medium-term
requirements that may be application-speciﬁc or may point to
required improvements in IT services and the infrastructure.
Longer-term requirements emerge, once IS/IT opportunities are
identiﬁed, for impacting the business and its competitive strategy
through innovative application of IS/IT.
. The business area plans usually have short-term IS/IT requirements,
often carried forward from earlier cycles, but perhaps with diﬀerent
priorities, based on the current objectives.
. The CSFs (often used in conjunction with a ‘Balanced Scorecard’—
see later in this chapter) lead to two diﬀerent types of IS/IT require-
ments: those that will enable success and those that monitor progress.
Business Processes, Activities and Key Entities
Another set of deliverables, derived from analysis of the current situation,
are models that depict the processes, activities and main information
elements, and how they relate to one another. These models make up
the business model and, together with supporting IS models, comprise an
IS architecture for the business (see Figure 4.3). These models oﬀer a
number of beneﬁts. They provide:
. A valuable aid to understanding what is happening in the organiza-
tion and for clearly visualizing the business processes and informa-
tion ﬂows, independent of organizational structures.
. A communications vehicle for explaining and illustrating them to a
business audience in a manner that is easy to comprehend.
. A means of reviewing the merits or otherwise of the organizational
structure, when viewed against the business model. This is a very
valuable feature, especially when evolutionary development has
created anomalies in the structure of the business, as, for example,
when a particular executive has ‘carried’ a part of the organization
with him when he moved to a diﬀerent area of the business or
assumed another responsibility.
. A basis for highlighting particular messages. These might be:
– the disjointed nature of the processes, which inhibits eﬀective
operations and interrupts information ﬂows;
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– where CSFs are focused;
– high-cost and other problem areas;
. A basis for conceptually deﬁning activities and for designing and
illustrating improvement opportunities.
. A basis for indicating the scope of application areas and for deﬁning
the future systems architecture.
Interpreting the Business Strategy 193
Architecture model
Business process model Business data model
Entity life history
R
C
IS/Entity
matrix
IS process model
App 1
App 2
IS data model
App 1
App 2
Business model
IS model
IS functional
model
App 1 App 2
R
C
Process/Entity
matrix
Figure 4.3 An example of an architecture model, comprising a business and an
IS model (source: M. Cook, ‘Architecture models’, working papers, Glaxo Well-
come Operations, 1995)
. A mechanism for mapping current applications against the processes
they support.
. A basis for explaining the importance of having a common set of
terms in a business. It is quite common for organizations to have
diﬀerent understandings of a particular term used within the same
organization. For example, one particular managing director com-
mented that, at a board meeting, he had four diﬀerent parts of the
organization giving him four diﬀerent answers to a question about
sales. The production department said that they had produced for
sale a certain quantity of goods, and that was their ‘sales ﬁgure’. The
marketing department had another set of ﬁgures for ‘sales’, which
was independently derived from their forward-marketing projections.
The sales department had a ﬁgure based on customer orders, while
the ﬁnance department had a ﬁgure based on actual invoiced sales.
Each of those directors was talking about what he thought was the
same information, but clearly there were four entirely diﬀerent sets of
ﬁgures involved.
. A means of identifying high-level redundancies. As an example, an
analysis was conducted at a ﬁnancial institution using the techniques
of data-ﬂow diagramming and entity modelling. One particular area
of the organization was reviewed, and it was found that, while
considerable activity was taking place within the department and
information was coming into it, nothing, in fact, was leaving it!
This had arisen because, some years before, exchange controls had
been introduced by the government of the country concerned and
this department was then established to monitor exchange control.
However, when the exchange controls were relaxed the department
carried on, but there was then no purpose to it!
An example of a business model and its associated IS model is given in
Figure 4.3. The IS model indicates applications and their relationships.
The individual models are created to depict:
. Business processes—the sets of interlinked activities or roles that
deliver speciﬁc outputs to identiﬁed customers inside or outside the
organization. In many cases, a functional organization inhibits the
eﬀective operation of the business processes, by placing barriers at
the functional boundaries, and, in eﬀect, preventing the timely and
smooth ﬂow of information. Nevertheless, the underlying processes
may be identiﬁed and modelled. Value chain analysis, a technique
covered extensively in Chapter 5, is invaluable in identifying and
conﬁrming the key processes in the business, and across its external
boundaries. It ensures that the process ends at a point when a
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satisfactory business outcome is delivered (i.e. when value has been
delivered to the next partner in the chain). Later in this chapter, we
consider how business processes are analysed.
. Activities—the elements of the business processes that the organiza-
tion undertakes to produce, promote and distribute its products or
services, to develop, support and administer its infrastructure, and to
measure performance against objectives.
. Key entities—within an activity, those ‘things’ that are of fundamen-
tal importance to the business processes, and for which there will be
associated information, although not necessarily held as computer
information. They may include people (customers, suppliers, employ-
ees), objects (products, invoices), places (workshop, laboratory) or
abstractions such as events (sale, order). The models also indicate
relationships between the entities (optional or mandatory, one-to-
one, etc.).
These models are obtained from top-down analysis of the business. They
are all high level and tend to be somewhat imprecise, since so much of the
detail is absent, but are capable of successive decomposition so that they
can become increasingly more precise, when later undertaking feasibility
studies and systems development activities. They are frequently called
‘fuzzy’ models at the high level. The entities themselves are likely to
become the focus of the subject databases subsequently developed and
maintained. The IS models are likely to include:
. Process ﬂow models or process dependency charts, which show the
end-to-end series of information dependencies and actions that
deliver satisfactory business outcomes to external or internal cus-
tomers. An example might be ‘develop a new product’.
. Hierarchical activity models or functional decomposition diagrams,
describing the business units’ activities. They are produced by
activity analysis and show how the high-level functions of the
business are broken down into broad activity categories deﬁning
what it does or wants to do (sell and produce products, etc.) and
then into more detailed subordinate activities.
. Entity relationship models, showing the relationships of the key
entities or entity groups relevant to the organization. Their main
purpose is to deﬁne the underlying information architecture, inde-
pendent of any functional considerations. They also provide a means
of clarifying company-wide business language and are the source of
the initial entries into the business unit’s data dictionary.
. Data ﬂow diagrams (DFDs), indicating the movement of informa-
tion around, into and out of the business. A DFD is a network
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representation of business information systems and shows the logical
dependency of one activity upon another for its data. The most
signiﬁcant characteristics of DFDs are that the situation is repre-
sented from the viewpoint of data, not a person or organization.
The diagrams are graphic and can be partitioned and layered so
that rather complex ﬂows can be easily shown. They can be struc-
tured so that functions can be decomposed into more detailed self-
contained models.
. Activity/Entity matrices, providing a tabular representation of the
business and illustrating the relationship between information
entities, conceptual business activities and conceptual application
areas. They plot the usage of information entities against the
business activities and also record whether the particular activities
create, use or modify the entities. This enables a ﬁrst-pass attempt at
matching application areas to important business needs and showing
how information will be shared across applications.
More details regarding IS modelling tools can be found in Avison and
Fitzgerald,9 Avison and Wood-Harper,10 and Checkland.11
The creation of models, and the accompanying fact ﬁnding and
analysis, is frequently performed within the IS strategy development
process by information analysts in the team, working with people from
the business side to obtain the relevant information. They are often
initiated at workshop sessions with business people, held to discuss the
business strategy and IS requirements. Alternatively, the models may
have been built by the IS function independently of the IS/IT strategy
development process, or they could be built as part of a business re-
engineering initiative. If the models already exist, they may just need
verifying and updating. Many of the large enterprise systems vendors
also supply generic industry process models. Some modelling tools such
as ARIS12 also have a library of models for diﬀerent industries.
Once process models have been developed, the processes can be eval-
uated for their eﬀectiveness in meeting business needs. An approach for
assessing the eﬀectiveness of processes is presented later in the chapter.
Information models may be created for the whole corporate body or at
strategic business unit (SBU) level or even major business function level.
In the latter case, there may need to be a rationalization process to
identify common entities, cross-functional entity relationships and
common logical activities. Policy and implementation issues relating to
rationalization would then follow in the management of corporate in-
formation and development of application systems. There may also be
organizational implications if there is merit in rationalizing operational
activities.
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In a large organization with several business units, it is most probable
that separate models will be created for each unit, but that there will be
no attempt to create a global model for the whole organization. However,
where there is a good deal of similarity between the units, or business
synergy, then reconciliation between common entities becomes impor-
tant, when the business relationships are explored. Similarly, when con-
solidation of information from various units up to corporate level is
considered, reconciliation may also be desirable.
Organizational Environment
When considering the process and information needs of an organization,
it is also essential to have a clear understanding of the organization’s
current structure, relationships and the people of which it is composed.
These organizational dynamics form an important input into the
planning process. It is necessary to understand the environment and its
skills, resources, values, culture and social interactions, as well as its
management style and its relationship with the external environment.
These become increasingly important when the magnitude and pace of
change has implications for all aspects of a business. There are a number
of organizational development and organizational modelling techniques
that can be used to prompt the analysis, one of which is covered later in
the chapter.
External Business Environment
This external environment was described in Chapter 2. For the purposes
of IS strategy formulation, it is essential to understand and analyse the
environment, so that opportunities for IS/IT to impact the business and
contributing to the shaping of the business strategy can be identiﬁed and
explored. The analysis of the external environment and the development
of IS/IT initiatives to exploit its opportunities and counter its threats is
further covered in Chapter 5.
EXAMINING THE CURRENT IS/IT ENVIRONMENT
In order to assess and prioritize IS actions, it is also necessary to examine
the current IS/IT environment to establish the gap between current and
future targeted provisions, so as to determine whether the environment
can sustain the changes required or itself needs changing. Gaps may
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relate to the provision of the target portfolio, either by enhancement of
existing applications or by developing new ones. The remainder may
aﬀect any of the other aspects in the IS/IT environment, including the
organization, its competencies, the technical infrastructure or supplier
relationships.
While most of the analysis of the current IS/IT environment relates to
factual matters, a further important aspect is to ascertain a business
manager’s perception of the role and current eﬀectiveness of IS/IT.
This will enable IS/IT management to determine whether they have to
address issues creating the perceptions held and will also give a good
indication as to the level of commitment the business is likely to give
to any proposals. Chapter 8 addresses issues regarding the relationship
between the IS function and the business.
Examination of the external IT environment enables the strategists to
take account of trends and opportunities from emerging technologies and
to investigate how competitive or complementary organizations are
applying IT. This will lead to a more objective appraisal of current
eﬀectiveness, as well as to new ideas for potential application of IT.
Assessment of the internal IS/IT environment comprises:
. an evaluation of the current application portfolio and the applica-
tions under development to determine their content, coverage and
contribution;
. a similar evaluation of current information resources;
. an evaluation of the current infrastructure and IT services and re-
sources, accomplished through a technology assessment.
The results are the basis of the assessment of the gap between current and
required provisions. While this work can be conducted independently
from the analysis of the business environment, there are obvious advan-
tages in maintaining frequent contact between the two activities to ensure
that the assessment of IS/IT is conducted in the context of what the
business wants to achieve. The most signiﬁcant aspect is the current
application portfolio, since it represents the starting point from which
future development will begin. It is also a key determinant of how the
business community in the organization perceives the value and contribu-
tion of IS/IT.
Current Portfolio Evaluation
The current suite of applications includes centralized, distributed, web-
enabled and end-user systems and databases that support various aspects
of the business—administrative, operational, control, planning and strat-
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egic. Gaining a thorough and agreed understanding of the portfolio
enables measurement of its value to the business and the contribution
that systems make towards satisfying business objectives. This will
include a description of the functions performed by each of the systems
and an assessment of their technical and functional eﬀectiveness, as well
as the opinion of the users in terms of utility and value to them. The
analysis includes not only existing systems and databases but also those
under development and those planned but not yet under way. Clearly,
any of these could be revised as a result of the strategy process.
Typical deliverables from a systematic assessment are listed in Table 4.3.
The likelihood is that key operational and support quadrants will be well
populated, and that a few systems will indicate some strategic use of IT.
Often, there are a number of high-potential systems created by end-users
experimenting independently with innovative ideas.
The analysis involves gathering and collating a substantial amount of
factual and subjective information, both technical and user orientated,
for each system from two main sources:
. The users of the information systems and databases—to gain infor-
mation about how the system supports business objectives and pro-
cesses; the functionality and business information in its scope; users’
views on system quality and the usability of the application; depen-
dence on the application; documentation, training and systems
support quality; users’ views on its future potential.
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Table 4.3 Deliverables from a current portfolio assessment
. Categorization in terms of application portfolio segments—strategic, high
potential, key operational and support
. Assessment of coverage and contribution of systems to business needs, and
any major opportunities to increase business value
. The extent to which the systems integrate or interoperate
. Assessment of the eﬀectiveness and robustness, and the unrealized potential
in current systems, and of the enhancement required to increase contribution
. Common elements and diﬀerences between current portfolio and required
information and systems architecture
. Supporting information to enable estimates of potential improvement
projects
. Supporting information to allow prioritization of enhancement and support
work on current systems
. Opportunities that exist to improve quality of information
. Strengths and weaknesses assessed against the business CSFs
. Assessment of the risks of failure from the current portfolio
. The IT development and technical staﬀ—to gain information about
the structure and interfaces of information systems and databases:
their technical characteristics, quality, age and technical robustness,
ease of maintenance and extent of data duplication.
This part of the strategy process can be very extensive and time consum-
ing, and care must be taken not to spend too much eﬀort here, which may
not be repaid. A relatively short evaluation may be quite adequate to
obtain a broad picture, then, later, when the intended initiatives are
becoming clearer, further investigation can be made of targeted areas
of the portfolio.
The information may be collected by discussion or questionnaire, or by
a mixture of both. A questionnaire may be the only practical method,
because there are often multiple users for major business systems and
databases. A selection of the type of questions that might be asked is
given in Table 4.4.
Current/Previous Strategy and Policies
If IS/IT strategic formulation and planning is a continuous process, it is
very likely that a previous IS/IT strategy exists, which documents the
200 IS/IT Strategic Analysis
Table 4.4 Sample questions for evaluating the current portfolio (source: adapted
from a questionnaire developed by T. Osborne, ‘Current portfolio questionnaire’,
working papers, Glaxo Wellcome Operations, 1994)
1. What business activities are ‘contained’ within the system?
2. What information (automated and manual) ﬂows through the system and
how is the information accessed and transferred?
3. Does the system support a critical business process, with reference to
objectives, critical success factors, drivers, value chain? Does the system
inhibit the eﬀectiveness of the core process?
4. How does the system map on to process maps, entity charts and the
conceptual architecture? How does it map on to the future applications
architecture, if one has been developed?
5. What problems—gaps, poor links, duplications, etc.—are revealed?
6. How does the system contribute to meeting the IS demand determined in
business strategy analysis?
7. How eﬀective is user support in terms of responding to and clearing up
problems, and how eﬀective is training, documentation and usability?
8. How useful, accurate and timely is the information put into and taken out of
the system?
9. Are there any better ways of using the system?
10. How ﬂexible is the system for making changes?
previous ‘current situation’, the policies that were to be adopted and
plans for accomplishing the changes. This would have included the in-
vestment in capital expected and the expenditure expected in relation to
turnover or organizational budget. It would also have documented perti-
nent policies (e.g. information management policies or policies governing
the selection of technology products, services and vendors). Careful
scrutiny of the previous strategy and its business rationale will guard
against making critical policy decisions that may be diﬃcult, if not
impossible, to implement. Chapters 8–11 address many of the factors
in the IS/IT environment, which are brieﬂy described in the following
subsections.
IS Organization and Processes
This covers a number of aspects that will be more or less relevant,
according to how eﬀective the current services are and whether the role
of IS/IT in the organization needs to change drastically. It is likely that
the following factors will need assessing for their suitability:
. the IS function, its size, structure and relationship with the business
at organizational, functional, departmental and individual levels;
. the organization for the provision of IT resources and services;
. sourcing strategy for IT resources and services;
. how the IS function is managed and the level at which it reports into
the corporate level and individual businesses;
. the IS/IT governance structure, including decision-making processes
and any steering committee structure in place;
. how business cases and budgets for IS/IT investments and expendi-
ture are prepared and by whom, and how they are authorized.
These topics are covered in detail in Chapter 8.
Current Assets, Resources and Skills
These are the assets of the organization in terms of hardware, software,
communications capability and any other technology employed, together
with the information resources, human assets and skills of IS/IT people
and users. This inventory must be reviewed for its relevance and ability in
meeting future requirements.
Methods and Training Provisions
This refers to the methods in use for business and systems analysis,
business process re-engineering, systems design and development, data
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management, project management and control, quality assurance and
control, and estimating. It includes any systems development methodol-
ogies, object-oriented methods, technical standards, use of rapid applica-
tion development (RAD) methods, decision support, expert systems or
any other specialized tools. It also covers training and education methods
employed, and any particular awareness programs directed at the
business to raise understanding of IS/IT. Similarly, any awareness or
other training available for technical people on business matters is also
covered.
Much of the assessment of the IS function and its processes can be
accomplished by focusing the organization modelling technique, de-
scribed later in the chapter, on the IS function itself. This provides a
framework of questions and a structure for assessing the answers.
What Does the Business Think of IS?
It is advantageous to have an objective view of the current role and
contribution of IS/IT in the business, the role and contribution of the
IS function itself, and of the perception of this from the rest of the
business. This is not an exact science, but an objective and largely qua-
litative perspective can be drawn by considering a number of diﬀerent
aspects:
. Analysis of the current application portfolio can provide a great deal
of information. By categorizing the portfolio into strategic, high
potential, key operational or support systems, it can indicate how
well current and future business strategy is supported. This is also a
key indicator in assessing how IS/IT is perceived by business people.
If, for example, there are no strategic or high-potential applications,
this suggests that management consider IS/IT of little strategic value
to the business. Chapter 7 describes in detail how to assess the
applications and the resulting management options and issues.
. Consideration of how many of the business functions and processes
are underpinned by systems, and of the size of the applications
development backlog, gives an indication of the level of support
given to the operational and management needs of the enterprise.
. Assessment of levels of user satisfaction across the range of IS/IT
services gives a preliminary view of the eﬀectiveness of the relation-
ship achieved between IS/IT and the business. User roles in
managing projects and in developing business cases, together with
the IS function, gives a measure of the cooperation existing between
the business and IS function.
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. The level of integration achieved between systems and across diﬀer-
ent technologies, and the status of information management in the
business, gives a good measure of the degree to which information is
considered a key corporate resource.
. Analysis of the role and the structure of the IS function, in relation to
the structure of the organization, indicates whether IS/IT is already
well integrated with the business.
. An indicator of the current role and value of IS/IT comes from the
level in the management hierarchy where overall responsibility for
IS/IT resides. This is increasingly a board-level appointment in busi-
nesses where IS/IT is considered strategic.
Peppard and Ward’s13 research has indicated that, where IS function is
perceived as making a value-added contribution to the business and
where there is a close relationship between the IS function and the rest
of the business, IS/IT has a signiﬁcant positive impact on business per-
formance. If the relationship is poor, the organization is probably faced
with a long struggle, ﬁrst of all, to, improve the perception of IS/IT and,
second, to get business managers involved in IS/IT decision making.
Implementing an IS/IT strategy process, as outlined in this book, will
be challenging, particularly when exploring the impact of IS/IT and
seeking opportunities for innovative application (as opposed to align-
ment). In Chapter 8, the relationship between the IS function and
other areas of the business is explored in more detail.
External IS/IT Environment
This ﬁnal input into the strategy process relates to the external IS/IT
environment, where the purpose is to gain a perspective on technology
trends and opportunities for using IS/IT in new and innovative ways. It
does not necessarily mean seeking ideas for implementing leading-edge
technology, although these are not precluded. The aim may be to ﬁnd
ways of using existing technology at lower cost or in previously uncon-
sidered ways.
Part of this involves looking at what competitors or other comparable
organizations are doing. This outward view is useful not only to pick up
ideas but also to obtain a measure of the relative maturity of the busi-
ness’s own IS/IT contribution. It may be a deliberate policy of the
company not to be a pioneer of any new technology in its own
business sector or a leader in innovative use of IT at all, but to follow
at a measured pace behind the recognized leaders.
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Another aspect of this external survey may be to categorize elements of
technology that may be worth evaluating in more detail later, when
implementation issues are addressed. Clearly, any organization that
makes a point of following external trends and opportunities through
an established mechanism will have the required information available
as input to the planning process.
IT research establishments such as Gartner, IDC and Forrester
Research can be another good source of technology trends and informa-
tion. However, organizations should exercise caution when reading many
of their reports, particularly regarding vendors, as they may not be as
independent in their assessment as it might seem. Not only do many of
the research organizations charge for providing information but they also
charge vendors a fee; failing to pay usually means a vendor is not
included in any of their assessments or analysis despite the fact that
they may be providing a superior solution.
TECHNIQUES FOR INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS
There are many techniques that can be used in analysing the current
situation and business strategy. Some of them are included in Table 4.5,
which also indicates the main deliverables derived from the techniques.
Those marked with a single asterisk have already been described or will
be described in this chapter; those marked with two asterisks are essen-
tially ‘impact’-seeking techniques and are described and their use ex-
plained in Chapter 5. The remainder includes standard techniques such
as SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) analysis and
business strategy analysis. Business process redesign is also referenced
and, although it is described in overview several times in this book, as
already noted it is too large a topic to cover in detail here.14
The aim of the rest of this chapter is to brieﬂy describe these techniques
and to suggest why and how they are used.
INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS TO MEET THE CURRENT
BUSINESS OBJECTIVES: THE USE OF CRITICAL SUCCESS
FACTORS AND BALANCED SCORECARDS
In order to position critical success factor (CSF) analysis and the
Balanced Scorecard, it is useful to develop the link between data, infor-
mation and business results. Figure 4.4 illustrates such a model, the
DIKAR model (Data, Information, Knowledge, Action, Results),
derived from the work of Venkatraman.15 Viewing the model from left
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Table 4.5 Techniques used in creating the IS demand statement
Technique Deliverables
Business strategy analysis Business strategy—mission, objectives, etc.
Global business initiatives
Business area initiatives
Business priorities
IS requirements leading to IS demand
Critical Success Factor (CSF) Areas of business activity ‘where things
analysis* must go right’
Potential IS/IT thrusts
Performance measures
SWOT analysis Analysis of Strengths, Weaknesses,
Opportunities and Threats of internal and
external business and IS/IT environments
Balanced Scorecard analysis* Business objectives and key information
requirements
Performance measures
Business portfolio and competitive Options for long term IS investment to
strategy analysis* * strengthen competitive position
Value chain analysis (internal and Internal information ﬂows
external)* * High-level ‘industry’ information ﬂow
model
Potential impact of IS/IT
Process analysis*/Business process Identiﬁcation of core business processes
re-engineering* Eﬀectiveness of processes in meeting drivers
Process improvement options
Process redesign blueprints (that deliver
signiﬁcant performance improvement
regarding drivers)
Resultant IS/IT options
Organizational modelling* Comprehensive assessment of the business
and IS/IT environments
Filtering mechanism in assessing options for
change
Business modelling—information Enterprise model:
analysis techniques* —entity models
—object models
—process dependency charts
—data ﬂow diagrams
—functional decomposition diagrams
—conceptual architecture
continued
to right represents an IT perspective where the focus is on data processing
and the provision of information to the business. Viewing it from right to
left, the focus is on business results and the actions and knowledge
required to achieve those results. (This model is used again in
Chapter 10 when the concept of knowledge and its management is
explored in detail.)
The Balanced Scorecard identiﬁes the information required to measure
performance against the business objectives. CSF analysis, on the other
hand, identiﬁes what has to be done, or changed, in order to achieve the
objectives, including new information and/or systems needed. In combi-
nation, they provide a way of obtaining agreement as to the priority of IS
investments relevant to achieving the explicit business objectives for the
next 6–12 months.
Balanced Scorecard
The Balanced Scorecard has become a popular tool for managing the
performance of organizations and, laterally, for the development of
strategy itself. Developed by Harvard Business School academics
Kaplan and Norton,16 it is based on the premise that ﬁnancial
measures only report the results of past decisions and that, if perform-
ance measurement is to have any real meaningful impact, a more
balanced set of objectives and measures is required. The Balanced Score-
card promotes the examination of performance from four interrelated
perspectives, each seeking to address speciﬁc questions (see Figure 4.5):
. Financial: How do we look to our shareholders and those with a
ﬁnancial interest in the organization?
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Table 4.5 (Continued)
Technique Deliverables
Current portfolio evaluation* Proﬁle of current applications
Coverage and contribution to business user
and technical satisfaction
Contribution of applications to business
strategy
Technology assessment and IS/IT Inventory of current hardware and software
infrastructure review Assessment of IS organization, procedures,
skills and methods
* Covered in this chapter
* * Covered in the next chapter
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. Internal business perspective:What do we have to excel at if we are to
meet the expectations of our employees and trading partners?
. Customer perspective: How do our customers perceive us in term of
products, services, relationships and value-added?
. Innovation and learning perspective: To achieve our future vision,
how will we continue to improve and create future value for our
stakeholders?
For each of the four perspectives, objectives can be established and
relevant measures, often called key performance indicators (KPIs),
assigned against each objective, leading to the information needed to
measure performance.
Critical Success Factor Analysis
CSF analysis is a powerful and deservedly popular technique not only in
developing an IS/IT strategy but also for business strategy development.
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Figure 4.5 Information and the Balanced Scorecard (source: R.S. Kaplan and
D.P. Norton, ‘Using the Balanced Scorecard as a strategic management system’,
Harvard Business Review, January–February 1996, 76. Used with permission)
The technique often appears under many guises (e.g. ‘key issue analysis’
and ‘do wells’) and is probably the most commonly used tool in the IS
strategies toolkit. It can be used in a number of diﬀerent ways and for
diﬀerent purposes, as indicated in Table 4.6. As described here, it is used
for the purpose of interpreting the business objectives in terms of actions
required to achieve them, the key information and application needs of
the organization and its managers, and for assessing the strengths and
weaknesses of existing systems, in that context.
The technique can be used at the macro-level to examine the overall
industry (i.e. deﬁne industry CSFs), the company as a whole or a par-
ticular business unit. It can also be used at individual executive level to
determine which of those activities that he or she performs are the most
important for achievement of success against a particular objective. In
this way, the CSF process can assist in prioritizing activities and informa-
tion requirements, both at individual manager and at business unit levels.
In both cases, the CSF technique helps to focus attention on the key
issues.
What Are Critical Success Factors?
Rockart17 deﬁnes CSFs as being ‘the limited number of areas in which
results, if they are satisfactory, will ensure successful competitive
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Table 4.6 Uses of critical success factor (CSF) analysis
. It is a most eﬀective technique in involving senior management in developing
the IS strategy, because it is wholly rooted in business issues and in gaining
their commitment to proposed IS actions that contribute to achievement in
critical areas
. It enables linking of candidate IS projects through CSFs to objectives, and
thus clearly demonstrates alignment with the business strategy, and provides
a compelling basis for gaining wholesale agreement by the top-management
team
. In individual interviews with senior management, it is a good catalyst in
unearthing their own individual information needs
. By providing a link between objectives and information requirements, the
CSFs play an important role in prioritizing potential investments
. It is particularly useful in IS planning when the business strategy has not
progressed beyond objectives by focusing attention on the most critical
aspects of the business that need action taken to improve their performance
. It is extremely powerful when used alongside value chain analysis in identi-
fying the most critical processes, and enabling ownership of the CSF and its
associated actions to be accurately pinpointed
performance for the organization.’ They are the few key areas where
‘things must go right’ for the business to ﬂourish. As a result, the CSFs
are areas of activity that should receive constant and careful attention
from management. The current status of performance in each area should
be continually measured, and that information should be made widely
available.
Every ﬁrm in an industry may have some common CSFs such as access
to raw materials or timely delivery, due to pressures on or in the industry.
The overall organization, which could have units in many industries, will
have CSFs relative to its objectives of diversiﬁcation, return on invest-
ment and portfolio mix. The key area for determining CSFs as part of
IS strategy development is the business unit, since—as stated in
Chapter 3—this is the practical level to determine strategy. The agree-
ment of the business unit managers as to what these CSFs are is impor-
tant in obtaining consensus on the major IS/IT investments. There will
also tend to be a structured, cascading relationship in a large organiza-
tion between objectives and CSFs, as illustrated in Figure 4.6.
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Figure 4.6 Objectives and CSFs
The determination of CSFs should only be started when objectives
have already been identiﬁed. The ﬁrst stage is to identify CSFs against
each objective, then, second, to consolidate them across objectives, since
many CSFs will recur (see Figure 4.7). Ranking of objectives and the
number sharing the same CSF will give a relative priority to the achieve-
ment of CSFs. Only then should the importance of information or
systems in achieving those CSFs be considered. ‘How can IS/IT help
achieve the CSFs?’ and ‘How do existing systems inhibit achievement
of CSFs?’ are both important questions to consider, and this implies a
SWOT analysis of existing systems against the CSFs. By implication, if
the CSF is achieved, the probability of achieving objectives is increased.
That assumes that there are a reasonable number of CSFs per objective—
between ﬁve and eight per objective is a useful rule of thumb. Too many
suggest that the objective is unachievable; too few and it is not ambitious
enough!
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Figure 4.7 Critical success factors basic processes
From the above description, it may appear that the CSF is the uni-
versal management tool. This is not the case, for the following main
reasons:
. To be of value, the CSF should be easily and directly related back to
the objectives of the business unit. From experience in the technique,
it generally loses its value when used below the third level in an
organizational hierarchy.
. CSFs focus primarily on management control and tend to be intern-
ally focused and analytical, rather than creative.
. The nature of CSFs and KPIs reﬂect a particular executive’s manage-
ment style. The chief executive of one airline judged performance by
load factors. His predecessor judged performance on the number of
letters of complaint. Both are valid, but reﬂect diﬀerent approaches.
When used eﬀectively, it achieves a number of requirements, all of which
are vitally important to the strategic process. They are:
. involving top management in the IS/IT strategy process and gaining
their commitment;
. developing a consensus view of IS applications in the business;
. linking IS activity to business strategy;
. providing guidance for deﬁning executive information needs.
When used ineptly, the approach can cause frustration, even despon-
dency, and may even turn management against the strategy process.
The most common cause of such problems is that ‘critical’ is not diﬀer-
entiated from ‘important’, resulting in long lists of factors that eﬀectively
describe everything the organization does! The strengths and weaknesses
of the CSF approach are well documented. Shank et al.18 list practical
guidelines as to their use. They highlight the need:
. to use them in a formal, structured way;
. to educate people in advance regarding the process;
. not to link them solely and explicitly to the derivation of information
needs.
In addition, the eliciting of CSFs works best (and is certainly done more
quickly) in a group-working process rather than by conducting interviews
with numerous individuals and then trying to collate the results. The
value of a group approach is demonstrated by Hardaker and Ward19
who report the use of CSF analysis as part of a concept called Process
Quality Management in IBM. The CSF process must produce agreement
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to move in a coherent direction, which is very diﬃcult to achieve by later
consolidation, rather than achieving consensus as the analysis proceeds.
This also enables the CSFs to remain focused on the management
‘business agenda’ rather than the personal agenda of an individual and
avoids ambiguity being left unchallenged.
It can be summarized by saying that the process is as important as the
product, since it achieves commitment to the outcome. If well prepared
for the process, senior managers ﬁnd little diﬃculty in articulating CSFs,
since they are often merely overt statements of issues that they are aware
of or are already addressing anyway. Guidance in establishing an eﬀec-
tive process, based on real organization use, is provided in the articles
already mentioned in addition to Rockart and Crescenzi.20 It is impor-
tant to remember that consensus of the senior managers must be achieved
in order to get eventual agreement on IS/IT strategies. It forces analysis
of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats, and ensures a
proper understanding of the mission and objectives, often for the ﬁrst
time!
Consolidating the Balanced Scorecard and
CSF Analysis
The outputs from the construction of the Balanced Scorecard and the
CSF analysis can be combined to provide a more comprehensive set of IS
requirements. The Balanced Scorecard links measures to business objec-
tives, while CSF analysis identiﬁes what is critical to achieving results.
Together, both techniques provide a rigorous assessment of prioritized IS
opportunities, given the current business strategy.
Box 4.2 describes an example application of the combined use of
Balanced Scorecard and CSF analysis. It illustrates how the combination
can lead to the derivation of improvements to operational activities and
the identiﬁcation of both the internal and external information required
by those operational activities, and for performance measurement in
relation to business goals or objectives. It is always better to have a
crude measure of something important rather than a reﬁned measure
of something that does not matter! CSFs help to diﬀerentiate the two.
BUSINESS PROCESS ANALYSIS
Business process analysis is a technique for assessing the eﬀectiveness of
core business processes in support of business objectives and drivers from
one or a number of SBUs, or from speciﬁc business areas within an SBU.
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Box 4.2 The application of Balanced Scorecard and CSF analysis
This example relates to a manufacturing company providing a
product and parts service primarily to SMEs. This company
produces a wide range of electrical products that are assembled
mainly from imported components. Orders tend to be for unique
products conﬁgured to customer speciﬁcation. As far as possible, the
company attempts to meet all customer orders direct from com-
ponent stock. However, this has implications for stockholding
costs, both of components and ﬁnished products. The time
between order placement and fulﬁlment can be severely impacted
by the availability of component parts.
Using the Balanced Scorecard, the company constructed a score-
card of objectives and associated measures for each of the four
perspectives. A partial view of the scorecard is illustrated below.
So, for example, from a customer perspective, one objective is to
increase responsiveness for both ﬁrm orders and inquiries. Asso-
ciated measures to indicate the extent to which this objective is
being achieved include:
. order to delivery lead time;
. enquiry response times.TE
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Using CSF analysis, the focus shifts to identifying the actions neces-
sary to support each objective. So, for example, one of the objectives
is to reduce stockholding costs. The CSFs with respect to this objec-
tive are:
. earlier identiﬁcation of obsolete items;
. improved forecasting to reduce safety stock.
As illustrated in the ﬁgure below, working from the CSFs, we can
determine both the information and systems requirements in order
to support these CSFs:
. new analysis of stock-vturn to separate fast-moving/slow-
moving items (A, B, C-based praeto analysis);
. improved stock forecasting based on more accurate sales fore-
casts/actuals;
. new stock replacement algorithms for diﬀerent types of stock.
Deciding which systems to ultimately develop depends on business
priorities.
Ultimately, as a result of process analysis, a decision may be made to
embark upon major redesign of one or a number of business processes.
Whatever the outcomes, the IS/IT elements can be determined and
assessed and built into the IS demand.
The assessment of business processes is aimed at deﬁning the areas
where the greatest opportunities exist to improve performance. At the
highest level, an initial assessment can be made of how eﬀective the
current processes are in meeting the business objectives and drivers. A
second assessment can then be made to predict how eﬀective the pro-
cesses could and should be in making their fullest contribution to the
drivers. For example, if the driver relates to increased market share, then
the customer acquisition processes would expect to play a greater role in
achieving this than the process for servicing existing contracts, although
both would have potential for making a worthwhile contribution. Com-
paring current and potential performance gives an indication of the gap
that could be made up by improving the process.
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The outputs from Balanced Scorecard work and the CSF analysis
can then be consolidated, as illustrated below.
Adopting a Process Perspective
Over a decade after the concept of business process re-engineering
emerged, the majority of organizations are still structured along func-
tional (or departmental) lines, with each having their own hierarchy. The
‘chain’ of linked departments allows for specialization where the overall
task is broken down and people with speciﬁc expertise can be applied as
required. Such specialization of labour, whether on the manufacturing
shop ﬂoor or within oﬃces, has been a normal way of working for a long
time. ‘Levels’ of seniority evolve within these functions to form the
organizational hierarchy. This model is so widely established that it has
rarely been questioned. BPR is a concept that questions this ‘functional’
way of thinking and makes ‘processes’ a central focus for organization
design.21 In short, processes are becoming the building blocks of organ-
izations and seek to capture natural workﬂows (see Figure 4.8).
A process focus means examining the way a customer order is fulﬁlled,
a new product developed or a customer account established without
concern for functional boundaries or specialization. For example, when
requesting repair of a telephone fault, the customer is not generally
interested in which department the engineer works for, whether he
travels by public transport or buys spare parts in the local hardware
shop, as long as the service is restored.
The Oxford English Dictionary deﬁnes process as a continuous and
regular action or succession of actions, taking place or carried out in a
deﬁnite manner, and leading to the accomplishment of some result; a con-
tinuous operation or series of operations. In its simplest form, a process has
an input and an output and is made up of a sequence of individual
activities through which this input passes to become an output. With
this traditional view, the process itself can be anything that transforms,
transfers or merely looks after the input and delivers it as output. Organ-
izations adopting a process approach ﬁnd that, for example, many of the
steps in their order cycles have nothing to do with delivering the required
outcomes.22 Indeed, it is sometimes diﬃcult to identify why some steps
exist at all! Often, it is for no better reason than because they always
have! Getting rid of all these unnecessary steps can result in faster
throughput or quicker customer service and at considerably lower cost.
However, the traditional view of a process being composed of activities
can be problematic, particularly in information and knowledge indus-
tries. In such contexts, it is perhaps more appropriate to view the
process in terms of roles, with a process portrayed as a number of roles
collaborating and interacting to achieve a goal. This perspective can be
extended to make explicit reference to behaviours: a process is an organ-
ized collection of behaviours that satisﬁes a deﬁned business purpose,
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performed according to speciﬁc targets. This view is of relevance in
knowledge work or in areas where there is a high degree of interaction
between people. For example, specifying the precise activities in customer
service processes is diﬃcult, if not impossible. Guidelines as to the be-
haviour to be exhibited can be given, however attitude is often the crucial
ingredient in determining whether or not a customer is satisﬁed.
Many IT implementations have focused on automating traditional
ways of working that existed at that time—existing work practices
remain. However, an order-to-fulﬁlment process could be further
enhanced by examining the fundamental assumptions that underlie the
design of this process with a view toward radically redesigning how work
is performed. For example, the assumption that salespeople take orders,
or the assumption that accounting staﬀ perform credit checks, or the
assumption that payment is made on receipt of an invoice, guide the
design of the process. Why can’t the customer phone, fax or electronically
send (via the Internet) the order directly to the factory, where, using
expert system technology, the order can be veriﬁed, a credit check per-
formed, availability of stock determined and shipment to customer
arranged? Purchase orders could also be sent electronically to suppliers.
The company could also consider the introduction of ‘invoiceless proces-
sing’, where customers submit payment based on receipt of goods rather
than on receipt of an invoice, subject to the usual credit terms and con-
ditions. This is how Dell and Cisco operate.
This, in essence, represents the fundamental message of business
process re-engineering. It is not merely automating existing work prac-
tices but seeking opportunities where existing ways of working can be
totally transformed. The power of information technology, in particular,
provides the opportunity for new and innovative ways of organizing
and enabling organizational work to be performed in ways that are
not possible manually. Box 4.3 provides a summary description of ap-
proaches to redesign.
Identifying Processes
Despite the intuitive appeal of processes, identifying and understanding
processes is not as simple as it might at ﬁrst seem. For example, in the
delivery of most products and services, companies operate a highly
complex set of processes. A key challenge, however, is to identify pro-
cesses and deﬁne them at an appropriate level. Evidence suggests that
many organizations are redesigning processes that make little contribu-
tion to business success as a whole, even if the processes selected are
successfully redesigned. Performance improvements reported are very
often expressed relative to the process being redesigned rather than the
business unit as a whole. Although such results may look impressive in
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Box 4.3 Approaches to redesigning processes
Once an organization has identiﬁed a process to be redesigned, how
does it proceed in determining the new design? Having examined
many BPR initiatives, two broad approaches to redesign can be
identiﬁed: the systemic approach and the clean sheet approach. In
reality, however, organizations usually adopt a combination of both.
In adopting a systematic redesign approach, an organization maps
out and attempts to understand an existing process and then work
through it systematically to create new processes to deliver the
desired outcomes. The clean sheet approach, on the other hand,
demands a fundamental rethink of the way that the product or
service is delivered and designs new processes from scratch.
Redesigning an already existing process or, for that matter,
reﬁning a newly-designed one, is usually about making it better,
cheaper and/or faster. Better, in that it delivers higher levels of satis-
faction to its stakeholders, particularly for customers. Faster, in that
it does so as quickly as possible thereby also increasing responsive-
ness. Cheaper, in that it does the above to the highest levels of
eﬃciency.
When redesigning existing processes, the emphasis is on the elim-
ination of non-value-adding activities and the streamlining of the
core value-adding ones. The rules for doing this can best be summar-
ized using the acronym ESIA: eliminate all non-value-adding activ-
ities; simplify aspects of work where possible; integrate elements of
the process and automate where appropriate. The table below high-
lights the main areas of attention within these four domains.
Areas of attention for systematic redesign (source: J. Peppard and P. Rowland,
The Essence of Business Process Reengineering, Prentice-Hall International,
Hemel Hempstead, UK, 1995, p. 181)
Eliminate Simplify Integrate Automate
Overproduction Forms Jobs Dirty activities
Waiting time Procedures Teams Diﬃcult activities
Transport Communication Customers Dangerous activities
Processing Technology Suppliers Boring activities
Inventory Problem areas Data capture
Defects/Failures Flows Data transfer
Duplication Data analysis
Reformatting
Inspection
Reconciling
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With the clean sheet approach, assumptions implicit in the existing
process are discarded and a fundamental rethink of the way the
process is undertaken ensues. It is built on the premise that, to
achieve signiﬁcant performance improvement, work within the
process must be done diﬀerently. The clean sheet approach is
about working back from that target to a design that will make it
happen.
Organizations adopt a ‘clean sheet’ approach either because in
their opinion they have reached a ‘breakpoint’, or simply that
previous attempts to re-engineer the existing processes through a
systemic strategy have failed to result in any signiﬁcant performance
improvement. This is not to suggest that systematic redesign is any
less creative or innovative. The main disadvantage of the clean sheet
approach is that the required organizational changes can be diﬃcult,
though not impossible, to implement incrementally. Overall, with
this approach the risk is higher and the pain and disruption
greater. During implementation, a crucial problem, faced by many
organizations who have used this method, is that the new processes
diﬀer so fundamentally from the existing ones that workers have
great diﬃculty in relating to them. Unless great care is taken and
management commitment is solid, workers may refuse to switch to
the new methods of working.
Sometimes, organizations decide a new division or operation is
necessary rather than try and change the existing organization.
Midland Bank’s decision to set up a separate telephone banking
company, First Direct, and even General Motors’ Saturn business
unit are examples of this strategy. This ‘greenﬁeld site’ approach has
a number of distinct advantages; not least, the chance to design the
facilities from scratch taking into account the latest thinking in or-
ganization and management and exploiting the latest technological
innovations without having to deal with legacy systems. Creating the
desired culture with a new workforce is also much easier than where
signiﬁcant to an existing one are required.
In reality, there is a great deal of middle ground between both
methods with many organizations choosing a combination of the
two. The choice between the two approaches will depend on what
the organization is most comfortable with, and also on the time-
scales involved. Whichever alternative is selected, it is important to
ensure that the analysis of existing processes is not overdone, though
the danger of this is higher in the systematic redesign approach.
Always remember that the objective, regardless of the approach
the context of the process prior to design, in reality they have little impact
on the organization’s overall competitiveness or proﬁtability.
Hammer,23 whose work has helped promote the concept of business re-
engineering, acknowledges that process identiﬁcation is almost certainly
the most intellectually-challenging component of redesign. Identiﬁcation
is complicated because, as we have seen above, business processes cross
departmental and hierarchical boundaries. In a factory, one can at least
follow the ﬂow of incoming material through to the point of departure of
the ﬁnished product. This may be complicated, with many materials
being combined into one; however, the physical ﬂows are visible and
can be identiﬁed and understood relatively easily. In services and oﬃce
environments, it is much more diﬃcult to understand a process that
includes paperwork, and other forms of communications such as tele-
phone calls, electronic messages and information, which must be
followed.24 In addition, many employees working in the process often
have little idea of how the whole process works, how the output they
create is used or even why it is produced. They often only understand
their particular role and set of tasks. The nature of business processes is
such that they can be construed as almost any activity that goes on in the
organization—everything can be considered as a process—and conse-
quently processes can exist at any level. An approach to identifying
business processes based on their strategic importance and, hence, poten-
tial beneﬁcial redesign is described in Box 4.4.
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chosen, is to obtain signiﬁcant improvement in performance. More
attention should therefore be paid to the new process rather than the
old, which is merely a starting point.
The redesign of any process is a creative activity and there are
many techniques that can be used to get those involved in the
redesign to engage in ‘out of the box thinking’. There are also
many software packages on the market speciﬁcally designed for
process mapping. However, many companies simply choose to use
large sheets of paper and Post-It notes with the same eﬀect. It should
be noted that any map is only to aid in understanding although the
simulation facility provided by some packages can be used to good
eﬀect in modelling diﬀerent redesign options. There are also a
number of diﬀerent process mapping techniques including simple
ﬂow charting, IDEF(0) and Role Activity Diagrams.
 A detailed description of both these approaches can be found in J. Peppard
and P. Rowland, The Essence of Business Process Reengineering, Prentice-
Hall International, Hemel Hempstead, UK, 1995.
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Box 4.4 Identifying processes (for more information on this
method, see C. Edward and J.W. Peppard, ‘Organizationalizing
strategy through process’, Long Range Planning, Vol. 30, No. 5,
1997, 753–767).
One approach to identifying processes is to examine the expectations
of stakeholders and then determine the processes required to deliver
these expectations. In Chapter 2, the inﬂuence and impact of stake-
holders on business strategy was highlighted. Stakeholders hold a
variety of expectations; through its marketing activities, the organ-
ization seeks to understand and often inﬂuence these expectations,
particularly those of external constituents.
The ﬁgure below illustrates a view of the relationship between
strategy, stakeholders, expectations and processes. In this model,
the interplay between strategy and stakeholders is critical: the
strategy of the business deﬁnes who the stakeholders are, and stake-
holders themselves shape the strategy. These expectations, when
consolidated in the context of the business strategy, deﬁne the re-
quirements placed upon the organization and the processes that will
deliver them. It is these processes, when executed, that deliver these
expectations that in turn satisfy stakeholders. In eﬀect, the strategy is
deﬁning the required processes but indirectly via stakeholders and
expectations.
The technique works by ﬁrst listing out the expectations of each
stakeholder, placing some level of priority against each expectation.
Then, for each stakeholder expectation, determine whether an
already identiﬁed process exists to satisfy that expectation. For
example, with a new expectation, a process will need to be created
(as by deﬁnition no process can yet have been created); an example
of this may be ‘to educate visitors’, which results from an expecta-
tion on the part of visitors to a zoo to be educated. For another
Processes deﬁned at an organizational level can be broken down into
more detailed sets of subprocesses. These subprocesses, in turn, can also
be decomposed into further levels of detail and so on until we reach the
level of the individual task or role.25 It is important in re-engineering that
the processes selected for redesign or benchmarking are meaningful to the
organization, if signiﬁcant beneﬁts are to be achieved.
Process redesign has wider implications than merely redesigning how a
process operates and implementing new technology. Job descriptions will
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expectation, management need to decide if it is to be met by the
existing process or if a new process needs to be originated. This
decision involves considering if an existing process fully matches
the expectation described and the degree of importance of that
stakeholder and that expectation to the organization. If no existing
process is able to deliver the expectation, then a new process is
originated. If an existing process only partly meets the expectation
and if satisfying the expectation is critical to the strategy, then a
further process will need to be created; or an existing process
needs redesigning to include meeting the expectation. Each time an
expectation is subsumed into a process, or a new process is origin-
ated, the list of performance measures for that process must be
updated to reﬂect the enlarged scope of the process or the
amended process focus. The link between expectation and process
should be documented for later consideration.
To reiterate, processes are seen as consolidations of stakeholder
expectations and reﬂect what the organization must do. It does not
include an indication of how it will be undertaken or who is to do it;
this is determined in the design of the process. Processes themselves
do not actually do anything: they exist to provide focus for achieving
a desired outcome (i.e. an expectation). They are a device to enable a
grouping of the activities and/or roles that will be required to be
performed if the outcome is to be achieved. In other words, a collec-
tion of activities are the physical manifestations of a process. For
example, the process ‘to educate customers’ visiting a zoo could be
satisﬁed in a multitude of ways (e.g. installing a multimedia
computer beside each cage, providing human guides or issuing a
leaﬂet for later reading). It is a management decision to evaluate
and select the particular set of activities that are appropriate to
achieve the process.
TE
AM
FL
Y
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Team-Fly® 
probably need to be rewritten, multifunctional job skills and the ability to
work in teams becomes a priority, performance measurement and reward
systems fostering individuality or functional priorities and internal com-
petitiveness must be revised, new information systems must be designed
and implemented. This can entail behavioural and cultural changes
within the organization. Invoiceless payment, for example, demands a
much closer and trusting relationship with customers and suppliers that
may require a mindset change by management in their attitude toward
suppliers, and even customers!
Process Importance–Performance Assessment
To identify potential candidates for redesign, it is useful to examine the
importance of the processes to achieving business objectives and addres-
sing the business drivers and plot this against the organization’s perform-
ance in this process vis-a`-vis competitors (see Figure 4.9). This
importance–performance matrix26 helps focus attention on those areas
that are in most need of improvement. The matrix can also be used to
obtain stakeholder feedback, and it is often interesting to contrast the
views obtained from internal stakeholders with those from external stake-
holders. Benchmarking may also be necessary to assess actual and
relative performance.
American Express adopted a variant of this approach when selecting
processes suitable for redesign. The primary criteria was on the gap
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Figure 4.9 The importance–performance matrix
between their stakeholders expectations and their current performance
and the potential impact this gap could have on their continued growth.27
On the basis of these criteria, they decided to focus on two processes:
travel service delivery (travel reservations and ticketing) and customer
relationship management. The travel service delivery process was
falling short of the expectations of both customer and shareholders as
measured by the company’s service performance monitor—the monthly
tracking of customer satisfaction—and margins, and this underperfor-
mance was limiting growth prospects. The process underlying the man-
agement of customer relationships had become so complex that they
hindered employees in meeting customers’ needs, as measured by the
company’s annual survey of key contacts at client corporations.
ORGANIZATIONAL MODELLING
Organizational modelling is a structured technique used to ensure com-
prehensive examination and documentation of a business and its IS/IT
environment. It is a valuable technique in IS/IT strategy development,
and, if the business is also conducting any business re-engineering ex-
ercises, this or a similar means of obtaining a very broadly-based under-
standing of the organization is essential.
There are a number of diﬀerent techniques that can be used. The
organizational model at the heart of this technique, which is described
here, is based on original work by Kotter.28 This model of the organiza-
tion is made up of seven elements: a central ‘process’ element labelled
core business processes and six ‘structural’ elements—the external en-
vironment, employees and other tangible assets, formal organizational
arrangements, the internal social system, the organization’s technology
and the dominant coalition. In his book, Kotter29 developed a set of
questions to understand the nature of the organization, although it is
not expected that deﬁnitive answers can be obtained for all the questions.
What is needed is a sensitivity to the potential relevance of each element
or variable in the model, combined with an understanding of the activ-
ities within the organization and the information required to support
these activities.
The original work by Kotter has been substantially modiﬁed and
enhanced for the particular purpose of IS strategy formulation. Gener-
ally, the questioning approach is conducted on a macro-basis for the
organization as a whole and in micro-form for the IS function itself.
The questioning is tackled as part of the overall assessment process,
where the main focus is on determining objectives, activities and informa-
tion ﬂows, in relation to the model, so that an appropriate representation
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of the organization and how it functions is developed and understood by
the senior management. Figure 4.10 shows the components of an organ-
izational model, which can be built up in the following way:
. The external environment—questions are asked concerning the
impact of legislative and ﬁscal policy, industry and economic
trends, the basis of competition in the particular industry, industry
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Figure 4.10 The organizational model: environment and culture (source:
adapted from J.P. Kotter, Organizational Dynamics: Diagnosis and Intervention,
Addison-Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts, 1978)
standards, competitor practices and products, as described in
Chapters 2 and 5.
. The dominant coalition—these are the key internal inﬂuencers who
constitute the driving force behind the organization: What are their
values? What are their aims? How do they work together as a team?
What is the source of their power and inﬂuence, and how do they see
the future of the organization? It is essential to identify this group
because they will need to be convinced of the need for changes in
information systems for competitive advantage; without their com-
mitment, there is little likelihood of success. This topic is considered
again in Chapter 8.
. Formal organizational arrangements—the plans, budgets, organiza-
tion charts, job deﬁnitions, performance measurement and control
systems are reviewed in order to develop an understanding of how
the organization records the way in which it operates.
. Employees and other tangible assets—the quality and quantity of
people, their skills and training and the level of turnover, and the
physical, intellectual property and ﬁnancial assets of the organiza-
tion.
. Social structure—the formal arrangements within the company are
reviewed along with employee and trade practices and relationships
with trade unions, if applicable. The informal arrangements and
customs and practices, staﬀ attitudes to management and other
workers, and to employee policies are also reviewed.
. Technology employed—the level of use of technology within the en-
terprise itself, in relation to the available technology and that used
industry-wide, is also determined. This is not just concerned with IT
but includes a ‘catalogue’ of the main hardware and software within
the enterprise.
. The core processes—these are the processes and activities within the
organization that convert the raw material into the ﬁnished products
or bring resources together to deliver services.
Extracts from the questionnaire to help in constructing the model, devel-
oped from Kotter’s original, are included in Box 4.5. Sample questions
only have been included from a complete set of over 100. They are
intended to give an indication of the depth and breadth of detail that
may be elicited. Without this kind of model, it is very diﬃcult to develop
strategies for information systems that are consistent with the values and
culture of the organization. In his book, Kotter described how to use the
model to bring about organizational change. This is often a feature of
implementation of strategy and, in its subsequent management, provides
further justiﬁcation for adopting this type of technique.
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Box 4.5 Organizational modelling: extracts from a sample ques-
tionnaire to elicit required facts and options (source: adapted
from J.P. Kotter, Organizational Dynamics: Diagnosis and Interven-
tion, Addison-Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts, 1978)
A The External Environment
1. What are the key external groups that the organization has to
take notice of?
2. Who dominates/determines the development of the industry?
3. What is the industry growth, maturity, size, etc.?
4. What makes for success in that particular industry?
5. How dependent is the organization on the external groups and
what inﬂuence does it have over them?
6. What is the basis of its own power?
7. What is the industry value chain? How intense is the information
value-added?
8. Could IT be used to increase customers’ switching costs?
9. How are competitors/suppliers/customers using IS/IT?
10. Is there potential for pre-emptive use of IT with customers/
suppliers?
B The Dominant Coalition
1. Describe individually, for the key power holders, their personal
skills, attitudes and motives and how they think the organization
should be run.
2. How do they work as a group?
3. How do they seem to look at the future of the organization?
4. How powerful are they really in the organization, and where
does such power come from?
C The Formal Organization Arrangements
What formal procedures exist for:
1. Corporate strategy and planning?
2. The ﬁnancial control of unit performance? The measurement of
individual or unit performance?
3. Controlling information (i.e. is information being managed as a
resource)?
4. Deciding directives for information systems users or IS/IT?
5. Determining policy with respect to distributed processing, use of
personal workstations, etc.?
6. Determining corporate or SBU strategy?
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7. Reporting of IS/IT? Is its top manager part of the senior
management team?
8. IS strategy and does this relate to corporate strategy?
D Employees and Other Tangible Assets
1. What are the organization’s main physical and ﬁnancial assets?
2. How many employees are there and of what general types?
3. Are the physical assets in good condition and up to date?
4. Are there strict ﬁnancial limits imposed on the IS function or
can projects proceed on the basis of justiﬁcations?
5. Comment on the existing application portfolio. How adaptable
is it; how integrated, how cohesive?
6. Comment on the relative maturity of the IS organization.
E The Internal Social System
1. What are the attitudes of the employee groups to company
loyalty, hard work, cooperation with management and coopera-
tion among themselves?
2. Are there any special cultural values that employees hold that
aﬀect the organization?
3. Are IS/IT personnel formally organized into groups or unions?
4. What is staﬀ turnover? What are the recruitment and career
development policies?
F The Organization’s Technology
1. What main techniques are used to produce the most important
product of the organization?
2. What are the products and potential substitutes?
3. What is the information content of the products/services?
4. Can IT change the products/product life cycles/production
economics?
With particular reference to company-based information systems:
5. Is the installation relatively large or small?
6. Is computer power centralized or distributed?
7. What is the degree of ﬂexibility within the IS/IT environment?
8. Does the technology have a high or low impact on the enterprise
itself?
9. How much is there by way of telecommunications, oﬃce auto-
mation, new technology, etc.?
10. How are the costs of IT passed on to the users?
11. How are IS investments evaluated and prioritized?
There are three main reasons for developing the organizational model:
1. When embarking on an IS strategy process, there are a multitude of
options available to the organization. It may want to develop new
management information systems, or there may be a focus on obtain-
ing competitive advantage. However, the strategy development and
planning activities need to be completed quickly so that the enthu-
siasm and commitment that develop during the process can be sus-
tained and so that work can start toward achieving the beneﬁts of
these improved systems. It is necessary, therefore, to have an eﬀective
ﬁltering system so that the most relevant, realistic and implementable
applications are considered for the future. The organizational model
provides an eﬀective ﬁltering mechanism, since it contains substantial
information about the resources that could be made available to
implement systems, the culture of the organization, and its values
and priorities. It helps prevent proposals for new information
systems that would be unable to be resourced or that would be
totally foreign to the culture.
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G The Key Organizational Processes
1. What does the organization require so that it can operate (e.g.
raw materials, energy, information, special skills, etc.)?
2. Are any of these especially costly or diﬃcult to obtain?
3. How are these resources converted into goods or services?
4. How are the goods or services disposed of ?
5. How does change come to be considered?
6. In IS/IT, are there any steering committees or groups giving
guidance and direction?
7. How are key decisions made in IS/IT? Are there any user con-
sultative groups? Are consultants used for second opinion? How
much authority does management have?
8. How is IS/IT performance measured/objectives set?
9. How is any R&D funded?
10. What formal systems are used for development (method-
ologies)?
11. Is there an information centre and does it include PCs?
12. How does use of resources compare with strategic importance of
applications?
13. Is maintenance separate from development and does it include
enhancements?
2. However, it may be essential to implement new systems and strate-
gies that require changes in behaviour and run counter to the current
culture of the organization. If that is so, then the behaviours, and
perhaps even the culture itself, needs to be modiﬁed. Here, the model
is of considerable beneﬁt because the required cultural changes can
be compared against the model to determine their impacts and how
to eﬀect them. It is for this reason that it is suggested that two models
be developed: the macro-version for the organization as a whole and
the micro-version for the IS function, since almost inevitably there
will be changes required to both.
3. The third, important use of the organizational model is to provide a
comprehensive collective understanding of the environment, both
external to the organization and internally, precisely when strategic
decisions are taken. This is important because, when the strategy is
revisited, questions may be asked why certain options were discarded
or why certain choices were made. Without this historical per-
spective, it would be diﬃcult to answer those questions, which
could result in work being performed again or, worse, a decision
being reversed, to the detriment of the organization. It also
provides the perspective against which changes can be monitored.
There will be a ﬁnite elapsed time before revisiting the strategy,
and, during that time, changes will take place in the external environ-
ment concerning competitors, the legal environment and the
economic situation, and, internally, concerning the way in which
employees work, new salary structures and so on. It is important
to know the impact that all these may have on future strategy. The
model provides a way of examining these changes to determine their
possible impacts. It will enable systems to be developed and imple-
mented that are sensitive to the inﬂuences of the various pressure
groups and stakeholders.
As mentioned above, it is worth considering developing a second organ-
izational model for the IS function itself. This is often necessary because
the IS function has its own particular culture, values and methods of
working, which may be quite diﬀerent from those of the rest of the
organization. It may be possible to develop a good IS strategy that
fulﬁls all the criteria of supporting the business and being accepted by
senior management, but which is unimplementable due to its not being
accepted by the IS function or beyond its existing capability. The rela-
tionship between the IS function and the rest of the business is explored
in Chapter 8.
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EVALUATING THE GAP BETWEEN CURRENT AND
REQUIRED IS/IT ENVIRONMENTS
The IS/IT requirements that result from this process form the basis of a
framework within which we can critically assess the IS strategy itself. It
consists of candidate developments to build or enhance applications and
schemes to upgrade the provision of IT resources. Unless the strategy
process has focused on a very small number of critical initiatives that will
be certain to go ahead, the IS demand and IT supply proposals will need
to be prioritized against the business objectives, either on their own
merits or in conjunction with the business plans that they support. This
stage, resulting in an application portfolio development plan, is discussed
in Chapters 6 and 7.
The IS demand is the main deliverable to come out of the analysis of
the current situation and the business needs, stemming from its strategy
and the collection of demands from the current business operations. It
will also contain the needs arising out of analysis of the external business
environment. This chapter has concentrated on the current business
needs that usually produce short-term IS requirements and medium-
term requirements that arise from the business strategy. Chapter 5 will
move the analysis out to a longer-term horizon, in seeking new ways of
impacting the business through IS/IT.
The assessment of the current IS/IT environment indicates the capabil-
ities of existing IS/IT resources in relation to the known business strategy.
There will almost certainly be a gap between the current resources and
competencies and those needed to satisfy the future IS demand. The gap
identiﬁes the requirements for change:
. Processes in need of recognition, simpliﬁcation, streamlining or
redesign—all with signiﬁcant IS/IT requirements.
. New or upgraded information resources. The list of information
needs can be compared with current systems and databases to deter-
mine where the new information will come from or whether new
sources must be found. Quite often, new information needs can be
fulﬁlled by relatively minor modiﬁcations to existing systems or
databases. Obviously, these could be tackled in the short term.
Other information needs may only be satisﬁed by developing new
applications, and will take longer to be implemented.
. Changes in IT supply resources and competencies to support the role
IS/IT needs to play.
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By analysing the coverage of systems across the core business processes, it
is possible to consider and compare a disparate set of information
systems requirements across the whole organization and put them into
proper context related to the beneﬁt to the business. For example, the
production engineering department may wish to invest heavily in systems
that will enable the factory to respond quickly to customer orders,
the marketing department may want to spend money on developing
analytical CRM systems to segment markets and develop propensity
models, and the sales department may want to spend money on develop-
ing a system to increase salesforce productivity in managing contacts and
generating repeat orders. It would be very diﬃcult for anybody to say
which of those three systems should be developed ﬁrst without reference
to the overall strategy and priorities of the organization.
SUMMARY
This chapter has introduced one part of the process of determining the IS
strategy, by getting a good understanding of the current situation in the
business and by eliciting IS requirements that are inherent in the existing
business strategy to achieve a high degree of alignment between the two.
The main stages involved in establishing the current situation and logical
requirements are fact ﬁnding, analysis and interpretation. The processes
occur iteratively and rely heavily on each other. The purpose is to identify
the activities and business processes that support the objectives and
strategy of the business, and the associated information requirements.
The ‘fact ﬁnding’ can result in a large volume of information, which
needs to be recorded in a way that facilitates analysis and interpretation.
Whether the data are text, lists, tables or graphical models, they can be
recorded in a number of ways, but need to be structured. The various
modelling and analysis tools described here help with structuring and
comparison of information derived from diﬀerent sources. Some of the
information will be associated with the business strategy, where the
strategy components aﬀord a natural structure; some may result from
organizational modelling, which oﬀers a further structure for recording
much of the ‘soft’ information.
The key points to draw from this chapter are:
. there is a process for fact ﬁnding, which needs to be followed if the
relevant information for deﬁning the IS strategy is to be obtained;
. the techniques for analysis must provide suﬃcient insight and inter-
pretation for developing the IS/IT strategy, but no more;
. the analysis task is not trivial and a variety of modelling and assess-
ment techniques will need to be used and the outputs reconciled;
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. while the techniques discussed in this chapter are essentially analy-
tical and logical, rather than creative, going through the processes
will almost certainly generate a number of original and creative ideas.
These need to be captured and developed.
But, this is only one side of the picture of determining the IS strategy; in
order to enrich this strategy by looking for new ways to impact the
business and strengthen its competitive performance, more creative tech-
niques have to be brought to bear. This is the subject of the next chapter.
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5
IS/IT Strategic Analysis:
Determining the Future
Potential
The techniques of assessment discussed so far enable the current role that
IS/IT is—or should be—playing in the business to be analysed, both
critically and constructively. It is always important to understand
where you are—a situation appraisal of the systems that exist and how
well they support and enhance operational performance, management
control and the ongoing development of the business. A key aspect of
this assessment is to what extent these systems enable the separate activ-
ities and functions of the business to perform harmoniously. This implies
an understanding of the information-based relationships of the business,
both internal and external, as well as information processing require-
ments. Often, this analysis reveals areas of systems deﬁciency, obsoles-
cence, ineﬀective linkages and poor utilization of existing information.
Dealing with the critical inadequacies—ensuring IS/IT is not hindering
current business performance and is not a potential or real source of
competitive disadvantage—is a key part of the strategy development
process.
Directing resources and actions toward areas that will aﬀect the
achievement of future, known business objectives is then the next step
in developing the strategy. The use of a combination of ‘Balanced Score-
cards’ (BSCs) and ‘critical success factors’ (CSFs) are an eﬀective way of
achieving the appropriate focus of management attention. They are
designed to put IS/IT onto the management agenda, to ensure IS/IT
strategy and plans are in alignment with organizational intentions and
management’s priorities for a given period. This probably implies within
the objective setting horizon of one to two years.
Therefore, these are analytical techniques that enable the eﬀective
support of the current or intended strategy from IS/IT developments.
However, as described in Chapters 1 and 2, adept investment and deploy-
ment of IS/IT can enable new strategic options to be developed, thus
shaping the strategy of the business. Equally, changes elsewhere in the
industry, caused by IS/IT investments by customers, competitors and
suppliers may aﬀect the organization’s intended strategy. Hence, the
potential opportunities and threats from IS/IT and its ability to change
industry dynamics and relationships must be addressed. This assessment
of new IS/IT application areas requires a degree of creative thinking as
well as analysis of business options, to determine the potential impact of
IS/IT on the business.
The analytical techniques that have been described so far are not
suﬃcient to carry out such an ‘impact analysis’, neither do they easily
express the options and issues in terms familiar to line managers. The
tools and techniques of strategic thinking and analysis frequently used in
business strategy formulation oﬀer another approach, which will be more
easily adopted by business line managers, whose commitment is critical to
converting good ideas to actual strategic uses of IS/IT. Many of these
were described in Chapter 2, where the IS/IT strategy implications were
also discussed. The techniques described in this chapter oﬀer a more
focused brainstorming or creative analysis approach, and help to forge
a coherent link between the business strategic issues and options and the
rationale for the nature and purpose of future IS/IT investments. They
are undoubtedly not an exhaustive coverage of all that could be used, but
they are those that have often been successfully adopted in assessing
the potential future impact of IS/IT on many industries and on many
businesses.
One problem with a ‘tool kit’ approach is deciding which tool to use
and when. It is always convenient to have a methodology that clearly
indicates which tool to apply when, what result to expect and what to do
next if you get (i) the right result or (ii) the wrong result! Unfortunately,
such a clear deﬁnition of an IS/IT strategy development process is not,
and probably never will be, possible. Many writers over the last 20 years
have described the application of many of the techniques introduced in
this chapter, and most agree that a prescribed methodology is not appro-
priate, concluding that what is required is a tool kit. Neumann1 describes
essentially the same set of techniques, but refers to them as ‘frameworks
for strategic information systems’. He recognizes that they are a means of
helping the thinking process, not a recipe for ensuring the identiﬁcation
of strategic systems. More recently, in the context of ‘e’ opportunities,
Feeny2 and Timmers3 suggest a similar set of techniques within an
overall logic for their application.
Although no methodology can be proposed, in Chapter 6 each of the
tools will be considered as part of a process that can be adopted for
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developing IS/IT strategies, within the overall context described in
Chapter 3. In terms of the application portfolio, the focus of this
part of the assessment is primarily to identify strategic investments (see
Figure 5.1). However, the approaches may also suggest high-potential
possibilities that need further investigation, before their contribution
can be decided. They may also identify whether existing or planned key
operational systems either provide a good basis for exploitation or could
be a constraint to future business options provided through IS/IT.
ALIGNING THE IS/IT INVESTMENT STRATEGY TO
THE BUSINESS
Development of business strategies can be carried out in a variety of
ways, but, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, this is probably most eﬀective
if the organization is considered as a group of (strategic) business units.
This enables the market/product relationship to determine strategic
thinking and functional/organizational aspects become secondary,
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Figure 5.1 Developing the application portfolio from a strategic perspective
ensuring that external strategy drives internal strategy rather than vice
versa. Within a business unit, the portfolio of products and/or customers
can be analysed to identify how each grouping contributes to or makes
demands on resources available.
The business unit is also the level at which the analysis of competitive
forces provides the sharpest focus and for which the generic strategy
concepts best apply—low cost, diﬀerentiation, niche—since it is both
possible and essential to develop and operate a coherent set of consistent
behaviours for a business unit. Low-cost versus diﬀerentiation conﬂicts
within a business unit will cause confusion and suboptimal or even
contrary decisions to be reached. But, within a corporation, two
business units operating in two diﬀerent environments might adopt
low-cost and diﬀerentiation strategies, yet still trade internally with
each other.
For these reasons alone, it is important that IS/IT strategic analysis
should align itself to the business unit approach. Quite diﬀerent business
attitudes to investment, including investment in IS/IT, are likely to
prevail in units following diﬀerentiation or low-cost strategies, and the
opportunities for strategic IS investments are unlikely to be the same.
Applications for similar business functions like order processing could
well be very diﬀerent in practice due to the diﬀerent relationships with
customers that the two generic strategies imply. Units operating in niche
markets will have diﬀerent opportunities for exploiting IS/IT options
from those serving a wide range of market sections, especially with cus-
tomers and suppliers.
As discussed in Chapter 1, the most signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the SIS era
is the external focus of systems. Organizations have adopted the strategic
business unit (SBU) approach to business planning, in part to achieve the
more eﬀective strategic decision making implied in Phase 3 of approaches
to strategic management discussed in Chapter 2 (see Figure 2.1) (i.e. more
eﬀective, externally orientated, planning), based on:
. situation analysis and competitive assessments;
. evaluation of strategic options;
. dynamic allocation of resources.
This would include an assessment of the role of IS/IT in terms of its use in
the industry, by competitors, suppliers and customers, as well as the
eﬀectiveness of its use within the business unit.
Chapter 2 described how, using these techniques, it is possible to
interpret the results in terms of high-level implications and priorities
for IS/IT investment for a business unit, or enable pertinent questions
about IS/IT opportunities or threats to be included in the business
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strategic analysis (see, e.g. Figure 2.8 and the discussion on pages
95–100).
Determination of priority IS/IT investments also depends on the
chosen ‘value discipline’, as per Treacy and Wiersma,4 for achieving
advantage and the relative strength of the organization in the other
disciplines (i.e. Operational Excellence, Customer Intimacy and
Product Leadership). Figure 5.2 portrays levels of relative competence
of the organization along each of the axes—survival, success and
prosperity. The last of these implies that, if the organization is beyond
the ‘success’ line in at least one competency and equal to competitors
in the other(s), it should deliver above-average proﬁts in the industry.
However, if any of the competencies are within the ‘success’ circle,
any potential advantage is likely to be oﬀset by poor performance
elsewhere.
For example, a bank that had developed a new and excellent mortgage
product for younger people (as deﬁned by independent benchmarks) and
had as good customer relationships as any other bank (again via inde-
pendent surveys), could not understand why sales were so poor. The
reason was the slowness and unreliability of the mortgage application
process, which used a much older system designed for an earlier genera-
tion of products. The process could not deliver the ‘service promise’
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Figure 5.2 Advantage and disadvantage—dimensions of competency (source:
after M. Treacy and F. Wiersma, The Discipline of Market Leaders: Choose Your
Customers, Narrow Your Focus, Dominate Your Market, HarperCollins, London,
1995)
inherent in the product and, given the target customer group, many cus-
tomers went elsewhere to obtain an inferior product, faster.
This is just one example of how the competency analysis can help
identify how priority IS investments are essential to avoid competitive
disadvantages. Where the organization is outside the success line (i.e. is
outperforming most others in one dimension), more creative thinking is
needed to identify how IS/IT can be used to develop the competency
further and sustain the advantage. For example, having established
‘personal’ relationships with its book-buying customers, Amazon.com
is able to analyse purchase patterns and identify other books of potential
interest to an individual customer—a far more valued service than
sending a general catalogue, either by post or electronically.
Some suggested questions, of particular relevance to the electronic
commerce dimensions of the strategy, have been overlaid on the basic
model in Figure 5.3. They attempt to show how generic e-commerce
options—improving the value proposition, mass customization, perform-
ance improvements and cost reductions—require combinations to be
addressed.
As stated in Chapter 2, this technique proves very valuable in gaining
agreement among managers about what has to improve and why, and,
especially, whether the purpose is to gain advantage or avoid disadvan-
tage. It helps integrate the ‘themes’ inherent in the business and IS
strategies and focus resources on medium-term IS priorities.
Although the relationship will not always be perfect, the changing
content of the application portfolio should reﬂect the evolving strategic
themes. Applying these ideas in a number of organizational situations,
they have proved very useful in clarifying the business rationale for IS/IT
investment plans. Generally speaking:
. Strategic applications should relate readily to the dimension in which
the organization seeks to excel in the next one to three years (i.e.
product leadership, customer intimacy or operational excellence),
with the objectives of gaining advantage in the marketplace.
. Key operational application improvements are essential in any
dimension if the systems are causing performance levels to fall
below those essential to success (i.e. are causing disadvantage).
. High-potential projects would normally be ‘prototypes’ related to
speciﬁc strategic developments or evaluations of ideas relevant to
the other dimensions (i.e. early, tentative steps in ﬁnding out how
IS/IT might provide future opportunities once the current focus of
the strategy changes).
Over a period of time, an organization might pursue all three of these
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directions. It will probably have to change if it is to maintain a leadership
position in response to the actions of competitors. But, it is extremely
diﬃcult to ‘major’ in more than one at once, and any indecision will cause
ever-changing priorities, inconsistency and even confusion within the
business—a recipe for failure with IS/IT investments.
Analysis of the business situation, from both external and internal
perspectives, is essential to establish the context within which opportu-
nities can be identiﬁed and assessed. The techniques described below need
to be used following an assessment of the business environment and with
an agreed purpose, based on the priority ‘themes’ for improving perform-
ance through IS/IT. Otherwise, the assessment can become an unfocused
exercise in which interesting options are identiﬁed, but without a natural
and coherent link to the overall future intentions and direction of the
business. As such, they will not be seen and treated as priority or strategic
business investments.
VALUE CHAIN ANALYSIS
The concept of Value Chain Analysis is described at length by Michael
Porter5 who notes that: ‘Every ﬁrm is a collection of activities that are
performed to design, produce, market, deliver and support its products or
services. All these activities can be represented using a value chain. Value
chains can only be understood in the context of the business unit.’
Equally, the value chain of the business unit is only one part of a larger
set of value-adding activities in an industry—the industry value chain or
value system. The value chain of any ﬁrm therefore needs to be under-
stood as part of the larger ‘system’ of related value chains—those of its
suppliers, customers and competitors, before it can be optimized. The
actions of those other parties will have a signiﬁcant impact on what the
ﬁrm does and how it does it. This is especially true in the area of in-
formation systems. For example, the considerable investment made by
food retailers in Point-of-Sale (POS) systems has changed the way in-
formation is passed to food manufacturers and has dramatically changed
the delivery service required from those manufacturers. This has implica-
tions for the information systems within the food-processing companies
and, in turn, the systems that relate to their suppliers. For an organiza-
tion to identify the overall implications of e-commerce for its business in
terms of opportunities and threats, the information ﬂowing through the
industry—the external value chain—needs to be analysed before the
information processes can be optimized inside the business—by consider-
ing the internal value chain.
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THE EXTERNAL VALUE CHAIN (INDUSTRY VALUE CHAIN
OR VALUE SYSTEM)
Figure 5.4 gives a schematic view of an industry value system. In par-
ticular, it emphasizes the key roles information plays throughout the
chain. The overall performance of the industry, in terms of its ability
to maximize its value-added and minimize its costs, is primarily depen-
dent on how well demand and supply information are matched at all
stages of the industry. To achieve the highest possible income and
proﬁt from the consumption of goods or services produced by the
industry, the resources of the industry need to be focused on the value-
adding activities involved, by producing those goods and services as
eﬃciently as possible to the satisfaction of the consumers. If poor in-
formation means that those resources are wasted or used ineﬃciently,
costs rise without increases in revenue, and overall proﬁtability falls. In
such situations, all that ﬁrms can do to improve proﬁt is compete with
their suppliers and customers to share out the limited available net proﬁt.
This almost inevitably leads to some ﬁrms going ‘bust’, the equilibrium is
destroyed and the industry has to be reorganized in some way. It is not
always the least eﬃcient that suﬀer, it is often those with the poorest
information about what is happening in the industry who go to the wall.
While the above discussion is primarily about ‘proﬁt’, the value chain
approach can be used in any industry, since every industry uses funds,
incurs cost and uses resources to deliver services of some sort to con-
sumers. In ‘non-proﬁt’ industries such as government, health care and
charities, there is always a matching of supply and demand to achieve a
break-even, if not a proﬁt.
The type of industry value chain model depicted above is appropriate
for ‘traditional’ manufactured goods. Alternative models are considered
on pages 265–268 that represent service-based industries. However, the
following general issues apply to all the models.
Obviously, if an organization can match the demand for its products
and services very closely to the supply of resources at all times, perform-
ance can be optimized and eﬃciencies maximized. Equally obviously, if
the ﬁrm, ‘the business unit’ in Figure 5.4, is operating at some distance
from the ultimate consumer and primary suppliers, it is diﬃcult to obtain
precise demand and supply information. Interestingly, we would expect
organizations that have component businesses in diﬀerent parts of the
same industry value chain to be able to exploit their combined informa-
tion to outperform others who cover less of the chain. In fact, that is often
not the case, especially when the businesses operate as proﬁt centres—the
‘internal competition’ that produces often means they actually cooperate
less well than independent ﬁrms in sharing information!
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When starting to understand how industry information ﬂows aﬀect the
ﬁrm itself, the ﬁrm should be treated as a ‘black box’ (i.e. how things are
done inside the ﬁrm should be ignored—that will be considered later
when looking at the internal value chain). The consideration should
start at the end-consumers in terms of what information is available
about the consumers’ needs, who they are, etc. and how they can be
inﬂuenced.6 Then, the needs for information exchange with more im-
mediate customers can be examined in terms of how eﬀective it is for
both parties. Eventually, all the ﬂows of information to and from the ﬁrm
downstream in relation to the consumers and intermediaries can be
understood, in terms of critical information the ﬁrm needs and the
current and potential sources of that information. The same process
can be repeated in terms of immediate suppliers and their suppliers of
key resources, raw materials and services.
Then, each of the key information ﬂows can be examined to see how
the process could possibly be improved in terms of accuracy, speed, cost
or timeliness and how that might beneﬁt the business. It might be, for
instance, beneﬁcial if a distributor could provide raw sales data directly,
rather than consolidate their sales in order to place larger orders. This
may enable the ﬁrm to give that distributor a more reactive service,
allowing the distributor to hold lower stocks, yet satisfy more of its
customers. At the other end of the chain, it may be possible to do
similar things with suppliers and, while these are simple examples, they
form the basis of ‘re-engineering’ the way the industry operates to every-
one’s beneﬁt.
It may be, of course, that many of the information exchanges cannot
easily be improved, or cannot be improved without the willing coopera-
tion of trading partners. Cooperation may only be forthcoming if there is
some mutual beneﬁt in changing that particular information ﬂow or by
changing another ﬂow to provide the partner with a balancing beneﬁt. It
could be that, to produce the improvement, existing trading partners
have to be bypassed and information exchanged with other parties
further upstream or downstream in the chain. This may eventually lead
to signiﬁcant realignment of business relationships.
It is important to understand the type of ‘value’ and ‘cost’ added by
each ﬁrm or process in the chain (i.e. what is diﬀerent between the
outputs and inputs); for example, a ﬁnancial broker provides more
choice to a customer than one insurer, but takes a % commission from
the insurers on sales. Each key process in the chain should be assessed
from two viewpoints:
(a) How does it add value to the (next) customer in the chain?
(b) How does it add value to those providing the input?
The External Value Chain (Industry Value Chain or Value System) 247
A retailer adds value to the customer mainly through the range of goods
oﬀered and local access to them, and adds value to the supplier by
providing consumer availability, sharing stock costs and administration
of low-value transactions, etc. When assessing changes to the chain, it
implies that new value can be added, or existing value-adding and costs
will be redistributed, or costs of adding the same value can be reduced,
enabling price reduction or increased proﬁt. In Internet shopping, the
consumer’s (invisible) costs are reduced, but costs are switched to home
delivery. Unless this is oﬀset by another cost reduction (e.g. lower stock
holdings), the increased cost of supply will require an equivalent increase
in price (payment for delivery)—or the proﬁt in the chain will be reduced.
These are relatively simple and obvious examples, but it is necessary to
understand the overall chain economics and utility if changes are to be
successful.
Many options will usually present themselves from the analysis, only
some of which will prove feasible and beneﬁcial to implement, at least in
the short term. However, an understanding of the complete picture may
lead to further options emerging in the longer term. It will certainly
enable the organization to understand the implications of potential
actions by others and then determine a more strategic response.
INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND THE VALUE CHAIN
Obviously, business performance is dependent on the processes that
gather and disseminate information. Links can be developed to various
levels of sophistication and mutual dependence. Figure 5.5 shows three
types of relationship. Normal business transactions (invoices, orders,
payments, etc.) could be addressed by a company with most of its
customers and suppliers who have computers, simply by connection via
the Internet. This has indeed already happened in some industries,
especially those dominated by large retailers, where the majority of
basic business transactions with suppliers are now electronic. This basic
use of e-commerce is spreading through diﬀerent industries at varying
rates. It not only improves the economics of transaction processing but
also enables the whole chain to respond more eﬀectively to real-time
demand and supply changes—provided transaction information is
shared.
Figure 5.5, based on work by Rayport and Sviokla,7 considers two
further types of value chain information ﬂow that are being challenged by
e-commerce. First, the implications of the promotional ﬂow of informa-
tion, which informs customers further down the chain of the products
and services available, have to be understood. E-commerce oﬀers an
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additional channel for this ﬂow, but also provides customers with the
ability to search the whole chain for information directly or via inter-
mediaries, on whom ﬁrms become increasingly dependent to provide an
electronic shop window/shelf space for their products and services.
Demand from the end-consumer may well change more rapidly than in
the past, given the combined e-commerce attributes of eﬀective ‘promo-
tion’ linked to the immediate ability to transact business.
Second, e-commerce oﬀers huge potential to gather information and
intelligence about consumer and customer preferences and attitudes
online, rather than through traditional market research. More impor-
tantly, customer behaviour can be tracked with greater accuracy than
before via e-transactions and hence correlated with both the promotional
stream and the intelligence gathering stream. Unless each organization
and the chain as a whole can assess this information coherently, it is likely
that major misinterpretations of changing demand patterns will create
potential chaos in the supply chain. The issue is therefore that, in the e-
commerce environment, three information streams that could previously
have been reconciled oﬀ-line now have to be integrated if the value chain
is to function economically.
A ﬁrm will not be able to determine its own destiny with regard to its
information systems. It is not just a matter of company size, but clearly
the larger players have more to gain and hence tend to force the smaller
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Figure 5.5 Understanding the information issues in the value chain (source:
after Rayport and Sviokla)
companies to comply with their demands. As most industries develop
standards for electronic trading and information exchange, the potential
risks for the small company diminish since it will not have the cost of
satisfying a variety of requirements for diﬀerent suppliers or customers.
The arrival of XML (Extended Mark-up Language) will produce a
general standard for the majority of organizations to utilize and reduce
the need for industry-speciﬁc standards for many types of information
transfer.
According to Porter,8 we are entering a new stage of evolution in terms
of how IT is aﬀecting industry value chains. Previously, each ﬁrm has
achieved improved performance by integrating its activities and processes
as well as its supplier and customer interactions through IS, most recently
via Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) and Customer Relationship
Management (CRM) software packages. He believes this new stage,
‘which is just beginning, enables the integration of the (. . .) set of value
chains in an entire industry, . . . as end-to-end applications involving
customers, channels and suppliers . . .’. It is diﬃcult to predict whether
the emergence of ‘e-marketplaces’ (or trading hubs) or the ability to
integrate throughout the value chain will have the more signiﬁcant
eﬀects on industry economics and customer/supplier relationships.
Could trading hubs become the centres though which IRP (‘Industry
Requirements Planning’) systems operate, linking everyone’s ERP
systems together to provide seamless, integrated information ﬂows?9
However, even in sophisticated and mature industries, there is often a
huge gap between what is possible and the current reality. Box 5.1 gives
examples of the problems in the motor industry value chain that needs
major information systems and process changes if the beneﬁts, potentially
available from information integration, are to be realized.
By whatever means information systems are used to enable better
information exchanges through the industry value chain, signiﬁcant
beneﬁts can be obtained from the improved links. These beneﬁts
should enable a ﬁrm to spend more of its business energy in outperform-
ing its real competitors rather than competing with its trading partners
for the available proﬁt. The essence of the argument is:
(a) At any one time, an industry generates a certain amount of net proﬁt
(total sales— total costs). That proﬁt is shared among the organiza-
tions contributing to the value chain for the industry. Clearly, inter-
mediation increases the number of ﬁrms among whom the proﬁt is
shared, and the attraction of disintermediation is that the opposite
occurs.
(b) If, in the version of the value chain that includes our ﬁrm, the overall
net proﬁt can be increased, we can take a share of that increased
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Box 5.1 Information problems aﬀecting the performance of the
automotive industry value chain (source: M. Howard, R. Vidgen,
P. Powell and A. Graves, ‘Planning for IS related industry transfor-
mation: The case of the 3DayCar’, in Proceedings of the 9th
European Conference on Information Systems, Bled, Slovenia, June
2001, pp. 433–442, used with permission of the authors)
The automotive industry operates a sophisticated but complex IS/IT
throughout the supply chain. However, current systems act as a
major inhibitor both to time compression in the order-fulﬁlment
process and to organizational change. For example, a customer
order entered into a system at a car dealership must complete ﬁve
overnight updates on existing IS, involving batch processing and
code conversions, before it is released into vehicle production.
The European automotive industry is facing a period of signiﬁ-
cant change, driven by poor proﬁtability, excess ﬁnished stock and
overcapacity. Customers are more price conscious and less patient,
demanding vehicles built to individual speciﬁcations and delivered in
short lead times. Vehicle manufacturers can no longer rely on selling
cars from existing stock and are shifting their business models away
from mass production toward mass customization and build to
order. This increases the importance of existing systems for eﬃcient
order execution and integrated information ﬂow. Yet, many IS
reﬂect the functional departments for which they were originally
conceived.
The key objective of the 3DayCar project is to develop a frame-
work in which a vehicle can be built and delivered to customer
speciﬁcation in minimal lead times, with three days order-to-
delivery (OTD) time as the ultimate goal. The current average
OTD lead time is 45 days. The diagram on the following page illus-
trates the current IT barriers among the key players in the
automotive industry.
Problems and issues include:
. The lack of integration between Dealer Management Systems
(DMS) and Dealer Communication Systems (DCS) causes high
levels of typing and information duplication. For example, when
an order is placed, signiﬁcant levels of duplication of informa-
tion occur, with identical data such as vehicle description and
owner details typed into both systems.
. Many DCSs do not give a delivery date or have signiﬁcant
time delays in conﬁrming them—a particular problem for
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custom-built orders. When dealers are given delivery dates on the
system, these often change and are not guaranteed. Dealers have
poor visibility of orders throughout the network.
. There is an unwillingness among dealerships to share
information.
. The current conﬁguration of vehicle manufacturers systems
typically results in individual mainframe systems updating over-
night, processing batches or buckets of orders in time-intensive
cycles that add four to ﬁve days to the order lead time. As
information ﬂow through the batch-processing systems is
largely unsequenced, it is possible for the output of one
process to miss the start of the next window, adding further
time into the process.
. Poor business process integration. Within vehicle manu-
facturers, systems were developed within separate functions
and not driven by a true customer order fulﬁlment philosophy
and inhibit smooth order ﬂow—production push rather than
customer pull.
. Suppliers perceive the major IT barrier as a lack of adherence to
EDI standards by vehicle manufacturers, in terms of protocol
(language used during transmission) and format (the label
SUPPLIERS
f Multiple EDI standards
f ‘The future’: Internet?
LOGISTICS
f Lack of outbound open access data
system
f Lack of real-time forward data
f Vehicle labelling: wasteful and time
intensive
VEHICLEMANUFACTURERS
f Batch processing
f Legacy systems
f Vertical stovepipes
f Central management systems
DEALERS
f Systems not integrated (DMS/DCS)
f Duplication of order entry
f Poor order visibility
f Lack of ‘common car description’
proﬁt and hence outperform our direct competitors, who are not part
of that version of the chain.
(c) If we initiate the changes but also share the beneﬁt with our cus-
tomers and suppliers (i.e. they too become more proﬁtable), they will
prefer to trade in our more eﬃcient version of the industry. It is very
likely that rival ﬁrms will be competing for those suppliers and/or
customers—but they should give us preference because they are more
proﬁtable when they do. This brings about long-term advantages and
in due course aﬀects the whole industry structure.
To achieve (b), only three things can be done:
(i) create more demand;
(ii) satisfy more of the available demand (gain market share);
(iii) reduce the cost of satisfying the demand.
By better information exchange through the value chain, all or any
combination of the three can be done at the same time. For example,
by sharing consumer market-research information obtained by retailers,
a manufacturer may be able to enhance a product to open up and develop
a new market segment. Or, earlier feedback on changing tastes may
enable the production plan to be rescheduled to meet the new
consumer preference. This is particularly important in fashion goods
and in very seasonal products like toys. Benetton, the clothing
company, has developed highly-integrated systems that link the fran-
chised shops right through to the subcontractors who make the clothes.
This enables them to respond faster than their competitors to changes in
fashion and they are far more proﬁtable than the average clothing
company.
There are many ways in which better information exchange can
reduce costs that occur at the boundaries between companies. Table
5.1 provides a number of examples, all of which can be seen in a
number of industries, with the eﬀect of reducing interorganizational
costs very signiﬁcantly.
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layout or visual interface). Suppliers already receive messages in
about a dozen diﬀerent formats, all of which must be converted
to a common standard before they can be processed internally.
This causes delay and disruption to the system, particularly in
the event of a system malfunction.
One ﬁnal example may serve to illustrate the long-term eﬀects of in-
tegrating information ﬂows through a value chain. In 1982, UK tour
operator Thomson Holidays introduced the TOP system, which
enabled travel agents to book holidays via a Viewdata system directly
on the Thomson computer. This immediately reduced some of the
double-handling costs of bookings (in the travel agency and at
Thomson) and speeded up the process of booking, hence saving agency
time and cost. As a result, agents ‘directed’ consumers toward the
Thomson brochure, since they earned more commission per man-hour
spent booking the holiday. Later, Thomson developed similar links to
their suppliers (airlines, hotels and other service providers). In eﬀect, this
enabled Thomson to respond better to changing demand than others,
which for a number of years gave them an advantage, but other tour
operators were still proﬁtable since demand for holidays was increasing.
The ‘system’, however, gave Thomson a major advantage when demand
dropped suddenly as it did in 1987 (USA bombed Libya) and 1991 (Gulf
War). In 1987, Horizon Holidays (No. 3 in the industry) failed and, in
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Table 5.1 Reduction of intercompany costs due to better information exchange
along the value chain—examples
Cost Potential e-commerce impact
1. Administration Electronic transmission of orders and invoices, etc.
directly between customers and suppliers
2. Inventory Sharing information on stocks and demand to avoid
both companies carrying unnecessary stock
3. Transport/storage Optimizing delivery to ensure transport or storage space
is utilized eﬀectively to meet agreed service levels
4. Design Sharing product design data interactively to enable
faster development of a better product and less ‘rework’
5. Financing Electronic payments to improve cash ﬂow and reduce
the need for working capital and reduce Accounts
Receivable and Payable costs
6. Capacity Matching the use of resources across ﬁrms to avoid idle
resources in one part of the chain and/or overload in
another
7. Services Linking third-party service suppliers to service
requests to reduce delays in delivering and costs of
administrationTE
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1991, International Leisure Group (No. 2 in the industry) went bust.
Neither of them were able to respond to the rapid changes in demand
as eﬀectively as Thomson, and both had lower margins due to higher cost
structures. Thomson were able to adapt more quickly and were more
eﬃcient in the context of the overall industry value chain.
In summary, an understanding of the industry value chain, and the key
information ﬂows in the industry, can enable an organization to intercept
and inﬂuence those information ﬂows to its advantage, to the beneﬁt of
its trading partners and at the expense of its competitors. Box 5.2 is
another example of a real value chain—for the ethical pharmaceutical
industry (i.e. prescription drugs)—showing where information systems
applications have had and/or are having a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the per-
formance of the industry.
Customer Relationship Management and the Value Chain
While the concept of Customer Relationship Management (CRM)
emerged in the mid-1990s, key tenets underpinning the concept such as
relationship marketing, customer value analysis and mass customization
have been around much longer. However, they remained essentially theo-
retical concepts; aspirational rather than a practical reality. Technology
has changed this, making CRM a feasible option for organizations by
providing the tools to operationalize these concepts.
‘Customer resource life-cycle analysis’, described in detail by Ives and
Learmonth,10 is a powerful tool to analyse relationships with customers.
By examining its customer relationships via the model, companies can
determine not only when opportunities (and threats) exist for improved
or new information exchanges but also which speciﬁc applications should
be developed. Ives and Learmonth suggest that the Resource Life Cycle
(RLC) model should be viewed from one end only (i.e. toward the
customer), but the same possible options will apply in reverse in relation-
ships with suppliers. Hence, the RLC model could be a customer or
supplier resource life-cycle model, depending on point of view!
The RLC model relies on the fact that an organization’s products/
services go through a typical life cycle, when viewed as a resource by
the customer. The four main stages of this life cycle are:
. requirements determination;
. acquisition;
. stewardship;
. retirement or disposal.
These are expanded in more detail in Table 5.2.
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Box 5.2 Value chain for pharmaceutical company
N.B. This is for an ‘ethical’ drug company where the whole strategy
is based on diﬀerentiation of the product and its treatment eﬃcacy.
Key areas where information ﬂows/relationships are critical to
success and provide opportunity to gain advantage or achieve sig-
niﬁcant performance improvements:
1. Provision of drug information to clinicians/doctors who will
prescribe the treatment and the inﬂuencers—either eminent
people in the ﬁeld and/or ‘panels’ of experts who advise hospi-
tals, etc. Traditionally, these were medical people, but now they
include health economists and insurers who decide on the ﬁnan-
cial aspects of the treatment’s eﬀectiveness in relation to alter-
native uses of funds. The same inﬂuencers also determine
whether pharmacists will ‘stock’ the drug and dispense it. In
return, the prescribers and dispensers feed back information
on the use of the drug and, particularly importantly, any side-
eﬀects or adverse reactions encountered. Unless this ‘loop’ is
well managed, a drug can fail, especially a new drug.
2. The pharmaceutical company relies on forecasts of requirements
and then orders from third parties (wholesalers may be the
distribution channel for 80% + of drugs to dispensers) in order
to set schedules, etc. for manufacturing. This is a particular
problem with new drugs where forecasts rather than orders
drive the production scaling/economics. Underestimates lead
to lost sales, overestimates to signiﬁcant waste and cost. The
quality of forecasts and, then, consistency with order patterns
are key, making online demand and supply information
exchange crucial to both parties.
3. The skill in pharmaceutical market research is to establish both
the nature and size of the market from a variety of particular
and statistical data and to determine a development opportunity
in a therapeutic area where the company has distinctive skills/
competency. Often, today, the opportunities arise from gaps in
current treatments, which are known to inﬂuencers mentioned in
Item 1 above. Collecting data from diverse sources and inter-
preting them can be greatly assisted by electronic data input.
4. Testing of a drug during development can take many years, and
reducing the development time from, say, 8–12 years to maybe
5–6 means more of the patent life is unexpired for production,
and this aﬀects drug proﬁtability dramatically over its patented
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Each of these stages involves a number of processes of information
exchange—between buyer and seller—to enable the stage to be managed
eﬀectively, thereby ensuring maximum beneﬁt to the buyer and seller. If
at any stage the exchange breaks down, either the current transaction or
future business will be adversely aﬀected. The further through the life
cycle the information exchange has gone, the higher the switching cost to
the customer, who will have to retrace the steps at additional cost and
inconvenience with another supplier.
In essence, the RLC analysis forces consideration of what happens to
the product or service once it has become part of a customer’s value chain
or while it was part of the supplier’s value chain and, thence, leads to
information relationships between buyer and seller over an extended
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life (hundreds of millions of pounds). Much testing is in-house
and controllable, but clinical trials by doctors must be done
outside the organization and can take many years. The key to
success is organizing the trial—getting the right clinicians to test
it on the right population, which requires good information on
the test population, etc. to avoid delay and wasted eﬀort.
Equally, getting the results in is a major data collection/logistics
exercise where ‘e-commerce’ is essential both for speed and
gathering comprehensive/valid trial data.
5. To be able to produce the drug, regulatory approval must be
obtained by submitting all the evidence about the drug—this
can run to 120,000 pages! The most demanding agency is the
US FDA (Food and Drug Administration). Once the proposal
is submitted, endless questions will be asked and if the informa-
tion is not well organized the queries can take months to resolve.
Most drug companies use IT to develop/store/submit the
package of information and enable the regulatory authority to
enquire into it electronically. This again can save considerable
time and reworking of data to satisfy the regulators and speed
up the time to market the drug.
6. With the increasing access consumers have to information via
the Internet, many ‘patients’ now inform their doctors of the
treatment they think they require! In the USA, ‘self-prescrip-
tion’ is now an option for some drugs, although, in the UK,
the doctor still has to prescribe the drug. However, as informa-
tion is increasingly available to the public, it is likely the value
chain will have to include the patients more eﬀectively, rather
than leave them isolated as suggested in this model.
timescale while the product/service is being consumed or, in reverse, while
it is being developed and made available. Most of the steps in the four
stages can be improved by direct electronic links and by asking ‘how can
e-commerce (or IT) improve our ability to help the customer to . . .?’ can
identify quite speciﬁc opportunities to enhance the relationship.
The RLC model suggests that the information relationship is an
extended one, eventually resulting in a replacement sale or purchase.
The life cycle may be very short (days) for consumable items, but
many years for capital items.
A slightly extended and updated version of the basic model is described
by Feeny11 to address the increased ability of online service provision to
meet a wider range of customers’ requirements at lower costs via the
Internet. Gathering information about the customer throughout the re-
lationship life cycle becomes much easier, and more economic, as more
information exchanges become electronic. Information gleaned ‘post-
purchase’ from customers is the most valuable in terms of understanding
what they actually value regarding service and product requirements and
preferences.
An example of the use of a ‘technical service’ system in adding
customer value to what is essentially a catalogue can perhaps help demon-
strate the ideas. RS Components, a business-to-business distributor,
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Table 5.2 Resource life-cycle analysis (source: after Ives and Learmonth)
Requirements
Establish requirements To determine how much of a resource is required
Specify To determine a resource’s attributes
Acquisition
Select source To determine where customers will buy a resource
Order To order a quantity of a resource from the supplier
Authorize and pay for To transfer funds or extend credit
Acquire To take possession of a resource
Test and accept To ensure that a resource meets speciﬁcations
Stewardship
Integrate To add an existing inventory
Monitor To control access and use of a resource
Upgrade To upgrade a resource if conditions change
Maintain To repair a resource, if necessary
Retirement
Transfer or dispose To move, return or dispose of inventory as necessary
Account for To monitor where and how much is spent on a
resource
oﬀering a large range of electronic and mechanical components and tools
through catalogues, has achieved major advantages in dealing with its
customers (engineers) by paying particular attention to Stage 1 as well
as developing very responsive and eﬃcient systems to deal with Stage 2.
Often, a customer will phone, or enquire via the Internet, not knowing
what he or she wants, merely able to describe the symptoms of a problem
with a piece of equipment. By putting technical data about the majority of
its products online, about 80% of such ‘problems’ can be converted to
appropriate component orders for delivery within 24 hours by the
engineers themselves or by staﬀ with little or no technical knowledge.
The remaining 20% need to be considered by the company’s technical
staﬀ. The system is to help the customer specify his or her requirements
and to ensure that the parts dispatched are those most likely to solve the
customer’s problem.
Already, e-commerce has been used by many ﬁrms to help customers
establish and specify their needs by providing more extensive information
than ever before with easy access. Many new entrants provide ‘sourcing’
systems via e-commerce to enable buyers to ﬁnd the best deal. New
means of trading, to enable customers to obtain the product/service,
have been introduced, including customer pricing against which the
supplier can choose to sell. Home delivery has grown dramatically to
balance the new remote buying. The challenge is how to gain and
maintain customer loyalty in the new environment through ‘stewardship’
services that encourage further purchases. This depends on establishing
an electronic dialogue with the customer to learn more about them and
tailoring the relationship as individually as possible to their needs.
Customer Relationship Management (CRM) systems are designed to
cover the whole life cycle, providing a comprehensive view of the cus-
tomers’ pattern of interactions and relationships with the ﬁrm, enabling
tailored and proactive rather than reactive approaches to meeting their
needs.
A similar technique for generating information systems ideas during
value chain analysis—the ‘strategic option generator’—has also found
renewed favour with the rapid developments in e-commerce. The
approach was described by Rackoﬀ et al.12 and is explored in great
detail by Wiseman.13 It considers the impact of IS/IT in relation to:
. Suppliers—anyone supplying essential resources. It may be necessary
to subset them either by the nature of what they supply or their
strength, or their ability to exert pressure on you and other cus-
tomers.
. Customers—this could include the consumers as well as direct cus-
tomers if the latter are essentially distributors. The customers should
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be segmented in terms of what (and what else) they buy or how much
leverage they exert.
. Competitors—obvious competitors who sell very similar products or
services should be supplemented by actual or potential new entrants
into the market and ‘threatening’ substitute products and services
should be included as competition. Consideration should also be
given to the threat of new intermediaries or options for disinterme-
diation by others.
For each of them, alternative ‘strategic thrusts’—oﬀensive or defensive
moves—can be made by the ﬁrm:
. Diﬀerentiation—ensuring that superior quality is delivered and per-
ceived, leading to obtaining a premium price. It could also imply
being a ‘preferred customer’ to obtain preferential service.
. Cost—being cheaper or enabling suppliers or customers to reduce
their costs (sharing the beneﬁt) and thereby preferring to conduct
business with the ﬁrm (ways may also be found to increase com-
petitors’ costs!).
. Innovation—introduce a new product, service, process or way of
doing business that transforms the relationships and competitive
forces in the industry. This may require the active involvement and
cooperation of suppliers and/or customers.
. Growth—enable volume or expansion in geography or increased ﬂex-
ibility of production and distribution to meet diﬀerent segments
needs.
. Alliance—forging agreements, joint ventures or joint investments in
systems to prevent new entrants or competitors achieving advantage.
It may be that each of the above are appropriate with diﬀerent groups of
suppliers or customers or even competitors, implying that a great variety
and range of options could be identiﬁed, many of which may prove
infeasible!
To identify what beneﬁts are potentially available, a questionnaire
approach is suggested. Table 5.3 shows some sample suggested questions
that might lead to the identiﬁcation of options. Some of the questions
imply a degree of lateral thought. For instance, ‘reduce suppliers’ costs’
tends to go against the grain! The full question should be perhaps ‘reduce
the suppliers’ cost, when he does business with us’ (in order to create
more proﬁt in the chain and share the beneﬁt).
The strategic option generator approach relies on a thorough under-
standing of the state of the industry, the ﬁrm’s competitive position, the
determining factors for success in the industry value chain, plus a clear
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business strategy. It is most helpful in being speciﬁc about who will
beneﬁt and how from the options for change in relationships through
the value chain.
THE INTERNAL VALUE CHAIN
Much of what has been said about the external value chain above applies
to the ﬁrm’s internal value chain—the contribution of these activities to
the creation of value in the organization as well as the relationships
between its value-adding activities. Before trying to improve the organi-
zation’s internal use of information, its wider role in the industry needs to
be understood, since those external interfaces should be a major inﬂuence
on the way information is gathered, organized and used in the organiza-
tion. In many cases, the actions of trading partners and competitors will
have a direct impact or constrain what the company would ideally like to
do.
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Table 5.3 IS/IT opportunity analysis—questions
1. Suppliers—Can we use IS/IT to:
Gain leverage over our suppliers (improving our bargaining power or
reducing theirs)?
Reduce buying costs?
Reduce the suppliers’ costs?
Be a better customer and obtain a better service?
Identify alternative sources of supply?
Improve the quality of products/services purchased?
etc.
2. Customers—Can we use IS/IT to:
Reduce customers’ costs and/or increase their revenue?
Increase our customers’ switching costs (to alternative suppliers)?
Increase our customers’ knowledge of our products/services?
Improve support/service to customers and their needs?
Identify new potential customers?
3. Competitors—Can we use IS/IT to:
Raise the entry cost of potential competitors?
Diﬀerentiate (or create new) products/services?
Reduce our costs/Increase competitors’ costs?
Alter the channels of distribution?
Identify/Establish a new market niche?
Form joint ventures to enter new markets?
etc.
The purpose of Internal Value Chain analysis, like many other tech-
niques for assessing and improving how a company operates, is to
divorce what the company does from how it does it (i.e. look at the
activities it performs, to contribute to the value-adding processes of the
industry, rather than its organization structure). Historically, the infor-
mation systems a company has will have usually resulted from the organ-
izational needs at functional and departmental level. Only subsequently
will these systems and information resources have been aligned to the
processes that the ﬁrm carries out to satisfy its customers and govern the
business. This means that the systems tend to ﬁt the functional structure
well, but are less eﬀective in ensuring an appropriate ﬂow of key infor-
mation through the business to optimize its overall performance. As
external trading relationships change, the internal processes and
systems will also have to change to enable the new business model to
operate eﬃciently.
The value chain approach ﬁrst distinguishes between two types of
business activity.
(a) Primary activities—those that enable it to fulﬁl its role in the industry
value chain and hence satisfy its customers, who see the direct eﬀects
of how well those activities are carried out. Not only must each
activity be performed well, they must also link together eﬀectively
if the overall business performance is to be optimized.
(b) Support activities—those which are necessary to control and develop
the business over time and thereby add value indirectly—the value
being realized through the success of the primary activities.
Each activity adds value in terms of creating a product or service that
generates revenue from customers or enables value-adding activities to be
coordinated or ensures that value has been added, at an acceptable cost.
Some activities only add value if they are eﬀectively integrated across
primary and support parts of the chain. These are often information
intensive activities such as forecasting—estimating demand, planning
capacity and scheduling resources and activities—and pricing, which
requires input from many components in the chain and will have
eﬀects on many others.
In a multi-unit business, each operating unit will have a set of primary
activities it must perform successfully to satisfy its set of customers. The
support activities, or some of them, may be shared by the operating units
because it is more cost-eﬀective to do so, or because there are synergistic
beneﬁts by providing a central service to each of the units (e.g. Human
Resource Management, Finance or IT).
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The Traditional Value Chain Model
Porter14 classiﬁes the primary activities into ﬁve groupings, which can be
considered in sequence starting with suppliers and ending with customers:
1. Inbound logistics—obtaining, receiving, storing and provisioning the
key inputs and resources in the right quality and quantity to the
business. This may include recruiting staﬀ as well as buying
materials, components and services and dealing with subcontractors
and acquiring equipment.
2. Operations—transforming the inputs into the products or services
required by the customers. This involves bringing the resources and
materials together to make the ‘product’ (e.g. a car) or provide the
service (e.g. a banking current account).
3. Outbound logistics—distributing the products to the customers either
direct to the consumer or to the appropriate channel of distribution,
so that the customer can obtain the product or service and pay for it
appropriately (e.g. a car could go via a dealer to the customer,
although it is possible for the customer to buy direct from the manu-
facturer and have the car delivered from the factory; or the delivery
of cash to a bank customer via an Automatic Telling Machine
(ATM) installed in a grocery retailer).
4. Sales and marketing—providing ways in which the customers and
consumers are aware of the product or service and how they can
obtain it, including how to induce them to buy or use the product
or service. This would apply to a new car model, or a bank account,
but also to cancer screening in the Health Service, for instance.
5. Services—adding further value by ensuring the customer gets full
beneﬁt or value from the product once purchased (e.g. car
warranty, or information on how to use a bank account to avoid
unnecessary charges).
Porter’s structuring of the activities ﬁts most easily to a manufacturing
company, but, using the same logic of obtaining resources, transforming
them, delivery, getting the customer to ‘buy’ and then get maximum
value from the product or service, value chains can be drawn for any
business.
Figure 5.6 shows sets of activities grouped in the structure described
above and also some of the associated support activities we would expect
to ﬁnd in a manufacturing company. The nature of the primary activities
a ﬁrm performs will to an extent be predetermined by the industry, its
products, customers and suppliers—its success is determined by how well
it performs the range of primary activities in concert. That will decide
264 IS/IT Strategic Analysis: Determining the Future Potential
TE
AM
FL
Y
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Team-Fly® 
how much value is derived and how much the activities cost and, hence,
the primary proﬁt margin.
ALTERNATIVE VALUE ‘CONFIGURATION’ MODELS
The traditional value chain model was based essentially on a manufactur-
ing/retail view of industry and works well for ‘physical goods’. However,
while it can be applied quite successfully to some service businesses, in
many others it does not really represent what the business does or its
relationships with customers and suppliers. For example, most aspects of
insurance and investment businesses involve no physical product (except
paper and money), nor does the model represent businesses where sup-
pliers can also be customers (e.g. banking) and it is especially weak in
describing many newer service businesses like those based primarily on
electronic commerce.
Stabell and Fjeldstad15 describe two alternative ‘value conﬁguration’
models that attempt to address these problems. The focus is on the
primary value chain activities since the support activities are often very
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Figure 5.6 Firm’s value chain—manufacturing example
similar to the Porter model. They call these two alternatives: ‘Value
Shops’ and ‘Value Networks’.
Value Shops are businesses that essentially are ‘problem solving’, deli-
vering value by providing solutions for clients. They are characterized by
intense and extensive information exchanges both in setting up the
business transaction and delivery of the solution. Examples are as wide-
spread as oil exploration companies, design engineering, management
consultancy, insurance, advertising, etc. They are characterized as non-
ﬂowline, since each problem is, for the client, unique and the client is
normally involved in both the design and implementation of the
solution.16
Figure 5.7 shows an example of such a value chain, which better
reﬂects a service business, where the objective is to satisfy the client or
customer requirements, by bringing together the appropriate knowledge
and resources from inside the ﬁrm or by using other external resources.
The chain involves two ﬂows, to determine the client needs and
(assuming they can be met) designing and implementing a solution that
satisﬁes the client requirement. This can be relatively simple (e.g. a new
hairstyle) or very complex (a new oil reﬁnery). Considerable information
exchange is often required (in the more complex situations!) and IS/IT
oﬀers opportunities to increase the eﬃciency of such exchanges, reduce
elapsed time and improve the accuracy of the exchange.
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Figure 5.7 Value chain: service businesses (‘Value Shop’) (client is actively
involved in and affected by the processes) (source: after Stabell and Fjeldstad)
Value Networks are businesses that provide exchanges and mediation
between buyers and sellers, enabling relationships to be established. They
earn revenue from either or both in their use of the ﬁrm’s network
‘everyone’s a customer’. The UK’s Post Oﬃce is an example both in
its mail and parcel delivery and its counter services where it is acting
as an agency for government service delivery (DVLC, Social Security,
etc.). The services may extend beyond connection to revenue col-
lection, contract management, systems integration, information source,
etc., in terms of adding additional value for a customer or customer
segment. Many new Internet Service Providers (ISPs), cable and media
companies as well as more established telecoms providers are in this
group as well as a range of ﬁnancial service and investment businesses
(e.g. share trading). Many of the new online trading models (auctions,
clubs, etc.) are Value Networks. No doubt many more will emerge in the
future.
The primary activities of such ﬁrms include infrastructure development
and maintenance to provide capacity and access, service provision to
cater for the needs of diﬀerent buyer/seller relationships and promotion
to both buyer and seller groups to recover the capacity costs via transac-
tion-based revenues. Figure 5.8 suggests how this model diﬀers from the
other two.
In all types of model, information about what customers want and how
that demand can be satisﬁed should ﬂow freely through the organization,
enabling the management of each activity to determine how best to
deploy its resources to maximize customer satisfaction in the most eﬀec-
tive way. Any action taken would be immediately visible to other activ-
ities in the chain, who can then take further action accordingly or inform
the other activities of problems in meeting the requirement. The chain can
be continuously rebalanced across all the activities. In addition to the
ﬂow through the organization, each activity (e.g. warehousing, sales force
management) will need information systems to carry out and manage its
part of the business. In themselves they may be very extensive but should
link in to the ﬂow as required. For instance, the warehouse management
system must know where every item is in the warehouse, but the rest of
the business only needs to know what is in it, and, while the manufactur-
ing department needs to schedule each machine in detail, the rest of the
business only needs to know that products will be ready to meet orders
from customers. Equally, in a consultancy-type business, resource man-
agement activities do not need to know the detail of each assignment, but
need to know who is committed and for how long.
One engineering company, producing electrical switching systems,
studied how information ﬂowed through the primary activities involved
and were able to simplify the ﬂows from the customer enquiry through to
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the component suppliers, and back again, to reduce delivery lead times
from 27 to 5 days. The result was a 37% increase in sales—sales they were
losing because their delivery times were too slow and unreliable. That was
only for one product, but, when the same logic was applied across the
whole product range and associated processes, dramatic performance
improvements were made, often at very little cost and with the result
that the systems became much simpler. Once these improvements have
been made, e-commerce investments to enable online enquiry and
ordering were able to deliver further beneﬁts rather than cause even
more operational problems.
THE USE OF VALUE CHAIN ANALYSIS
Value chain analysis is essentially a form of high-level industry, and
business process/activity analysis—a way of describing an industry as a
network of key components and their interrelationships. The basic, rather
structured, concept of the value chain—the ‘big arrow’—is sometimes
diﬃcult to apply to non-manufacturing industries where the product is
not tangible and there are no obvious raw materials. A bus company, the
police, car hire, building societies, estate agencies, the Inland Revenue
and education are all examples where the ﬁve linear components of the
268 IS/IT Strategic Analysis: Determining the Future Potential
Support activities
Infrastructure, technology, human resources,  administration, etc.
Other resources
Network
Infrastructure
development
Operation and 
maintenance
Core technologies
- Marketing
- Pricing
- Contracts
- Performance
- Capacity
              Service
          development 
        and operations
- Security, standards
  controls
- Transaction and revenue
  management
- Availability
- Information provision,
  etc.
(a) Core services
(all customer groups)
Service
delivery
  (b) Value-added 
services
(designed for particular
customer groups)
Service
contractors
All customers
Buyer/Seller
segments
(a)
(c)
etc.
(b)
Suppliers
Figure 5.8 Value chain: service businesses (‘Value Network’) (source: after
Stabell and Fjeldstad)
internal value chain are diﬃcult to identify. The two more recently devel-
oped value models—‘shops’ and ‘networks’—are more helpful in describ-
ing how activities interrelate to provide the customer with value. And all
activities cost money! The process of analysis should be relatively ﬂexible,
describing ‘freehand’ the relationships among the customers, the service/
product and the resources consumed. The main objective in all cases is to
represent the main activities in the business and their relationships in
terms of how they add value so as to satisfy the customer and to
obtain resources from suppliers—not in terms of how the organization
currently is structured—(i.e. to focus on core business requirements). By
considering that value chain as a component of an industry value system,
a broader view of systems implications and opportunities can be deter-
mined. It is equally important to separate those primary activities from
support activities that are there for organizational or institutional
purposes and only indirectly contribute to adding value! Organizations
have greater discretion over how they carry out support than primary
activities, since the latter have to ﬁt successfully into the processes of
industry.
However the value chains are drawn, they can enable further analysis
of any or all the following:
. The information that ﬂows throughout the industry and how critical
that information is to the functioning of the industry and the success
of the ﬁrms in it, by determining where and when that information is
available, who has it and how it could be obtained and turned to
advantage or used against the ﬁrm.
For instance, in some industries like fashion goods, ‘demand’ in-
formation is the critical factor, but, in others such as confectionery
(the price and availability of cocoa) and timber (the price and avail-
ability of wood), ‘supply’ data can be critical to success. Manu-
facturers who have good information and can respond to changing
demand/supply fastest can outcompete those who lack the relevant
information. In the UK timber industry, the price of softwoods is
aﬀected over a six-month cycle by the US building industry,
‘housing starts’ in the USA determining availability and price
elsewhere. As the world’s largest purchaser of wool, Benetton
would ﬁnd huge stocks on its hands if it failed to anticipate and
satisfy demand—hence, the importance of its point-of-sale system
in its franchised shops to obtain daily sales data in a volatile
market.
. The information that is or could be exchanged with customers and
suppliers throughout the chain to improve the performance of the
business or lead to mutually-improved performance by sharing the
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beneﬁts (e.g. the information that is required for the customer to sell
on the product/service or the supplier to acquire input resources).
Suppliers of particular components or resources may have longer
lead times than appropriate, given the volatility of the company’s
business. Providing plans for forward requirements, even buying
on its behalf to spread both companies’ risks, might help. The in-
formation links between companies are far more complex than often
appreciated and the value chain approach allows them to be
analysed. Obviously, the use of electronic commerce is becoming
the main basis for such information sharing across various com-
panies’ information systems.
In the 1980s and early 1990s, EDI-based systems were seen as a
major strategic option for most organizations. The reality has been
that major players in certain industries, usually retailers, generally
determined the strategic impact of EDI by their action or inaction.
A study by Benjamin et al.17 concluded that, for the majority of
organizations, ‘EDI applications will be built out of competitive
necessity . . . and will become a cost of doing business.’ The
evidence of the study showed that EDI for basic business transac-
tions will provide, at best, short-lived advantages, since they are
easily copied. Sustained advantage comes from changing the rela-
tionships with trading partners and using the information exchange
to conduct business in new, mutually-beneﬁcial ways, as explained
earlier. This is almost certainly true of the Internet and e-commerce
applications. Once the available cost savings have been ‘shared out’
equitably between buyers and sellers, advantage will only accrue to
those who innovate in business processes, provide new value to cus-
tomers and/or can ﬁnd signiﬁcant numbers of new customers to
satisfy.
. How eﬀectively the information ﬂows through the primary processes
and is used by them:
– within each activity to optimize performance;
– to link the activities together and avoid unnecessary costs and
missed opportunities; and
– to enable support activities to contribute to the value-adding
processes, not hinder them.
Historically, systems were ﬁrst developed to meet functional needs,
and the links between them from marketing to outbound logistics,
for instance, were added later. This often resulted in armies of people
with the generic job title of ‘professional reconciler’, working to
overcome the weaknesses at the system interfaces. Many business
re-engineering initiatives often accompanied by implementing inte-
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grated software packages have been focused on eliminating such
ineﬃciencies. One insurance company reduced the number of ‘hand-
lings’ of new policy details from 14 to 3 without any loss of control.
Porter suggests that the companies who succeed with IS are those
who link their systems together along the value chain most eﬀec-
tively. For instance, it may be most eﬀective to supply daily sales
data in its raw form direct to the procurement and inbound logistics
activities to determine ordering requirements much earlier. Other-
wise, they could eﬀectively hinder the marketing eﬀort in the long
term.
‘NATURAL’ AND ‘CONTRIVED’ VALUE CHAINS
O’Sullivan and Geringer18 explain how, by understanding the role of
information in both ‘internal’ and ‘external’ value chains, major
business performance improvements can be made by changing how the
chain works. They introduce the concept of ‘natural’ and ‘contrived’
value chains. The natural value chain describes the (unattainable)
optimum structure for the industry’s value-adding processes and infor-
mation ﬂows, based on what needs to be done. The contrived value chain
shows how (in far from optimal ways) things are currently done. They
identify characteristic diﬀerences in natural and contrived value chains.
These are shown in Table 5.4. The ﬁrst purpose in analysing the value
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Table 5.4 Natural versus contrived value chains
Contrived value chain represents how things are done by resources in the industry/
organization:
. driven by organization structures, historical evolution and compromise
. is often very complex, confused and ‘messy’, and poorly understood
. contains many reconciliation activities and reacts slowly
. can take many forms, is continuously being modiﬁed to meet business
changes
Natural value chain represents what has to be done to succeed in market
requirements:
. based on value-adding activities and the resources needed to carry them out
. deﬁnes essential interrelationships and dependencies and the ideal way to
achieve business purposes
. contains few reconciliation activities and responds quickly
. usually only one ideal exists, and it does not change signiﬁcantly or
frequently
chain in information terms is to reduce the existing complexity either
inherent in the current information relationships or caused by them.
The second purpose is to identify new, often faster, options for informa-
tion to ﬂow to where it enables the value-adding processes to be per-
formed more eﬀectively and at the ideal time. In doing so, the way the
chain works should change from whatever ‘contrived’ state it has reached
through evolution to something more like the ‘natural’ view of the chain.
In order to achieve this and to ensure that the more beneﬁcial IS/IT
investments are identiﬁed, it is important to start with an understanding
of the overall external value chain and how it aﬀects the internal value-
adding processes. Otherwise, even signiﬁcant IS investments may deliver
no noticeable overall beneﬁt and they may even result in business dis-
advantages due to the actions of others in the chain.
BUSINESS RE-ENGINEERING AND THE VALUE CHAIN
The upper three levels of impact of IS/IT on business described in
Chapter 1, from the MIT’s Management in the 1990s Research Pro-
gramme, requiring revolutionary change or transformation include
two—process redesign and network redesign—that imply changing the
internal or external value chain components and relationships. Business
re-engineering, as a mechanism for strategic change, normally includes a
signiﬁcant process dimension, which will lead inevitably to implications
for IS/IT. Most of the successful business re-engineering initiatives have
also had an external drive or focus, ensuring that internal changes deliver
perceived improvements to the customers. Almost by deﬁnition, the
starting point for determining what to change, why and how to change
it, is an understanding of the value-adding processes in the industry and/
or the ﬁrm.
Much of the information systems and business re-engineering literature
uses the same words for deﬁning the actions to take to improve business
performance: eliminate unnecessary processes, then rationalize the rest to
ensure the value-adding processes are optimized, integrate to improve
responsiveness and reduce unnecessary eﬀort and error; ﬁnally,
automate where technology can deliver further improvements. By the
1990s, in many companies, IT had become a constraint to redesign,
because, in the past, IT used to automate badly-designed processes that
had become expensively petriﬁed in silicon! In many ways, business re-
engineering is a restatement of the aims of IS investment over the past 30
years, but those aims were often subverted in the drive to employ IT. In
many organizations, the need for rapid, relatively radical change is now
imperative and IT provides a wide range of capabilities to assist in
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implementation. Rather than devise their own business models and hence
core systems, many organizations have implemented enterprise systems
software packages (e.g. ERP and CRM) to obtain those new business
processes and modern, upgradeable software. These solutions involve
adopting a value-chain-driven approach to understanding ‘how the
business works’ and hence can be improved via a combination of
business re-engineering and new IS.
SUMMARY
Information systems have always been part of the value-adding processes
that comprise any enterprise, whether it be a commercial company, a
public service or a charitable body. Historically, though, IS/IT has
been mainly deployed to improve individual component processes or
activities of the enterprise. Initially, this improvement was targeted at
reducing the costs of the supporting activities rather than improving
the performance of the primary activities of the business. Even when
systems became focused on primary activities, they tended to be aimed
at optimizing the performance of the main operational activity of the
business, and only then on activities that directly interact with suppliers
and customers, but with a view to not compromising or jeopardizing the
eﬀectiveness of internal operations. Historically, the emphasis has been
on:
. internal operations and control;
. key processes in the organization;
. internal critical success factors;
. the ﬁrm not the industry.
The value chain analysis techniques suggest that the ﬁrm’s information
systems should be considered in an extended context—that of the
industry value chain—in order to achieve maximum leverage from IS/
IT investments and beneﬁts from industry and internal developments.
The value chain represents the ﬂow of goods and services and use of
resources through the industry, and there are simultaneous, parallel
ﬂows of information running through the industry. The value chain
analysis tools make the organization consider how those industry infor-
mation ﬂows aﬀect the ﬁrm, and, potentially, how they can inﬂuence it
and where it is worth investing to achieve superiority with respect to
others by exploiting the information and its ﬂow or avoid being disad-
vantaged by the actions of others. This form of analysis also enables the
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assessment of existing systems and known requirements to be considered
in a broader and longer-term context.
In planning future information systems and technology for an organ-
ization, it is important to identify the business opportunities and threats
presented by the increasing and developing use of IS/IT in the ﬁrm’s
industry. The objective is to identify strategically-important applications,
those applications that directly support chosen business strategies or
enable new business strategies to be developed and implemented. If the
organization is not in a strictly-competitive environment, strategic appli-
cations will be those focusing on meeting organizational objectives. These
strategic applications are only a part of the organization’s IS application
portfolio, but a very important part.
This chapter has described a number of approaches that can be taken
to understand an organization’s information and systems possibilities
and the potential business beneﬁts. The use of each technique has been
exempliﬁed by what others have done. The various techniques have been
described from the ‘top down’, from the industry down to particular
aspects of information exchange with customers or suppliers. Beneﬁcial
options can arise at any stage of the analysis or equally by inspiration.
The various models used also oﬀer a basis for testing the value of ‘good
ideas’ resulting from ad hoc inspiration.
There are undoubtedly other techniques that could have been consid-
ered here—the most widely-accepted ones have been included. All these
techniques have a common theme—they must be used by people with
knowledge of the business and its environment, and therefore cannot be
tools for IS/IT specialists alone to use. Senior management and line
managers must become familiar with the basic approaches to this type
of analysis. All the tools and techniques described are really IS/IT subsets
of business strategic analysis tools, which should enable such managers
to become actively involved in determining the future potential, both
potential opportunities and potential threats, that IS/IT has to oﬀer the
organization.
In the next chapter, the ideas of this and the preceding two chapters
will be brought together—in terms of how they can be integrated into the
process of IS strategy development.
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6
Determining the Business
Information Systems Strategy
Through in-depth analyses of the business environment and the strategy
of the business as well as an examination of the role that information and
systems can and could fulﬁl in the business, a set of known requirements
and potential opportunities can be identiﬁed. These needs and options
will result from business pressures, the strategy of the business and the
organization of the various activities, resources and people in the organ-
ization. Information needs and relationships can then be converted into
systems requirements and an appropriate organization of data and in-
formation resources.
To enable these ‘ideal’ applications to be developed and managed
successfully, resources and technologies will have to be acquired and
deployed eﬀectively. In all cases, systems and information will already
exist, and, normally, IS resources and technology will already be
deployed. Any strategy, therefore, must not only identify what is even-
tually required and must also understand accurately how much has
already been achieved. The IS/IT strategic plan must therefore deﬁne a
migration path that overcomes existing weaknesses, exploits strengths
and enables the new requirements to be achieved in such a way that it
can be resourced and managed appropriately.
A strategy has been deﬁned (on page 69) as ‘an integrated set of actions
aimed at increasing the long-term well-being and strength of the enter-
prise.’ The IS/IT strategy must be integrated not only in terms of in-
formation, systems and technology via a coherent set of actions but
also in terms of a process of adaptation to meet the changing needs of
the business as they evolve. ‘Long term’ suggests uncertainty, both in
terms of the business requirements and the potential beneﬁts that the
various applications and technologies will oﬀer. Change is the only
thing that is certain! These changing circumstances will mean that the
organization will have to be capable of eﬀective responses to unexpected
opportunities and problems.
This chapter considers how the models and processes of IS/IT strategic
planning from Chapter 3 and the tools and techniques of analysis from
Chapters 2, 4 and 5 can be consolidated into an IS/IT strategic manage-
ment approach for the organization: an approach that enables it con-
tinuously to identify the appropriate application systems and information
resources it requires and, at the same time, to take advantage of new
opportunities as they arise.
As discussed in Chapter 3, an organization’s IS strategy is a result of its
own decisions—the choices it makes in the context of evolving business
and information technology environments (see Figure 3.8). However, it
must adapt to events, changing priorities and emerging options as well as
adjust its plans according to how well and how quickly the intended IS
strategy is actually realized. Business objectives are now often updated
and even radically revised within months of their establishment, and
this can cause frequent reassessment of investment opportunities and
priorities. To avoid wasted IS/IT investments and misuse of resources,
some aspects of the IS strategy will have to be adjusted quickly and
decisively, but, equally important, much of the strategy will not need to
change. Frequent, unnecessary reassessment can waste resources and
often causes implementation failures. The approach described in this
chapter describes how this can be allowed for, as well as illustrating
how the various tools and techniques can be successfully blended
together into a practical and adaptable process.
STRATEGIC PLANNING TECHNIQUES AND
THEIR RELATIONSHIPS
In Chapter 1, a simple model for describing the IS application portfolio
of a business was developed. This model suggested that IS/IT applica-
tions could be described in terms of ‘strategic’, ‘high potential’, ‘key
operational’ or ‘support’ (see Figure 1.7). The main factors that inﬂuence
the balance of that portfolio for any business (i.e. which applications
reside in which sectors and the relative strategic importance and critical-
ity of each) can be classiﬁed as (see Chapter 3 for more detail):
(1) External long term—external business environment
. the state of the industry in terms of proﬁtability, growth and
structure;
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. the degree to which IS/IT is, or is capable of, changing the
products, markets and interrelationships of the industry.
(2) External short term—external IS/IT environment
. the actual use of IS/IT by competitors and others in the industry
to gain a relative advantage;
. the opportunities created by IS/IT to change the balance of com-
petitive forces and inﬂuences on the industry, both in the existing
value chain and by new entrants or product/service substitution.
(3) Internal long term—internal business environment
. how new IS/IT applications could more eﬀectively support or
enhance the business strategy of the enterprise;
. how new IS/IT applications could enable the business to adopt a
more appropriate strategy to suit the future business environ-
ment.
(4) Internal short term—internal IS/IT environment and current applica-
tion portfolio
. the degree to which existing systems support the chosen strategy
and the criticality of those systems to avoiding business disad-
vantages and/or sustaining existing advantages;
. the existing approach to IS/IT management and its appropriate-
ness to the business strategy;
. the IS/IT resources and competencies the organization has or
can easily acquire.
Chapter 4 primarily dealt with the internal factors, both short and long
term, that determine the overall structure of the portfolio, and Chapters 2
and 5 focused mainly on external factors. At this stage, these factors are
considered in terms of their inﬂuence in determining what could and
should be done rather than how to do it—the demand-management
part of the basic demand/supply rationale of IS/IT strategic management
depicted in Figure 1.6. The models in Chapter 3 considered in greater
depth the issues of both demand and supply management. There is
obviously an iterative relationship; supply can constrain the demand,
and any modiﬁcation of demand will require diﬀerent strategies for
supply. How to achieve the appropriate supply will be considered in
depth in Chapters 8–11, as will the detailed issues of the management
of the portfolio (in Chapter 7).
The processes for formulating the IS/IT strategy described in Chapter 3
emphasize the need to determine requirements before deciding how to
satisfy them, but the ability to conceive the requirements will be coloured
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by a historical predisposition based on a knowledge of the organization’s
ability to deliver. Despite these convolutions, which can potentially result
in an inability to do anything, the determination of future demand is the
most critical, and often most diﬃcult, aspect of strategy formulation.
Consequently, approaches and methods used need to be brought
together to ensure that a comprehensive and coherent set of demands
is identiﬁed and agreed.
Demand for IS/IT in a particular business unit can be most easily
described as a ‘business information systems strategy’ using the portfolio
concept above. The previous two chapters have described techniques for
trying to ‘ﬁll’ the portfolio with applications. Figure 6.1 summarizes the
inputs to the approach to IS/IT strategy formulation and the techniques
used to populate the portfolio. (The numbers on the diagram refer to the
chapters in which the tools are described.) Although it might appear from
previous discussion that the strategic quadrant is all-important, appro-
priate investments in applications in the others will produce signiﬁcant
contributions to improved performance. An inability to manage support
or key operational systems successfully will both reduce the ability to
realize available beneﬁts and absorb resources on applications of lesser
importance. The objective at this stage of strategy formulation is to
determine what future applications would be appropriate for the
business. So far, a model has been developed that has inputs, tools and
techniques and a conceptual product! The next stage is to consider how
the various techniques and approaches can be brought together to ensure
that the products of analysis are consistent and can be reconciled during
more detailed planning.
FRAMEWORK IN WHICH THE TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES
CAN BE USED EFFECTIVELY
It would be convenient if a ‘methodology’ or structured, repeatable
process could be proposed, but this is not realistic given the need simul-
taneously to relate existing situations to requirements to ideas. However,
a framework within which the various concepts can be used more eﬀec-
tively, rather than as isolated techniques, is essential if the determination
of the business systems strategy is to be a manageable task. Also, as
circumstances alter and progress is made, the strategy will require
updating, without the necessity to reappraise all the analysis and resulting
conclusions.
The main objective of determining the IS strategy is to identify the
required applications and their priorities, and be able to deploy resources
to achieve them successfully. The outline framework depicted in
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Figure 6.2 illustrates, as the end product, the portfolio divided into three
components:
(1) The existing applications—those currently in place and being devel-
oped to be installed in the near future, usually 6–12 months. They
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Figure 6.1 The inputs and tool kit
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should be assessed in terms of their contribution to existing business
processes and performance and how well they support the achieve-
ment of known future requirements. The strengths and weaknesses of
each need to be understood, but in a future as well as a current
context.
(2) The required applications—those that will be necessary to achieve the
business objectives and strategy within the business planning horizon
and can be shown to have speciﬁc contributions to make.
(3) The potential applications—those that might prove valuable in the
future, provided they prove feasible to deliver and can be shown to
produce relevant beneﬁts, either to the strategy directly or by sig-
niﬁcant indirect eﬀects through improved business performance.
The diﬀerent types of application and their implications are likely to
result from (respectively) a thorough situation appraisal of the business
and its information requirements, an analysis of the business strategy and
objectives, and a creative assessment of possibilities for IS/IT in the
business environment. The products of each of these processes needs to
be interrelated and consolidated, which implies that the process will be
somewhat iterative. Ideas, as they crystallize, will have to be reconsidered
in relation to each other and the overall business options. The three
columns of Figure 6.2 refer to:
(a) the need continually to reappraise how both the external and internal
environments are changing and the role that IS/IT is or should be
fulﬁlling in the business and its relationships—central column;
(b) the need to identify and monitor new or emerging IS/IT-based
opportunities to create potential advantages for the organization
(or that might result in disadvantages if ignored)—right-hand column;
(c) the need to make decisions on how best to deploy available business
and IS/IT resources in the immediate future—left-hand column.
The horizontal arrows on Figure 6.2 suggest the most eﬀective route
through the ‘map’ when the strategy is ﬁrst formulated, but also
indicate what also needs to be considered if any changing variable
causes the strategy to be reappraised.
In the following sections, the overall framework described in Figure 6.2
will be considered in more detail, in terms of the processes, the products
of each process and their interrelationships. All the various tools and
techniques have been described in previous chapters, and this framework
is a more detailed description of the overall processes and deliverables
described in Chapter 3.
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IDENTIFYING HOW IS/IT COULD IMPACT THE STRATEGY
The ﬁrst part of the discussion considers the steps that address the range
of opportunities and threats that IS/IT oﬀers and poses for the business.
This primarily involves addressing the top six boxes of the framework, as
shown in Figure 6.3: assessing the IS strategy implications of the industry
environment, exploring competitive forces, assessing external value chain
relationships and the analysis of the current business strategy. Any in-
novative ideas for exploiting IS/IT, identiﬁed separately from the main
strategy development process by informal, creative thinking, should be
incorporated and assessed during this part of the framework.
Understanding the Industry and the Potential Impact of IS/IT on
Products and Markets
Understanding the industry and the potential impact of IS/IT on
products and markets is a prerequisite to any development of an IS/IT
strategy. The ﬁrst step is the assessment of the overall business situation
in relation to the external environment, and this should be done by the
business management as an integral part of the business strategy. The key
issues to be considered are:
. the business units and their relationships to each other and to the
corporate body;
. the stage of maturity of the industry or industries within which the
businesses compete;
. the product and customer portfolios of the business units and the
contributions to revenues and proﬁts, and demands on resources that
each group of products/markets makes;
. the competitive forces aﬀecting the business units and the corpora-
tion, and their impact on the business—this in turn leads to a SWOT
(Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) analysis of the
companies’ positions regarding each of the forces to identify areas of
greatest concern and need for action;
. the key competencies required to succeed in the industry and the
relative status of the organization’s competencies in each dimen-
sion—customer, product and operations.
This stage is essentially the business strategic analysis process described in
Chapter 2, and it leads immediately in two directions:
(1) to consideration of the business strategy and objectives in the estab-
lished business environment (see Chapter 4); and
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(2) to identiﬁcation of ways in which IS/IT could impact the industry in
terms of products/services/economics and be used to aﬀect the
relative strengths of the competitive forces (see Chapter 2).
Perhaps the main product of this stage of analysis is the understanding of
the organization in terms of business units, their relationships and the
similarities and diﬀerences among them and the environments in which
they operate. For each unit, the strategic competency assessment can
identify in which dimensions (product, customer or operations) the or-
ganization could expect IS/IT to sustain its advantages or create new
ones, and in which the immediate IS/IT investment focus should be to
redress existing or emerging disadvantages. This enables a basic invest-
ment stance on IS/IT to be adopted—innovative, aggressive, defensive or
survival—and this will act as guidance to the types of opportunity to be
sought.
In the discussion below, it is assumed that a business unit is being
considered; the additional implications across business units and for
corporate information will be considered at the end of the chapter.
Interpreting Business Objectives and Strategy
Business objectives and strategies are the products of a number of
considerations:
. what the organization might do, based on the environment within
which it operates or by moving into new environments;
. what the organization wants to do, based on the values and views of,
chieﬂy, the senior executives and stakeholders;
. what the organization must do if it is to survive in its environment,
depending on the pressure groups and their inﬂuence;
. what the organization can do, based on its resources and capabilities.
Overall business objectives can be classiﬁed in a number of ways for
further analysis and formulation of strategies—the Balanced Scorecard
being one of the best known and most frequently used. The overall
strategy will deﬁne speciﬁc objectives for the whole organization, which
will then need to be analysed and interpreted to develop functional and/
or initiative-based strategies to achieve them, to reﬂect how each part of
the organization will contribute to meeting the overall objectives. The
scorecard process can be extended and formalized into a strict ‘manage-
ment by objectives’ (MBO) scheme, which allocates responsibility to indi-
viduals for achieving their contribution to the objectives. The objectives
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need to be prioritized—if only into high, medium and low—and measure-
ment criteria established to complete the scorecard.
Another way of structuring objectives, adopted by a major retailer, for
use in determining IS/IT requirements considers objectives at three levels:
. permanent objectives, which reﬂect the mission and overall goals of
the company and its long-term intentions;
. strategic objectives, which the company wants to achieve in the
medium term;
. tactical objectives, which the company and its divisions can and must
achieve in the short term to make strategic and permanent objectives
attainable.
In terms of ‘usable objectives’ in IS/IT strategy formulation, the last two
are the most relevant and can be assessed in terms of critical success
factors (CSFs). The permanent objectives essentially provide the back-
ground to ‘why’ the company needs or intends to do things.
Although objectives should be driven by business requirements and be
set primarily in relation to external demands, often they reﬂect the way in
which the current organization and its managers interpret that external
world in terms of what they see as necessary to do. They may not, there-
fore, consider enough options or may address only some of the issues. IS/
IT may change objectives due to its potential impact on the business
environment. Therefore, at this point, we need to bring together the
potential impact of IS/IT on the industry and the objectives of the
organization either to develop new objectives or qualify the priority
given to existing objectives based on IS/IT threats and opportunities.
Before looking at CSFs, it is worth considering both the objectives and
potential impact of IS/IT on the business in more detail in terms of
industry relationships.
Analysing the Industry (External) Value Chain and the
Information Flows
The industry value chain is eﬀectively a high-level information ﬂow
model, which can demonstrate the role that information plays in deter-
mining the overall performance of the industry and how it can be used by
suppliers, customers and competitors to eﬀect the potential achievement
of the enterprise’s strategy. The product of such analysis is an under-
standing of the information relationships and ‘entities’ that all players in
the industry need to manage well to achieve success. This, in turn, can
lead to an extension of the IS requirements and potentially new or
modiﬁed objectives.
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Appraising these possibilities in the light of business objectives and
strategies, and overlaying them on the overall industry value chain,
enables consideration of what the organization wishes to do to take
advantage or otherwise of the options. The result will possibly lead to
reﬁnement of objectives and should produce a more focused considera-
tion of the potential opportunities or threats. It will also identify the
external organizations required to become involved in any changes in
relationships and processes required or resulting from IS/IT options.
The external value chain and high-level information models then form
a framework for more detailed considerations of the internal implications
(see page 289). More speciﬁc analysis techniques such as data ﬂow
analysis and entity modelling can then be used to deﬁne the detailed
information involved, its potential sources and uses. Process analysis
and modelling techniques can produce a ﬁrst view of how the options
might be developed and implemented.
Determining Critical Success Factors
As discussed in Chapter 4, Critical Success Factor (CSF) analysis has
been the most commonly-used tool in the IS strategies toolkit and its
value is increased if used in conjunction with the Balanced Scorecard.
The establishment of a set of CSFs against a set of business objectives
and measures, within a Balanced Scorecard framework, requires con-
solidation into a matrix of objectives and relevant CSFs, as described
in Chapter 4. This is reasonably straightforward, provided there are not
too many of either! The priority for dealing with the CSFs is not deter-
mined by the CSF (‘critical’ implies that no priority can be set), but by the
priority of the objective that caused the success factor to be identiﬁed and
by the number of objectives that will be aﬀected by its satisfactory
achievement. The next stage in the process is not, however, as straight-
forward. Interpreting CSFs in terms of information and information
systems cannot easily be done without reference to the activities of the
business and its organizational structure, which is considered below.
Determining the Strategic Potential
The next stage is to consider in more detail how the key business pro-
cesses (in information and systems terms) relate to and are aﬀected by
other organizations’ ‘systems’ in the industry value chain. The strategic
potential of IS/IT and its eﬀects on the overall value chain can then be
identiﬁed.
The reﬁnements of the value chain analysis described in Chapter 5—
resource life-cycle analysis and strategic option generators—enable
Identifying How IS/IT Could Impact the Strategy 287
consideration of which other parties in the industry, to what extent and
for what purposes, the organization can and should extend information
systems through the external value chain, and to exert appropriate inﬂu-
ence and accommodate external changes in industry structures and pro-
cesses. The CSFs deﬁne how important it is for the organization to do so
(if at all) in order to meet its objectives. This analysis should lead to the
deﬁnition of new information needs and potential systems options. How
feasible it is actually to develop or change processes and systems to take
advantage of such opportunities will depend on:
(a) the eﬀectiveness of existing internal systems in linking the chain
together;
(b) the possibility and economics of obtaining additional information;
and
(c) the willingness of suppliers and customers to cooperate, based on the
beneﬁts they perceive.
To summarize the process so far, Figure 6.3 shows how far the analysis
has progressed through the framework of tools and techniques. The
overall products are eﬀectively a view of the opportunities and threats
of IS/IT for the business, based on its relationship to the business en-
vironment and its overall strategy. No consideration has been made of its
ability to deal with them, to take advantage or avoid being disadvan-
taged. The remaining steps in the process are essentially to assess the
strengths and weaknesses of the existing IS/IT applications and informa-
tion within the context of the broader business issues and to identify
priorities for action and needs for enhancing the capability. So far, the
analysis and thinking has taken an external (‘outside-in’) and top-down
view of the business. This needs to be counterbalanced by an internal,
bottom-up analysis, before selecting which application areas are to be
addressed and over what timescale.
Before proceeding, however, it is worth considering how long this ﬁrst
‘half ’ of the analysis should or can take and the resulting implications for
the rest of the strategy formulation process. It must not take too long,
because it is important to obtain a senior management buy-in to the
potential of IS/IT in terms of business opportunities and threats. If
management interest and involvement cannot be obtained at this stage,
suﬃcient to commit the organization to the second, more internally-
focused stage of the process, then there is little chance of later success.
Given the knowledge and types of analysis involved, a group of senior
managers need to come together for a number of sessions to enable their
knowledge and views to be shared eﬀectively. Their available time will be
limited and the work must be done over a short period, since continuity
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needs to be maintained and to avoid repeated reworking of the analyses
and ideas. It is realistic, from experience of companies that have under-
taken this, to expect one to two months to elapse at the most, with the
main working done in a series of workshops, led by a business manager.
The role of IS/IT staﬀ is to facilitate the process and perhaps document
and consolidate the rationale and conclusions, without attempting to
initiate action unilaterally on ideas arising, unless it is apparent that
resources are currently being seriously misused or that decisions currently
being taken are obviously inappropriate.
During the next stage of the process, the IS role is signiﬁcantly in-
creased, in providing management with input to help strategic decision
making and identify the speciﬁc implications of available options. That
does not mean, however, that this second stage should take too long.
From identifying the opportunities and threats to eventually describing
an outline business systems strategy for the unit should again take no
more than one to two months. If it takes much longer, earlier work may
have to be repeated or management will have lost interest, since nothing
appeared to result from the time they spent. The second half of the
process will now be considered in more detail (see Figure 6.4).
ESTABLISHING THE RELATIVE PRIORITIES
FOR IS/IT INVESTMENTS
Analysing the Internal Value Chain and Organizational Relationships
One thing is almost certain at this stage: the analysis of the internal value
chain to identify what the business does and how it could be better carried
out, and the analysis of the organization to show how it is structured to
do it, will produce a degree of mismatch. When the dynamics of how the
organization actually works are considered, this will probably confuse the
picture even more! Equally inevitably, existing systems and information
resources will have been established more from an organizational than a
value chain perspective. In addition, the situation is not static. The
business will be changing, developing or retrenching, and reorganization
of functions, people and structure will be a continuing process.
The value chain oﬀers a ﬁrmer foundation than the current organiza-
tional structure or relationships, in terms of understanding and analysing
the key business processes and activities and identifying appropriate
information and systems requirements. It is, therefore, important to
identify the primary activities of the business—those essential to the
value-adding processes and to describe the key information requirements
of each and the links among them. These can then be considered as part
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of the information ﬂow through the industry in relation to suppliers and
customers, and, if necessary, the existing value chain can be ‘extended’ or
redeﬁned in terms of those external relationships. Which processes need
most improvement through IS/IT should be identiﬁed from an analysis of
competency. For example, if customer intimacy is a potential source
of advantage, IS/IT should be targeted on innovation or extension of
customer-facing activities. If operational performance is far from excel-
lent and is in fact a cause of disadvantages, the particular processes that
are problematic need to be targeted with IS/IT investments to bring
performance back to the required levels. Each of the dimensions should
be considered in terms of the value chain activities and processes that
have the greatest impact on overall performance in that dimension.
The internal primary chain essentially describes how the business
operates, not how it is controlled or developed. Control and development
involve both primary and support activities, and information to enhance
these processes will be derived from and be overlaid onto the information
and systems in the primary activities. Control and development activities
are more dependent on the organization structure and functional respon-
sibilities than the core business value-adding processes. The value chain
model is less useful in analysing the support activities and deﬁning the
consequent information and systems needs.
Opportunities for gaining advantage from IS/IT exist in both primary
and support activities, as do ‘opportunities’ to incur a disadvantage,
although the disadvantage incurred will be more immediately obvious
due to failure in the primary activities. This reinforces the need to estab-
lish a clearly understood internal primary value chain within which to
evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of existing applications—a high-
level information ﬂow model that accurately reﬂects how and how eﬀec-
tively the business operates and relates to its trading partners. Diﬀerent
types of internal value chain model were described in Chapter 5. It is
important to understand which type of model reﬂects the nature of the
business most accurately.
Having established the model, the organization structure can be
examined to identify how the activities of each function contribute to
or fulﬁl a primary role in the model. Many organizational units will
contain primary and support functions, and they need to be separated.
Some support activities will exist merely because of poor linkages with
other functions, their existence being the result of ‘failure’ in another part
of the organization. Many will have evolved due to systems or informa-
tion management weaknesses elsewhere, and the problems that resulted
in ‘unnecessary’ reconciliation or recovery activities need to be cured at
source. The value chain is likely to expose such problems—organizational
analysis may obscure them.
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As has been noted, support activities are more organizationally depen-
dent: they either assist in planning or controlling the primary activities,
where integrated and/or consistent planning processes or controls are
needed, or are instrumental in the development of the business by co-
ordination of the acquisition and deployment of resources and organiza-
tional knowledge across primary and secondary functions. They require
analysis in terms of the information they need from primary functions,
plus any additional information, and in terms of how primary functions
can obtain information from them in order to manage their activities
successfully.
Information and systems can be used to improve eﬃciency, enhance
management’s eﬀectiveness or add value to the business in terms of
external relationships and perceptions. To focus attention appropriately,
therefore, it is important to identify why and where costs are incurred,
where success depends speciﬁcally on management eﬀectiveness and how
and where value is actually added.
Accounting systems oﬀer a basis for cost allocation, although they will
inevitably reﬂect organizational rather than value chain groupings of
cost. It should be possible, via even a rudimentary activity-based
costing process, to reallocate the costs of the business to the value
chain processes to identify areas of most potential beneﬁt. This, again,
will separate ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ costs. Business objectives,
Balanced Scorecards and CSFs oﬀer a basis for assessing management
eﬀectiveness, through measured achievement or otherwise. A very useful
step in the analysis is to position each of the CSFs in the value chain to
identify which activities, or sets of related activities, need most attention
to sustain or improve overall business success. CSFs that cannot be
allocated need to be questioned, since organizational ownership of a
CSF is important if it is to be dealt with eﬀectively. The external view
of the business, developed earlier in the process, oﬀers guidance as to how
and where the company adds value in relation to suppliers/customers and
in comparison with competitors. This can be transposed into the value
chain to highlight areas for enhancing the value-adding aspects of the
business.
Identify Critical Business Processes and Activities
From this stage, it is now possible to identify the critical business pro-
cesses and activities, based on CSFs and the way in which the company
adds value/incurs cost and is managed. The overlay of CSFs will also
show up the interdependence of activities. The nature of the potential for
business improvement will vary depending on the relationship between
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the value adding, cost and the CSFs associated with activities and
processes:
. a high-cost, low-value-adding activity with few CSFs clearly only
oﬀers cost-reduction possibilities from IS/IT investment;
. a high-value-adding activity could be made more eﬀective through
IS/IT investment, but this will only be worthwhile if its improvement
relates directly to agreed business CSFs. If, however, it is a high-cost
as well as a high-value-adding activity, then IS/IT may still help to
reduce the cost;
. where a number of activities are associated with a CSF, then they
need to be assessed collectively in terms of options for enhancing the
value or reducing the cost of each, via IS/IT developments;
. however, if an activity adds little value and is not associated with any
of the CSFs, it is more important to question whether it is needed at
all than to consider how to improve it through IS/IT! Every organ-
ization carries out some activities that actually add no value, and
some organizations have even computerized them!
The information and systems implications can now be categorized into
those that are critical to current business success, those that are likely to
aﬀect future success and those that merely support the business processes
(i.e. strategic, key operational or support). Again, the data ﬂow and data
entity models (as described in Chapter 4) will show the dependence of
processes on sources of data across the organization, and the need for
integration or otherwise of systems and information resources.
Assessment of New Options for Investment
Having understood the relationship between the value chain, the organ-
ization structure and the criticality of processes and activities, it is now
possible to assess the value of the various IS/IT opportunities developed
earlier through the ‘creative’ thinking route, in terms of whether they
could have an immediate impact or are of longer-term potential. The
ideas and options need to be reassessed in terms of whether and how
they could provide the organization with speciﬁc advantages or reduce
foreseeable threats, and whether and how, in the shorter term, they can
contribute to the existing business strategy by improving the current
operational and developmental processes. This will depend on how
closely they align with the objectives/CSFs and, hence, address known
critical business activities. Because of the rationale of the overall process,
the options and their current relevance should not be at odds with the
prevailing business issues or strategies. Some, however, may be beyond
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the current objective horizon, but should be kept within the portfolio as
high-potential ideas, which may become more valuable as the business
moves forward and the environment changes. It may well be worth some
investment to test the ideas, determine the possible beneﬁts and examine
the feasibility of achieving them. That is especially true of ideas that
would apply equally well to competitors. The selection process is essen-
tially a decision on each idea in terms of why it should be pursued or not,
in the next few months or year (i.e. is it currently strategic to the
business?).
The overall route through the ‘creative’ chain can be summarized as:
. What could IS/IT do for all the ﬁrms in the industry, in terms of
changing business parameters and relationships?
. What could IS/IT do for the organization, based on its particular
position within the industry?
. Which options oﬀer most immediate beneﬁt in terms of the business
objectives/strategy and the way the company operates and is
managed?
Determining the Future Applications Portfolio
Each of these last steps in the process is focused on deﬁning the future
portfolio of applications. The creative route will produce ideas that will
be generally categorized as:
. high potential: worth evaluating further; and
. strategic: the idea relates directly to the business strategy.
The current situation analysis will probably highlight the need for new
applications in each quadrant, although they are more likely to be key
operational and support rather than the other two. From this will come a
need to consolidate strategic and high-potential applications derived
from various routes, plus a need to address the weaknesses of existing
key operational and support systems. Determining which weakness to
address ﬁrst will depend not only on current impact but on whether it
will be increasingly or decreasingly important in the future. That, in turn,
depends on how critical the activity it supports will be or whether it can
aﬀect any of the CSFs. Will, for instance, not integrating a system make a
further strategic application impossible? CSFs determine what is of strat-
egic importance, what oﬀers the highest potential and which key opera-
tional weaknesses must be overcome. They have little, if anything, to do
with support applications, where decisions are based on the net economic
beneﬁts of investment. An approach to assessing the contribution (and
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strengths and weaknesses) of the existing applications is described in
detail in Chapter 7. At this stage, it is worth emphasizing that it is
perhaps more important to deal with serious weaknesses ﬁrst, especially
if they could soon result in a real threat to the business or are precluding
opportunities being taken. In addition, some opportunities that are not
dependent on anything else should be pursued, in particular where they
build on existing strengths, giving more chance of success.
It must be stressed again that this approach to using the models and
techniques is not a methodology, but a way of bringing them together to
ensure that the overall results are more complete and of greatest overall
value to the organization. No one technique provides a comprehensive
view of the business options for IS/IT investment and no one technique
can produce certainty of conclusions. Figure 6.2 has one additional arrow
showing the need for the next stage—managing the resulting portfolio.
Before considering that in detail, one further aspect needs to be discussed:
How can this process be used in a multi-SBU company and what are the
implications?
LARGE ORGANIZATIONS, MULTIPLE SBUs AND
THEIR CONSOLIDATION
Most multi-business-unit organizations will have some scope to beneﬁt
from examining not just one business unit but also looking across
business units, before deciding on how best to meet information and
system requirements. Figure 3.7 demonstrates the basic relationships.
Both synergistic and economic opportunities will be aﬀected by a
number of factors, not least of which is corporate management’s desire
to gain such beneﬁts across business units. It is possible that each
business unit is seen merely as part of a ‘portfolio’ that is continually
being changed by buying and selling businesses for primarily ﬁnancial
reasons. In such a case, synergistic and economic beneﬁts will at best be
short-lived, if achievable at all. In most other circumstances, however, the
overall corporate beneﬁts from IS/IT opportunities will often exceed the
sum of the parts.
The factors that can aﬀect the corporate as opposed to purely business
unit ‘value added’ of IS/IT can be outlined as follows:
. whether the units compete in the same or diﬀerent industries and the
similarity or otherwise of their products and services;
. whether the units are in similar competitive positions in their indus-
tries, whether the industries have similar rates of growth (or decline)
and whether the types and mix of competitors are diﬀerent;
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. whether they have similar levels of strategic competency in each of
the three key dimensions—customer, operations and product;
. whether they have the same (or similar) customers, distribution
channels, and/or suppliers, with whom information can be shared
and value chain links can be mutually developed;
. whether they trade with one another (i.e. are related in a value chain,
where IS/IT links could give the company an overall advantage);
. whether they carry out similar processes (i.e. are the internal value
chains of the same type and/or are some or all of the primary value
chain components similar?);
. whether they are of similar sizes and scale of operation (e.g. numbers
of customers or suppliers);
. whether they have similar objectives and are adopting similar strate-
gies, and, as a consequence, have similar CSFs (units with diﬀerent
CSFs will have signiﬁcantly diﬀerent IS/IT priorities);
. whether the parent company requires a consistent, even standard,
structure of information from all the units;
. whether support activities are broadly similar and (can be) organized
in the same basic structure.
These imply that opportunities for further beneﬁts exist in each of the
inputs to the IS/IT strategy process (i.e. external and internal, business
and IS/IT environments) for the corporation overall to gain from synergy
and economies. A threat or weakness for one business unit may be able to
be overcome by transferring knowledge or even applications from
another business unit. It is, therefore, important to compare the results
of the analyses and to share ideas. Any of the techniques, at any stage of
the process outlined above, could reveal such cross-unit opportunities, so
all results should be ‘pooled’ and made available for others to adapt,
adopt or join in the development, if appropriate. An idea from one
part of the business, adapted by another, may even oﬀer more beneﬁts.
SUMMARY
Chapters 2 to 5 described approaches to IS strategy formulation, provid-
ing an overall organizational process with associated tools and techniques
of analysis. This chapter has attempted to bring these key components
together in summary form, in order to describe a framework within
which the business information systems strategy can be developed and
then represented in terms of what information and systems the business
must, should and might have to achieve maximum beneﬁt in its business
environment.
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The IS/IT strategy consists of much more than this, but, without
business needs and opportunities so identiﬁed and deﬁned, the rest of
the strategy is worth very little. Although not every threat can be antici-
pated, every opportunity spotted, each strength exploited or every
weakness overcome, the framework for using the tools and techniques
should enable fewer threats and opportunities to be missed, and IS/IT
strengths and weaknesses to be understood better in terms of their
business implications.
The framework may seem rather conceptual, even theoretical, and it
may be that various steps can be short-circuited and appropriate conclu-
sions drawn much earlier in the process. There is no point in exhaustive
examination when ideas obviously make sense, but many ideas cannot be
properly evaluated without consideration and testing from a number of
viewpoints.
The framework attempts to bring together analytical processes and
focused, creative thinking approaches to enable the products of both to
be considered as they arise. This is more realistic than waiting for all the
analysis and all the ideas to be generated, and then examining them all
together, to distil all the resulting conclusions. That is not how the best
ideas and strategies evolve and develop. Good ideas and insights will
occur throughout the process, and they need to be capitalized on there
and then, as far as possible, not put on the shelf for later consideration
when their rationale and ‘value’ may have been forgotten.
Although the framework is therefore somewhat ‘ideal’, it does include
most of the tools and techniques that are generally found to be useful, in
a logically linked process. It also ensures that all types of strategic input,
both external and internal, are assessed in relation to one another. It does
enable an outline business IS strategy to be identiﬁed and a consensus of
agreement and management endorsement to be achieved in a matter of a
few weeks or, at worst, a very few months.
It must also be remembered that planning is a continuous and con-
tinuing process, and the formulative framework described above will
have to be repeatedly revisited to ensure that the portfolio as foreseen
is still relevant. As factors inside or outside the business change, in the
business or IS/IT environment, the conclusions to be drawn from each
step in the framework may change, therefore some paths through the
process will have to be revisited to identify the implications of changes
and reﬂect these quickly in the form of a revised portfolio. However, it is
equally important not to need to repeat the whole process if any particu-
lar factor changes.
The management of such application portfolios is considered in depth
in Chapter 7, in terms of ensuring that demand for applications based on
needs and ideas generated, as above, can be successfully supplied. Later
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chapters then consider in more detail the strategies for managing key
aspects of the delivery of that supply to satisfy the variety of requirements
inherent in the applications.
ENDNOTES
There are no endnotes for this chapter—all the relevant references, etc.
are covered in preceding chapters.
298 Determining the Business Information Systems Strategy
7
Managing the Applications
Portfolio
The applications portfolio concept, introduced in Chapter 1 (see Figure
1.7), is a means of bringing together existing, planned and potential
information systems and assessing their business contribution. It has
been referred to in previous chapters, which have been concerned
primarily with how to populate the portfolio with required applications.
Gaining business management understanding and agreement on the con-
tribution expected from the variety of current and future systems is the
cornerstone of any strategy.
The usefulness of the matrix is borne out by the ease with which
management is willing and able to categorize systems in this way. A
survey of some 300 organizations that had become aware of the
concept showed that 70% were using it within their approach to
managing IS/IT. One reason is probably the familiarity of business
managers with similar portfolio models like the Boston Consulting
Group’s ‘Boston Matrix’, described in Chapter 2. As will be seen in
this chapter, these similarities are more than superﬁcial—many proven
attributes of other portfolio models can be adapted to address key issues
in IS/IT management. Another reason for its usefulness is its simplicity,
which also implies that it has limitations and cannot deal with every
conceivable situation. But, it can provide valuable insight and guidance
in addressing the issues associated with the majority of business applica-
tions of IS/IT.
The application portfolio, as described so far, owes much to the
‘McFarlan Grid’1 used to assess the overall contribution of IS/IT to
business success. The limitations of this perspective were discussed in
Chapter 1. In this chapter, we develop this basic model into a manage-
ment tool.
Two-by-two matrices are very popular ways of describing the implica-
tions of unrelated, but interacting variables, and a number of other such
matrices related to the management of IS/IT have been developed. The
ﬁrst part of this chapter brieﬂy reviews some of them in order to synthe-
size a set of relevant issues, attributes and options associated with the
portfolio segments. The main purpose in classifying applications is to
ensure that they are managed successfully and that the expected contribu-
tion is delivered. Based on the issues relevant to each segment, appro-
priate implementation strategies can be adopted. These, in turn, can be
related to the strategy formulation and planning approaches, as described
in Chapter 3 (based on work by Earl2) to provide consistency of manage-
ment from strategy formulation to implementation.
As noted above, any simpliﬁcation of a complex situation has its
limitations. Precision should not be expected; merely relevant guidance
to enlighten and support management decision making in what is often
an area fraught with uncertainty and even conﬂict. It is a valuable
‘framework’, which helps to link together and reconcile the complexities
involved in managing the demand and supply components of the
IS/IT strategy, in particular to achieve ownership by business managers
of their IS/IT applications and the issues that have to be addressed in
achieving success. The application portfolio will evolve over time, and
how the eﬀects of that evolution can be managed successfully will be
considered.
CONCLUSIONS FROM VARIOUS MATRICES AND MODELS
A number of matrices have been produced to help management decision
making with respect to IS/IT planning, utilization and resourcing. The
early versions were analysed in detail by Ward.3 Some of the conclusions
from that analysis are useful to show how the ideas and concepts are
generally complementary, even convergent. More recent versions, devised
to address developments in the 1990s, are also, in essence, very similar,
even if the terminology used is diﬀerent. A composite matrix, including
some key ideas, is shown in Figure 7.1. The main models on which the
composite matrix is based include the following:
1. The Sullivan4 matrix, which has already been described (see Figure
1.9), considered the range of IS/IT management issues that depend
on the combination of infusion and diﬀusion of IS/IT in the organ-
ization. Infusion is ‘the degree to which IS/IT has penetrated a
company in terms of importance, impact or signiﬁcance’, and diﬀu-
sion is ‘the degree to which IS/IT has been disseminated or scattered
throughout the company’. Sullivan identiﬁed the need for new,
demand-driven and decentralized planning approaches to improve
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the management of the strategic and high potential quadrants, in
addition to the better understood strategy formulation and plan-
ning approaches required for ‘backbone’ (key operational) and
‘traditional’ (support) systems. He expressed the need for an
‘eclectic’ planning method to deal with the strategic developments
when IS/IT is considered in establishing the business objectives or
is being used to transform business processes (i.e. when there is an
interdependent relationship between IS/IT and business strategies,
which is increasingly becoming the case).
2. The Information Technology Assessment and Adoption (ITAA)
matrix developed by Munro and Huﬀ,5 based on work by
Benjamin et al.,6 considered how organizations have adopted IS/IT
as a competitive weapon. Most companies, according to Munro and
Huﬀ, are either ‘technology driven’—looking for ways of deploying
new technology to advantage—or ‘issues driven’—looking for new
business opportunities within the known possibilities of existing
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Figure 7.1 A composite matrix
technology. These relate mainly to high potential and key opera-
tional-type environments, and few companies achieve ‘normative’
planning where business issues, opportunities and technology are
eﬀectively matched—an ‘ideal’ planning relationship as they de-
scribe it (i.e. that required for strategic applications to be developed).
Galliers7 developed a matrix for a similar purpose that, like the
Sullivan matrix, considers factors aﬀecting planning methods, but
this time in relation to:
. long-term and short-term thinking, strategy or issue driven; and
. business issues versus technology-driven planning.
Galliers separates the need for IS/IT to react to current business
issues (key operational) from the need to react to changing future
objectives (strategic), and compares them to the proactive IS/IT
stance required for high potential opportunities. Like most others,
he identiﬁes an eﬃcient, problem-solving basis for managing
support-type systems.
3. Two matrices, developed by Ives and Learmonth8 and Galliers,9
both considered how the ‘value adding potential’ of IS/IT in the
business and the ‘quality of IS resources’ (i.e. the capability of the
organization) aﬀect how IS/IT is deployed and how it is managed.
They showed how a vision of what is possible plus strength of
resources are essential if IS/IT is to be used as an oﬀensive (i.e.
strategic) weapon, and how the two are often interrelated. In many
organizations, the lack of vision reduces the ability of even good
resources to do more than ‘explore’ opportunities as issues arise.
Low quality of resource implies a ‘safe’ support systems-only
approach, and the organization will become very vulnerable, due
to its inability to respond to new, high potential or strategic applica-
tions developed by competitors. In such a case, ‘vision’ is not
enough—the resource must be improved at the same time and the
organization must ‘beware’ of IS/IT investments by competitors.
4. An example of more recent matrices, which were devised to help
management address ‘e-business’ options, is the ‘e-business value
matrix’ described by Hartman and Sifonis.10 The axes of the core
matrix are (a) business criticality and (b) practice innovation, and the
four resulting segments equate closely with those of the application
portfolio. Low criticality and low innovation are deﬁned as the new
fundamentals, and the characteristics are close to support. Key opera-
tional is a direct equivalent of operational excellence—high criticality,
low innovation. High innovation but low criticality is called rational
experimental and the parallels with the high potential segment are
obvious. Finally, the strategic part of the matrix equates reasonably
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well with the high criticality, high innovation combination called
breakthrough strategies by Hartman and Sifonis. The implications
they describe in terms of the best approaches to identifying, justifying
and managing e-investments in an organization are similar to the
guidance that can be obtained from combining the attributes of
previous matrices.
In most of the models, all of which address similar issues from diﬀerent
directions, clear diﬀerences can be seen in the ways in which applications
in each of the four quadrants need to be planned and managed. Not all
ideas map precisely onto the application portfolio, and there is not
always full agreement on the speciﬁc needs of the strategic and high
potential segments, perhaps due to their more uncertain and changing
nature. However, there is general agreement in the key operational and
support areas. The composite matrix in Figure 7.1 attempts to reﬂect the
key ideas from the various matrices in terms of the issues or options for
managing the portfolio segments. These are examined in more detail later
in the chapter. The axes are derived primarily from McFarlan’s work.
The horizontal axis attempts to reﬂect the ability of an organization to
control its destiny, whereas the vertical axis reﬂects the uncertainty due to
external forces of future IS/IT impact.
Matrix analysis approaches are attractive because they reduce an
apparently inﬁnite continuum of alternatives to a manageable, pertinent
number of discrete options from which high-level directions can be
determined. They demonstrate relationships that evolve over time, but
that will normally have to be managed to success simultaneously in the
organization. Like many such models developed to assist management,
they are often overly simple, and more complex models would be needed
to reﬂect the diversity of reality. As complexity is added, however, clarity
of perception often dims. Without intending to introduce confusion by
complexity, it is worth considering a few further aspects of the models.
In relation to the Sullivan model, which considered the impact of IS/IT
on a business (infusion) in relation to the ability to devolve IS/IT deci-
sions (diﬀusion), an organization in the complex quadrant will have,
almost by deﬁnition, a comprehensive application portfolio. Diﬀusion
equates to ‘informality’ in that each part of the business can decide
what it wishes to do, but some formality is needed if applications
spanning diﬀerent parts of the business are to be identiﬁed and the
beneﬁts delivered—and most strategic systems cross organizational or
functional boundaries and/or require business processes or organiza-
tional relationships to change.
Figure 7.2 suggests a number of cause-and-eﬀect relationships, which
are generally borne out by observation in many organizations:
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. Organizations that have a traditional, low impact view of the role of
IS/IT with highly centralized IT decision making will tend to have a
predominance of support applications.
. Those with devolved IT decision making, because it is not seen as
particularly critical to overall business success, will also produce a
profusion of support systems, solving local problems. A number of
high potential ideas will probably also be developed, but it will be
diﬃcult to bring them to strategic fruition because of the localized
view of their value and the limited IT capability available in each
area. Decision making is localized and, so, although some key opera-
tional systems will be implemented, integration across the business
will be poor because system interrelationships are not considered
when satisfying the local needs.
. Where the impact of IS/IT has increased, probably due to external
pressures, but IT is kept highly centralized, both key operational and
support systems will be developed and continually improved, but
more innovative uses of IS/IT will not be instigated, because of the
limited knowledge in the business of what is possible.
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There are reasons for these cause-and-eﬀect relationships, based on the
way in which IS/IT evolves in organizations and the way in which the IS/
IT strategy has to respond and become more sophisticated and better
balanced over time. This also implies that a number of diﬀerent methods
need to be in place at any one time to develop a relevant and complete
portfolio.
Most of the models address the need to accommodate both centralized
and decentralized management approaches, the balance of which will
depend on the degree of integration required in the business and organ-
izational processes. Particular competitive opportunities and new uses of
IT will tend to address singular or few applications and, initially at least,
can be exploited most advantageously close to the business opportunity.
Applications that produce beneﬁts by business integration or sharing of
assets require strong business coordination, competent IS/IT manage-
ment and sustained investment in resources. The Sullivan model helps
understanding of how the application portfolio will evolve by the eﬀects
of these forces within an organization.
CLASSIFYING THE APPLICATIONS IN THE PORTFOLIO
How to populate the portfolio with future IS/IT investments is described
in the preceding chapters, and the basic rationale for a portfolio
approach was discussed in Chapter 1. Describing the existing and
future applications in this way helps the task of obtaining a consensus
among executive management, line managers and the IT management on
the content of the IS strategy. Once the portfolio is understood and
agreed, decisions on how best to manage each application, both
existing and future, can be made, along with overall decisions on the
use of resources across the portfolio and the selection of the most eﬀec-
tive sources for supply—which aspects should be managed in-house and
which can and should be outsourced.
While agreeing the contribution and, hence, portfolio positioning of
future investments is important, so is understanding the role of and value
to the organization of the existing application set. Some applications may
be obsolete and no longer required, others may need signiﬁcant invest-
ment to avoid future business problems, some may be underexploited and
others may be consuming undue amounts of resource in relation to their
business value. Table 7.1 suggests a set of criteria that can be used as a
basis for a strength, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT)
analysis of the current applications, to determine the need for action,
either to improve their contribution or enable other, related applications
to be developed or used better.
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Merely classifying current and future applications into a 2 × 2 matrix is
of no great value, unless it causes each application and the overall port-
folio to be managed more eﬀectively. The process of classifying the
applications is as important as the end result, since the discussion
involved will enable diﬀerent perspectives to be understood (and hope-
fully reconciled!) and the implications of the decisions made to be appre-
ciated by all parties. If a particular application is considered by one group
of users as strategic, due to their uses of the output, and as support by
another that provides the input, it is unlikely that the maximum beneﬁts
available will be delivered, due to the diﬀering operational priorities and
quality of information management in each group. A realistic and agreed
assessment must be made.
Each organization will have slightly diﬀerent interpretations of the
terms used for each segment. Hence, a decision-support tool that
would ﬁt every organization’s criteria for classiﬁcation cannot be
deﬁned, but Box 7.1 contains a simple starting point for the process,
by posing questions that can help the analysis. It should only be used
to guide the assessment, not as a ‘rule book’. Normally, it is relatively
easy to agree and classify most of the applications into the quadrants,
although there are always some where discussion, based on diﬀerent
perceptions of their role and contribution is necessary.
If agreement cannot be reached, it often means that the ‘system’ needs
to be considered at a lower level, in terms of the main functions it
performs. For example, an Accounts Receivable system may consist of
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Table 7.1 SWOT analysis of existing portfolio
Analysing the applications in the portfolio (SWOT)
EXPLOIT STRENGTHS:
. high future potential, currently underexploited;
. can be extended, enhanced to be of more value;
. could be more valuable if integrated more eﬀectively or used more exten-
sively;
. critical to the business, but data quality is poor;
. needs to be developed to meet current and future business needs;
. must be enhanced to meet changed business requirements for future;
. system required, but needs to be reimplemented to absorb less resources or
overcome technology obsolescence;
. system will be less important in future—needs to be simpliﬁed/reduced to real
needs;
. system is no longer of value—should be discontinued.
OVERCOME WEAKNESSES
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Box 7.1 Classifying the applications in the portfolio
Questions
If the development* succeeds, will it:
(a) Result in a clear competitive advantage for the Yes/No
business?
(b) Enable the achievement of speciﬁc business Yes/No
objectives and/or critical success factors?
(c) Overcome known business disadvantages in relation Yes/No
to competitors?
(d) Avoid foreseeable business risks becoming major Yes/No
problems in the near future?
(e) Improve the productivity of the business and, hence, Yes/No
reduce long-term costs?
(f) Enable the organization to meet statutory Yes/No
requirements?
(g) Provide beneﬁts not yet known, but may result in Yes/No
(a) or (b) above?
* For existing applications the question is, is the application deliver-
ing beneﬁts that . . .’
Interpretation
In answering the questions above, the reasons for the judgement
should be stated. The table below shows how the answers can be
interpreted and the application classiﬁed, based on whether or not
any Yes answers appear in a column.
If more questions produce a Yes answer in any one column (i.e.
the application appears to be in more than one category), then it
should be reassessed by splitting it into its major components and
considering each of them in the same way (i.e. the application should
be broken down into subprojects). If this is not done, the risks of
failure will increase dramatically due to the mixed objectives and the
confusion that it can cause once the project proceeds.
High potential Strategic Key operational Support
(a) Yes (i)
(b) Yes (i)
(c) Yes
(d) Yes
(e) Yes
(f) Yes (ii) Yes (ii)
(g) Yes
several business processes or subprocesses, some of which may be more
business critical than others—bad-debt control may be key operational,
whereas statement production is support. Although many applications
are often provided via large packages (e.g. ERP and CRM software), the
purpose of the analysis is still to classify the business activities that the
package covers (e.g. order processing, purchasing), rather than the
package itself. An ERP package can deliver applications in all quadrants,
depending on the competitive positioning, the business strategy and the
maturity of IS/IT development in the organization.
It also follows that the portfolio is not a way of classifying tech-
nologies—email, groupware, intranets, the Internet and a data warehouse
can all be used for a variety of applications, making diﬀerent contribu-
tions to diﬀerent business activities. And to reiterate a point made in
Chapter 1, an application utilizing cutting-edge technology does not
imply that it is automatically classiﬁed as strategic—classiﬁcation must
be based on business contribution.
An example portfolio for a manufacturing company, produced using
the question set in Box 7.1 and showing a simpliﬁed version of the SWOT
analysis described above, is shown in Figure 7.3.
Reconciling Demand and Supply Issues in the Applications Portfolio
Before considering the best approaches to managing the applications in
the diﬀerent segments, it is important to understand the key diﬀerences in
the rationale for the types of application and the resulting issues to be
addressed in implementation. Discussion in Chapters 4–6 considered
what might be described as the driving forces for applications in each
segment of the portfolio (i.e. why they are being developed and how
eventual success or failure will be determined). They can be translated
into some critical requirements to be satisﬁed in the delivery of the
application. These key issues are described in Table 7.2.
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(i) If either applies, the supplementary question is Yes/No
then, ‘Is it clear what the business beneﬁts are and
how they can be obtained?’ If Yes it is Strategic, if
No it is High potential.
(ii) To clarify which it is, the following question should Yes/No
be asked, ‘Will failure to comply lead to signiﬁcant
business risks (be speciﬁc about the risk)?’ If Yes it
is Key operational, if No it is Support.
To ensure overall success, it is important that decisions about how to
implement the system (e.g. package or bespoke development) are directly
related to decisions about what is required. Both of them have to derive
as clearly as possible from the initial decision making on why the invest-
ment is being made, in terms of the contribution required. Albeit
somewhat simplistically, Figure 7.4 attempts to pose simple questions
that the chosen implementation strategy should address. Understanding
the management implications of these questions oﬀers guidance on how
best to manage each application through its life cycle.
Figure 7.4 shows how the questions become more complex as we move
around the matrix. For support applications, the general objective is clear
(why = eﬃciency) and what needs to be improved is determined by
existing tasks and activities. The main question is how to do that success-
fully, in terms of the most cost-eﬀective use of IT. For key operational
applications, the how question still has to be addressed, but in addition
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Figure 7.3 Example portfolio for a manufacturing company
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Table 7.2 Some key issues in the segments of the portfolio
Driving forces Critical requirements
High potential New business ideas or Rapid evaluation of
technological opportunity prototypes and avoid
Individual initiative—owned wasting eﬀort/resources on
by a ‘product champion’ failures
Need to demonstrate the Understand the potential
value or otherwise of the beneﬁts (and the economics)
idea in relation to business
strategy
Identify the best way to
proceed—the next step
Strategic Market requirements, Rapid development to meet
competitive pressures or the business objective and
other external forces realize beneﬁts within the
Business objectives, success window of opportunity
factors and vision of how Flexible system that can be
to achieve them adapted in the future as
Obtaining an advantage and the business evolves
then sustaining it Link to an associated business
initiative to sustain
commitment
Key operational Improving the performance High-quality, long-life
of existing activities (speed, solutions and eﬀective data
accuracy, economics) management
Integration of data and Balancing costs with beneﬁts
systems to avoid and business risks—identify
duplication, inconsistency, the best solution
and misinformation Evaluation of options
Avoiding a business available by objective
disadvantage or allowing feasibility study
a business risk to become
critical/comply with
industry legislation
Support Improved productivity/ Low-cost, long-term
eﬃciency of speciﬁc (often solutions—often packaged
localized) business tasks software to satisfy most
General legislation needs
Most cost-eﬀective use of Compromise the needs to
IS/IT funds and resources the software available
available Objective cost/beneﬁt analysis
to reduce ﬁnancial risk and
then control costs carefully
considerable thought may be needed to deﬁne speciﬁcally what has to be
done, and to which systems, to avoid potential disadvantage (why we
need to do it). Again, both what and how questions need to be resolved
in strategic applications, but in addition we need to clearly understand
why we wish to do it in terms of the business strategy. Strategic applica-
tions require creative thinking and will cause change, probably externally
as well as internally, and the reasons for and intended beneﬁts of such
changes must be agreed on. By deﬁnition, the strategic systems cannot be
copied from others (since we will already be potentially disadvantaged!),
hence their rationale has to derive explicitly and coherently from the
strategy of the organization. If one or two of the why, what or how
questions is unanswered, it implies that the application is high potential,
and appropriate evaluation is needed to answer the remaining questions
before making a large-scale investment.
GENERIC APPLICATION MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES
Given the variety of factors aﬀecting success in the diﬀerent segments and
the business consequences of success or failure, no single implementation
approach is likely to deal eﬀectively with the range of issues involved.
Equally, adopting a unique approach to each and every new development
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Figure 7.4 Key questions on the applications portfolio
will lead to a degree of chaos and probably result in as many failures as
successes. A limited set that meets the majority of requirements and is
well understood throughout the organization is more likely to enable the
best approach to be selected in each instance and increase the chances of
success.
Based on extensive observation of the realities of IS/IT management
processes in many organizations, Parsons11 described ﬁve strategies that
are prevalent as the means by which organizations link the management
of IS/IT to the corporate or business management processes. These
‘linking strategies’ are ‘general frameworks which guide the opportunities
for IT which are identiﬁed, the IT resources which are developed, the rate
at which new technologies are adopted, the level of impact for IT within
the ﬁrm, etc.’
They are ‘the central tendencies which ﬁrms use to guide IT within the
business’. As they are ‘general frameworks,’ the term ‘generic strategies’
is used in the discussion below. They are essentially alternative strategies
for the implementation of IS/IT, ensuring that the nature of the demand
is matched by the appropriate means of supply. How these implementa-
tion strategies can be aligned and reconciled with Earl’s planning ap-
proaches will be considered on pages 321–323.
Parsons described the characteristics and implications of each strategy
in detail, and they are summarized in Table 7.3. As can be seen from the
table, the strategies deﬁne diﬀerent roles and responsibilities for the three
key parties involved in enabling successful implementation:
. executive management;
. line management: functional or process managers and users of the
systems;
. IS/IT specialists: whether or not they are internal to the organization
(centrally located or in business areas) or external.
As such, the strategies are behavioural and each set of behaviours will
cause certain eﬀects. The eﬀects required are determined by the nature of
the contribution of applications in the portfolio—the generic strategies,
therefore, are ways of causing the right eﬀects to occur.
Parson’s strategies are: centrally planned, leading edge, free market,
monopoly and scarce resource. They are well titled, since the very names
evoke a basic understanding of the attitudes and behaviour that each is
likely to produce. The key points of each, and their pros and cons, will be
outlined at the same time as considering how they relate to the applica-
tions portfolio.
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Centrally Planned
This generic strategy implies that senior and executive management need
to be fully aware of the development, due to its potential impact on the
future business strategy. It is therefore most appropriate for strategic
systems. Ensuring success in such circumstances demands the attention
of senior management, to ensure that the objectives are met and that the
necessary resources are applied to deliver the solution in the time
required. Most strategic developments are likely to span a number of
business areas, and, while the nature of the system can often be easily
deﬁned in outline, it will be its uniqueness and its close ﬁt to the business
strategy that will deliver the business advantages. To gain those advan-
tages, it is almost inevitable that changes to business practices and even
organization structure will be necessary.
To meet all these requirements, a ‘task force’ approach is best suited.
Led by a senior business manager, the team will need dedicated, prefer-
ably full-time, high-quality business resources, which have excellent
knowledge of the areas aﬀected and the authority to agree to business
changes. Equally, it will need good IS/IT skills and knowledge in the
team to design the system and manage the technical aspects of its
implementation. This dedicated team require direct access to top manage-
ment to resolve issues that will undoubtedly arise during the develop-
ment. Subject to this senior management agreement, the team has the
authority to decide both what the system will do and how, in business
and IT terms, that will be achieved. It is likely that the design and
development will be iterative, comparing possible solutions with
emerging or changing requirements. This requires very close working
relationships among the members of the team, individuals’ contributions
depending more on their knowledge than formally designated roles.
Although the idea of a dedicated team is attractive, it is often diﬃcult
to achieve successfully in many organizations. The people it requires are
often the most valuable in their existing jobs and are not readily given up
by their functional management for the duration of the project. Even
though it may not be the most eﬃcient use of skilled and knowledgeable
people, it is a very eﬀective way of achieving clear objectives in a tight
timescale. The need for key people dedicated to such teams may also limit
the number of strategic developments that can be undertaken at any one
time, since such key people are often in short supply. It is better to
reschedule the projects based on the availability of key resources than
to spread the resource too thinly or substitute lower-calibre or less ex-
perienced people. This centrally planned strategy addresses the needs of
strategic applications most eﬀectively, but it could be used in certain
circumstances to carry out a short, sharp evaluation of a high potential
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opportunity or even attack a key operational development where the
business faces the prospect of serious short-term disadvantage (e.g.
Y2K compliance or Euro conversion).
Leading Edge
With this strategy, the senior management of the organization believes
that, by adopting information technology that is ‘leading edge’ in the
context of its industry, it should be able to gain some business advantage.
It follows that they must be willing to fund some experimentation to
evaluate technologies and ideas and accept that not all of the evaluations
will succeed. While the new technologies may be identiﬁed by IT special-
ists, the evaluation should be in relation to some potential business idea
or need and carried out in conjunction with the business. The objective is
not to understand the technology for its own sake. Alternatively, the lead
may come from the business, through seeing a technology in use else-
where that may be potentially applicable for the organization. While that
business ‘vision’ may be appropriate, IT specialists need to be involved in
the evaluation, to provide an objective assessment of the capabilities of
the technology and determine the longer-term implications to the organ-
ization of adopting a particular technology. This is essential, to counter-
balance the often enthusiastic business user who has fallen prey to the
persuasive pitch of a professional IT salesperson!
While the technology is ‘brand new’ to the organization, it should be
conﬁned to the high potential box for evaluation. It is very high risk to
apply untried technology in any other segment of the matrix. Once
evaluated, it may well be that the technology has signiﬁcant potential
for the business and becomes part of a strategic application. Alterna-
tively, it may not, and it would be prudent if the technology is only
relevant to key operational or support needs to proceed more carefully
in line with the pace of adoption of technology in the industry. If there is
no advantage to be gained, it is perhaps best to let others take the risks.
Free Market
The strategy that follows is ‘monopoly’ and, before considering the free
market strategy in more detail, it is worth clarifying the key diﬀerences
between the two in terms of the decision-making roles of the three parties
involved. Table 7.4 attempts to do this.
The philosophy behind the free market approach is that line managers
are accountable for the performance of the business activities within
their area of responsibility. As part of that responsibility, subject to
their normal degree of authority, they should be able to make beneﬁcial
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decisions about IS and IT and not be hindered in any way by another
group in achieving their performance targets. The alternative view, ex-
pressed by the monopoly philosophy, is that, while line management
decide what is needed subject to senior management agreement to
resource those needs, it is best if there is central coordination and
control of how those needs are met. These two apparently opposing
views can be reconciled by understanding how each satisﬁes the issues
in diﬀerent parts of the portfolio.
The beneﬁts of the free market strategy are that business problems are
resolved by IS/IT solutions close to the problem. This leads to strong
motivation to make the system work, design solutions that ﬁt the
problem better in terms of need, cost and time, and, in some cases, a
degree of business-driven innovation in the use of IT. This is very attrac-
tive to strong line managers with clear targets and objectives for their
function, although the longer-term issues and costs of supporting the
resulting systems are often overlooked in the drive to deliver short-term
results. The downside is clearly that, if everyone pursues such a strategy,
integration of data and systems is extremely diﬃcult and the organization
will acquire a wide range of often incompatible hardware and software.
The long-term costs of such a situation can become unacceptable, but—
possibly even more critically—the business overall may be prevented
from gaining strategic beneﬁts from IS/IT, which largely arise from the
integration of systems and information resources.
Against that background, the free market strategy, operated within
some limits to the types of technology ‘permitted’ in the organization,
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Table 7.4 Free market versus monopoly strategies—key differences (N.B. In
some cases, the Monopoly may be a combination of IT specialists and a particular
function [e.g. for accounting systems])
Free market Monopoly
Demand Who decides what is Line or functional Senior management
done and whether it is management based on needs
done—the IS decision agreed by line
management
Supply Who decides how it Line or functional IT specialists with
will be done in terms management with endorsement of
of the IT approach or without advice senior management
from IT specialists (IT can veto
‘unacceptable’
solutions)
is most eﬀective in producing many of the support systems needed by the
various functions in the organization. It is also an appropriate strategy
for some high potential evaluations—those driven by a business idea and
that can be tested with limited IT help, to the point where the potential
beneﬁts can be understood. Beyond these two segments of the portfolio,
it can be a dangerous and expensive strategy in the long term.
Monopoly
In many ways, monopoly is the opposite of free market, whereby the
inﬂuence of the centralized IT management of supply options will
standardize on solutions, to provide integration of data and systems
and also to control the cost of technology to the organization. This
may well mean that the most expedient and perhaps ideal solution in
each case has to be compromised to enable the long-term best set of
solutions for the organization to be achieved, at an acceptable overall
cost. Each functional manager will not necessarily achieve the most cost-
eﬀective or timely satisfaction of his or her needs. This may cause resent-
ment, unless there is a general understanding of how the various systems
of the organizations interrelate across the functional areas. Often, this is
because the IT monopoly has exceeded its brief and is setting priorities
for what is done (probably because no one else will!), rather than optimiz-
ing how best to achieve all that needs to be done. Senior management
must set the priorities to make best business use of the IT resource
available or, if that is unsatisfactory to line managers, increase the size
of the resource.
The positive attributes of the monopoly strategy are that, if it is well
directed in terms of business priorities and if users are competent in
specifying their needs, high quality, integrated, maintainable systems
are procured or developed and then supported in an overall cost-eﬀective
way. This is what is required for key operational systems, where a low-
risk, controlled approach to the development process is essential to avoid
systems failure and consequent disadvantage. The monopoly strategy can
be adopted for support systems, but may produce relatively high-cost
solutions where cheaper, less comprehensive options would have suﬃced.
Scarce Resource
This is essentially a ﬁnancial strategy that controls the spend on IT
through a budget limitation, within which those investments that
provide the greatest return for the spend will get priority. Each invest-
ment should be ﬁnancially justiﬁed and the most cost-eﬀective solution to
deliver economic beneﬁts should be selected. Expenses are then tightly
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controlled against the agreed budget to ensure that the maximum net
ﬁnancial beneﬁt is delivered. This approach tends to promote local
speciﬁc solutions to meet local needs, and militates against ﬂexible or
integrated solutions, which will always be more expensive. The
emphasis on purely economically-justiﬁed use of IT is very appropriate
for support applications, and may produce eﬀective key operational
systems in the short term but at the expense of longer-term opportunities
derived from integration. It does not encourage innovative or speculative
(i.e. high potential) uses of IT, and precludes many strategic investments
due to the demand for quantiﬁed ﬁnancial beneﬁts to be detailed in
advance. However, a limited budget for research and development
(R&D) or high potential activities, allocated from the centre to innovative
ideas, is a version of scarce resourcing to reduce overall R&D risks.
On the other hand, setting priorities on the basis of ﬁnancial ‘return on
investment’ criteria forces both users and IT to ﬁnd the lowest-cost
solution, based on long-term economics, and hence encourages the
buying of packaged software that is normally available for most
support applications. It is more cost-eﬀective to modify business
practice to use available software than to develop new software to
satisfy non-critical tasks. The strategy does focus for good reason on
the IT costs, and it should be complemented by an equally strong drive
to ensure that all the claimed eﬃciency and economic beneﬁts are
realized. Often, this is not the case, and a full audit of many apparently
ﬁnancially-justiﬁed investments would reveal a very poor actual return.
The above outlines are meant to describe the key attributes of each
strategy suﬃciently to diﬀerentiate them and allow understanding of
why each is more appropriate in a particular segment of the portfolio.
In each case, the strategies can be seen to correlate closely with the
application driving forces and requirements described in Table 7.2.
Figure 7.5 summarizes that relationship. These strategies oﬀer consider-
able guidance to management about options available and choices to be
made if IS/IT investments are to be managed successfully—they are
important ‘principles’ to be understood and employed.
There are many similarities between these generic strategies and the
styles of management proposed by Simon12 to address the nature and
degree of change involved in projects. Most IS/IT developments now
involve business change, of increasing extent and signiﬁcance and un-
certain outcome as investments become more strategic. Simon considered
two particular dimensions—the balance of prescription versus discretion
that the project team has in determining what to do and how, against the
level of explicit knowledge in the organization of how to achieve success.
This resulted in four management styles:
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. boundary control, appropriate when the objectives and constraints are
clear, but allows the project team discretion about how best to
achieve the required outcome, which matches the change require-
ments of the support segment and correlates with aspects of free
market and scarce resourcing;
. diagnostic control, implying a clear, prescriptive control based on
sound knowledge of what has to be done to achieve performance
targets, which is appropriate for key operational projects and
implies similar levels of prescription as monopoly;
. a combination of Simon’s interactive control, which is appropriate
when there is a vision of the potential ‘end point’, but much to learn
in order to deﬁne, scope and develop an appropriate solution and
belief system, where the project team is expected to create a new and
innovative application that will be closely congruent with the
business strategy, relate to needs of the strategic investments—the
uncertainties, change issues and learning required—and together are
very similar to the concept of central planning;
. none of his styles is directly related to the R&D nature of the high
potential segment, given that knowledge is the product rather than
any implemented change.
In total, the strategies address the range of IS demand and IT supply
issues in all segments and oﬀer the balance of centralization and decen-
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Figure 7.5 Relationship of applications portfolio and generic IS strategies
tralization needed. Central planning is a demand management strategy,
whereas monopoly is essentially a supply management approach; both
obviously mean strong centralization of control. Free market and leading
edge are demand management approaches, letting users decide and/or
new technology initiate demand. Free market can also be used to deter-
mine supply and is obviously decentralized, and leading edge is dependent
mainly on external supplies of technology. Scarce resource is a supply
management strategy and is decentralized in that, once the justiﬁcation
rules are set, the ability of any user function to satisfy them will determine
what is done. Clearly, an organization with a comprehensive portfolio
will use most of the strategies simultaneously.
Using Generic Strategies in Developing the IS/IT Strategy
The generic strategies have primarily two uses in the process of develop-
ing the IS/IT strategy:
1. Diagnostic—they are a way of assessing the current strategies being
used—a clear way of expressing how IS/IT applications and invest-
ments are actually being managed. There is a strong correlation
between the successful applications developed and the strategies
adopted. Equally, the failure of many investments can be simply
explained—the wrong generic strategy was adopted! The generic
strategies can encapsulate the apparent complexity of the existing
situation and, by describing it succinctly, explain it.
2. Formulative—once a future portfolio of applications can be identiﬁed
using the various techniques described in earlier chapters and the
strengths and weaknesses of the existing applications assessed, the
generic strategies can be used to identify a migration path toward
the mix of approaches required in future. It is superﬁcially attractive
to say that central planning is needed, but it might be an overkill and
it is impossible to centrally plan everything. Allowing more freedom,
using new technology or tighter, monopolistic control may be more
appropriate in the short term. More rigorous scarce resourcing of
support systems might release resources to be deployed on strategic
systems. No deﬁnitive mixture can be prescribed for every situation,
but the generic strategies provide a limited number of basic options
from which to select the set that matches best the application port-
folio requirements. This avoids the requirement to ‘invent’ the
strategy entirely from the ‘ground up’—it is easier to deﬁne the
approach by modiﬁcation from proven approaches to suit the par-
ticular need and then to identify the action necessary to achieve the
migration path.
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In a single business-unit company, these concepts are reasonably
easy to apply and, as is discussed on pages 334–337, comparisons of
portfolios and strategies can be made across business units to gain
further beneﬁts.
Relating Approaches to IS Strategy Formulation and the Generic
Implementation Strategies
It would appear that there should be a logical relationship between how
an organization plans for its IS investments, as described in Chapter 3
(based on Earl’s work), and the approach it adopts for the implementa-
tion of the resulting applications. Although the two concepts of ‘planning
approaches’ and ‘generic strategies’ are derived from diﬀerent sources,
there are some clear connections that can be drawn, and the evolution of
the generic strategies used in many organizations can be reconciled with
the development of IS/IT planning described by Earl. The correlation is
not perfect and there are some anomalies:
. Organization led planning implies cross-functional views of IS to
ensure that investments are targeted on the business objectives and
key themes implied by these objectives. It follows that the centrally
planned strategy for implementation would best maintain that strat-
egic view.
. Business led with IS investments, driven by the plans for the particu-
lar business areas, should lead to uncovering high potential oppor-
tunities and, in due course, perhaps to strategic investments, but will
also often lead to a plethora of applications that, in the overall
business context, are actually support. This aligns closely with the
free market strategy, which is good for enabling innovation but also
appropriate for support systems. In many cases, because of the
purely functional view taken of the systems, the organization fails
to realize the full beneﬁts and in practice only localized, support-type
beneﬁts materialize.
. The administrative approach to planning implies that the main
objective is budgetary control of IS/IT, which can result in a scarce
resource approach to implementation, whereby each investment is
asked to justify a budget allocation via a ﬁnancial case. Alternatively,
one way of ensuring overall eﬀective administration is to bring all the
resources and costs together in one place, to plan and control the
whole investment program through one budget centre, normally the
IS function. This eﬀectively creates a monopoly channel through
which all investments are vetted. This does not imply ﬁnancial
constraints, merely centralized budgeting and monitoring of
expenditure.
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. Method driven planning involves a highly analytical and structured
approach to determining the needs and priorities for investment, and
it would seem prudent to follow through with the consistent, quality-
based, highly-structured implementation process that monopoly
brings. Both the planning approach and the implementation
strategy are risk averse and work well where a long-term plan to
improve the performance of relatively stable business activities is
needed and feasible (i.e. key operational applications).
. Technology led planning and leading edge implementation ap-
proaches appear very similar, but also seem anomalous when
placed in the portfolio context. Reconciliation is not obvious, given
that Earl’s work suggests that technology led is most relevant to
identifying only support applications, whereas leading edge is best
applied to high potential opportunities. The diﬀerence is one of
perception and time. The technology led approach implies an incre-
mental adoption of technology as it is available and proven, to
enable technology eﬃciency to substitute for people’s ineﬃciency
(i.e. automation through technology). Leading edge implies using a
relatively new, possibly unproven, technology to discover whether it
has strategic beneﬁt to the business. For example, technology led
planning would lead to replacement of older, ineﬃcient environments
(such as mainframes and client server) with newer, more user-eﬃcient
environments (such as Web-enabled and browser-based systems).
But leading edge would involve a completely new type of IT being
evaluated (e.g. third generation mobile phones). This diﬃculty in
reconciliation in some ways reﬂects a traditional dilemma in terms
of how far ‘technology-push’ should be allowed to inﬂuence an
organization’s IS/IT strategy.
In terms of the evolution of IS strategic management, described in
Chapter 3, many organizations develop or evolve their mix of planning
and implementation strategies in the following way (see Figure 7.6):
. Stage 1—no coherent strategy—a mix of free market, monopoly and
scarce resource—which is likely given the ‘bottom-up’ process, and
the only planning is of technology supply.
. Stage 2—a monopolistic strategy tends to prevail, linked to the need
for structure and integration related to the method driven planning
used to avoid systems ineﬀectiveness.
. Stage 3—a combination of monopoly and scarce resourcing is
common to provide the necessary controls of implementation
processes and costs in line with the emphasis on the budget (admin-
istrative led).
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. Stage 4—users pursuing localized opportunities opens up free market
activities in addition—which should be based on business led
planning, in terms of local functional priorities. Alternatively,
emerging new technologies provide the opportunity to innovate in
creating new business processes or radically change existing ways of
working. Linking the technology to a genuine business need is the
ﬁrst step in determining the beneﬁts of adopting the technology.
. Stage 5—the use of the centrally planned strategy occurs for the
implementation of strategic applications, as the organization identi-
ﬁes the links between its strategic themes and the role of IS/IT.
Those who succeed in the longer term are those who can understand,
accommodate and use the required mixture of planning approaches and
implementation strategies most eﬀectively.
PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO THE
APPLICATIONS PORTFOLIO
The obvious resemblance of the applications portfolio to the better
known ‘product portfolio’ of the Boston Consulting Group and
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Figure 7.6 Portfolios, planning and generic strategies evolution
customer/channel management portfolios has already been mentioned.
The similarities are important, since products and IS/IT applications
must be managed according to their contribution to the business over
an extended life cycle. That contribution is determined by both internal
and external factors—in the case of IS/IT, the external market-driven
factors are becoming increasingly important. The lessons from ‘other
portfolios’ have become more pertinent still as IS/IT becomes integral
to products, services and relationships with customers and suppliers.
Comparisons will be drawn directly with portfolios of products/
services, though similar parallels exist with customer portfolios.
First, both applications and products have life cycles, and move
around the matrix over time. High potential applications and wildcat
products are both risk investments that need to be carefully assessed as
to whether or not they are of strategic importance or can become star
products. As the competitive balance is restored and the application is
commonly in place across the industry, it becomes key operational, as a
star product should become a cash cow when the market matures.
Finally, as the industry moves on to a new competitive basis, applications
may be of support value only, and, similarly, products move from cash
cows to dogs eventually. It is important in both cases to avoid high
potential or wildcat investments from drifting straight down into the
support or dog quadrant, as a result of indecisive management or an
inability to capitalize on any knowledge gained.
Second, both applications and products require investment funding.
This is easily seen with products, where the cash generated by today’s
proﬁtable products is reinvested in cash-hungry future products. For
applications, this implies reinvesting the beneﬁts derived from today’s
systems into new applications. What are these beneﬁts? They are:
. skills, knowledge and experienced resources;
. the capability to develop and manage complex business systems and
the evolving ‘IT supply chain’;
. management commitment to the use of IS/IT in the business, based
on successes achieved and a perception of the value of IS/IT invest-
ments;
. data (or information) held in the existing applications, if well organ-
ized, is a potential source of advantage if exploited through its use in
strategic applications.
Lack of reinvestment will in all cases cause the value of previous invest-
ments to depreciate, steadily but surely, over time.
Third, both applications and products need to be managed and have
resources allocated in accordance with their business importance, not
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their technical or operational peculiarities. Management capability and
resources are normally in short supply, and need to be continuously
reallocated to obtain the best business results and maximum beneﬁts
from the overall portfolio. Balancing the available resources and exper-
tise to match the evolving portfolio needs is essential to sustain success.
Overall, the main reason the product portfolio model oﬀers useful
input to the application portfolio is that it reﬂects the competitive
business environment. The model was developed to assist in managing
and planning in an uncertain, market-driven environment, where man-
agement decisions are made within a total environment that can only be
inﬂuenced, not determined. IS/IT is also subject to the forces of the
marketplace—external parameters now deﬁne the eﬀectiveness of an
organization’s IS/IT management. Of the various analyses and conclu-
sions that can be drawn from business portfolio models, some have par-
ticular relevance to the application portfolio and, hence, provide valuable
insights for managing IS/IT. In their book, Hartman and Sifonis13 draw
very similar parallels in describing the issues and approaches in their
‘e-business value matrix’.
Figure 7.7 superimposes the product and applications portfolio
matrices. Maximizing the long-term contribution of products depends
on successful management in the relevant quadrant and successful transi-
tion management across quadrants, as determined by prevailing market
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Figure 7.7 The business/systems portfolio matrix
forces. IS application management depends on the same two factors. The
particular parallels will be drawn by following the evolution of an appli-
cation around the matrix.
High Potential (Wildcats)
IS/IT high potential applications resemble wildcat products due to the
degree of uncertainty of success—the amount of risk they involve. Many
will fail. Identifying and then transforming the successes into the next
phase of the life cycle is the objective. This implies dealing eﬀectively with
the failures and not pouring good money and resources after bad. Three
particular approaches to management are appropriate to achieving this:
. Process R&D—not ‘product’. From the business lessons: how to
make, market, distribute, resource the new product, not just
achieve the ultimate in product design. A common weakness in
many ﬁrms is ‘over-engineering’ products—satisfying the designer,
not the customer! A similar problem exists in IS—satisfying the
technical professional, not the user. Any prototyping or pilot imple-
mentation of an application should be undertaken to ﬁnd out how
the organization, and/or its trading partners, can beneﬁt most from a
new use of IT, not to discover all that the technology can do. Many
prototypes of electronic commerce, knowledge management and
CRM systems have failed—not because there were no beneﬁts to
be gained from the technology, but because the organization failed
to discover how to implement it in the way that would deliver those
beneﬁts.
. Minimal integration. While being evaluated, risky ventures should
be separated from mainline activities. Should they fail, aspects of
the business should not have become dependent on them and, at
low cost, the prototype can be aborted. Neither will the evaluation
be clouded by issues not directly relevant to it. A key part of the
evaluation is to decide how the integration can best be achieved—
therefore, any initial integration could preclude the most eﬀective
options. Often, new IT applications produce disappointing results
due to evaluations that are prejudiced by existing activities to
which they are attached. Non-separation of new products has
caused similar problems—contribution to the business being imposs-
ible to assess, and commitments having been undertaken that make
decisions to pull out expensive.
. Cost control. The only common factor that applies across prototypes
is money. A budget is the only consistent link with normal manage-
ment processes, where the unknown is being explored. This need for
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strict budget control reinforces the need for non-integration to ensure
that the speciﬁc ﬁnancial implications can be assessed. To improve
the cost control further, it is usually worth restricting the time
allowed for evaluation, even though it is diﬃcult to predict how
long it will take when it is a unique R&D project. Most evaluations
can be made in three to six months: suﬃcient to determine whether
further investment is worthwhile. Even if the work is not ‘ﬁnished’ (it
never will be!), it is better to review the progress formally after, say,
three months and decide whether further work is still needed or
whether the evaluation has provided suﬃcient evidence to proceed.
Strong cost-based management is the only eﬀective control available,
and it must be understood that the ‘investment’ may have to be
written oﬀ. It is better if these evaluations are funded from an
R&D budget—either speciﬁc to IS/IT or a business R&D fund—
and not compete with funds required for the rest of the portfolio.
As new technology options are now emerging faster than ever, even rela-
tively conservative organizations will need to ‘experiment’ more in the
high potential segment to avoid falling behind their competitors in IT
use. Successful management of IS/IT ‘R&D’ is becoming an increasingly
important aspect of most ﬁrms’ strategies, but one with which many are
unfamiliar.
Strategic (Stars)
A star product or strategic application is one that the company is depen-
dent upon for future success in a competitive, changing marketplace,
where any advantage gained can be expected to be eroded quickly. The
value of the application can only be judged by its eﬀectiveness vis-a`-vis
competitors. Using the Internet to link customers directly into an organ-
ization’s order-taking systems will only work if it is of value to the
customer—a judgement that the ﬁrm can inﬂuence, but the customer
will make!
Again, particular approaches should be adopted:
. Continuous innovation—this applies to what the system does and how
it does it, to increase its value-added as an integral part of the
business. These improvements will be business driven, based on the
need to sustain or increase the perceived advantages. Whether to
spend more money will be a business manager’s decision, based
not simply on return-on-investment calculations, but on the risk to
the business if the system fails to stay ahead of the competition. A
website oﬀering access for buying products may become obsolete
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very quickly if a competitor oﬀers advice and other service features
that the customer ﬁnds more valuable or easier to use.
. High value-added and vertical integration—in order to achieve appro-
priate innovation, the business manager has to understand how the
system can enhance the business process and then have the capability
to make further changes to increase the value created, or improve
process performance, as and when required. This implies business
control of IS/IT resources and the right to satisfy the unique needs
of the particular situation without prevarication or accepting lower
value-added compromises. The processes of systems management
should be vertically integrated with the business unit management
to obtain maximum strategic leverage from the system or the infor-
mation it delivers. Most applications in the strategic box are
normally associated with a highly information-intensive part of the
business, and the business manager will not be able to take
full advantage if he or she has insuﬃcient discretion over IS/IT
deployment.
This process of value-adding is expensive and resource intensive and is
only justiﬁed where IS/IT can change the business performance to gain a
speciﬁc, sustainable advantage. As the rest of the industry catches up,
diminishing returns will result from adding further value and greater
returns can be obtained by reducing the cost of matching performance
to industry norms.
Key Operational (Cash Cows)
As with its cash cows, an organization expects its key operational systems
to make a signiﬁcant and lasting contribution to the business. This
depends on keeping the product or system in line with current market
and business demands in the most cost-eﬀective way. The particular
business lessons in this case are:
. Defensive innovation—the system should only be enhanced or re-
developed in response to changes in the business that threaten to
put the business at risk through a reduction of competitive capability
(i.e. avoiding disadvantage). This risk should be quantiﬁed as far as
possible to ensure that the expenditure involved gives a net beneﬁt
over time. Deciding on further investment now requires a joint evalu-
ation—users deciding the beneﬁt or risk of action or inaction and IT
professionals identifying the costs and consequences of any action.
. High quality—key operational systems are expected to have an
extended life over which they make a signiﬁcant business contribu-
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tion. Compromises on system quality will reduce that eﬀective
economic life due to increased user costs for ‘workarounds’ to
overcome system deﬁciencies or increased IT ‘maintenance’ costs
due to increasing numbers of systems problems. In the long term,
the low cost of support depends on professional quality manage-
ment—data and processing integrity and accurate integration of
the system with other key operational systems and databases as
well as related processes and procedures.
. Eﬀective resource utilization—key operational systems cannot be
aﬀorded the dedication of resources given to strategic systems—it
is not justiﬁed. This implies the integration of the support for the
system with other systems—sharing resources and expertise to reduce
the costs. This is a familiar lesson from systems development—trans-
ferring the management of a system from a dedicated development
team to a general support group after implementation. This reduces
the cost, improves development quality control and discourages con-
tinuing poorly-justiﬁed ‘enhancements’. There is another important
reason: integrating the system’s support activities will allow oppor-
tunities to reduce costs further from general improvements in IT
infrastructure capacity and capability, whose justiﬁcation is based
on the number and range of applications that use it.
The overall approach to managing key operational systems is to reduce
costs while sustaining the business value derived from the use of the
system. Integration of systems and resources with other applications
will provide this net gain.
Support (Dogs)
Support systems, like dog products, are not critical to an organization’s
future, unless they waste valuable resources or the marketplace changes
unexpectedly. The business lessons are therefore:
. Disinvest/rationalize—reducing the organization’s commitments to
systems can be achieved in a number of ways: by using software
packages and/or outsourcing their operation and support. Each
involves the substitution of resources—money for scarce skills—
and the decision is essentially a ﬁnancial one, which often gives
very good returns. Alternative solutions are available for these ap-
plications, because they oﬀer no competitive advantage and service/
package providers can make a proﬁt from the range and volume of
similar applications in many companies.
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. Sustained quality and eﬃciency—the quality of the system should be
maintained in proportion to the costs of failure and, if necessary,
calculated risks should be taken, based on the eﬃciency of resource
use involved. In general, the system should not be enhanced unless
there is a very demonstrable economic case—to ensure that resources
are only consumed where a return is certain. The disinvestment
process discussed above will automatically reduce the pace of en-
hancement to that of the generally-available service or package.
The general rule here is to adjust the business activity to ﬁt the
package, not the other way round—or costs will increase dramatic-
ally, not reduce!
A number of immediate observations can be made from the above
analysis:
. The rate of enhancement to any application should reduce as it
progresses around the life cycle.
. The justiﬁcation for application investment becomes more quan-
tiﬁable over the evolution, and ﬁnancial evaluation becomes
both more meaningful and more decisive in the key operational
and support quadrants. This is dealt with in more depth in
Chapter 9.
. To achieve the appropriate balance of resource use to business
contribution, diﬀerent management approaches are required in the
diﬀerent quadrants—which implies that the system may have to be
rebuilt or at least reimplemented when it crosses the boundaries to
optimize the net organizational beneﬁts. For instance, the degree of
enhancement and probable expediency of change control in the strat-
egic quadrant can militate against eﬀective resource utilization when
it becomes key operational, unless some consolidation or rationaliza-
tion is undertaken during the transfer.
Some of the key issues described above that have to be considered as
an application migrates around the portfolio are summarized in
Figure 7.8.
While the migration from high potential via strategic to key opera-
tional is the most common sequence and delivers the maximum contribu-
tion over time, mismanagement in the early stages can reverse the logic
and outcome. This occurs most frequently when applications using a new
technology are allowed to evolve without eﬀective management. Based on
studies of Intranet applications,14 a number of examples showed a
diﬀerent evolution:
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. Initial experimentation (high potential) enabled knowledge-sharing
applications to be developed, saving time, etc., but the beneﬁts were
not ‘strategic’. Therefore, they soon became support applications;
they were still used, but the costs of support were minimized.
. Over time, due to their ease of use, the applications were relied upon
as a source of operational information, even though the ‘content’ was
not managed in a disciplined way—there were no procedures for
maintenance or clear ownership of the components of the informa-
tion base. Eventually, a major operational problem or failure
occurred due to incorrect or out-of-date information content. Only
then was the key role that the ‘informal’ information system was now
fulﬁlling realized and appropriate disciplines, procedures and
support resources put in place.
In one example, salespeople were selling services to customers based on
information from the (informal) Intranet catalogue. The company no
longer oﬀered some of those services, but no procedure or control
existed to remove the out-of-date information. Only when contracts
were about to be signed did the customer (and salesperson) discover
the problem. Several valuable contracts were lost! This is not an issue
of Intranet-based applications, it can happen when informal, free market
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Figure 7.8 Key issues in managing the evolution of an application over time
management of applications appears in the key operational segment, due
to a change in the business role of the system.
Application Management Styles
Another important concept developed from the product portfolio is
how the management style should change during a product’s life cycle
in response to the evolving issues to be addressed. Since managers
cannot be totally adaptive in style, this often implies changing the
manager! Equally, diﬀerent styles of management are required to success-
fully develop and deliver the diﬀerent types of application in the portfo-
lio. The lessons of product portfolio management oﬀer signiﬁcant
guidance.
High potential applications require a similar style to wildcat products,
namely entrepreneurial, to champion the application through phases of
doubt or decide to stop if the potential is not realizable. ‘Entrepreneurs’
are highly motivated, expecting personal recognition of their success. At
the same time, they recognize that they must not be judged to have failed
by others and will either be adept at avoiding failure or be the ﬁrst to
decide it is not worth proceeding. Also, they do not obey ‘the rules’ and
will cause change and innovation, which implies challenging preconceived
ideas or ignoring or bypassing accepted custom and practice. This mode
of operation is very appropriate for the high potential situation, but
would be wholly inappropriate elsewhere in the matrix.
Strategic systems require more nurturing, to gain organizational accep-
tance through demonstrated contribution to future strategy. A style of
‘developer’ best describes the type of manager required: someone who
will build a team and develop the resources necessary to achieve the task
objectives. Other terms to describe this are ‘organizational climber’—
someone whose career ambitions will be met by being related to the
achievement of organizational success—or ‘empire builder’—a much
maligned term! A developer is a planner who achieves results through
others, a team manager who moulds the resource to match the needs of
achieving the objective and who can be ﬂexible to changing circum-
stances—adapting the means to achieve the end result.
Key operational systems require a diﬀerent style of management
entirely: that of a ‘controller’ who is risk-averse, wanting everything to
be done correctly and failure never to occur. Assurance of success implies
reducing risk to a minimum via strict adherence to procedure and
standards, and building an organizational structure and mentality that
is self-checking and control conscious. The best way of achieving quality
control is to build it into the organization structure through job respon-
sibilities and procedures. The controller approach is essentially inﬂexible
332 Managing the Applications Portfolio
and resistant to change, since change causes confusion and error! Within
clearly deﬁned parameters, the status quo will be defended and require-
ments carefully scrutinized and evaluated, before changes will be allowed,
in order to prevent business problems and even serious disadvantages due
to systems failure.
Support applications are ideally best managed by ‘caretakers’, who
get their satisfaction from achieving ‘the impossible, with no resources,
repeatedly’ and have to be congratulated for it! It is a reactive,
problem-solving approach, where planning and resource management
are less important than getting the job done expediently and eﬃciently
to the satisfaction of the client. This implies a multitasking, ﬂexible
approach to achieving results that are not of any strategic impact, but
will cause a major distraction from more strategic matters if not dealt
with in a timely and adept manner. Support systems have no great
future potential impact, but can be a constant source of irritation if
mismanaged.
An entrepreneur is impatient to achieve results to demonstrate his or
her personal capability, whereas a developer has longer-term career aims
of achieving success through the organization. A controller wants to
prevent the failure of the organization and a caretaker wants to be
recognized as an eﬀective user of limited resources in solving problems.
The nature of these management styles reﬂects the generic strategies
required to manage the various components of the portfolio:
. an entrepreneur is a free marketeer, who pays little attention to
established procedure;
. a developer is a central planner, close to the organizational goals,
who builds resources to achieve results;
. a controller is a monopolist, uncomfortable with anything outside his
or her control;
. a caretaker is a scarce resourcer, proving that he or she can achieve as
much with less!
If the strategy is to be achieved overall, then the appropriate management
styles must be adopted; the strategy will not be achieved by managers
who are ‘square pegs in round holes’—a developer managing in the
support segment will produce ever larger, more signiﬁcant versions of
relatively inconsequential systems; a controller expected to evaluate a
high potential opportunity will never take the ﬁrst risk, and so on. It
must be remembered that all these roles are important and each has a
major part to play in managing a complex portfolio over time. The basic
attributes are summarized in Figure 7.9.
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MANAGING APPLICATION PORTFOLIOS IN
MULTI-UNIT ORGANIZATIONS
Once IS strategies for each business unit can be expressed in terms of the
application portfolio, it becomes easier to identify possible mutual
beneﬁts across the organization, by taking advantage of successful
innovations as well as meeting similar needs more economically. Figure
7.10 depicts the minimum gains to be made by a coordinated approach
across the organization, when the applications portfolios are compared
across business units.
In the support segment, even if the businesses are diverse, the applica-
tions are likely to address similar administrative requirements, and
packages are a common choice. At worst, a limited number of
packages should be used; at best, a single, common suite of applications
could be used. This will obviously depend on the diversity of the types of
business. For example, manufacturing and ﬁnancial services organiza-
tions will require diﬀerent systems, but several types of retail companies
in diﬀerent market sectors could easily use common accounting systems.
The same logic applies throughout the matrix, but the beneﬁts of
commonality of actual applications are likely to decrease as we move
from support to key operational to strategic, although in the strategic
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quadrant beneﬁts may be realizable through diﬀerent implementations of
the same idea. Transferring the knowledge gained from one organization
to another may accelerate the development of strategic applications. This
implies business-based sharing of how to achieve the beneﬁts available,
even if the details of the applications vary. Links to suppliers, for
instance, are likely to achieve similar beneﬁts to manufacturing and
retail companies.
It could well be that, due to the diﬀerent state of development of the
diﬀerent industries in which the units operate, a key operational system in
one business could provide a competitive advantage in another. One
company was able to transfer a system that was well established for
managing consumer goods inventories and distribution to a chemical
industry business. The approach was new to the chemical industry and
enabled that unit to gain an advantage through better customer service
levels and lower stock holdings.
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Figure 7.10 Portfolio management in a multi-business-unit organization
This kind of opportunity can only be identiﬁed if the existing and
required future portfolios of the diﬀerent businesses are compared,
within the context of the competitive environments and strategies of
those businesses. However, there is an inherent danger in this approach,
if business units are ‘forced’ to accept systems from other units for largely
economic reasons, without due recognition of their diﬀering business
situations, competitive priorities and organizational competencies.
The real objectives are to ensure that opportunities are not missed or
that time, resources and funds are not needlessly wasted. This can only be
achieved if a similar rationale has been used to deﬁne the portfolios. If the
eﬀort of the IS/IT strategy process is worthwhile, then additional work to
build on or share ideas could yield signiﬁcantly greater beneﬁts and avoid
considerable duplication of eﬀort across the overall business.
There is consistency between the rationale for the degree of coordina-
tion advised for each segment with the planning and implementation
approaches described on pages 311–318. The generic strategies can be
used to summarize the actual or required relationship between the cor-
porate body and the business units, and among those units. In a diversi-
ﬁed conglomerate, evolving through acquisition and divestment of
businesses, the corporate IS/IT generic strategy is likely to consist of a
minimal centralized (monopolistic) component—perhaps ﬁnancial
control systems—with an otherwise free-market philosophy. This is
appropriate to the business.
However, if the company is predominantly in one industry where
synergy is a potential source of advantage, the business unit strategies
are likely to be supplemented at a corporate level by some central
planning of IS/IT applications and a monopolistic control over the
ways of meeting key operational needs to avoid proliferation and incom-
patibility of solutions. Where the organization cannot beneﬁt from
vertical synergy, but consists of like types of company (e.g. manufactur-
ing, retail or ﬁnancial services), similarity of functional requirements
might be more eﬀectively or economically satisﬁed from a central utility
(monopoly) or by ‘monopolistic’ management of outsourced supply, for
those systems that are needed by many companies.
In Figure 7.10, the term constrain in the support segment implies cor-
porate scarce resourcing for applications that are not unique in any of the
units. Monopolistic control is suggested for key operational applications
to reduce unnecessary diversity over time to enable both reduction in
costs through eﬀective resource use and to develop and sustain expertise
in application operation and use. Capitalizing on strategic application
success requires some (business) central planning across the units to
determine whether and how the same beneﬁts can accrue across the
organization. Finally, while any corporate ‘interference’, however well
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intended, can stiﬂe innovation in the units, sharing knowledge of new
technology, its capabilities and limitations—by ensuring the results of
R&D work is made available to others—could increase the speed of
exploitation and reduce wasted eﬀort. The communication facilitation is
probably best established at the corporate IT centre, via a ‘bulletin board’
or similar knowledge-sharing mechanism.
SUMMARY
This chapter has tried to demonstrate the rationale behind adopting an
applications portfolio management concept as a core framework within
the IS/IT strategies. The basic 2 × 2 matrix model has been explored from
a variety of directions to identify the potential advice and guidance it can
oﬀer organizational and IS/IT management in deﬁning, selecting and
implementing the variety of applications required. While not all the
advice is identical—after all, it has been derived from many diverse
sources—it is never contradictory, and the patterns that emerge are gen-
erally consistent. It must be reasserted that the simple model does not
reﬂect the full complexity of the IS/IT strategic management environ-
ment, but it does allow much of the complexity to be analysed to
enable the issues and alternative solutions to be understood better.
From what has been said in this chapter, it follows that diﬀerent
approaches will be needed to deal with the detailed aspects of resourcing
and technology development and deployment in the segments of the
matrix:
. diﬀerent development methodologies, processes and application de-
velopment tools will be more or less appropriate;
. diﬀerent degrees and types of involvement of executive and line
management in IS/IT governance and projects;
. diﬀerent IS organizational structures, services competencies and re-
sourcing policies including procuring and supporting the required
technologies;
. how IS/IT investments are justiﬁed/evaluated, prioritized and costs
allocated—a singular approach will tend to produce one type of
application to the exclusion of others.
These and other aspects of the issues of business and IS/IT management
that enable the successful evolution of the portfolio will be considered in
more depth in later chapters. The objective of the IS/IT strategy process
is not to have a strategy document per se, but to develop and sustain the
organization’s ability to implement the ideal set of business applications
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in the most eﬀective way. This requires appropriate demand and supply
management approaches in each segment and coherent means of migrat-
ing systems around the matrix in relation to their evolving business
contribution.
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Strategic Management of
IS/IT: Organizing and
Resourcing
So far, the book has demonstrated how the potential that IS/IT oﬀers a
business or organization can be assessed in relation to its environment,
objectives and strategy. The focus so far has been on the inputs to the
strategy development process and the tools and techniques of analysis
and formulation. Chapter 7 used the application portfolio matrix to show
how the approaches taken to managing IS/IT in an organization are
inextricably linked in a cause-and-eﬀect relationship with the portfolio.
High-level (generic) management strategies were reviewed, from which
organizations can derive a mix that is appropriate to their needs, leading
to a set of management approaches to achieving success in managing
applications across the portfolio. In order to develop an overall organi-
zational capability to exploit IS/IT eﬀectively over an extended period,
further aspects of IS/IT require coherent and consistent strategic manage-
ment. These key strategy areas are:
. for managing investments in IS/IT, to deliver the maximum value in
terms of beneﬁts to the business;
. for managing the data, information and knowledge resources of the
organization to ensure that its business value is fully exploited and
protected;
. for managing the acquisition, deployment and utilization of informa-
tion technologies, through IS/IT services, to the beneﬁt of the organ-
ization and relationships with technology and service suppliers;
. for organizational management of the range of IS/IT-related
resources, the activities they perform and the governance and
administration of IS/IT, both in its unique features and in relation-
ships with other parts of the business.
This chapter deals with the last of these in order to establish an organ-
izational context for the more speciﬁc strategies for the management of
investments, information and infrastructure and the associated IT
services. Earl1 notes that it is the ‘organisational issues in the strategic
management of IT that matter most’, and research highlights that what
distinguishes organizations that are successful with IT is not technical
sophistication, but how they manage IS/IT.2 This chapter presents
models and frameworks for guiding management action to address the
organization dimensions of the IS/IT strategy. The ‘organizational’
strategy for IS/IT resources cannot be prescriptive. It must evolve over
time as the organization becomes more dependent upon, and demands
more from, IS/IT. More freedom of action in terms of greater discretion
or tighter control of resource use will be appropriate at diﬀerent stages of
that evolution. With the increased use of outsourcing, the selection of
diﬀerent sourcing options for services and resources will depend both on
the economics of IT supply and the evolving mix of business applications
over time. The organizational context also exerts both enabling and
constraining inﬂuences that shape the ultimate strategy.
THE STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT REQUIREMENT
The formulation of strategy is only the ﬁrst step on the road to successful
IS/IT management. The strategy must be implemented, and delivering the
results and updating the strategy to reﬂect changing business and IS/IT
environments are obviously critical to eventual success. Failure to achieve
the intended strategy is often the result of organizational, political and
cultural issues being inadequately addressed.
The basic IS/IT strategy development model (reproduced in Figure 8.1)
ignores explicit reference to the inevitable ‘reﬁnement’ of strategy during
planning and implementation, and its continuing adaptation as achieve-
ments (or otherwise) occur or any environmental input changes. As
noted in Chapter 2, strategic management is a combination of formal
planning, creativity, innovation, informal thinking and opportunism, all
of which must be eﬀectively exploited and integrated. From establishing
the strategic direction, through deﬁning speciﬁc strategies to eventual
achievement of results, the balance moves from formality to relative
informality and opportunism. This set of activities also requires some
feedback or control mechanism to ensure that plans and their implemen-
tation are appropriate for the strategic direction or to enable changes of
direction should achievement prove impossible. Sometimes, the strategy
as originally formulated has to be revisited as a new strategic context
emerges; at other times, the implementation processes have to be
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reconsidered in the light of the strategy itself. Figure 8.2 depicts these
relationships.
In order that the formal strategy process does not inhibit the realiza-
tion of each step in the implementation of strategy and changes to the
strategy, policies and practices must be established to avoid slowing up
business progress. At the same time, many organizations have suﬀered
the consequences of lack of coordination in IS/IT management, which
can cause the existing (and potential) application portfolios eﬀectively to
disintegrate. Figure 8.3 considers how this might happen: the strategic
direction is disregarded as localized opportunistic developments and/or
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Figure 8.1 The IS/IT strategic model
uncoordinated business initiatives eﬀectively disable the overall IS/IT
strategy.
In the longer term, this failure can have three major eﬀects:
1. the systems that are developed and implemented do not meet overall
business needs;
2. resources are misused;
3. strategy formulation is essentially a retroﬁtting process, producing
enormous rework.
Any or all three can occur. The cause can usually be attributed to three
main reasons:
1. lack of alignment between the business and IS strategies;
2. uncoordinated management of IS demand and IT supply;
3. over-centralization or decentralization of responsibility regarding
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Figure 8.2 Strategic management processes
IS/IT investments with lack of mechanisms to ensure coherence
across centralized and devolved IS/IT decisions and activities.
It is the eﬀectiveness of the overall IS/IT management strategy and
resulting policies and practices that determines whether all other
aspects of strategy development and implementation succeed. This IS/
IT management strategy must not only deal with the ‘rational’ aspects of
strategy like investment appraisal but also with behavioural and cultural
considerations. While deﬁning such strategies is predominantly an intel-
lectual process, implementing them requires appropriate behaviours
throughout the organization.
The central objectives of the IS/IT management strategy are listed in
Table 8.1. These are requirements that senior management must ensure
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Figure 8.3 Avoiding the disintegration of the applications portfolio
are dealt with by clear delegation of responsibility and/or appropriate
organizational processes. The rest of this chapter will consider how these
can be addressed, in practical terms and in conjunction with the need to
manage the development of the application portfolio and supporting
technologies and resources.
It might be tempting to include ‘corporate information systems’—the
set of applications required by the corporate body—in this overall man-
agement strategy, but they are essentially an IS strategy to satisfy cor-
porate requirements, not issues of management policy. Equally, potential
synergy between systems or beneﬁts from rationalization of systems
across the business are obviously of interest to corporate management,
but, again, they are application or technology strategy issues. A ‘manage-
ment edict’ to use common systems or software from a particular vendor
(such as SAP, Baan, PeopleSoft or JD Edwards for ERP applications)
across a number of business units will only work if the businesses con-
cerned can see the beneﬁts in their applications. The investment and
organizational policies should encourage these approaches, but, in
many cases, the policies, like accounting practices, can mitigate against
the intended strategy.
Hayward,3 in an article on developing IS strategies, argues for a similar
structure for the IS/IT strategy in terms of the model in Figure 8.1. He
identiﬁes a ‘management strategy’, an ‘applications strategy’ and a ‘tech-
nology strategy’ as the components, as in the model used in this book.
Earl4 made a similar distinction, using the terms ‘information manage-
ment strategy’, ‘information systems strategy’ and ‘information technol-
ogy strategy’, respectively. He considers the information management
strategy as ‘putting the management into IT’ or outlining the way IT
is to be managed in the organization.5 He portrays it as addressing
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Table 8.1 Requirements of strategic management
. To ensure IS/IT strategies, policies and plans reﬂect business objectives and
strategies.
. To ensure potential business advantages from IS/IT are identiﬁed and
exploited.
. To ensure strategies, etc. are viable in terms of business risks.
. To establish appropriate resource levels and reconcile contention/set
priorities.
. To create a ‘culture’ for the management of IS/IT that reﬂects the corporate
culture.
. To monitor the progress of business-critical IS/IT activities.
. To achieve the best balance between centralization and devolvement of IS/IT
decision making.
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questions such as the mission and organization of the IS function, control
and accounting for IT, and the design of the management processes
required across all the IT activities of an organization.
ORGANIZING STRATEGIES FOR IS/IT MANAGEMENT
This section will consider not only aspects of overall organizational alter-
natives and the position of IS functions in the organization but also
organizing options (structure and resource conﬁguration), allocation of
decision rights (centralization versus devolution) and resourcing strate-
gies (both insourcing and outsourcing). While these depend on the
approaches adopted for information, application and technology man-
agement, it is most critical that the IS function is organized to satisfy its
‘customers’ requirements as well as to manage itself eﬀectively. And cus-
tomers today are not necessarily located in the business, but can be actual
customers (e.g. as with e-banking) and suppliers (e.g. as with e-supply
chains).
In addition to deﬁning organizational responsibilities concerning IS/IT
management, corporate management also has to decide if and how that
structure should be overlaid by other ‘governing’ processes such as com-
mittees or steering groups for coordination and control. Most large
private sector and public bodies have realized that no one organizational
alternative can achieve appropriate management of all aspects of IS/IT.
To overcome this, upward of 80% of major US and UK organizations
have constituted some form of IS/IT management steering group.
However, in many of these organizations, the ‘steering group’ is seen as
a failure, or at best an irrelevance, by both line management and IS
managers, and even by some senior executives. Others, however, are
very eﬀective as mechanisms for developing a more concerted approach
to the strategic management of IS/IT. The reasons for these diﬀering
realities will also be explored and an overall ‘ideal’ model for eﬀective
governance will be outlined.
Beyond Centralization versus Decentralization
The positioning of the main IT resource of the organization in the organ-
izational structure has been problematic since ‘computing’ began, but the
problems have become compounded as IS/IT has pervaded and aﬀected
many parts of business. Over the years, a ‘tug of war’ has often developed
between centralized and decentralized control of IS/IT resources. Much
has been written about the positioning, structuring and organization of
the IS function, or indeed whether or not one should even exist, and the
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ﬁndings from these studies will be drawn upon in this section.6 Getting it
wrong can be very costly, but how can an organization know when it is
right?
For example, in a decentralized engineering group, a very centralized
monopolistic IS function was failing to provide a satisfactory service.
Rather than evaluate why, the management bowed to political pressure
from the operating company managers and rapidly devolved IS/IT
resources to the business units. Systems development virtually ceased
and support for existing systems was adversely aﬀected. Many of the
best people left, and at no site was there suﬃcient resource to achieve
major developments, while local management had no experience of
running an IS group. Gradually, it was realized that some aspects of IS/
IT should be recentralized to avoid duplicated expertise, avail of syner-
gies, etc. and that some aspects, reinforced by user resource investments,
should remain in the units. There are many similar instances of swings
between extreme centralization and decentralization, neither of which
proves successful, for the rather obvious reason that—as seen in
Chapter 7—some things are best centralized and others devolved!
Undoubtedly, much application expertise is devolving into the user
organization, although, in the process, the quality of many systems and
the integrity of data can decline. At the same time, the need to develop
technical infrastructures and information architectures is forcing more
centralization of certain responsibilities. Discussion regarding the organ-
ization of IS/IT and the role of the IS function often re-emerged as a
consequence of the proliferation of ‘e’-related activities, which have often
resulted in even more disparate systems that are not integrated—a situa-
tion referred to as ‘islands of automation’ in the 1970s and 1980s! Also of
signiﬁcance is the fact that these activities have often failed to make any
real contribution to the overall business. For example, Citigroup, parent
company of Citibank, Soloman Smith Barney and Travelers Insurance,
launched e-Citi in 1997 as an incubator for Web-businesses. The task of
e-Citi was to keep the rest of the group on its toes and was free to
cannibalize business from other group companies. However, the only
thing it managed to do was gobble up money—between 1998 and 2000
it lost over US$1 billion. From being seen as separate from the business,
the Internet is now seen as an integral part of corporate strategy and a
Corporate Internet Operating Group has been established to oversee the
complete Net strategy across all businesses.7
It is not easy to produce a general statement of the ideal organizational
arrangement for IS/IT resources. A number of factors will always have to
be weighed for any organization:
. the organization’s dependence on IT;
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. its stage of maturity in terms of its application portfolio;
. the geography of the enterprise, especially for organizations with a
global presence;
. its business diversity and rate of change of the types of business and
competitive pressures in each business;
. the potential beneﬁts of synergy between businesses in both trading
goods and services and information exchange;
. the economics of resourcing, obtaining and deploying skills.
Nearly 20 years ago, EDP Analyser,8 in an edition entitled ‘Organising
for the 1990s’, focused on how the role of IS/IT was changing at that
time. It observed the trend away from ‘production’ to ‘service’ orienta-
tion, and to providing the architectural support for the applications, and
concluded that the data or information architecture will become a critical
component of strategy, which ‘someone’ in the organization must tackle.
However, despite the passage of time, this aspect still remains so.
‘Whither the IT organization?’ was the question posed by La Belle and
Nyce,9 who discussed how the IS/IT resource was reorganized in Manu-
facturers Trust Co.10 to respond to a major company reorganization. The
company considered many alternatives before arriving at the need to
‘recentralize’ (as they put it) some aspects of IS/IT in order to support
a decentralization of the business into ﬁve units to match the customers
each served. Previously, IS/IT had been steadily decentralizing, but in
support of a diﬀerent business structure. They concluded that, while the
business units should be responsible for applications—architecture,
development and operation—certain areas should be centralized. These
included: telecommunications, hardware and software architecture, in-
formation architecture, risk management and security, shared services
and utilities, and human resources.
In each of these areas, the central IT group would be able to assist,
advise and, if necessary, control the activities of the business units where
they could provide improved economies or supply-related options and/or
demonstrate added value from corporate synergy. To do this, the activ-
ities of the units had to be coordinated with the central architectural
development via a ‘steering group’ structure, which is similar to that
described later in this chapter. This brief description does scant justice
to the detail of the restructuring involved and the careful planning and
implementation required to change not only the organization but also
the culture to accept the implied changes in responsibility. Table 8.2
summarizes the divisions of responsibility for one aspect—‘IT architec-
ture management’.
If the overall application strategy is to ﬁt the business strategy, the
business unit management must be accountable and responsible for
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the deployment of the unit’s resources in developing and maintaining the
applications. This applies whether they are employed as part of the
business unit or contracted from a central IS function or third-party
vendors for the duration of a project, or the life of the application.
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Table 8.2 Division of responsibility: IT architecture management (source: after
La Belle and Nyce)
Function Central IT group Business unit operations
Develop and maintain f Monitor process; provide f Complete business
information architecture assistance if requested architectures deﬁning
business (within sectors)
by location
f Complete translation of
strategy into technology
requirements
f Deﬁne information
architecture
Develop and maintain f Set standards, monitor f Deﬁne requirements and
application architecture process develop architecture
f Review architectures and f Coordinate between units
report on adequacy to for common businesses
Technology Committee
f Ensure appropriate
commonality
Develop and maintain f Coordinate development/ f Deﬁne requirements
data architectures establishment of f Develop in accordance
common database with standards
management process
f Create/maintain corporate
databases
Develop and maintain f Monitor development/ f Develop in accordance
hardware/operating implementation within with corporate standards
system architectures sectors and business
f Develop and maintain requirements
architecture for f Request variances as
corporate appropriate; make
users-support operations change recommendations
Develop and maintain f Develop in accordance f Deﬁne requirements
telecommunications with standards and f Report performance/
architectures business requirements responsiveness problems
This responsibility includes the application architecture for the unit, even
if some applications are also part of the corporate portfolio and/or
shared with other units. Where there are signiﬁcant potential gains
from synergy, sharing experience or resources, or from economic optimi-
zation, an additional corporately-sponsored ‘central planning and
control’ of the application architecture and delivery will be beneﬁcial.
The more geographically dispersed the organization, the less attractive
the concept of coordinated planning becomes in the short term, but
perhaps the more attractive are the long-term beneﬁts of not resourcing
very similar applications separately in multiple places.11
The degree to which information is a shared business resource
will determine how centralized the information architecture and data
control processes will become. Similarly, how closely technologies need
to be coordinated will depend on the relationships among applications
and data utilization as much as on the economies of supply or technical
simplicity or ﬂexibility achieved.
Undoubtedly, in every major organization other than the most diver-
siﬁed conglomerate, there are potential gains from the centralization of
some resources. But, as described in all the models, these centralized
functions are primarily required to service the various needs of the
business units—their raison d’eˆtre is that, if the resource were distributed,
it would be less eﬀective. In addition, where there are potential beneﬁts to
the organization as a whole that are greater than the sum of the parts (of
the business units), then some planning and coordination at the centre
can add value to ensure that these additional beneﬁts are achieved.
Balancing IS Demand and IT Supply
The management of ‘demand’ and ‘supply’ and achieving balance
between both is complex. The previous section illustrated that the
debate is generally portrayed as alternating between centralization and
decentralization. However, the ‘middle ground’ has become an appealing
alternative.12 Von Simson,13 for example, subscribes to an IS functional
design with IS/IT roles played by both a central IS function and the
business units and prescribes a ‘centrally decentralized’ IS function
with strong dotted-line reporting relationships. He argues that clear
structures and distinct roles and responsibilities must be deﬁned with a
mix of centralized and decentralized resources. Otherwise, confusion,
conﬂict, duplication of eﬀort and/or inadequate systems integrity will
occur. In a similar vein, the federal structure is often seen as capturing
the beneﬁts of both centralization and decentralization.14 With such a
structure, business units receive a responsive service from decentralized IS
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functions, while at the same time a corporate IS function provides group-
wide IT services and exerts some degree of central leadership and control
of IT activities (see Figure 8.4). While intellectually appealing, little
guidance can be found as to what these decision areas are and how to
make it work.
The key questions are what aspects of IS/IT are best managed centrally
and which are best devolved—degree of diﬀusion in Sullivan’s15 terms—
and whether IS/IT activities are managed by a specialist IS function at
all or should they be managed by business management themselves.
Table 8.3 summarizes the dominant structural arrangements for IS activ-
ities, highlighting the advantages of each type and identiﬁes the critical
management issues.
Imperatives for the Management of IS/IT
Rockart et al.16 have suggested a number of imperatives for the ‘new’ IS
function to take account of the changing business and technical environ-
ments. They are:
1. achieve two-way alignment between the business and IS/IT strategy;
2. develop eﬀective relationships with line management;
3. deliver and implement new systems;
4. build and manage IT infrastructure;
5. reskill the IS function with new competencies and knowledge;
6. manage vendor partnerships;
7. redesign and manage the federal IS organization.
Venkatraman17 argued the need for a diﬀerent approach to managing IT
resources that considers the sources of value to be derived from IT
resources and proposed that resources should be managed as a value
centre. The value centre is an organizing concept that recognizes four
interdependent sources of value from IT resources: cost centre, service
centre, investment and proﬁt centre. He argues that the very act of
adopting these perspectives permits companies to diﬀerentiate the man-
agement approaches needed to realize these distinct sources of value. The
relative mix among the four components reﬂects the strategic role for IT
within a particular business and will undoubtedly change over time:
. The cost centre has an operational focus that minimizes risks with an
emphasis on operational eﬃciency. Cost-centre activities are good
candidates for outsourcing.
. The service centre, although still minimizing risk, aims to create an
IT-enabled business capability to support current strategies.
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. The investment centre has a long-term focus and aims to create new
IT-based business capabilities. It seeks to maximize business oppor-
tunity from IT resources.
. The proﬁt centre is designed to deliver IT services to the external
marketplace for incremental revenue and for gaining valuable experi-
ence in becoming a world-class IS function.
The clear message is that the organization and management of IS/IT
resources are going to get more complex. GartnerGroup18 contends
that sharper demarcation between centralized and decentralized IS activ-
ities, specialization in centres of excellence, process-based work and out-
sourcing will lead to what they refer to as IS Lite (see Figure 8.5). With
this structure for the management of IS/IT, much conventional IS/IT
work is either outsourced or embedded in the business, with the IS
function remaining as an intermediary to perform an important value-
adding service between suppliers, on the one hand, and users, on the
other. In addition, the IS function concentrates on driving IS/IT-based
innovation in the business. Similarly, Earl and Khan19 note that the key
change in the role of the IS function in the so-called ‘digital economy’ is
that it has become a key contributer and builder of the business, particu-
larly as business processes become even more dependent on IT, distribu-
tion channels become electronic and products become digital.
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Figure 8.5 IS Lite (source: IS Lite: The Future, Research Report, GartnerGroup,
Egham, UK, 1999, also Stamford, Connecticut)
Gartner have identiﬁed the ﬁve key competencies of this cut-down IS
function, IS Lite, as:20
1. IT leadership, which includes IT envisioning, fusing IT strategy with
business strategy, and managing IS resources.
2. Architecture development, which is concerned with developing a blue-
print for the overall IT technical design.
3. Business enhancement, which includes business process analysis and
design, project management and managing relationships with users.
4. Technology advancement, which is application design and develop-
ment.
5. Vendor management, which includes managing and developing rela-
tionships with vendors and suppliers, negotiating and monitoring
contracts and purchasing.
This changing role of the IS function not only involves developing new
organizational alternatives to meet new demands but also to reduce the
resource commitment to old demands. The emotive picture of the disin-
tegrating portfolio, as illustrated in Figure 8.3, is as much the result of the
organization failing to manage its legacy from the past, as the develop-
ment of new demands. It is often this legacy that prevents organizations
moving away from old structures, based on IT supply issues, to newer
ones, based on balancing demand and supply issues. Swanson and
Beath21 consider the conﬂicts in the IS function between the demand
for new developments and the need to ‘maintain’ the legacy. They
suggest that most IS functions are designed for development because
the importance of the repair and enhancement of existing systems is
‘undervalued’. While they recognize the need for ‘service-driven’ organ-
izations, they argue that a key part of that service should deal eﬃciently
with maintenance and minor enhancement—a service that has particular
attributes and requires diﬀerent skills (especially operational application
knowledge) from development or other services.
A FRAMEWORK GUIDING ACTION
What Needs to Be Managed?
Before presenting a framework guiding action, it is ﬁrst useful to consider
the nature and content of IS/IT activities. The activities that are tradi-
tionally seen as necessary for ‘IT’, and consequently considered as taking
place within the IS function, can be portrayed as delivering a range of
services to the business. They range from the planning of the investment
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in IT to building applications, to installing and maintaining servers,
software and networks, to providing end-user support. These services
can be categorized under four headings: strategy and planning, applica-
tion development, application and technical services, and technology
delivery and maintenance. Examples within each of these service cat-
egories are outlined in Table 8.4.
In deciding on the organization of IS/IT resources, two key issues must
be considered. First, the location of IS/IT decision rights regarding IS/IT
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Table 8.4 Examples of IS activities
Strategy and planning services
. IS strategy development
. IT strategy development
. IT planning and resource development
. New technology options ‘evaluation’ (technology road map)
. ‘Account’ management
. Consultancy/business analysis
. Contingency planning
. Capacity planning
. New service development
Application development services
. Systems analysis
. Systems design
. Package evaluation
. Systems implementation
. Programming and software development
. Software acquisition
. Project management
. Information management
Application and technical services
. Training
. Application maintenance and change control
. First line user-support/problem resolution
. Advice centre
. Security/Access control
. Information ‘procurement’ (from external sources, etc.)
Technology delivery and maintenance services
. Installing, PC, servers, cables
. Keeping network running
. Maintenance of hardware
. Upgrading software/version control
. Supplier and contracts management
activity in the organization. What decisions, for example, should be
centralized and what aspects of IS/IT management should be devolved
into the business and out of the IS function? In addressing this question,
the organization needs to deﬁne authority, responsibilities, policies, co-
ordinating mechanisms and control procedures. The second aspect to
consider is concerned with the sourcing of IS/IT resources. Traditionally,
most IS/IT resources were provided from an in-house function under its
direct control. However, today, there are a range of sourcing options
open to the organization, and it is not necessary to provide all IS/IT
resources from within the IS function. Even if an IT activity is deemed
business critical, it does not mean that all its elements have to be kept in-
house. This interorganizational arrangement places new stresses in the
management of IS/IT resources, demanding additional coordination and
vendor relationship management.
Figure 8.6 depicts a framework that maps ‘location of decision rights’
against ‘sourcing’ options. Most organizations operate in all areas of this
framework, with decision-making responsibility spread throughout the
organization and making greater use of the external market for the
supply of IS/IT resources. Organizations engaging in outsourcing at
some stage identify the need to realign, change and/or develop diﬀerent
parts of their IS/IT structures, competencies and skills to enable them to
maintain the link between IS/IT and business prerequisites. This only
serves to increase the complexity in managing IS/IT.
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Figure 8.6 Trade-offs in the organization and resourcing of IS/IT (source: based
on an idea from N. Venkatraman and L. Loh, ‘The shifting logic of the IS organ-
ization: From technical portfolio to relationship portfolio’, Information Strategy:
The Executive’s Journal, Winter 1994, 5–11)
Location of IS/IT Decision Making
It has already been noted that some IS/IT decisions can be centralized
while others are better devolved out into the business. IT does raise
certain questions concerning scale, infrastructure planning and risk.22
Most people can quickly recognize the need for technology components
to interoperate easily and hence accept the need for certain technical
standards to be adhered to throughout the organization. The problems
that technical incompatibility pose for integrating systems becomes all
too apparent when attempts are made to link disparate technologies. Yet,
for IS/IT services and IS demand decisions, there is generally less
awareness of the need for coherence. For example, who decides project
priorities and how? Should applications be common across all operating
units? If business units can develop their own applications, how much
freedom should they have? In implementing an ERP system across a
number of business units, will a certain amount of leeway be given to
these units in customizing the application or is it a case of ‘one size ﬁts
all?’ Should a common methodology be used for systems development or
project management? We often ﬁnd that responsibility for technology
supply may well be more centralized than responsibility for managing
and coordinating IS demand.
Devolving IS/IT decision making into the business requires outlining
authority and responsibilities, deﬁning the set of rules guiding informa-
tion, systems and technology decision-making areas, and managing the
interdependencies across the range of decisions. In short, the organiza-
tion must put in place guidelines for decision making and deﬁne mech-
anisms to achieve coherence across the range of decision areas. These
aspects require deﬁning:
. Content—the decision areas that are being managed. Included here
are decision areas about the whole realm of IS demand and IT
supply—areas outlined in Table 8.4. Examples include resource allo-
cation, systems development and maintenance, personnel, establish-
ing project priorities, project management methods, disaster
recovery, documentation, privacy and purchasing.
. Authority—the individuals or groups that have the power actually to
make decisions in the various areas. They are ultimately answerable
for the outcomes of the decision made. For example, some decisions
may be made directly by the IT director, others by business
managers; there may be other decisions that require ratiﬁcation by
a ‘committee’ or forum of some sort.
. Responsibilities—the individuals or bodies responsible for day-to-day
execution in decision areas. The deﬁnition of responsibility needs to
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be integral to each person’s job role and function, whether technical
or non-technical. The degree of importance attached to any respon-
sibility will be reﬂected in the seniority of the role and will vary across
the organization. Roles that carry responsibility do not necessarily
carry authority.
. Coordination—essentially, the mechanisms and processes for
ensuring coherence across all decision areas. It is concerned with
deﬁning the mechanisms (steering committees, management groups,
etc.) for ensuring a coordinated approach to IS/IT decision making,
including the roles to be played by both individuals and groupings.
This aspect will be addressed toward the end of this chapter.
. Policies—statements of principles or actions deﬁning acceptable
behaviour. They provide a basis for consistent decision making and
resource allocation. Policies may exist for security, development
methodologies and the approach to IS/IT strategy development.
Policies may deﬁne the extent to which common systems will be
used across all business units; they may even specify that software
be purchased from a particular vendor.
. Control—outlining the approaches to policing decisions, ensuring
conformance across the organization. This might include the implica-
tions and procedures for non-conformance to policies or decisions.
Also included are ﬁnancial control and charge-out mechanisms.
Some decisions are one-oﬀ; for example, deciding on a project manage-
ment method to use across the whole organization. Indeed, such a
decision may be enshrined in a policy statement. Other decisions are
more ongoing like dealing with changing business priorities, and a key
task is deﬁning how these situations are to be dealt with.
IS/IT Policies
In a devolved environment, there is a need for deﬁning policies that frame
the decision-making rules and options. Policies determine the amount of
discretion that IS and business managers have in decisions regarding
IS/IT. For example, charge-out policies were once seen as one way of
introducing more accountability into a centralized mainframe environ-
ment, promoting particular behaviours regarding usage of computing
resources.
The key to deﬁning a workable set of policies is to recognize that there
are two categories of policy: restraining policies and enabling policies.23
Restraining policies are seen as describing the rules of federation. They
deﬁne the parameters within which decisions are made. Enabling policies
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essentially relate to the dissemination of best practice. Table 8.5 presents
examples of each.
Information management, especially concerning its quality, conﬁdenti-
ality and security, also require corporate policies to be established. This
area of strategy is considered in Chapter 10, not because it does not
deserve management attention, but information management strategies24
need to be seen as an integrated set of approaches in user, senior manage-
ment and IS/IT terms.
PROVISIONING OF IS/IT RESOURCES
Deciding from where IS/IT resources should be sourced has become a
critical issue for organizations. While most IS/IT resources have tradi-
tionally been provided in-house by a central IS function (commonly
referred to today as insourcing), a wide range of sourcing options are
now available. For a variety of reasons, many organizations have
looked to the market to provide them with the IS/IT resources that the
business requires, a practice generally referred to as outsourcing. Clark et
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Table 8.5 Enabling and restraining policies
Restraining policies Enabling policies
1 Technical compatibility standards 1 Making group-resourced services
2 Standards for buying equipment available to divisions
and services 2 Negotiating volume discounts
3 Common systems mandate, if any 3 Managing supplier relationships
4 Disaster recovery, security and 4 Inﬂuencing behaviour through
quality policies charge-out rules
5 Group systems standards (are 5 Setting criteria for selecting
purchasable and integratable common systems
components preferred over 6 Funding shared assets
custom built or extensively 7 Establishing tendering procedures
modiﬁed products?) 8 Developing common systems
6 Group job speciﬁcations 9 Using consultants
7 Any conformance to industry 10 Carrying out post-audit reviews
standards 11 Negotiating groupwide technology
8 Outside revenue-earning ability agreement
of IS function 12 Vendor selection procedures
9 Charge-out mechanisms and
beneﬁt reclaim
10 Ergonomic standards
11 Staﬃng levels
al.25 deﬁne outsourcing as ‘the delegation, through a contractual arrange-
ment, of all or part of the technical resources, the human resources and
the management responsibilities associated with providing IT services, to
an external vendor.’
The outsourcing of IT is not new and can be traced back to the 1960s
when computers were expensive and physically large. During that period,
computers required considerable space and controlled environmental
conditions so as to operate them successfully. This situation demanded
that companies had to make substantial capital investments in order to
have their own computing facilities. In order to avoid such expenditure,
many organizations contracted out their routine data processing, particu-
larly payroll and accounting, to large data-processing service bureaux.
This arrangement was referred to at that time as facilities management.
While a major problem in the 1960s was the cost of hardware, the 1970s
saw a huge increase in software development costs. Due to rapidly in-
creasingly demand for IT applications and the inadequate supply of IT
personnel, managers sought a solution through contract programming, a
form of outsourcing.
Outsourcing during this period was important, but largely peripheral
to the main IT activities that took place in medium and large organiza-
tions. Loh and Venkatraman26 suggest that the Eastman Kodak–IBM
outsourcing deal of 1989 marks the beginning of the current outsourcing
revolution. This deal saw Kodak outsource the bulk of its IT operations.
Never before had such a well-known organization, where IT was con-
sidered to be a strategic asset, contracted out for IS services.
The arrival of the Internet and the rush to e-commerce has seen many
companies look to outside vendors to supply necessary skills and compe-
tencies, as these are often not available in-house. Developing e-commerce
applications can place great demands on companies, and managers often
conclude that the only way to meet short deadlines for new technology
projects is to contract for specialist services. In addition, engaging in
e-commerce means that external parties will inevitably be involved,
including telecommunication operators and providers, Internet service
providers (ISPs), etc.
Outsourcing Rationales
The decision to outsource IT is not an easy one to make. Experience
highlights that it demands considerable managerial attention and
should not be made without rigorous analysis and discussion. The out-
sourcing decision is further complicated by the fact that some variables in
the decision can be viewed as an advantage by the proponents of out-
sourcing and a disadvantage by others.
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Financial and Economic Reasons
The diﬃcult economic conditions in which many national economies
found themselves during the early 1990s, combined with intense com-
petition in turbulent global markets, exerted a lot of new pressures on
companies and the public sector leading many to assess outsourcing as a
way of cutting costs. Surveys during this time conﬁrmed this, and, as IT
spend accounted for an increasing percentage of budgets, it was an
obvious candidate for outsourcing.
Cost savings were generally assumed to occur from vendor economies
of scale. When an organization contracts with professional IS service
providers, reduced costs can also be realized in the area of technology
acquisition. The outsourcing vendor is able to distribute ﬁxed costs of
computer hardware over a broad base of customers. In addition, the
vendor is seen as having the relevant technology and experience and
many hardware vendors oﬀer products with decreasing incremental
costs per unit of power.
Outsourcing can provide an opportunity to liquefy the client organi-
zation’s capital assets, thus strengthening its balance sheet and avoiding
capital investment in the future. One viewpoint is that outsourcing shifts
expenditure from the capital budget to operating budget, which can
provide some ﬂexibility. However, this shift may have an adverse eﬀect
on the tax liability of the organization. For instance, if there are any
purchased computers in the client organization, their value will be depre-
ciated. In addition, outsourcing the total IT operation is reported to
increase an organization’s return on equity. Complete outsourcing
reduces equity because computer hardware is transferred to the vendor.
Therefore, the return on equity is expected to increase. A number of
outsourcing arrangements involve upfront payments from the vendor
to a client organization. In eﬀect, this is the selling of the IT assets of
the client to the vendor, which in turn generates cash.
Technical Reasons
We have seen that IT is increasingly becoming an integral part of many
businesses. The marketplace oﬀers a wide range of choices regarding
specialist information technology products and services. Technical
reasons why organizations choose to outsource include: improving tech-
nical expertise, gaining access to technical talent and technical expertise
not available in-house, gaining access to new technologies. Third-party
contractors may also deliver applications more quickly because the exist-
ence of a contract puts pressure on the supplier, compared with internal
development, to deliver a quality product on time and within budget.
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Business Reasons
There are a number of business reasons why an organization may decide
to outsource some or all of its IT activities. Occasionally, it may be to
eliminate an ineﬀective and ‘burdensome’ IS function or as a catalyst to
restructure the IS function and how it is organized and resourced (the
topic of this chapter). It can also be used to reduce the applications
backlog, particularly when strategic applications are slow ‘going live’.
Fluctuating demands for IS services can place a signiﬁcant burden on
the IS function, and through outsourcing some of this demand can often
be met more economically and eﬃciently.
A number of companies have used outsourcing to facilitate mergers
and acquisitions (M&A). The rationale being that outsourcing should
solve the technical incompatibilities, absorb the excessive IS assets like
data centres and assimilate the additional IS employees generated by
M&A activity.
Classifying Sourcing Options
There are a number of sourcing options available to the ﬁrm, and
Figure 8.7 illustrates a framework that can be useful in classifying
them.27 This framework maps purchasing style and purchasing focus.
A Transaction style refers to one-time or short-term contracts with
enough detail to be the original reference document. A Relationship
style refers to less detailed, often incentive-based contracts, centred
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Figure 8.7 Clarify sourcing options (sources: adapted from M.C. Lacity, L.P.
Willcocks and D.F. Feeny, ‘The value of selective IT sourcing’, Sloan Manage-
ment Review, Spring, 1996, 13–25; and M.C. Lacity, L.P. Willcocks and D.F.
Feeny, ‘IT outsourcing: Maximizing ﬂexibility and control’, Harvard Business
Review, May–June 1995, 84–93)
around the expectation that the customer and vendor will do business for
many years. With a Resource option, organizations buy vendor resources
such as hardware, software or expertise, but manage the use of the
resources in-house. With a Result option, vendors manage the delivery
of the IT activity, using whatever resources are necessary, to provide the
customer with speciﬁed results. This analysis leads to four distinct
contract types or sourcing strategy. Only two of them—contract out
and preferred contractor—are strictly outsourcing contracts:
. Contract out strategy—with this strategy the vendor is responsible for
delivering the results of IT activity.
. Buy-in strategy—this strategy sees the organization buying in re-
sources from the external market, often to meet a temporary require-
ment. Contracts often specify the skills required and cost, with the
resources then managed in-house.
. Preferred contractor strategy—with this approach, organizations
contract long term with a vendor to reduce risk, with the vendor
responsible for the management and delivery of an IT activity or
service. To ensure vendor performance, an incentive-based contract
is generally constructed.
. Preferred supplier strategy—this strategy takes the buy-in approach
further, with an organization seeking to develop a long-term close
relationship with a vendor in order to access its resources for ongoing
IT activities. The organization, not the vendor, takes responsibility
for managing these resources.
Even with ‘complete outsourcing’, there are vital competencies that need
to be maintained in-house in order to mitigate risks inherent in IS out-
sourcing. These have been identiﬁed by Willcocks and Lacity28 as:
. the ability to track, assess and interpret changing IS/IT capability
and relate them to organizational needs;
. the ability to work with business management to deﬁne the IT re-
quirements over time;
. the ability to identify appropriate ways to use the market, specify and
manage IS/IT sourcing;
. the ability to monitor and manage contractual relations.
These are similar to the ﬁve key roles of ‘IS Lite’, highlighted earlier in
the chapter.
IS demand decision areas are never outsourced and should always be
retained in the organization. The challenge is to decide where in the
organization these decisions are best made—in a central IS function or
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devolved into the business and made by a local IS group or perhaps
business management themselves. Approaches to outsourcing and the
key management issues to be addressed are considered in more detail
in Chapter 11.
WHO SHOULD MANAGE IS/IT AND WHERE SHOULD
IT REPORT?
While aspects of IS/IT will be managed by the IS function and aspects
devolved into the business, there is generally someone in the organization
who has overall authority for IS/IT. Ultimately, someone at board level
(represented at the highest executive level of the company, not necessarily
with director status as deﬁned by legislation), even the chief executive
oﬃcer (CEO) by default, is accountable for IS and/or IT. In practice,
many board members are actually responsible for IS, given the diﬀusion
of systems throughout the whole organization. Even then, someone will
probably be primarily responsible for IT, although often that will not be
his or her main responsibility at board level. But, should that be the case?
Should not someone be charged at board level with responsibility for all
(or most, or some?) aspects of IS/IT management within the organiza-
tion, and have that status primarily based on the IS/IT management
tasks? This question has no doubt been discussed in the boardrooms of
most major organizations. A variety of answers have resulted.
Griﬃths29 considered the implications of locating responsibility for IT
with the IT director (or chief information oﬃcer [CIO]), ﬁnance director,
business unit heads and the board. She identiﬁed the plusses and minuses
of each, and this assessment is summarized in Table 8.6.
At some level in the organization, an individual (or in a devolved
business, several individuals) will be responsible solely for IS/IT activities
and services and for a signiﬁcant resource and budget. For simplicity, he
or she will be referred to as the IT Director or chief information oﬃcer
(CIO), although in reality other labels are encountered. In a multi-
business unit company, there are likely to be ‘IS (biased) managers’ in
each unit with an ‘IT (biased) manager’ at the centre, and this seems
sensible given the earlier organizational arguments. The split of respon-
sibilities discussed earlier would give application responsibility to the
units, leaving some areas of IS/IT at the centre for economic and strategic
reasons. The IT manager at the centre is the more problematic because
his or her reporting position will aﬀect his or her ability to do the job.
Given any autonomy in the units, they will easily be able to overrule or
ignore the central role, if it is too junior. The IS managers in the units will
be considered below.
The ‘IT director’ or ‘chief information oﬃcer’ (CIO) faces a continu-
364 Strategic Management of IS/IT: Organizing and Resourcing
TE
AM
FL
Y
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Team-Fly® 
ally-changing job role. As applications development and operations are
passed to the business areas to manage: (i) corporate IS functions will
shift to a staﬀ orientation, including coordinating strategy and planning
for IS/IT across the whole business. Any line responsibilities will be either
to serve the corporate body’s IS needs or to manage ‘interconnection
issues’, among systems, data and networks, and hence (ii) the CIO (in
charge of such functions) will increasingly concentrate on setting strategy
and policy in a similar way that the ‘chief ﬁnancial oﬃcer’ (CFO)
executes ﬁnancial management responsibilities.30
Regarding the changing role and position of the CIO for the 21st
century, Harvard Business Review invited a number of experts to
comment on the question: Are CIOs obsolete?31 The rationale that lies
behind this question being that as IS/IT and business strategy are now so
much an integral part of each other that all senior managers are—or
should be—‘information oﬃcers’. The central message from responses
was that the role of the CIO will change in line with business development
and that CIOs must assume a more central role in business strategy
formulation (see Box 8.1).
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Table 8.6 Consequences of locating overall authority for IS/IT
Plusses Minuses
IT directors Technical expertise IT not aligned
Accurate systems Education omitted
Sound technology Information overload
Systems integration Technical solutions
Finance directors Tight cost control Not always best value for
Department coordination money
Training costs integrated Insuﬃcient time to devote
Strict authorization to IT
Opportunities missed
Short-term approach
Business-unit head IT investments linked to Systems not coordinated
the business direction Incompatibility across
Locally-focused systems business units
Continuous development Duplication of data
Shorter reporting structure Unnecessary costs incurred
Board of directors Strategic direction Logistical details omitted
Appreciation of broader IS/IT underexploited
impact of decisions Infrastructure weak
Major problems tackled Slow to exploit
Funding allocated technology
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Box 8.1 Are CIOs obsolete? Summary of responses from Harvard
Business Review, March–April, 2000
Dawn Lepore, CIO Charles Schwab, argues that the CIO position has
long been misaligned as most people don’t understand its true poten-
tial. At Schwab, she is a peer to the various business heads and has a
great deal of inﬂuence on the company’s strategic direction, organ-
izational structure and culture. She recommends that the CIO
position should be broadly deﬁned, well understood throughout
the organization and that the incumbent be a strong contributor
to strategy discussions as well as marketing and ﬁnancial decisions.
Critically, she argues that the position should report to the CEO. In
identifying a potential CIO, she would advise companies to look for
someone who has a background in technology, but who can also
take a general management perspective.
Jack Rockart, director of the Centre for Information Systems
Research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, believes that it is
a fundamental mistake to predict a CIO-less future. As in the past,
the functions of the CIO will evolve as changes in the business en-
vironment dictate major changes in IS/IT roles, structure and pro-
cesses. He believes that, while today’s CIO should be a technology
executive who provides direction and counsel to other senior
managers, they are business executives ﬁrst and technologists
second. However, one of the shifts he is seeing is their role in
ensuring an eﬀective IT infrastructure.
Michael Earl, London Business School, similarly sees a change in the
scope and depth of the CIO role, with both expanding. He cautions
that, despite these changes, CIOs retain visible operational respon-
sibilities, ‘If the operational performance of IT is below standard, the
CIO is dead.’ He poses two questions: What competencies are
required of a new CIO? Can one person do it all? Required compe-
tencies include technical competency, management know-how to
lead specialists and integrate the function with the rest of the
business, business acumen and leadership skills. He suggests that
in the future this role may split into two with a CIO who is respons-
ible for strategy, change and information resources working along-
side a chief technology oﬃcer who is responsible for technology
policy, IT infrastructure planning and operations (essentially
someone responsible for demand management and someone respons-
ible for the management of supply).
The role of the CIO in the organization has changed over the years,
their titles often changing to reﬂect new focuses and emphases. Table 8.7
traces the evolution of the role of the CIO across the main technology
shifts from mainframe to distributed (including advent of PCs) to the
web-based and Internet era.
Part of the problem is not perhaps the need of the job, but the origins
of the person ﬁlling it. Merely promoting, via a change in job title, a
career IS/IT specialist seems to be unsuccessful since they generally
remain ‘outsiders’ in the executive team. Some individuals may
overcome the problem of background, but more success is likely if a
high-ﬂying non-IS/IT executive takes the role. This also upgrades the
perceived importance of the task and should provide a business focus
to its activities. However, research in the early 1990s by Earl and Feeny32
tends to contradict this, in that successful CIOs, as judged by chief
executives, are more likely to have a sound IT background.
There are ﬁve roles critical for the success of today’s CIO.33 They are:
. leadership;
. visionary;
. relationship builder;
. politician;
. deliverer.
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Tom Thomas, chairman and CEO at Vantive, sees the CIO position as
inextricably linked to technology and the way in which diﬀerent
businesses use it. He argues that the positions of CEO and CIO
are the only places in the company where there must be an integrated
view of the business, and the two jobs should be considered as a
partnership. In addition, the CIO should be knowledgeable about all
the major functions of the business and understand the information
drivers in the company.
Peter McAteer and Jeﬀrey Elton, consultants at Giga Information
Group and Integral, respectively, note that today in many organiza-
tions the CIO position has devolved into a sort of heavyweight
project manager, coordinating large IT projects and ERP deploy-
ments, with minimal input to corporate strategy. They deﬁne the
position as ‘manager or leader’ ﬁrst and ‘technical specialist’
second. In addition, they see the CEO as being at the centre of
operations for strategy pertaining to technology and its implementa-
tion, noting that, if the role is going to be successful, it will usually
require a change in the mindset of the company’s top executives.
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The leadership exhibited by the CIO is a key aspect in achieving success
with IS. Two components of leadership of critical importance for the CIO
are:34
. Ability to create a set of value expectations shared across all areas of
the business—one sensitive to the realities of competency, com-
petition and culture.
. Ability to deliver on those expectations measurably. CIOs must
understand and express IT’s value in a way that’s meaningful to all
executives.
Appointing a CIO alone is not a solution to all the management issues!
Earl and Feeny deﬁne the attributes that a CIO must possess to ensure
the appointment is, at least to some degree, successful (i.e. improves the
value to the organization of IS/IT). They are shown in Table 8.8. The
obvious conclusion is that people with all these attributes will be in short
supply, which may explain the rapid turnover of people in such jobs.
In a bank or similar information-intense organization, having an IT
director or CIO is the equivalent of an engineering director in a
manufacturing company. IT is the technology of banking. However, he
or she will not have jurisdiction over all applications. Equally, in less IT-
dependent organizations, IT may well report via another executive,
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Table 8.8 Proﬁle of the CIO who adds value (source: after Earl and Feeny)
1. Behaviour
. Is loyal to the organization
. Is open in management style
. Is perceived to have integrity
2. Motivation
. Is goal oriented
. Comfortable as a change agent
. Creative and encourages ideas
3. Competencies
. Is a consultant/facilitator
. Good communicator
. Has IT knowledge
. Able to achieve results through others
4. Experience
. Sound experience in an IS development role (especially in systems
analysis)
preferably one with a primarily commercial or business development role
rather than a service role such as ﬁnance. IT will inevitably, for better or
worse, be tarred with the brush of the department within which it sits.
Within business units, ‘IS manager’ positioning faces similar problems
and should depend on the criticality of the systems to the business: the
more critical, the more senior and central should the role be to the
running of the business. Again, indirect reporting should be through
commercial rather than service activities to ensure that ‘primary’ activ-
ities (in value chain terms) obtain the appropriate emphasis relative to
support activities.
One conclusion in all this vagueness is quite certain: that, as IS/IT
becomes more critical to organizations, the more senior will become
the executives with speciﬁc IS or IT responsibility, both in corporate
and business unit terms. Equally certain is that the success of such a
senior role in ensuring that strategies are developed and achieved will
depend as much on the individual as his or her position on the organ-
ization chart. Both issues should be on the management agenda for
regular review.
No doubt some companies will succeed without a coherent strategy for
organizing, positioning and developing IS/IT resources, but most will
need to address this aspect of strategy with considerable thought and
insight. Whatever conclusion is reached, it will not be entirely satisfactory
from every viewpoint and will need to be changed over time and probably
supplemented or overlaid with some other IS/IT strategic management
processes in the meantime.
COORDINATING MECHANISMS FOR THE STRATEGIC
MANAGEMENT OF IS/IT
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the majority of organizations in both
public and private sectors have established some form of ‘steering group’
and other coordinating mechanisms for IS/IT. They are called many
things, but usually have the words ‘policy’, ‘strategy’ or ‘planning’ in
the title. According to Earl,35 ‘steering committees appear to be an
obvious necessity in managing IT.’
Most writers agree that the reasons for establishing such committees
are (one or more of):
. ensuring top management involvement in IS planning;
. ensuring the ﬁt between IS and business strategy;
. improving communication with top and middle management;
. changing user attitudes to IT.
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A study by Drury36 showed that successful steering committees not only
addressed each of them but also introduced a process of reaching deci-
sions by consensus—something which can otherwise prove diﬃcult with
respect to IS and IT. Gupta and Raghunathan,37 based on a large survey
in US companies, concluded that steering committees were one of the
most eﬀective ways of improving organizations’ IS planning, by assisting
the integration of the IS function with the business and by coordinating
planning activities.
From discussions earlier in the book, some other reasons for the estab-
lishment of such a grouping of senior managers focused on the manage-
ment of IS/IT can be identiﬁed:
1. In Chapter 4, Kotter’s organizational model was used to diﬀerentiate
between formal and informal organizational arrangements. The
formal organization structure reﬂects the way in which the business
operates, whereas the ‘dominant coalition’ or informal structure
essentially determines the future strategy of the organization. This
implies that members of that coalition are scattered through the
upper layers of the organizational structure, but are not necessarily
the most senior and/or all from the senior management team. Using
the jargon of Chapter 7, some senior executives may be ‘caretakers’
or ‘controllers’ by nature rather than the ‘developers’ and ‘entrepre-
neurs’ who drive things forward. It is important that the members of
the ‘dominant coalition’ overtly include IS/IT on their agenda since:
. they are, in practice, establishing business strategy and therefore
will miss opportunities, etc. if they ignore IS/IT. They are in the
best position to identify and evaluate the impact of IS/IT on the
strategy;
. they, by their attitude and behaviour towards IS/IT, are deter-
mining the role it plays in the business.
It means that the dominant coalition, by intent or default, is setting
IS/IT strategy and needs to be aware of that and the consequences of
its interest or neglect! Any steering group, therefore, must include the
main members of that coalition or power group.
2. In Chapter 3, the model of the evolving nature of IS/IT strategy
showed how, in the most mature stage when the objective is to link
IS/IT to business strategy, a coalition approach of users, senior
management and IS/IT staﬀ needed to be established. This sounds
very similar to the argument above but extends the potential fran-
chise to users and IS/IT staﬀ as well as the strategy formulators. In
essence, this may imply that a steering or policy group is not enough
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to involve all necessary parties to the strategy process. This will be
considered below.
3. A number of issues in portfolio management point to the need for
strong coordination and a means of making decisions across the
range of types of investment proposed and required. In particular,
strategic applications, which are normally cross-functional, need
executive management agreement and endorsement of the business
beneﬁts and commitment to the normally extensive change program
needed to realize them.
4. Perhaps the most compelling reason is that the formal organization
structures for IS/IT activities are never seen to be satisfactory by all
the parties involved, and additional ‘governing’ processes become
necessary, whether IT resources are centralized or decentralized. If
IT resources are centralized, there is a need to assess and prioritize
demand and set an appropriate resource level. If IT resources are
decentralized there is a need to coordinate applications planning to
ensure that incompatible, even disadvantageous, developments are
not undertaken and that IT resources are employed where the
greatest business beneﬁt can be obtained.
These arguments perhaps explain the spread of steering groups during the
past decade. Equally, some of the points made above may also explain
why many of those groups fail to steer IS/IT in a beneﬁcial or even
consistent direction. Criticism of steering groups is often the only thing
that users and IT can agree on, especially if they introduce delays,
increase bureaucracy, fail to make decisions, etc. The list of comments
is almost endless:
. ‘wrong people/too many people attend; the right people don’t
attend’;
. ‘wrong terms of reference’;
. ‘discuss the wrong things’;
. ‘meet too infrequently/too often’;
. ‘make too many/not enough decisions’;
. ‘do not understand the real issues’;
. ‘are too remote from reality’.
The causes of these problems can probably be summarized into three
major areas:
1. The wrong people are involved: the group does not include enough (if
any) of the ‘dominant coalition’ to be willing or able to establish
strategy. If the right people are involved, many of the other
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problems disappear—the ‘agenda’ will contain items of strategic
value only and the less important will be dropped. Decisions can
and will be made. Obviously, the credibility of the steering group
depends on the respect others have for its members, the evident
importance of the matters they address and the results of decisions
made. One important point is that executive managers, asked to
‘serve’ in such a group, must not be made to feel ‘incompetent’ by
being asked to discuss and decide on subjects beyond their area of
knowledge. This generally occurs if the agenda is dominated by
technology as opposed to business matters.
2. The activities of the steering group and the decisions taken have to be
integrated with the overall strategy processes in the business. This
implies both interpretation of business objectives and key initiatives
into IS/IT priorities and providing IS/IT input to the development of
the strategy. Even in organizations with steering groups, many strat-
egic initiatives are taken without thought for the implications on the
existing IS/IT strategy, causing at least disruption and delay in deliv-
ering critical systems. Even worse, the initiatives may be counter to
the current strategy and, in many cases, the initiative itself may need
rethinking due to the detrimental eﬀect it has on longer-term strat-
egic development. ‘Initiative overload’ is a phrase commonly heard in
recent years, and there appears to be real conﬂict between coherent
strategic management and the plethora of initiatives, many of
which—like bubbles—often ‘fade and die’!
3. The group has no infrastructure to support it and carry out its
actions, which, as agreed, become the strategy. The steering group
needs to address two basic areas:
. ensuring that the applications that are strategic in business terms
are identiﬁed, developed and implemented successfully;
. ensuring that policies for managing IS/IT as a key business
resource are deﬁned and adhered to.
This implies eﬀective communication to and from the steering group
among everyone who is involved in devising and implementing the
strategy.
Using the strategic management model mentioned earlier in this
chapter (see Figure 8.2), the role of the steering group becomes a
key part of the formal strategy process: to establish the strategic
direction, aligned to the business strategy. Two further stages
exist, which no grouping of senior managers can expect to carry out
personally:
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1. converting the strategy into viable plans for delivery of the applica-
tions and the allocation/procurement of the required resources;
2. implementing the plans by delivering the applications, through the
actual deployment of the required resources.
Others will undertake these activities, but obviously there have to be
strong links to and from the steering group, which cannot achieve
much in a vacuum. It must both obtain relevant inputs from
somewhere and have the means to ensure that its decisions are
actioned. Most good ideas will originate lower down the organization.
The steering group role is to evaluate opportunities resulting from
those ideas in the context of the business, judge their worth, initiate
appropriate action and then monitor whether success is achieved.
Interpreting this in terms of the IS/IT strategic model deﬁned earlier
and shown in Figure 8.1, and considering the need to balance supply
and demand eﬀectively, a structure for a steering organization for
IS/IT strategy is proposed in Figure 8.8. It reﬂects the need for
continuity, overlap even, and feedback between developing and
implementing the strategy, which should as far as possible be done by
the same organizational groupings. It is very diﬃcult in terms of knowl-
edge and motivation to implement someone else’s strategy. The main
roles and responsibilities are outlined below and summarized in Table
8.9.
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Figure 8.8 Steering organization for IS/IT strategic management
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Table 8.9 Responsibilities within the IS/IT coordination governance structure
Executive steering group
. Interpreting business strategy and agreeing overall IS/IT policies
. Establishing priorities, agreeing resource and expense levels, authorizing
major investments
. Ensuring that strategic applications (especially those that cross business
areas) achieve their objectives
. Establishing the appropriate organizational responsibilities and relationships
Business (IS) strategy groups
. Identifying business needs, interpreting CSFs, assessing opportunities and
threats and IS implications in that business area
. Prioritizing, planning and coordinating IS activities and expenditure in the
area and ensuring planned beneﬁts are delivered
. Ensuring appropriate user resources are allocated to projects and appoint
application managers
IT strategy group
. Interpreting IT trends and developments in the context of the organization’s
business
. Ensuring resources are deployed to meet business priorities
. Developing IT resources and services in line with business IS plans and
monitoring the performance of those resources
. Managing the supply of technology and specialist bought-in services
. Ensuring technical risks are minimized
Application management groups
. Identifying and specifying the needs, beneﬁts, business resources and costs of
applications to enable management to evaluate investments and set priorities
. Managing developments and ongoing use of systems to ensure beneﬁts are
maximized
. Ensuring business changes necessary to get the beneﬁts carried out
. Ensuring that user resources are made available as needed and used
eﬀectively on projects
Service management groups
. Translating business needs into technical requirements and resource implica-
tions
. Selecting the optimum means of meeting the business needs
. Monitoring performance against budgets/service levels agreed with the
business
. Ensuring technical solutions are tested and quality assured to avoid
application failure
. Planning the development of services and resources to meet evolving
demands
continued
The Executive Steering Group
This group is as critical to the whole structure as the keystone is to an
arch. Its membership should reﬂect the dominant coalition, which implies
they are:
. able to recognize the potential of IS/IT in terms of the business
strategy;
. keen to exploit IS/IT as a business weapon;
. able to inﬂuence the management of systems in the area of the
business they represent;
. have the conﬁdence of the executive to whom they report.
The steering group is a collection of people, not a collection of job roles.
The individuals are what matter, not the role they currently fulﬁl, but it is
important that all areas of the business are represented. That includes the
IT group, although it is critical that an IT person does not chair the
group. Leadership must come from the business, preferably from the
chief executive or a highly respected nominee.
The group should meet regularly, if not frequently—probably four to
six times per year. The lower levels in the structure should get together
more frequently—maybe even weekly when a critical application is being
developed. The main purposes of the steering group are:
. To ensure that the overall objectives of strategic management of
IS/IT, listed in Table 8.2, are addressed eﬀectively. Most of those
objectives are impossible to measure, require careful judgement and
consensus agreement among senior management as to whether any
particular decision made is appropriate to the situation and capable
of implementation.
. To direct the activities of the strategy groups and require responses in
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Table 8.9 (continued)
Technology management groups
. Understanding technology development, formulating options and commu-
nicating the implications
. Assessing the capabilities of the technologies against known and potential
needs
. Planning and managing infrastructure developments and migrations to
minimize the risk to business applications
. Resolving technical issues/problems with suppliers and ensuring service
groups are eﬀectively supported
due time, and to consider ideas and issues put forward by other
groups.
. To address any issues that aﬀect strategic applications and ensure
their success is not jeopardized by organizational or resourcing
problems. Equally, they need to ensure that the applications in the
strategic segment (and related activity in the high potential and key
operational segments) are all still relevant to the business as the
business environment and strategy evolves. They must be willing to
stop activity as well as initiate it.
. To act as the ﬁnal judges to reconcile or settle the short-term con-
tention for resources. Such urgent decisions must be made with an
understanding of the long-term implications for the business and its
IS/IT capability.
. To justify to the executives of the company that expenditures asso-
ciated with strategic applications and on related R&D or infrastruc-
ture improvements are worthwhile and will be managed eﬀectively.
. To ensure that experience is transferred across the organization, and
that potential beneﬁts of integration are not sacriﬁced merely for
expediency in meeting local requirements.
It is not just what the steering group does that is important but also the
way that it does it. Its process should be open, not secretive; its decisions
should be communicated quickly and widely; it should demonstrate its
willingness to consider ideas from the strategy groups that require such
attention and it should be quick to redelegate trivial matters. They are all
aspects of the IS/IT ‘business culture’ that must be established. Finally, it
should ensure that successes are recognized as well as failures!
Business Unit (or Functional) IS Strategy Groups
Depending on the organization’s structure, they may be established for
each business unit or major function (or both if the organization consists
of units and service functions). In a one-unit business, this role and the
management steering group will clearly overlap.
Ideally, the representative of the business area on the executive steering
group should chair the strategy process, although, equally ideally,
business IS strategy should be part of the agenda for whatever business
strategy process exists. Either way, the senior line managers involved in
the business should be directly involved with the planning group.
While the obvious responsibilities include ensuring that business prior-
ities and requirements are reﬂected in the planned application portfolio
for the area, it is also this group’s responsibility to ensure that the plans
interrelate with plans in other areas and are understood by the IT
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strategy group. Where mismatches occur, problems should be resolved
among the strategy groups, if at all possible, rather than be escalated to
the executive steering group before alternatives can also be provided from
which the best course of action can be chosen.
Having ensured that the application portfolio, priorities and plans
reﬂect the business requirements, a number of other aspects must be
addressed at this level:
. That appropriate approaches to development are adopted, given the
classiﬁcation of the application and the availability of central, local
or external resources. Where the free market philosophy is appro-
priate, the business IS strategy group may make the decision without
consulting the IT specialists.
. The group must ensure that project justiﬁcations include all relevant
costs and beneﬁts, and can be adequately resourced by the user areas
concerned. Lack of availability of key user resources is often as much
the cause of project delays as the availability of IT resources.
. The group must determine whether the portfolio is being developed
to take maximum advantage of experience gained and investments
already made in the area, and that the information resource is being
managed eﬀectively both locally and as part of the corporate
resource.
. Implementation of systems will undoubtedly cause organizational
change. Most major systems investments will need related organiza-
tional adjustments and even signiﬁcant changes if beneﬁts are to be
realized, both within the business area impacted and at the bound-
aries with other functions. Understanding and suitable, coordinated
and consistent, action needs to be established at this level as part of
business planning. The group has the responsibility for ensuring that
the expected beneﬁts from the application plans are delivered.
. The group should establish appropriate application management
groups for their own critical systems and developments, and ensure
they are appropriately represented on such other groups on applica-
tions that aﬀect the area. Those activities should be initiated,
directed, responded to and in time even disbanded, by decisions at
this level, unless the application is ‘strategic’ and cross-functional,
when the decision belongs higher up!
It is clearly this group’s responsibility to produce an IS strategy that
converts business requirements into demand for applications, which are
then managed to achieve the objectives identiﬁed. Establishing a coherent
plan and associated resource and ﬁnancial budgets are a key part of that
process. Box 8.2 gives the terms of reference for such a group, established
in one division of a global telecommunications provider.
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Box 8.2: Terms of reference for the Systems Strategy Control
Board in a division of a global telecommunications provider
1. Purpose
The primary purpose of the Systems Strategy Control Board (SSCB)
is to ensure that the Division’s business objectives are eﬀectively
supported by systems and processes. It also reviews the proposals
and business cases of all projects requiring computing and systems
development expenditure over c¼ 60,000, as deﬁned in the Division’s
Business Case process. Project Managers and Financial Controllers
are jointly responsible for ensuring that all business cases of projects
requiring information systems-related expenditure over c¼ 60,000
have received SSCB concurrence. In addition the SSCB:
. sets the overall Systems Policy, where there needs to be a subset
of the corporate Systems Policy as set by the Group Information
Board* (of which the SSCB Chairperson is a member);
. determines the criteria for the prioritization of the Division’s
Systems Budgets, including recommending and allocating the
budgets across the Divisional units in conjunction with the
Finance Division;
. ensures that the computing operations and systems development
requirements are fed into the ﬁve-year business planning
process; and
. reviews internal trading agreements with our Group IS and
systems suppliers and evaluates their performance.
2. Scope
. The SSCB has a Division-wide remit to address all aspects of
information systems owned by or on behalf of the Division. This
covers all computing systems charged to the Division by the
central IS Group via Computing Operations Revenue Appor-
tionment (CORA) and information systems development. The
SSCB is complemented by the Service Development Forum,
which should identify the impact on systems of the product
and service portfolio and of marketing campaigns.
3. Responsibilities
The main responsibilities of the Board are as follows:
. to determine the strategic direction for systems and business
processes;
. to ensure that the strategic direction is reﬂected in individual
projects/initiatives;
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. to ensure information is owned and managed as a corporate
resource, to deﬁned standards;
. to agree and implement corporate systems policy;
. to ensure that the Balanced Scorecard elements are assessed
(particularly Information Assets);
. to help determine, in conjunction with Business Planning, the
priorities for computing operations and development budget
allocation;
. to validate major system project proposals, including the
business cases;
. to identify links and dependences between projects and, so,
recommend programme structures;
. to review continually the validity of the systems investments
made (start, stop or amend); and
. to monitor and report on the performance of Group IS and
[name of outsourcing vendor] computing systems and develop-
ment suppliers on behalf of the Division.
Representation
The SSCB is chaired by the Division’s Head of Systems, with repre-
sentation from those within the Divisional units responsible for
systems delivery and/or systems expenditure, including Business
Planning. The individual responsibilities include:
. representing their speciﬁc unit;
. ensuring that Board decisions are implemented in the unit;
. representing the Board within the client units;
. participation in design approval;
. participation in priority setting and budget allocation; and
. supporting the Supplier Evaluation process.
5. Meetings
Frequency and Duration
. The SSCB meets every two months, unless otherwise agreed.
The schedule of dates is published in advance for the calendar
year.
Attendance
It is anticipated that attendance by the speciﬁed representatives will
be given a high priority and that, wherever possible, the requirement
to attend should be embodied within the representatives job descrip-
tions. Where absence is unavoidable, a representative will send their
nominated deputy, fully briefed, including the status of any action
In most organizations, business plans have often been developed in a
way that satisﬁes external requirements and suits the business culture or
style of management. That process may have excluded or ignored IS
planning. That cannot continue if the link is to be forged between the
corporate steering and policy setting of IS/IT and the management of
each application. In general, business planning itself is rarely a weak link
in this overall structure, but the inclusion of IS in that planning is often
done with reluctance and without great eﬀect, if the earlier-mentioned
surveys are to be believed.38
Application Management Groups
Every major project, group of related systems or major operational
systems will demand signiﬁcant user management and staﬀ time to
ensure that it ‘works’. During development, it is critical that it is
‘business project managed’ and not seen only as an ‘IT project’. The
users will have to live with the application’s consequences. One of the
commonest reasons why systems fail in a business sense is that the project
manager was not a heavily committed, knowledgeable and able user.
Every organization has learned this lesson, the hard way, over the past
30 years! The key objective of application management is to deliver the
required business beneﬁts from the application. A process for ensuring
that this can happen is described in Chapter 9.
Establishing system and service requirements and monitoring achieve-
ment is a critical aspect of application management. Most such problems
should be able to be resolved at this ‘implementation’ level unless they
aﬀect overall plans or resourcing. Then, the strategy group must become
involved.
Major existing systems, on which the area depends, and interrelated
groups of systems, whether developed centrally or locally, require the
same ongoing application management attention to ensure that they
continue to fulﬁl requirements. Less time and eﬀort should be devoted
Coordinating Mechanisms for the Strategic Management of IS/IT 381
points outstanding. The deputy will be fully empowered to represent
their Control Board member.
Decisions taken at the Board will be fully binding where absence
results in no representation. The Control Board members will invite
appropriate Project Managers to attend meetings to assist in
decision making or to obtain a full progress report.
* Another coordinating mechanism, at Group level.
to support than to key operational or strategic applications unless the
value of investment is signiﬁcant.
It is becoming increasingly frequent for many applications to cross
organizational and/or planning group boundaries, and some, such as
enterprise systems, may involve most parts of the organization. ‘Applica-
tion management’ is required irrespective of planning structures, and
applications that cross organizational boundaries and/or have multiple
users are notoriously diﬃcult to manage coherently. There is not a strict
hierarchical relationship; an application management group may report
to many masters and, should conﬂict be unresolved, the ‘application’ may
have to become an issue on the executive steering group agenda.
IT Strategy Group (and Service Management and Technical
Management Groups)
The IT limb of the structure consists of three parts, all of which have been
discussed earlier in the chapter. Overall resource and technology planning
and development is the responsibility of the IT management team, but
must also include or allow for resources not directly under its control.
The head of the IS function should be a member of the management
steering group, but in that role he or she is, ﬁrst, a senior manager
and, second, an IT professional.
An infrastructure is required to support the management team’s
planning and production of the ‘IT strategy’. The IT strategy group
should consist of the IT senior management team and, if appropriate,
senior user managers who control signiﬁcant resources or technologies.
This split of responsibility is common in ‘high-tech’ companies, where
technological use of IT is separated from commercial application. This
group will bring together the resource implications of application plans as
well as determine the main aspects of technology development and
capacity. Its primary purpose is to produce the ‘supply-side’ strategy
that best satisﬁes the demand resulting from the IS strategy process. It
should direct the activities of the service and technical groups, which are
probably departments rather than ‘committees’, and should be respons-
ible for determining the appropriate sources of supply for technology and
other resources. One responsibility it must undertake is to interpret the
implications of IS/IT developments and trends for the executive steering
committee in relation to the business. Some advantage will accrue by
being technically advanced, provided it can be exploited in business
terms.
The role of the subsidiary groups is summarized in Table 8.9. Other
issues to be managed under these headings are considered in later
chapters. What is important is to appreciate that close coordination
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along the implementation level, from business needs through service
provision to technology acquisition, is just as vital to success as the
eﬀectiveness of the executive steering group. The quality of the relation-
ship between user-biased application management and IT-biased service
management groups will determine not only how well applications are
managed during development but also whether the best application devel-
opment approach is adopted in the ﬁrst place. The ability of service and
technical management groups to work together will determine whether
technology is employed on the basis of what it does for the business,
rather than just what it does! At the same time, the choice of the best
technology within strategic and ﬁnancial constraints will depend on the
mutual understanding of these two groups. Technical specialists have a
very important role in the organization, but they and business-orientated
users often fail to communicate. The service groups are the interpreters in
both directions, capable of understanding the languages of both business
and technology. People working in such service groups will often have a
split loyalty to the business and technology.
Summary
This structure or model brings together a number of facets of IS/IT
strategic management:
. top management involvement where it is most useful (i.e. adds most
value);
. business and IT balance in determining strategy;
. demand and supply management;
. strategy, planning and implementation requirements;
. exploitation of ideas generated from anywhere;
. command and control in eﬀecting policy decisions;
. an organization-led approach to developing strategies and portfolio
management;
. consistency over time in developing and implementing strategies;
. an ability to learn from and transfer experience.
From using the model in evaluating the management of IS/IT in many
organizations, it is clear that, if one or more of the functions is missing, or
is ineﬀective, or not linked properly to related functions, then either
strategies are not being developed or they are not being implemented.
Many organizations need variations of this model, depending on size,
diversity or otherwise of the business, degree of corporate control ex-
ercised, the stage of IS/IT development and the variety and sophistication
of technologies deployed.
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Figure 8.9 represents the governance structure at a large European
automobile manufacturer. It illustrates the activities that are both co-
ordinated and managed by the central IS function (IS/IT strategy and
planning, program control, program delivery and IT standards and
policies) and the related governance bodies. It also highlights the major
outputs of these coordinating mechanisms.
For example, the IT Policy Group is chaired by a board member and
its membership is composed of senior business managers from the main
business areas and the CIO. It focuses on:
. setting the level of company-wide and local IT spend;
. ensuring IS/IT investments support business priorities;
. approving proposed IT investments;
. agreeing balances between types of IT spend:
—investment versus operational
—application versus infrastructure
—tactical versus strategic
. validating IS/IT direction and policies (e.g. outsourcing, IS function);
. monitoring performance against plans.
MANAGING THE IS FUNCTION AS A BUNDLE
OF RESOURCES
In Chapter 2, the resource-based view of the ﬁrm was introduced. It was
noted that this perspective has been gaining increasing prominence in the
strategic management discipline over the last decade and, essentially, it
takes the view that an organization is a ‘bundle’ of resources. With this
perspective, the task for management is to integrate and coordinate these
resources to create organization-speciﬁc competencies. Competitive
advantage is seen as emerging from how this resulting set of competencies
are deployed to achieve superior performance. Strategy formulation
becomes a process of building and leveraging the necessary competen-
cies—often referred to as core competencies—rather than merely identi-
fying proﬁtable positions in an industry. Competencies emerge out of the
integration and coordination of resources. Resources can be both
tangible and intangible. Tangible resources include land, buildings, com-
puters and networks. Intangible resources include skills, knowledge, pro-
cesses, customer relationships, brands, reputation and culture.
It is not unexpected that the logic and thinking behind the resource-
based view has been applied to the management of IS, with the IS
function portrayed as a bundle of resources. In the context of IS/IT
384 Strategic Management of IS/IT: Organizing and Resourcing
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management, the primary resources are intangible—the skills and knowl-
edge of staﬀ as well as processes, structure and culture of the IS function.
Tangible resources are less important, as these are available to all organ-
izations in the open market—their purchase, conﬁguration and manage-
ment the result of the application of intangible resources. Feeny and
Willcocks39 have explored the competencies necessary to manage the IS
function. In order to identify them, they highlighted three enduring
challenges in the exploitation of IT that a company must successfully
address over time:
. the challenge of business and IS/IT vision is to address the need for
two-way alignment between business and technology;
. the challenge of delivery of IS services at low cost and high quality is
being transformed by the evolving, vibrant service market;
. the challenge of IT design architecture—the choice of technical
platform on which to mount IS services.
In order to address these challenges, they deﬁne what they refer to as nine
‘core IS competences’40: IS/IT leadership, business system thinking, re-
lationship building, architecture planning, making technology work,
informed buying, contract facilitation, contract monitoring and vendor
development. These competencies are brieﬂy described in Table 8.10.
They assert that these competencies are required both to underpin the
pursuit of high-value-added applications of IT and to capitalize on the
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Table 8.10 Feeny and Willcock’s IS competencies
IS/IT leadership Integrating IS/IT eﬀort with business purpose and activity
Business systems Envisioning the business processes that technology makes
thinking possible
Relationship building Getting the business constructively engaged in IS/IT issues
Architecture planning Creating a coherent blueprint for a technical platform
that responds to current and future business
Making technology Rapidly achieving technical progress by one means or
work another
Informed buying Managing the IS/IT sourcing strategy that meets the
interests of the business
Contract facilitation Ensuring the success of existing contracts for IS/IT
services
Contract monitoring Protecting the business’s contractual position, current and
future
Vendor development Identifying the potential added value of IS/IT service
suppliers
external market’s ability to deliver cost-eﬀective IS services. The chal-
lenge for the organization is to design, resource and structure an IS
function to deliver these competencies.
An assumption underpinning this use of the resource-based view is that
success with IS/IT depends on improving the management of the IS
function and establishing the necessary competencies in this function to
enable this to happen. This is not the complete story. Success with IS/IT
must consider the actual exploitation and deployment of the technology,
and the organization must also develop appropriate competencies for this
to occur. No matter how good the IS strategy is and how successful the
organization is in supplying IS services, if the technology does not
support business changes and is not eﬀectively used, beneﬁts will not
be realized. Marchand et al.41 note that, to improve how businesses use
information, managers must do more than excel at investing in and
deploying IT. Organizations must combine those competencies with ex-
cellence in ‘collecting, organising and maintaining information, and with
getting their people to embrace the right behaviours and values for
working with information.’ These aspects lie outside the IS function,
but are critical for success.
Building on these diﬀerent views of IS competencies, a more compre-
hensive framework was developed during an extended research project
undertaken with several major corporations.42 Figure 8.10 illustrates a
model that links strategy (both business, IS and IT) with IT supply and
business exploitation. This is an extension of the model illustrating the
business strategy–IS/IT strategy linkage introduced in Chapter 1.
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Figure 8.10 A framework for IS competencies
Using this framework, the research identiﬁed six domains of IS com-
petency: strategy, deﬁning the IS contribution, deﬁning the IT capability,
exploitation, delivering solutions and supply. They provide a more
complete picture and are deﬁned as follows:
1. Strategy: the ability to identify and evaluate the implications of IT-
based opportunities as an integral part of business strategy formula-
tion and deﬁne the role of IS/IT in the organization.
2. Deﬁne the IS contribution: the ability to translate the business
strategy into processes, information and systems investments and
change plans that match the business priorities (i.e. the IS strategy).
3. Deﬁne the IT capability: the ability to translate the business strategy
into long-term information architectures, technology infrastructure
and resourcing plans that enable the implementation of the strategy
(i.e. the IT strategy).
4. Exploitation: the ability to maximize the beneﬁts realized from the
implementation of IS/IT investments through eﬀective use of infor-
mation, applications and IT services.
5. Deliver solutions: the ability to deploy resources to develop,
implement and operate IS/IT business solutions that exploit the
capabilities of the technology.
6. Supply: the ability to create and maintain an appropriate and adap-
table information, technology and application supply chain and
resource capacity.
Each of these competency areas has a number of speciﬁc IS competen-
cies—26 in total. They are listed and deﬁned in Table 8.11.
This application of the resourced-based view is premised on the crucial
importance to view IS competencies from an organizational rather than
from a narrow IS functional perspective. IS competencies transcend tra-
ditional functional boundaries; critically, they are not located solely in
the IS function, but spread right across the organization. For some
competencies, particularly IT supply competencies, resource elements
are primarily located within the IS function, but, for exploitation compe-
tencies, resource elements are primarily located outside the IS function.
Figure 8.11 illustrates the balance between resources located in ‘the
business’ and resources located in the IS function in delivering the
competencies.
This logic explains why some IS functions can be very good at deﬁning
the technical infrastructure and developing systems, but the organization
is not delivering beneﬁts from this investment. Perhaps the ‘wrong’
systems are being developed? It serves to emphasize the importance of
a strong business/IS partnership and that organizations must instil
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appropriate behaviours and values regarding information and its use in
the organization.43
The concept of IS/IT competencies can be used in a diagnostic mode to
assess both the existence and level of current performance of each of the
competencies. The current performance of each competency is assessed
relative to required performance. This assessment is usually conducted in
a workshop setting with both business and IT managers. Such a forum
can serve to identify areas of weakness and thus requiring development.
A ‘spider diagram’ from a series of workshops conducted in a global
telecommunications equipment manufacturer shows the size of the
gaps—especially in ‘business-side’ competencies—between the required
level and the disappointing actual performance (see Figure 8.12).
Needless to say, the IS function had previously been criticized for poor
delivery of applications and technology, etc., but the analysis showed that
the underlying causes of the problems were the business managers’ and
users’ lack of knowledge, skills and poor understanding of what informa-
tion and systems they required to meet business objectives.
IS/IT COMPETENCY: THE CRITICALITY OF THE
HUMAN RESOURCE
The message from the previous discussion is that when IS/IT fulﬁls a
strategic role in a business, the enterprise must develop and maintain a
high level of competency in how it manages and uses IS/IT. As noted,
IS/IT Competency: The Criticality of the Human Resource 391
Figure 8.11 Mapping location of resources against IS components
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competency can be considered as a combination of knowledge, skills,
expertise and behaviours that reside in the people it deploys, and organ-
izational processes that determine how to develop and exploit that ex-
pertise. Most of this chapter has focused on the latter component. It is
worth considering a number of strategic issues concerning the people who
deliver the other key component.
One aspect of the Manufacturers Trust Co. strategy, mentioned earlier
in the chapter, that deserves more comment is the need to manage human
resources as a corporate resource. Undoubtedly, one of the critical
factors for any organization in achieving the best results from IS/IT is
the quality of people involved in terms of knowledge, skills and experi-
ence. The ability to obtain and deploy highly-skilled IS/IT resources in
adequate numbers will determine, in the long term, how well the business
and IS/IT strategies are brought together. Whether these staﬀ are located
centrally or decentralized does not matter—the issues are similar.
However, given the increasing choices of ‘sourcing’ options for resources,
decisions on whether the people themselves need be employed by the
organization, over the long term, are becoming more complex.
There are essentially four solutions to the development of the requisite
skills, other than ensuring that the turnover of key staﬀ is kept to a
minimum by good ‘hygiene factors’ as well as career and personal devel-
opment options. The four ways are:
1. Training new recruits from school or university, which is expensive.
Also, people early in their careers are more likely to move on within
three to ﬁve years.
2. Recruiting experienced staﬀ from other organizations, which can be
risky.
3. Training existing non-IS people, especially in application skills in
user areas, which may require the development of new job roles.
4. Using external resources, either on a short-term basis to overcome
peak loads, etc. or longer term to provide the organization with
particular skills.
Consider the following scenario, which has become increasingly common,
as an example of how the problems of selecting the best options manifest
themselves.
The existing IS/IT resource is ‘bogged down’ in key-operational and
support systems, mainly maintenance and rewrites. A new major strategic
development is conceived, but cannot be resourced internally in the time
required. A decision is taken to bring in external contract-based resources
to develop the strategic application. What are the potential long-term
consequences?
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. An open-ended contract to meet an ever-changing requirement for
strategic development?
. No one in the IS function is capable of understanding and supporting
it in due course?
. What will the ‘supplier’ do with the knowledge?
. Demoralized staﬀ who have to do the ‘boring stuﬀ’, while others get
the ‘good’ jobs? They leave—often to join the outsourcing vendor—
and the situation worsens.
It can become a vicious circle. By referring to the rationale of the applica-
tions portfolio, it should be clear that the one area that must not be
handed over to outside parties is that which provides the future
business advantage! Equally, the one area that can be handed over
with purely economic consequences is the ‘support’ quadrant, or much
of what it contains. Outsourcing this work should be considered to
release resources to use elsewhere. If the organization is to develop its
competency and provide an attractive environment to retain its most
skilled and eﬀective people, then its own resources, IT and user, must
be deployed on the challenging strategic or high potential systems, or the
skills will become frozen in the past. It can even be more appropriate to
use outside resources to deliver or maintain key operational systems to a
clear contractual speciﬁcation rather than use scarce internal resources.
Quality control could be maintained by a strong quality assurance
process applied to the supplier, in conjunction with explicit service-level
agreements. Such a discipline can also discourage ‘nice to have’ enhance-
ments being requested, since their delivery will require real external
expense.
It may, of course, be necessary to buy in some special skills that the
organization does not have to help develop even a strategic application.
This resource should be bought with the objective of extracting that
special knowledge for the beneﬁt of the organization, by using it not
just to deliver results but also to develop internal expertise.
The long-term aim of any strategy is to move resources out of the
support quadrant by substituting less resource-intensive means, and,
while ensuring that key operational systems are adequately resourced,
develop the ability to carry out strategic and high-potential develop-
ments. Any alternative strategy will reduce the long-term capability of
the organization, and increase the development and operational costs of
applications in all parts of the portfolio. While many aspects of imple-
mentation and ongoing operation can be entrusted to external specialists,
it is risky, even foolhardy, to allow external organizations to decide the
strategic IS/IT direction. These ideas, in terms of the portfolio, are
summarized in Figure 8.13.
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Peter Keen44 discusses similar issues in more detail and considers not
only the types of people required and their likely sources but also the job
roles and skills, experience and career paths for each. He considers the
spectrum of skills from business to specialist IT and deﬁnes four major
role categories:
1. business services—requiring strong business, organizational and
planning skills;
2. business support—business and organizational as well as some tech-
nical skills;
3. development support—strong technical and good business skills;
4. technical services—strong technical skills.
Many organizations are developing such new roles to link the traditional
technical specialists via business-based dedicated people (e.g. business
systems analysts) to the ‘real’ business management. These roles are
required irrespective of where IS/IT reports in the organization. Many
of these roles are critical to the determination of the applications and
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Figure 8.13 Use of resources
resulting business beneﬁts (the IS strategy) as well as to deciding how best
to deliver those applications successfully (the IT strategy).
MANAGING RELATIONSHIPS
Relationships play a key part in the management of IS/IT. On the one
hand, both business and IS/IT specialists must work in harmony not only
in developing the IS/IT strategy but also in the implementation of that
strategy and delivering business beneﬁts. On the other hand, as organ-
izations look toward outsourcing, the strength of relationships with
vendors becomes paramount in ensuring continued success with IS/IT.
This is a critical risk factor associated with outsourcing and requires
continual management attention.
Venkatraman and Loh45 have examined the changing role of the IS
function in terms of its relationships rather than its activities, especially
given the wide range of sourcing options now available. They suggest that
the IS function needs to deﬁne its ‘locus of competency’ clearly in terms
of its value-adding capability, and then focus on managing three key
relationships:
1. With outside IT suppliers, who will inevitably do increasingly more of
the work through outsourcing arrangements. They also argue that a
simplistic approach to outsourcing IT supply will leave a ‘compe-
tency gap’ in the organization, which could disable its ability to
ensure that IS/IT fulﬁls its strategic role. And, as already noted,
even where IT supply is fully outsourced, there are certain compe-
tencies that should never be outsourced.
2. With the business managers and system users, to enable the business to
identify and realize the beneﬁts from the application investments and
to obtain maximum value from the services provided.
3. With IT specialists in other companies, especially trading partners, as
increasingly more systems become interorganizational through
extended and critical use of e-commerce and the Internet and even
shared systems, as described earlier in the book.
They contrast this new role with the skills and values of a traditional
organization, particularly cultural aspects, which are examined later in
this chapter.
Internal Organizational Relationships
From Table 8.2, one of the requirements of the strategic management of
IS/IT is ‘to create a culture for the management of IS/IT that reﬂects the
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corporate culture.’ This implies taking action to overcome the frequently-
observed ‘culture gap’ that can exist between the IT specialists and the
rest of the organization. Organizations are not culturally holistic—they
contain subcultures often associated with functional specialism or geo-
graphical location. These subcultures can be dysfunctional. Information
Technology as a functional specialism has been introduced to most
organizations during the past 30 years and, as such, has introduced a
new subculture, and one that is often diﬃcult to reconcile with the
dominant culture in the organization.46
The result—the so-called ‘culture gap’—implies that, as with business
strategy, the viability of the IS strategy will depend on the extent to which
it is derived from the ‘shared values’ of those who have to implement the
strategy. Simply put, do they believe in it as well as agree to it? In a study
conducted by Grindley,47 he found that the existence of the culture gap
had serious strategic implications:
. 47% of IT directors stated that their main problem was the culture
gap between IT and business professionals;
. 56% believe that the culture gap is inhibiting their organizations
from gaining competitive advantage from IS/IT.
His survey concluded that, ‘the culture gap is a deep-rooted problem, of a
much more fundamental nature than the simple knowledge gap experi-
enced when dealing with other specialists.’
The reasons why the IT specialism and its particular culture have
proved diﬃcult to integrate with the rest of the organization were de-
scribed to an extent in Chapter 1. In particular, the work of Galliers and
Sutherland48 uses the well-known McKinsey ‘7S’ model (strategy, struc-
ture, style, systems, shared values, . . .) to describe the evolving attributes
of IT in relation to the increasingly strategic role of IS in organizations.
Their analysis suggests a pattern of change in shared values and other
attributes of the IS/business relationship as the organization increases in
its dependence on IS/IT. But, they also have words of warning for those
who would suggest radically-diﬀerent approaches to IS/IT strategy and
planning. They draw the following conclusions:
. each of the attributes needs to change as the organization becomes
more dependent on its IT systems and the more mature in its
planning of them;
. if any of the attributes is unsatisfactorily addressed in an early stage
of the evolution, then the organization will be less able (or even
unable) to achieve success in the latter, more demanding stages;
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. positive attributes developed in the early stages should not be dis-
carded later since the organization will have a legacy of products
from the earlier stages to support;
. for an organization to succeed, without major hiatus or disruption of
IT supply, it should address all of the 7S elements coherently at each
stage before moving forward.
Table 8.12 summarizes the six stages as described by Galliers and Suther-
land, focusing on the conclusions regarding the ‘shared values’ at each
stage. In many organizations, it is the long-term eﬀects of behaviour in
Stages 2 and 3, as perceived by business managers, that make the rela-
tionship changes required in Stage 4 onward diﬃcult to achieve. The
table emphasizes perhaps the more negative aspect of the observed reali-
ties in Stages 4–6 in organizations than the desired, almost idyllic,
relationships described by Galliers and Sutherland as prerequisites for
success.
Crescenzi49 used the same 7S view to describe why the majority of
‘strategic systems’ (25 out of 30 in a study) were unsuccessful. He con-
cludes that the range of attributes and attitudes of IS functions and staﬀ
that are appropriate in a reactive, problem-solving, job-shop environ-
ment (i.e. ‘support’) are quite inappropriate when projects require a
proactive, change-driven approach (i.e. ‘strategic’).
From a rational perspective, the approaches to organizational design
and coordinating structures in this chapter are attempts to close or bridge
the gap. Matching IT services to the diﬀerent nature of IS requirements
and use in the portfolio segments should reduce gaps at an operational
level. The steering group structure attempts to allocate the decision
making and planning processes to the most appropriate place and level
in the organization, and provide the means for reconciling contention.
But, cultural issues are as much about beliefs and perceptions as about
intellectual consensus. Before full ‘congruence of shared values’ can be
achieved, the reasons for lack of congruence need to be understood. How
this can be done using a cultural mapping technique (‘the cultural web’) is
described by Ward and Peppard.50 The purpose of the approach is to
enable business and IT people to describe their perceptions of the rela-
tionship as a starting point for reconciliation, through changing either the
way business people work with IT specialists or (more commonly!) vice
versa. In most situations, change is required on both sides: business
people understanding better the need for structure and discipline in IS/
IT to avoid expensive failure; IT specialists appreciating the importance
of responsiveness to external pressures and accepting the degrees of un-
certainty and the often ambiguous nature of business decisions. Box 8.3
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describes the dimensions of the cultural web and illustrates how it was
used by one pharmaceutical company.
Often, even when the relationship between IT specialists and the rest of
the business is problematic, little eﬀort is made to understand the causes
of the problems. The remedy has normally involved ‘reorganization’,
either of IT resources or the means by which they are controlled, resulting
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Table 8.12 Summary of the staged model of Galliers and Sutherland
Stage 1 Adhocracy Very few, if any, shared values since the
focus of IT is internal and they are unable
or unwilling to seek a coherent relationship
with the business. They relate more closely
to IT suppliers
Stage 2 ‘Starting the foundations’ The ‘priesthood’ of IT begins to develop
and IT staﬀ perhaps cultivate a
unique culture based on technology
worship—often seriously at odds with the
business
Stage 3 ‘Centralized dictatorship’ When IT management often reacts to
business managers’ concern over
‘excessive spending’ on IT and views of
poor delivery performance by becoming
defensive and exerting control over what
it does to redress the balance
Stage 4 ‘Democratic dialectic IT specialists recognize the need to work in
and cooperation’ cooperation with business managers
toward achieving business goals, but still
expect the business to cooperate with IT’s
set of values
Stage 5 ‘Entrepreneurial Recognition in the business that IT can
opportunity’ deliver new, potentially strategic, beneﬁts
through innovative use often leaves the IT
department looking after the legacy and
struggling to provide any value to the
newly ‘liberated’ users
Stage 6 ‘Integrated harmonious Rarely achieved, due to the diﬃculties in
relationship’ reconciling diﬀering values, overcoming
historical precedents and prejudice, and
requiring a new openness in all aspects of
IT activity
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Box 8.3 The cultural web and its application to exploring the
culture gap
The culture web is a tool devised by Johnson* to assess the culture of
an organization. While individuals may hold diﬀerent sets of beliefs,
there is at some level a core set of values, beliefs and assumptions
commonly held throughout the organization. This has been referred
to by Johnson as the paradigm. The paradigm governs and inﬂuences
an organization’s view of itself and its environment. Johnson argues
that it is through this paradigm that an organization creates a rela-
tively homogeneous approach to business. As it evolves through
time and is reinforced by history, it sets out a repertoire of actions
and responses that can be made in certain situations. The paradigm
is protected by a ‘web’ of what Johnson refers to as cultural artefacts.
They are described as follows:
. Stories and myths—In every organization, there are stories, some
true, others either variations of the truth or simply myths.
Examples are the big IT failures, the products that ﬂopped,
the legendary leaders and mavericks. In particular, new employ-
ees hear stories about those who broke the cultural norms and
the consequences of their actions. Most have evolved over the
years and have become part of the organization’s folklore. What
stories do is legitimize types of behaviour and are devices for
telling people what’s important in the organization. Like the
ﬁsherman’s stories of ever larger ﬁsh, these stories can be
rapidly distorted by the workings of the grapevine.
. Symbols—All organizations have their symbols, although they
are often so ingrained that they may not be recognized. The
dress code, the furniture, executive parking spaces are all
symbols. At one particular insurance company, there were ﬁve
diﬀerent categories of restaurant and, as one progressed up the
management hierarchy, the quality of both food and dining
room de´cor improved considerably. Symbols also include
company-speciﬁc language, which reinforces entrenched atti-
tudes, like addressing managers as ‘Mister’.
. Rituals and routines—Rituals are those aspects of organizational
life that hold special signiﬁcance and may include the monthly
board meeting, the annual company barbecue and singing the
company song. Routines refer to ‘the way we do things here’ and
incorporate the core activities that the organization traditionally
undertakes.
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. Control systems—Organizations have particular control systems
to monitor and encourage performance. Pay and reward
systems, budgetary control systems and the management hier-
archy are all examples of such systems. They serve to highlight
what is valued by the organization.
. Organizational structures—Functions, departments, geograph-
ical-based business units, product-based business units, ﬂat
management hierarchies, large bureaucratic hierarchies are all
examples of how the structure of an organization impact the
paradigm.
. Power structures—Power lies with inﬂuence, particularly where
such inﬂuence can reduce uncertainty. The power structures
tend to reinforce the paradigm and, hence, they are often
targets for change. This is particularly diﬃcult given that
those who may be required to change often hold the power.
In attempting to change their culture, many organizations manip-
ulate the ‘hard’ elements of the web (i.e. the power structures, the
control systems and the organizational structures), neglecting to
address the more intangible elements. This is a mistake. All
elements of the web must be examined and acted on if culture
change is to take place and this change translated into tangible
action and results.
The web, illustrated below, was derived from data collected from
in either greater centralization or decentralization of either or both. In
many large companies, these dramatic, and, it seems, increasingly more
frequent, swings of the pendulum disrupt and even destroy any medium-
term strategies. The arguments throughout this book (and agreed by
most researchers) are that some resources and some decisions are best
devolved and others are best centralized. The balance will require adjust-
ment over time as problems will occur in the IS function/business rela-
tionship. It is better to resolve these problems than swap them for
another set by reorganization, and probably damage the eﬀectiveness
of the strategy process.
Outsourcing has introduced an additional set of issues. The relevance
here is that one alternative solution to an unsatisfactory IT/business
relationship is to outsource the IS function in signiﬁcant part, or in
total, to an outside supplier. While a complex set of options and issues
are trivialized by simple generalizations, it can be observed that many IS
functions that have been physically outsourced were eﬀectively ‘culturally
outsourced’ (i.e. were not considered as an integral, strategic component
of the organization) long before a convenient event, oﬀer or excuse
caused the real severance. This observation is veriﬁed to some extent
by research51 that shows that, although organizations quoted many
reasons for outsourcing IT, a main reason for selecting a particular
supplier was ‘cultural ﬁt’!
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a global pharmaceutical organization that had sought to bring both
IS staﬀ and business staﬀ closer together.** From the analysis, it was
evident that the organization had worked hard at restructuring its IS
function, improving the control of activities and getting line
managers involved in decision making about IS. However, the
symbols, stories and rituals, the ‘softer’ elements as perceived from
‘the business’ viewpoint, had changed little over this time. Senior
management were unaware of this and the impact that it had on
the ability of IS, and in particular the IS function, to work eﬀectively
in the organization.
*G. Johnson, ‘Managing strategic change—strategy, culture and
action’, Long Range Planning, Vol. 25, No. 1, 1992, 28–36.
**Detailed coverage of cultural web analysis can be found in G.
Johnson, ‘Mapping and remapping organisational culture’, in V.
Ambrosini, G. Johnson and K. Scholes, eds, Exploring Techniques
of Analysis and Evaluation in Strategic Management, Prentice-Hall,
Hemel Hempstead, UK, 1998.
Beyond the Culture Gap
In research conducted in the late 1990s, an attempt was made to progress
beyond merely using the label ‘culture gap’ as a variable in explaining the
problems that can exist between the IS function and the rest of the
business and explore in detail its nature and context. This research
took the view that one of the problems with attaching the culture label
is that it then becomes a fait accompli, and almost acceptance of the
situation. The ‘culture gap’ becomes a convenient label to attach to a
situation that is clearly causing a problem, but which organizations are
either unable or unwilling to address. It was strongly suggested that the
culture argument is often an excuse for, rather than the cause of, poor
working relationships. In essence, culture is a symptom rather than a
cause of an ineﬀective relationship between the IS function and the rest
of the business and the consequential failure of organizations to exploit
and leverage IS.
This research focused on identifying the organizational aspects to
be managed in improving the relationship between the IS function
and ‘the business’ and, consequently, the value derived from IS invest-
ments. Analysis of the empirical data from the three sites included in the
study revealed ﬁve core dimensions. These dimensions are leadership,
structures and processes, roles, relationships and behaviours (see
Figure 8.14).
Research related to each of these dimensions can be found in the
IS literature. However, the research reported in Peppard and Ward52
indicated that each dimension on its own is not suﬃcient to address
the organizational aspects of the relationship and that a more holistic
perspective is required. For example, hiring a new CIO will not
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Figure 8.14 Bridging the gap
automatically solve problems regarding the inability of IS to deliver
value; however, he or she may help in the creation of an environment
for success. The other four dimensions must also be addressed. How the
‘gap’ can be bridged is addressed at the end of the chapter.
Managing Relationships with Vendors
It is a fact that outsourcing results in a dependence of the client organ-
ization on the vendor, yet there has been only limited research on
building partnering relationships in outsourcing situations.53 Outsourc-
ing alliances are diﬃcult, particularly as contracts are usually for between
3 and 10 years in an environment with rapid business and technological
change. McFarlan and Nolan54 note that customers who make an
original decision based on eﬃciency will judge it diﬀerently if using
eﬀectiveness criteria later.
The importance of cultural ﬁt in any outsourcing situation has already
been noted, but, even then, a strong partnership is not guaranteed;
building a strong partnership generally has to be worked on. Klepper
used a sequential stage model of partnership development, developed by
Dwyer et al.,55 as a starting point for understanding the managerial
interventions an organization might make to further the partnering
process in outsourcing. This model consists of four stages: awareness,
exploration, expansion and commitment. There are also subprocesses
that work within the exploration, expansion and commitment phases
that either move the parties closer to or further from the next stage.
These are subprocesses of attraction, communication and bargaining,
development and exercise of power, norm development and expectation
development.
Awareness consists of recognition that the other party may be a
suitable exchange partner, but with no exchange at this point. Ex-
change begins in the second stage of exploration. It is in the
exploration phase, after experience with the vendor, that the two
parties ﬁrst appreciate that a deeper, longer-lasting relationship may
be possible. In the expansion phase, beneﬁts mount for both partners in
the relationship and they become increasingly interdependent. In the
commitment phase, the exchange partners receive such signiﬁcant
beneﬁts from doing business together that they agree, explicitly or
implicitly, to continue the relationship and partnership is cemented.
Indicators of commitment are high levels of input to building and
sustaining the relationship by both partners, consistency in the
application of inputs and durability of a strong relationship over
time.
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BRIDGING THE GAP: IMPROVING THE CONTRIBUTION OF
THE IS FUNCTION
In organizations where the relationship between the IS function and the
rest of the business is poor, this severely impacts the ability of the IS
function to make the sort of contribution that the business demands.
Bridging this ‘relationship’ gap is not an easy task and can take many
years to eﬀect.
There has been some research that has explored how an organization
can begin to improve the relationship between the IS function and the
rest of the business. Earl and Sampler56 have used the distinction between
IS demand and IT supply in order to deﬁne a prescriptive model. They
argue that supply and demand have to be managed, a process they refer
to as ‘market management’ and have proposed a four-stage model that
helps organizations balance supply and demand in managing IS/IT (see
Box 8.4).
As a result of longitudinal research in three organizations, Peppard57
constructed a model with six stages detailing the transformation process
(see Box 8.5). Success in improving the contribution of IS/IT is initially
premised on having strong IS leadership within the IS function and the
importance of the IS Director/CIO having credibility within the business.
As with the Earl and Sampler framework, the data from this research
highlighted the importance of ﬁrst getting the basics right—network
uptime, availability and reliability of applications, help-desk response
times, etc. It is fruitless engaging business management in dialogue if
basic IT services are not being delivered. Key inﬂuencers within the
organization then have to be enlisted before any realistic dialogue can
be held with the business. A key element of transforming the value-added
contribution of IS/IT is building the credibility of the IS function—it is
important to remember that credibility must be earned and is derived
from achievement and actual results. The overall conclusion from this
research is that ‘bridging the gap’ between the IS function and the rest of
the business is likely to take time and is primarily a people issue governed
by the organizational legacy regarding IS/IT experiences. Box 8.5 de-
scribes the transforming stages and Box 8.6 illustrates the transformation
program that a large UK bank put in place in order to improve the
contribution of their IS function.
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Box 8.4 Prescriptions for market management (source: M.J. Earl
and J. Sampler, ‘Market management to transform the IT organisa-
tion’, Sloan Management Review, Summer, 1998, 9–17)
1. Recognize disequilibrium
At this opening stage, the organization ﬁrst articulates, explores and
analyses the crisis or loss of conﬁdence in IT in general and the IS
function in particular. Generally, there are both supply and demand
issues causing problems. For example, IT may not be delivering or
the business is not specifying and using the systems that it needs.
Symptoms and prescriptions at this stage include:
. business needs not satisﬁed;
. technological problems;
. management assessment;
. start of new regime.
2. Emphasize supply management (supply ﬁrst, demand second)
At this stage, the company seeks radical performance improvement
of the supply side by setting delivery goals and beginning to rebuild
the technology platform. The focus is on releasing and realizing
value from the inherited IT situation. Prescriptions at this stage
include:
. setting ambitious performance targets;
. beginning to rebuild technical platform;
. seeking early, visible results;
. setting application priorities.
3. Emphasizing demand management (demand ﬁrst, supply second)
Stage 3 emphasizes demand management, shifting the focus from
supply to demand, but not exclusively. The concern is with
building IT capabilities and creating future value. Prescriptions at
this stage include:
. work out the vision;
. deﬁne demand management processes;
. deﬁne value propositions;
. plan the infrastructure.
4. Maintain equilibrium
In this ﬁnal stage, the company completes the transformation
process by implementing ﬁnal radical changes in both demand and
supply sides. This stage is an ongoing state of equilibrium between
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supply and demand. However, if business or technological disconti-
nuities occur and the company does not deal with them, it can
initiate a new transformation process by returning to Stage 1. Pre-
scriptions include:
. recognizing that it is a continuous journey;
. rethinking governance;
. reskilling IT personnel;
. creating a partnership with business and vendors.
Box 8.5 A model for improving the value-added of the IS function
(source: J.W. Peppard, ‘Bridging the gap between the IS function
and the rest of the business: Plotting a route’, Information Systems
Journal, Vol. 11, 2001, 249–270)
Stage 1: Get the basics right
The ﬁrst stage involves focusing on the IS function itself, ensuring
that it can deliver basic IT services. These are primarily technology
focused and tactical, and include network uptime, availability and
reliability of applications, and help-desk response times. This usually
requires an examination of internal structures and processes, par-
ticularly in the areas of project management, quality of applications
and quality of its customer service. The evidence from the research
was clear in asserting that it is futile attempting to improve the
relationship if the ability of the IS function to meet basic business
expectations is either weak or non-existent. This usually entails es-
tablishing metrics to measure and assess performance. It is also
important for the IS function to get business focused. However,
obtaining the buy-in of all IS staﬀ is crucial, if the IS capability is
to develop further. A central ingredient is the leadership, credibility
and vision of the IS director.
Stage 2: Enlist key inﬂuencers
Within any organization, there are particular individuals who are
pivotal to what happens in it, the so-called opinion leaders or key
inﬂuencers. If the transformation of the IS function is to progress,
the evidence from research suggested that it is important to get these
inﬂuencers on board before proceeding to the later stages; the visi-
bility that these individuals bring is not only to add impetus to the
process but can also decide the fate of the initiative. Enlisting key
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inﬂuencers generally requires that there is some agreement reached
as to the role and function of the IS organization. This is seen as not
only giving clarity to the role and establishing expectations but also
identifying areas of potential conﬂict that may have implications at
later stages (e.g. centralizing some aspects of IS spend previously
distributed across the organization or the imposition of technology
standards).
Stage 3: Build credibility
While the previous stages focused on the key inﬂuencers, this stage
focuses on incumbents at all levels in the rest of the organization. In
establishing credibility, it is important to bear in mind that cred-
ibility is not something that is taken, but rather something that is
given; in essence, it must be earned by the IS function and is derived
from achievements and actual results. The research data suggested
that building trust and mutual respect is a central aspect of the route
toward true partnership; distrust on both sides can emerge over the
years and is a legacy that can be diﬃcult to discard. It is equally
important to manage the expectations of the business and ensure
that the IS function does not over-promise. Education plays a key
role in this stage to impress upon business managers the process of
value creation through IT and the key role that they play in this
process.
Stage 4: Seek involvement early in projects
Having credibility is not an end in itself; rather, it establishes the
launch pad for passing through the ﬁnal stages. Without a credible
IS function, business managers are unlikely to risk being involved or
will be cautious in getting involved in IS-related matters, not to
mention assuming responsibility for activities and decisions tradi-
tionally made by the IS function. The research suggested that the
IS function should actively seek out the involvement of the business
in IS projects. Equally, the IS function should get involved in
projects when invited to by the business.
Stage 5: Place responsibility for IS with the business
The case data highlighted the importance of business managers
taking responsibility for aspects of IS that traditionally may have
been delegated to the IS function. This requires reframing the IS
governance structure, as many ‘IS decisions’ taken by the IS
function should often be the concern of business managers. The
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organization-wide nature of IS competencies and the distribution of
component resources has already been noted, and resource elements
from ‘the business’ are required for IS competencies to be enacted.
Stage 6: Cultivate and maintain partnership
Like any relationship, the relationship between the IS function and
the rest of the business must be continuously worked on. Both
technology and the business environments are continually
changing requiring appropriate responses to be made. Yet, there is
the danger of business management getting complacent and not
recognizing their contribution to IS success—reiterating the fact
that the resources underpinning IS competencies are enterprise-wide.
Box 8.6 Dulwich and Galway plc
The principal activity of Dulwich and Galway Financial Services
Group (D&G)* and its subsidiaries is the provision of a comprehen-
sive range of personal ﬁnancial services. In addition, the Group’s
principal subsidiary, Postbank plc, provides a wide range of banking
and ﬁnancial services to business and local authority customers. The
Group’s objective is to provide for its personal and business cus-
tomers a comprehensive range of mortgage, investment and personal
banking facilities that are high in quality and competitive in price.
D&G recognises that the delivery of shareholder value depends
upon our ability to create real value for our customers. This
involves retaining and growing mutually beneﬁcial relationships
through the development of innovative products; speedy delivery
through a wide range of accessible channels; excellent and ﬂexible
service; a strong brand; and anticipating and responding to
changing customer needs (Annual Report, 1997)
The Group, which employs nearly 7,500 employees, is divided into
three strategic business units each responsible for a speciﬁc business
area. The Retail Financial Services unit provides mortgage, in-
vestments and personal banking services. Postbank provides asset
ﬁnance, money transmission and merchant services. Group Treasury
are responsible for investments and management of corporate assets.
The business units are supported by the group functions, which
Bridging the Gap: Improving the Contribution of the IS Function 411
include Group Information Services (GIS) as well as Human Re-
sources, Strategic Planning, Finance and Corporate Aﬀairs.
GIS, employing approximately 650 staﬀ at two sites, is responsible
for the delivery and support of business initiatives by the exploita-
tion of new and existing technology. Its immediate customers are all
D&G business units. The ultimate customer is anyone who uses
D&G Group services and products (e.g. High Street Customers,
Corporate Customers, etc.). Core IT systems support over half a
million mortgages and over 4 million investment accounts. These
provide information for terminals operated by cashiers at over 350
branches and agents nationwide. Other systems provide support to
over 1 million personal banking customers, and to a large number of
blue-chip customers, as well as supporting the functions common to
any ﬁnancial services company (accounting, payroll, treasury, etc.).
GIS has traditionally had a rough time at D&G with a poor
reputation; in the words of one senior IT executive, ‘GIS was the
whipping boy.’ When projects did not go well, inevitably GIS got the
lion’s share of the blame. Given its weak position in the organiza-
tion, it was also reactive to business needs resulting in the develop-
ment of disparate systems and a real lack of systems integration, ‘. . .
over the last ﬁve years we have been excluded from the business
analysis side of things, we have been subservient to the business
. . .’ To further reinforce its disillusionment, many of the business
units simply bypassed GIS for IT services, going straight to third-
party vendors.
The arrival of a new IT director in 1996 saw the beginnings of a
programme to transform the performance of the function. Perhaps
consolidating the need for change, the result of a mid-1997 GIS staﬀ
survey were quite a shock for the top team of GIS. This survey
clearly indicated that morale was low, employees felt alienated,
and turnover was on the rise. A survey of internal customer satis-
faction, undertaken at the same time, highlighted that, at best, it was
indiﬀerent.
There had been pockets of activity to improve the performance of
the IT function prior to the arrival of the new IT director. These
included the service delivery transformation programme, improving
the delivery of systems (time, cost, quality, etc.) and general produc-
tivity improvements. A balanced Business Scorecard was also intro-
duced to track performance. However, the new IT director knew
that a step change was required if any signiﬁcant improvement in
the value-added contribution of the IT function was to be made.
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The World Class 2000 (WC2000) project was instigated during
1997. With this initiative, GIS set itself the task of becoming
world class by the year 2000; that is, to achieve world-class perform-
ance in all elements of the Business Excellence Model (BEM). The
BEM is based around a well-recognized framework originating for
the European Foundation for Quality Management. The model’s
structure forces completeness of thought to not only understand
the actions required to deliver objectives but also the actions
required to support this delivery through considerations of all funda-
mental business drivers. The model is based around the following
premise: Customer Satisfaction, People (employee) satisfaction and
Impact on Society are achieved through Leadership driving Policy
and Strategy, People Management, Resources and Processes, leading
ultimately to excellence in Business Results.
These nine criteria encompass all the aspects necessary for an
organization to operate successfully, and provides the underlying
framework for assessing the performance of all or part of an organ-
ization. The model divides into two principle sections—business
results and enablers. Results are what the organization achieves,
and the enablers are how the organization is run. Each criterion
has a diﬀerent score, reﬂecting its relative importance.
The IT director’s stated objective during 1998 was to ‘create the
environment in which we can develop our organisation towards
World Class status.’ He further noted that, ‘[S]uperior information
systems capability is central to the achievement of D&G business
objectives and will be critical to survival in an increasingly com-
petitive environment . . . The primary objective of Group IS is to
deliver a World Class Service and thereby support Shareholder
Value through the successful implementation of ‘‘Business Projects’’.’
Through WC2000, GIS had two central objectives. First, to be the
ﬁrst-choice supplier to the business units. One senior IT manager
noted that, ‘. . . we want the business to come to us ﬁrst, you know,
and always give us the chance ﬁrst of all, and we do that by, you
know, demonstrating that we are as good or better than external
suppliers.’ Second, to be the ﬁrst-choice employer for IS profes-
sionals; good people would come looking to A&L for employment
and career.
The BEM provided the framework for constructing the transfor-
mation programme. To populate the BEM with actions took six
months, and this process included workshops, interviews, and one-
on-one sessions. The bulk of this work was done by the GIS execu-
Bridging the Gap: Improving the Contribution of the IS Function 413
B
u
si
n
e
ss
E
x
c
e
ll
e
n
c
e
M
o
d
e
l
a
n
d
tr
a
n
sf
o
rm
a
ti
o
n
p
ro
g
ra
m
m
e
o
b
je
c
ti
v
e
s
414 Strategic Management of IS/IT: Organizing and Resourcing
B
u
si
n
e
ss
e
x
c
e
ll
e
n
c
e
m
o
d
e
l,
c
ri
ti
c
a
l
su
c
c
e
ss
fa
c
to
rs
(C
S
F
s)
a
n
d
k
e
y
p
e
rf
o
rm
a
n
c
e
in
d
ic
a
to
rs
(K
P
Is
)
TE
AM
FL
Y
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Team-Fly® 
SUMMARY
The previous chapter provided a framework of the applications portfolio
and high-level management strategies for IS/IT. Subsequent chapters deal
with aspects of strategy that, in many ways, are particular to IS/IT in
terms of information, systems and technology. This chapter has at-
tempted to consider the rationale for strategic management at the inter-
face between the particulars of IS/IT and the general management of the
organization. These strategies essentially address the matching and inte-
gration of the IS function to and within the business organization, and as
such have to be deﬁned by general management.
If these issues are not addressed both at the corporate level and for
each of the main business units and functions, it is likely that, throughout
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tive, with some support from its Organizational Development Unit.
The performance of GIS in each of the nine elements of the BEM
was assessed. This was done using the results of the customer and
staﬀ satisfaction surveys. Results for each element was analysed and
an Organization Development process provided a diagnostic on the
type and cause of the gaps between desired and actual performance
of each element of the BEM.
Critical Success Factors were designed from these data by the top
management team, which allowed subsequent development of Key
Performance Indicators and the actions necessary to achieve them.
These details were published in the 1998 GIS Operation Plan.
According to a senior manager, ‘the BEM gave us a complete frame-
work rather than just focusing on a particular area . . . not just knee-
jerk decisions to some of the problems that we may have.’ This plan
is now updated twice per annum. GIS staﬀ are kept updated on
progress via regular brieﬁngs, monthly communications sessions, a
newsletter and supporting documentation.
At the beginning of the initiative, GIS undertook a self-assessment
exercise and scored 291 out of 1000. ‘World class’ is generally
regarded as a score in excess of 500. To further illustrate the
enormity of the task they faced, the Customer Satisfaction index
maximum score is 200. In August 1997 D&G scored 63/200; by
April 1998 it had improved to 67, still substantially lower than
required. Employee Satisfaction in 1998 was 16 out of a maximum
score of 90. By 2000 the company had achieved world-class status.
*Name has been changed.
the organization, behaviour will not be consistent with the strategy. The
result will be failure to implement the strategy. It is obviously important
to devise appropriate business-driven IS strategies and then appropriate
IT-supply strategies. But, having a strategy is not going to lead to
business success! Implementing and then updating that strategy as the
business progresses is how success will occur. Mechanisms must be put in
place to ensure that happens. A number of these mechanisms are con-
sidered in this chapter—primarily those concerning the organization of
resources and their positioning in the business in relation to its other
primary and support activities—and ways of ensuring that those re-
sources are most appropriately deployed.
One conclusion, and hence an extension of the discussion into organ-
izational overlays, is that, except perhaps in the simplest businesses, there
is as yet no ideal organization structure for IS/IT within the business
structure. This should perhaps not be surprising given the relatively
recent arrival on the business scene of IS/IT and its rapidly-changing
nature and importance. Many general managers perhaps wish the IS/IT
management problem might ‘go away’ or become simple again—the
‘IT manager’ reports to Finance—but it will not, and will need to be
addressed in every organization repeatedly over the coming decade.
Equally, other issues concerning IS/IT that management would
perhaps prefer not to have to deal with are those resulting from the
specialist people IS/IT involves. These people often have a career-
versus-company conﬂict of loyalty and do not easily conform to the
culture of the company. But, experienced, capable people with the requi-
site skills are becoming in even shorter supply, and without them business
objectives may become unachievable. Strategies for ensuring that these
critical resources are retained and developed are an essential part of the
management strategy.
These organizational and resourcing issues of IS/IT strategy are those
that become very critical during implementation and can lead to the
failure to achieve what should have been a perfectly-feasible strategy,
because they are ignored or dealt with ineﬀectively by the senior manage-
ment of the enterprise.
ENDNOTES
1. M.J. Earl, ‘Integrating IS and the organization: A framework of organizational ﬁt’, in M.J.
Earl, ed., Information Management: The Organizational Dimension, Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 1996, pp. 485–502.
2. R.E. Dvorak, E. Holen, D. Mark and W.F. Meehan, ‘Six principles of high-performance
IT’, The McKinsey Quarterly, No. 3, 1997, 164–177; P.G.W. Keen, ‘Information technology
and the management diﬀerence: A fusion map’, IBM Systems Journal, Vol. 32, No. 1, 1993,
17–39; T.C. Powell and A. Dent-Micallef, ‘Information technology as competitive advan-
416 Strategic Management of IS/IT: Organizing and Resourcing
tage: the role of human, business and technology resources’, Strategic Management Journal,
Vol. 18, No. 5, 1997, 375–405; J.W. Ross, C. Mathis Beath and D. Goodhue, ‘Develop long-
term competitiveness through IT assets’, Sloan Management Review, Fall, 1996, 31–42.
3. R.G. Hayward, ‘Developing an information systems strategy’, Long Range Planning, Vol.
20, No. 2, 1987, 100–113.
4. M.J. Earl, Management Strategies for Information Technology, Prentice-Hall, Hemel Hemp-
stead, 1989.
5. It should be pointed out that other writers take a diﬀerent perspective regarding information
management. For example, while Marchand makes the distinction between IS, IT and IM,
he views IM somewhat diﬀerently, relating it directly to the content, quality and use of
information necessary for running an organization, such as operational controls, customer
services and ﬁnancial reporting. See D. Marchand, ‘Creating business value with informa-
tion’, in D. Marchand, ed., Competing with Information, John Wiley & Sons, Chichester,
UK, pp. 17–30.
6. Key research studies and papers include: A.C. Boynton, G.C. Jacobs and R.W. Zmud,
‘Whose responsibility is IT management’, Sloan Management Review, Summer, 1992, 32–
38; C.V. Brown, ‘Horizontal mechanisms under diﬀering IS organization contexts’, MIS
Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 3, 1999, 421–455; C.V. Brown and S.L. Magill, ‘Alignment of the IS
function with the enterprise: Towards a model of antecedents’, MIS Quarterly, Vol. 18,
1994, 371–403; J. Dearden, ‘The withering away of the IS organisation’, Sloan Management
Review, Summer, 1987, 87–91; G. DeSanctis and B.M. Jackson, ‘Coordination of informa-
tion technology management: Team-based structures and computer-based communication
systems’, Journal of Management Information Systems, Vol. 10, No. 4, 1994, 85–110; M.J.
Earl, B. Edwards and D.F. Feeny, ‘Conﬁguring the IS function in complex organisations’, in
M.J. Earl, ed., Information Management: The Organizational Dimension, Oxford University
Press, New York, 1996, pp. 201–230; J. George and J. King, ‘Examining the computing and
centralization debate’, Communications of the ACM, Vol. 34, No. 7, 1991, 63–72; S.L.
Hodgkinson, ‘The role of the corporate IT function in the federal IT organization’, in
M.J. Earl, ed., Information Management: The Organizational Dimension, Oxford University
Press, New York, 1996, pp. 247–269; J.L. King, ‘Centralized versus decentralized comput-
ing: Organizational considerations and management options’, Computing Surveys, Vol. 15,
No. 4, pp. 319–340; R. Peterson, R. O’Callaghan and P. Ribbers, ‘Information technology
governance by design: Investing hybrid conﬁgurations and integration mechanisms’, in
Proceeding of the 21st International Conference on Information Systems, Brisbane, Australia,
December 2000, pp. 435–542; V. Sambamurthy and R.W. Zmud, ‘Arrangements for in-
formation technology governance: A theory of multiple contingencies’, MIS Quarterly,
Vol. 23, No. 2, 1999, 261–290.
7. From F. Keenan and T. Mullaney, ‘Let’s get back to basics, folks’, BusinessWeek, e.biz, 29
October 2001.
8. ‘Organising for the 1990s’, EDP Analyser, Vol. 12, 1986.
9. A. La Belle, and H.E. Nyce, ‘Whither the IT organisation?’, Sloan Management Review,
Summer, 1987, 75–85.
10. Merged with Chemical Banking Corporation on 31 December 1991.
11. M. Krumbholz, J. Galliers and N. Coulianos, ‘Implementing enterprise resource planning
packages in diﬀerent corporate and national cultures’, Journal of Information Technology,
Vol. 15, 2000, 267–279; M.L. Markus, S. Axline, D. Petrie and C. Tanis, ‘Learning from
adopters’ experiences with ERP: Problems encountered and success achieved’, Journal of
Information Technology, Vol. 15, 2000, 245–265; M.L. Markus, C. Tanis and P.C. van
Fenema, ‘Multisite ERP implementations’, Communications of the ACM, Vol. 43, No. 4,
2000, 42–46; S.J. Simon, ERP Software Conﬁguration for Worldwide Markets: Issues of
Strategic Fit, Department of Decision Sciences and Information Systems, Florida Inter-
national University, 1999; C. Stedman, ‘Move to single global ERP system no easy task’,
Computerworld, 17 January 2000.
12. J.R. Buchanan and R.G. Linowes, ‘Making distributed data processing work’, Harvard
Business Review, September–October 1980, 143–161; J. George and J. King, ‘Examining
the computing and centralization debate’, Communications of the ACM, Vol. 34, No. 7,
1991, 63–72; S.L Hodgkinson, ‘The role of the corporate IT function in the federal IT
organisation’, in M.J. Earl, ed., Information Management: The Organizational Dimension,
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996, pp. 247–269; E.M. von Simson, ‘The centrally
decentralized IS organization’, Harvard Business Review, July–August 1990, 158–162.
13. E.M. von Simson, ‘The centrally decentralized IS organization’, Harvard Business Review,
July–August 1990, 158–162.
Endnotes 417
14. S.L. Hodgkinson, ‘The role of the corporate IT function in the federal IT organization’, in
M.J. Earl, ed., Information Management: The Organizational Dimension, Oxford University
Press, New York, 1996, pp. 247–269.
15. C.H. Sullivan, ‘Systems planning in the information age’, Sloan Management Review,
Winter, 1985, 3–11.
16. J.F. Rockart, M.J. Earl and J.W. Ross, ‘Eight imperatives for the new IT organisation’,
Sloan Management Review, Fall, 1996, 43–55.
17. N. Venkatraman, ‘Beyond outsourcing: Managing IT resources as a value center’, Sloan
Management Review, Spring, 1997, 51–64.
18. IS Lite: The Future, Research Report, GartnerGroup, Egham, Surrey, 1999.
19. M.E. Earl and B. Khan, How IT Departments Are Responding to the Challenges of E-
Commerce, Centre for the Networked Economy, London Business School, 2001, CNE
WP04/2001.
20. Evolving Competencies for IS Lite, Research Report, GartnerGroup, Egham, Surrey,
September 2000.
21. E.B. Swanson and C.M. Beath, ‘Reconstructing the systems development organization’,
MIS Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 3, 1989, 293–305.
22. M.J. Earl, B. Edwards and D.F. Feeny, ‘Conﬁguring the IS function in complex organiza-
tions’, in M.J. Earl, ed., Information Management: The Organisational Dimensions, Oxford
University Press, New York, 1996, 201–230.
23. Managing the Devolution of Systems Responsibilities, Butler Cox Foundation, Research
Report 81, June 1991; M.J. Earl, B. Edwards and D. Feeny, ‘Conﬁguring the IS function
in complex organizations’, in M.J. Earl, ed., Information Management: The Organizational
Dimension, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996, pp. 201–230.
24. Note that we use the term ‘information management strategies’ in a diﬀerent way than Earl
does. We use it to refer speciﬁcally to strategies regarding information.
25. T. Clark, R. Zmud and G. McCray, ‘The outsourcing of information services: Transforming
the nature of business in the information industry’, in L.P. Willcocks and M.C. Lacity, eds,
Strategic Sourcing of Information Systems, John Wiley & Sons, Chichester, UK, 1998,
pp. 45–78.
26. L. Loh and N. Venkatraman, ‘Diﬀusion of information technology outsourcing: Inﬂuence
sources and the Kodak eﬀect’, Information Systems Research, Vol. 3, No. 4, 1992, 334–358.
27. M.C. Lacity, L.P. Willcocks and D.F. Feeny, ‘The value of selective IT sourcing’, Sloan
Management Review, Spring, 1996, 13–25; M.C. Lacity, L.P. Willcocks and D.F. Feeny, ‘IT
outsourcing: Maximizing ﬂexibility and control’, Harvard Business Review, May–June 1995,
84–93.
28. L.P. Willcocks and M.C. Lacity, ‘Introduction—the sourcing and outsourcing of IS: Shock
of the new’, in L.P. Willcocks and M.C. Lacity, eds, Strategic Sourcing of Information
Systems, John Wiley & Sons, Chichester, UK, 1998, pp. 1–41.
29. C. Griﬃths, ‘Responsibility for IT: A gray area of management’, in L. Willcocks, ed.,
Information Management: The Evaluation of Information Systems Investments, Chapman
& Hall, London, 1994, pp. 223–250.
30. R.I. Benjamin, C. Dickinson, and J.F. Rockart, ‘Changing role of the corporate information
systems oﬃcer,’ MIS Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 3, 1985, 177–188.
31. ‘Are CIOs obsolete?’, Harvard Business Review, March–April, 2000, 55–63.
32. M.J. Earl and D. Feeny, ‘Is your CIO adding value’, Sloan Management Review, Spring,
1994, 11–20.
33. Conclusion from the authors’ research as well as that of Earl. See M.J. Earl, ‘Change isn’t
optional for today’s CIO’, in D. Marchand, T.H. Davenport and T. Dickson, eds,Mastering
Information Management, Pearson Educational, London, 2000, pp. 69–72; and ‘The chief
information oﬃcer: Past, present and future’, in M.J. Earl, ed., Information Management:
The Organizational Dimension, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996, pp. 456–484; J.W.
Peppard, ‘Bridging the gap between the IS function and the rest of the business: Plotting a
route’, Information Systems Journal, Vol. 11, 2001, 249–270.
34. M.L. Pedersen and K. Rubenstrunk, ‘The IT leadership vacuum’, CIO, 15 September 1999.
35. M.J. Earl, Management Strategies for Information Technology, Prentice-Hall, Englewood
Cliﬀs, New Jersey, 1989.
36. D.H. Drury, ‘An evaluation of data processing steering committees’,MIS Quarterly, Vol. 8,
No. 4, 1984, 257–265.
37. Y.P. Gupta and T. S. Raghunathan, ‘Impact of information systems steering committees on
IS planning’, Decision Sciences, Fall, 1988, Vol. 19, No. 4.
38. For example, R.D. Galliers, Y. Merali and L. Spearing, ‘Coping with information technol-
ogy? How British executives perceive the key information systems management issues in the
mid 1990s’, Journal of Information Technology, Vol. 9, No. 3, 1994.
418 Strategic Management of IS/IT: Organizing and Resourcing
39. D.F. Feeny and L.P. Willcocks, ‘Redesigning the IS function around core capabilities’, Long
Range Planning, Vol. 31, No. 3, 1998, 354–367; D.F. Feeny and L.P. Willcocks, ‘Core IS
capabilities for exploiting information technology’, Sloan Management Review, Spring,
1998, 9–21.
40. In their actual research, they used, the word ‘capability’, but the meaning is identical to how
we have used the word competency.
41. D.A. Marchand, W. Kettinger and J.D. Rollins, ‘Information orientation: People, technol-
ogy and bottom line’, Sloan Management Review, Summer, 2000, 69–80.
42. J.W. Peppard, R. Lambert and C.E. Edwards, ‘Whose job is it anyway?: Organizational
information competencies for value creation’, Information Systems Journal, Vol. 10, No. 4,
2000, 291–323.
43. D.A Marchand, ‘Why information is the responsibility of every manager’, in D.A.
Marchand, ed., Competing with Information: A Manager’s Guide to Creating Business
Value with Information Content, John Wiley and Sons, Chichester, UK, 2000, pp. 3–16;
D.A. Marchand, W. Kettinger and J.D. Rollins, ‘Information orientation: People, technol-
ogy and bottom line’, Sloan Management Review, Summer, 2000, 69–80.
44. P.G.W. Keen, ‘Rebuilding the human resources of information systems’, in M. Earl, ed.,
Information Management: The Strategic Dimension, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988.
45. N. Venkatraman and L. Loh, ‘The shifting logic of the IS organization: From technical
portfolio to relationship portfolio’, Information Strategy: The Executive’s Journal, Winter,
1994, 5–11.
46. E.H. Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1992
(chapter 12, ‘Management and information technology: Two subcultures in collision?’,
pp. 276–294).
47. K. Grindley, Managing IT at Board Level: The Hidden Agenda Exposed, Pitman Publishing,
London, 1991.
48. R.D. Galliers and A.R. Sutherland, ‘Information systems management and strategy for-
mulation—the stages of growth model revisited’, Journal of Information Systems, Vol. 1, No.
1, 1991, 89–114.
49. A.D. Crescenzi, ‘The dark side of strategic IS implementation’, Information Strategy: The
Executive’s Journal, Fall, 1988.
50. J.M. Ward and J.W. Peppard, ‘Reconciling the IT/business relationship: A troubled
marriage in need of guidance’, Journal of Strategic Information Systems, Vol. 5, No. 1,
1996, 37–65.
51. G. Fitzgerald and V. Mitchell, ‘The IT outsourcing marketplace: Vendors and their selec-
tion’, paper presented at The Management Challenges of IT Conference, Cranﬁeld School of
Management, Cranﬁeld, Bedford, UK, July 1994.
52. J.W. Peppard and J.M. Ward, ‘Mind the gap: Diagnosing the relationship between the IT
organization and the rest of the business’, Journal of Strategic Information Systems, Vol. 8,
1999, 29–60.
53. Some research in this area includes B. Bensau and N. Venkatraman, ‘Inter-organizational
relationships and information technology: A conceptual synthesis and research framework’,
European Journal of Information Systems, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1996, 84–91; D. Lasher, B. Ives and
S. Jarvenpaa, ‘USAA-IBM partnerships in information technology: Managing the image
project’, MIS Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 4, 1991, 551–565; W. McFarlan and R. Nolan, ‘How
to manage an IT outsourcing alliance’, Sloan Management Review, Winter, 1995, 9–23; L.P.
Willcocks and T. Kern, ‘IT outsourcing as strategic partnering: The case of the UK Inland
Revenue’, in Proceedings of the Fifth European Conference in Information Systems, Cork,
Ireland, June, 1997, pp. 1471–1489.
54. W. McFarlan and R. Nolan, ‘How to manage an IT outsourcing alliance’, Sloan Manage-
ment Review, Winter, 1995, 9–23.
55. F. Dwyer, P. Schurr and S. Oh, ‘Developing buyer–seller relationships’, Journal of Market-
ing, Vol. 51, 1987, 11–27.
56. M.J. Earl and J. Sampler, ‘Market management to transform the IT organisation’, Sloan
Management Review, Summer, 1998, 9–17.
57. J.W. Peppard, ‘Bridging the gap between the IS function and the rest of the business:
Plotting a route’, Information Systems Journal, Vol. 11, 2001, 249–270.
Endnotes 419
9
Managing Investments in
Information Systems
and Technology
The applications portfolio will include a range of diﬀerent IS/IT
investments that have been identiﬁed as new developments or signiﬁcant
enhancements to existing systems. Before resources are assigned and
development begins, several other steps need to be taken, including
establishing the expected beneﬁts of the investments, justifying the
costs of the systems, technology and business changes involved and
allocating priorities to individual developments across the portfolio.
These decisions can all be aided by reference to application portfolio
analysis, which provides a straightforward way of understanding the
nature of the contributions expected from investments in relation to
current and future business strategies. As was discussed in Chapter 8,
organizational IS competencies in relation to establishing eﬀective
investment appraisal processes, setting priorities and delivering the
beneﬁts expected are key ingredients of successful IS/IT strategic
management. Using the competency framework to assess organizations’
overall IS capability often reveals major weaknesses in these areas.
In particular, planning for and managing the beneﬁts and the business
changes essential to realizing them is cited as a continuing failing in
many organizations.1 Having a strategy is only a means to an end—
delivering the business results required from the strategy is the main
objective.
This chapter tackles some of the main issues relating to decision
making and management of IS/IT investments:
. justifying investments in information systems and the associated
technology, using various ways of assessing beneﬁts;
. determining priorities, taking into account the range of economic
and other types of business beneﬁt, resource constraints and logical
factors of precedence;
. processes for managing the realization of the expected beneﬁts;
. assessing the risks of the investments based on the characteristics of
the application and the approach to its management.
INVESTMENT AND PRIORITY SETTING POLICIES
Investments in systems and technology compete with alternative invest-
ments such as buildings, plant, equipment, research and development
(R&D) and advertising, for the organization’s funds. IS/IT investments
have traditionally been evaluated like capital projects such as plant and
equipment assuming a ﬁxed cost oﬀset against net revenue over the life of
the application. However, many modern applications are more like ‘new
business ventures’ or business initiatives where the ﬁnancial aspects of the
outcome can only be guessed and the technology is only one component
of a major change program. There is no simple answer to the question: on
what basis should IS/IT investments be assessed against other invest-
ments? However, it is important that some general rules are established,
within which applications and supporting technology requirements are
evaluated. Otherwise, any strategy will be distorted over time by incon-
sistent, even arbitrary, decision making.
If the organization was able to develop, at any one time, all the
applications demanded, inconsistent evaluation would not really
matter. The overall return on IS/IT investment might be very poor, but
at least the worthwhile would get done as well as the worthless! However,
in most cases not all demand can be satisﬁed and priorities must be set. If
no consistent justiﬁcation approach is followed, the more beneﬁcial ap-
plications may well be deferred, allowing those that make a lesser con-
tribution to proceed. Assuming that does not mean an opportunity
completely forgone, which may occur with delay, the resources and
funds invested will have provided a poorer return than could have been
achieved—hardly good management practice!
An obvious conclusion from the above is that the same principles and
practice should govern the ‘go–no go’ decisions for individual applica-
tions and deciding priorities across applications competing for resources.
The only additional factor, assuming that systems are not sequentially
dependent, is the amount of resource consumed. The limiting factor is
normally people, in quantity or quality (particular skills or knowledge),
but the same logic applies whatever is the limiting resource (e.g.
ﬁnance)—priority setting should enable maximum return from the use
of that resource.
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EVALUATING IS/IT INVESTMENTS
Much has been written about how investments in IS/IT should be
assessed and justiﬁed. There is little, if any, consensus on how it should
be done, but considerable consensus that the methods used are rarely
appropriate! Several surveys have shown that there is still virtually no
consistency in the practices used. Cooke and Parrish2 discovered that
70% of organizations had no formal justiﬁcation and post-implementa-
tion review process for IS/IT investments. Farbey et al.3 found that only
50% of IS/IT projects were subject to formal preinvestment appraisal; in
less than half the cases was a recognized ﬁnancial analysis technique used,
and in barely 30% was the outcome of the investment evaluated. They,
like many others, suggest that given the wide variety of types of IS/IT
investment and the wide range of beneﬁt types, which can be quantiﬁed to
greater or lesser degrees, a multiplicity of methods for justifying invest-
ments is needed. But, they recognize that selecting the right approach in
any situation can itself be fraught with organizational and political
problems.
Other analyses by Ballantine et al.4 and Willcocks and Lester5 suggest
that traditional ﬁnancial analysis techniques are still commonly in use,
but that organizations are ﬁnding it increasingly diﬃcult to use them as
the types of beneﬁt become more diﬃcult to quantify adequately.
Hochstrasser,6 Peters7 and Symons8 all suggest ways in which diﬀerent
techniques can be used to evaluate diﬀerent types of project. Interest-
ingly, Lincoln and Shorrock9 found that many successful ‘strategic’ IS/IT
projects had bypassed the normal justiﬁcation process used in the organ-
ization. Overall, organizations are far from satisﬁed with the techniques
and processes they have for IS/IT investment appraisal—only 36% felt
they were adequate in a survey10 of major UK corporations.
Grindley11 summed up the mistrust of conventional justiﬁcation
methods in two insights from his survey:
. 83% of IT directors admit that the cost–beneﬁt analyses supporting
IT investment proposals are a ﬁction;
. quote from a CEO: ‘It’s like there is a spontaneous conspiracy to
exaggerate the beneﬁts.’ Many others would agree, no doubt!
A number of good papers on this subject are included in a book edited
by Willcocks, entitled Information Management: The Evaluation of
Information Systems Investments.12 The approach described here is
taken from one of the chapters of that book, but the authors recognize
there is considerable merit in many of the other methods proposed.
Farbey et al.’s book IT Investments: A Study of Methods and Practice,13
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for example, provides a detailed assessment of the issues involved and
how diﬀerent approaches to evaluation are needed to accommodate
them.
A pure technology investment cannot strictly give a return on invest-
ment, unless it replaces an older technology and carries out the same
functions more eﬃciently. Most technology investments are justiﬁed on
the back of applications. Even if capacity and infrastructure components
have to be purchased in advance of the need, the justiﬁcation should be
primarily based on their subsequent use in business applications and the
resulting beneﬁts. However, it is often diﬃcult to associate all infrastruc-
ture investments with the subsequent beneﬁts of using applications, even
where sophisticated capital cost recovery accounting techniques are used.
More comprehensive approaches to developing the case for investing in
infrastructure are considered in Chapter 11.
Another point of evaluation logic, which is perhaps peculiar to IS/IT
investments, is the way in which particular costs and beneﬁts should be
treated. Most accounting evaluation practices are conservative, expecting
the worst and mistrusting the best. Raw IT costs have been reducing at
25% per annum for some 25 years, and this is diﬃcult for accounting
procedures to accept when evaluating systems with 5, 8 or 10-year lives.
This changing reality of running costs of systems over time must be
allowed for where shared resources are used. It is important to take a
realistic (even marginal) view of the costs rather than a theoretical one.
Equally frequently, the full costs of ‘development’ are not included.
Normally, the IS function and procurement costs for hardware,
software licences and purchased services are estimated in some detail,
but costs incurred by business departments in specifying, testing and
implementing the system are rarely included adequately.
On the other side of the coin, identifying and quantifying the beneﬁts
of any system can be a diﬃcult, even impossible, task, as suggested above.
In their book, Parker et al.14 assess in detail the ways in which informa-
tion and systems beneﬁts accrue and how they can be quantiﬁed to help
in justifying investments. They consider three main types of application:
1. substitutive—technology replacing people with economics being the
main driving force, to improve eﬃciency.
2. complementary—improving organizational productivity and em-
ployee eﬀectiveness by enabling work to be performed in new ways;
3. innovative—achieving a competitive edge by changing trading
practice, creating new markets, etc.
They suggest ways in which each of the diﬀerent types of application
should be justiﬁed and deﬁne ﬁve basic techniques for evaluating beneﬁts:
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1. Traditional cost–beneﬁt analysis, which allows for eﬃciency im-
provements in organizational processes resulting from automation
(e.g. automating invoices and sending them electronically to cus-
tomers via e-commerce, saving labour and data entry costs for all
parties).
2. Value linking, which estimates the improvement in business perform-
ance, not just savings made, from improving the linkages between
processes or activities (e.g. automatic reconciliation of orders,
invoices and payments to enable accounts staﬀ to spend more time
resolving customer queries and issues, leading to fewer bad debts and
less dissatisﬁed customers); or interactive component design with
suppliers via a shared Computer-Aided Design (CAD) system, to
reduce the number of iterations needed.
3. Value acceleration, which considers time dependence of beneﬁts and
costs in other departments of system improvements (e.g. giving sales
data to buyers on a daily basis, improving their ability to respond to
changes in demand and negotiate more eﬀectively with suppliers).
This implies that beneﬁts can occur in other parts of the business,
not just where the system is actually implemented.
4. Value restructuring, which considers the productivity resulting from
process and organizational change and change of job roles (e.g.
information-intensive tasks such as forecasting and planning can
often only be improved by a combination of better systems and a
change in organizational responsibilities).
5. Innovation evaluation attempts to estimate the value to the business of
new business or new business practices levered from IS/IT (e.g. the
launch of an online banking service may change the company image
and attract new types of customers).
The above categories of beneﬁt evaluation are suggested to be related to
their application types and the portfolio classiﬁcation, as shown in
Figure 9.1. There are also obvious similarities with the beneﬁts derived
from diﬀerent levels of IT-induced transformation described in
Chapter 1.15 By analysing costs and beneﬁts using these techniques, the
overall ‘economics’ of an application can be assessed. The ideas are
certainly more creative in interpreting information’s long-term value
than traditional accounting views of systems investments.
Although it is important to quantify and express in ﬁnancial terms as
many of the costs and beneﬁts as possible, it is simply not feasible to
express all the beneﬁts of ‘systems’ in ﬁnancial terms, and it serves no
useful purpose to develop spurious calculations to quantify the unquan-
tiﬁable! If a new system will reduce staﬀ frustration and stress by organiz-
ing policy and procedure information in an electronic library, accessible
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from every desktop via an Intranet, it is diﬃcult to calculate all the
beneﬁts ﬁnancially even after the event, let alone before it has
happened. However, as will be seen on page 442, it is important to
determine in advance how any intended beneﬁt will be measured. In
this case, a staﬀ survey could be an appropriate measuring instrument,
along with measures of absenteeism or turnover to determine the overall
eﬀect.
What is more important is to base the assessment of application
investments on the overall nature of the contribution they are expected
to deliver to the business. The portfolio approach can oﬀer help in
making such judgements. The rationale for developing applications or
investing funds and resources in each segment of the matrix is diﬀerent,
therefore the evaluation process should be diﬀerent. The arguments used
to justify a prototype system to model customer online buying behaviour
are not the same as those used to justify a replacement of the general
accounting system. Equally, response to a competitor’s online service,
which is causing customer attrition, and a decision to bring together
data from disparate applications in a data warehouse require diﬀerent
approaches to evaluation. The risks and consequences of failure in the
various segments are also diﬀerent. This can be allowed for by requiring
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Figure 9.1 Relationship between benefit types and the application portfolio
a higher predicted rate of return where the risk is higher, although this
may in turn merely lead to creative accounting for the beneﬁts! It is
perhaps better to analyse the inherent nature of the risks and take
appropriate action to deal with them, as far as possible, as will be
outlined later.
The portfolio approach suggests that:
. Quantiﬁed, ﬁnancial justiﬁcation of applications is easier in the key
operational and support quadrants, where most aspects of the
application will be better known or can be determined, risks are
lower and the rate of change is slower.
. A singular approach to investment justiﬁcation will tend to produce
one type of application to the exclusion of others. This argument is
particularly strong where a scarce resource approach has been
adopted and pure ﬁnancial return on investment decides investment
priorities—support applications will always be easier to justify ﬁnan-
cially.
. The way in which applications are planned and managed by the
organization will also aﬀect the way in which they are justiﬁed—
whether they are customer-related applications integral to achieving
business objectives or systems intended to save major costs in one
part of the organization.
Figure 9.2 highlights some of the key points to be considered in the
evaluation of applications in each segment.
Support Applications
The main argument for such systems is improving eﬃciency, which
should be possible to quantify and convert into a ﬁnancial argument
for investment. Additional arguments may revolve around system and
technology obsolescence and general staﬀ productivity/time saving, and
these may be diﬃcult to identify accurately and therefore to quantify. In
this segment, it is reasonable to expect potential beneﬁts to be estimated
before resources and costs are incurred to identify the most economic
solution within the beneﬁts achievable.
Again, if the application is competing with others for the limited
resource, then a support application must show a good economic
return for the allocation of a scarce resource. If, however, the project
can be carried out within the user department’s control, then it is
reasonable that, since the budget or funding is under local control, the
‘go–no go’ decision is made by local user management. The IS/IT invest-
ment is an alternative use of funds to other investments locally and is not
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competing with alternative use of scarce IS/IT resources. It is to be hoped
that user management will expect the case to be argued in predominantly
ﬁnancial terms, but if not that is their responsibility.
In summary, assuming a scarce resource strategy is being adopted
centrally for most support applications, then any allocation of that
resource should be argued on economic, return-on-investment grounds
primarily. At the same time, some discretion can, without great risk, be
left to local management via a free-market strategy.
Key Operational Applications
While, as far as possible, all costs and beneﬁts of a new development,
redevelopment or major enhancement to a key operational system should
be converted to a ﬁnancial evaluation, this may not allow for all the
arguments involved.
For support systems, it was suggested that beneﬁts should be estimated
before any resource is allocated or costs determined. This is inappropriate
for key operational applications, where ﬁnancial beneﬁts are not the only
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Figure 9.2 Investment justification
driving force. The most economic solution in the short term may not be
the most eﬀective over the long term given the role such applications play
in the core business processes. This is the area for strict ‘feasibility study’
to ﬁnd the best solution from a range of alternatives, each with diﬀering
costs, beneﬁts and risks.
The business may suﬀer a serious disadvantage if a system fails or
becomes less adequate in meeting the business needs as they evolve. It
might be worth spending more to achieve a more adaptable or integrated
solution that meets a range of needs more eﬀectively and upon which new
strategic applications can be built. Normally, this will increase the cost
and make the overall beneﬁts diﬃcult to express ﬁnancially. Some of
those additional beneﬁts will be able to be related to critical success
factors (CSFs), which provide a clear link of the investment to the
achievement of business objectives. An argument often used is ‘what
will happen to the business if we do not invest in improving this key-
operational system?’ and therefore ‘can we aﬀord the risk of not doing it?’
Perhaps the term ‘critical failure factor’ is more appropriate when con-
sidering the possible disadvantages of not investing.
The implementation strategy that works best for key operational
systems is monopoly, which implies a central control and vetting of all
applications and enhancements. This enables a standard checklist of
questions to be considered in the evaluation of any new project.
Factors that are important (other than economic return) from either a
business or IS/IT perspective can be allowed for and, if necessary,
changed over time. The monopoly approach should also avoid imple-
menting solutions based solely on economic expediency rather than
business beneﬁts, although it may mean that a particular application
may cost more in the short term.
In conclusion, it should be stressed that, for key operational systems,
the business unit management should be the ﬁnal arbiter. It is their
business that will suﬀer by lack of investment and they should
(provided they can aﬀord to pay) be allocated the necessary resource to
meet such systems needs. It is clearly untenable to allow competitive
disadvantages to develop due to lack of investment in IS/IT.
Strategic Applications
The fact that an application is deemed strategic implies that it is integral
to achieving aspects of the future business strategy. Obviously, it is
important to cost the investment and, where possible, put ﬁgures to
the potential beneﬁts, even if the latter are only ranges or orders of
magnitude, not estimates suitable for a discounted cash-ﬂow calculation.
However, the main reasons for proceeding are likely to remain mainly
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non-ﬁnancial—expressed as the business opportunity that is being
created or the CSFs that the application speciﬁcally addresses.
The strategy most appropriate for this part of the matrix is central
planning, whereby IS/IT opportunities and threats are being considered
along with the business issues and strategies. Hence, an application will
get the ‘go–no go’ decision based on how directly it relates to the business
objectives and particular strategies. The beneﬁts will derive from achiev-
ing those objectives by enabling the required business changes, not from
the system alone. Whether this will actually happen is partly a question of
luck (that the target does not move), partly of judgement (the quality of
business acumen of senior managers) and partly good management of the
application development and associated business changes.
A key issue is whether the management team, steering group or
whoever makes such decisions is uniﬁed in endorsing the project and
that the ‘organization’ deems the investment worthwhile. The critical
factor is then resourcing the task suﬃciently to achieve the objectives
in the optimum timescale. This may need repeated senior management
intervention to ensure that both user and IT resources are made
available. The budget for such investments and ﬁnancial control of
actual expenditure should perhaps reside with the steering group to
ensure that progress and resourcing are centrally monitored as well as
planned.
High Potential Applications
The very essence of high potential projects is that the beneﬁts are
unknown and the objective is to identify the beneﬁts potentially available
and how they could be achieved. It should be justiﬁed on the same basis
as any other type of R&D, and preferably from a general R&D budget
rather than IS/IT funds. In practice, where the money comes from—
R&D budget or IS/IT or user budgets—is important, but not critical.
What does matter is not pouring money down the seemingly bottomless
pit that R&D can become, if not properly monitored. It must be
remembered that many high potential ideas tend to arise informally,
based on individuals’ creative thinking, rather than from formal
planning, and it is important not to stiﬂe creativity through excessive
bureaucracy. However, many of the ideas simply will not work! and
some control is essential to avoid signiﬁcant waste of resources. It can
be argued that many e-commerce/e-business investments in 2000–2001
could have beneﬁted from better evaluation of their potential, before
large sums were spent on IT implementations that were based on incor-
rect assumptions and little, if any, objective assessment of their potential
value.
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The idea of ‘product champions’ to be responsible for such projects,
given a budget against agreed general terms of reference to deliver results
or otherwise, is the most eﬀective way of initiating and managing the high
potential stage in application life cycles. No investment should stay in this
segment for too long or have too much money spent on it. When initial
allocations are used up, further sums have to be justiﬁed based on the
evidence of the possible beneﬁts, not just allocated in the vague hope of
eventual success.
This approach ﬁts the leading-edge and free-market strategies for the
experimentation and assessment that high potential applications need.
However, it should be obvious that those responsible for ensuring that
central planning works for strategic applications must be aware of what is
being evaluated in the high potential segment and by whom and over
what timescale.
The above approaches to application justiﬁcation in the various
segments may lack the precision ideally required. But, this is no more
than is true of other investments in research and development, advertis-
ing, reorganization, building new plant or facilities, or launching new
products and services. IS/IT investments should be considered just as
objectively and just as subjectively as other business investments. The
portfolio approach allows the balance to vary according to the
expected contribution required.
SETTING PRIORITIES FOR APPLICATIONS
As mentioned earlier, the mechanisms used to decide whether or not
applications go ahead should also be used to set priorities across applica-
tions when they cannot all be done in parallel. Some priorities are
logical—Project B, for analysing customer data, cannot proceed before
Project A has built the data warehouse, for example—but many are
largely independent of one another.
It is important to introduce a consistent, practical approach to priority
setting if any strategy is to be implemented successfully. Short-term
business pressures will change, projects will not proceed as planned,
resources will not be available as expected, new opportunities and re-
quirements will emerge. Each of these can cause changes to priorities
and, unless a consistent rationale is employed, ‘crisis management’ will
repeatedly override the strategy. Priorities need to be set in the short term
to enable the best use of resources within the acquisition lead time for
further resources, assuming these are actually obtainable. Priority setting
is at the core of eﬀective strategic management—selecting the best invest-
ments to pursue and, perhaps even more importantly, those to defer or
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abandon. Inadequate mechanisms for agreeing priorities are a signiﬁcant
cause of organizational failure to deploy IS/IT successfully.
Based on the earlier discussion of application evaluation, it should be
seen that setting priorities across applications of a similar type (i.e.
support, key operational, etc.) is not too diﬃcult. After ranking them
on similarly expressed beneﬁts, the remaining parameter to optimize is
the resource use. It is also prudent to modify the ﬁnal ranking by con-
sideration of the ability to succeed, to ensure that not just high-risk
projects are tackled, resulting eventually in no achievement! Risk can
either be allowed for as contingencies in cost and resources, or by
reducing the expected beneﬁts, or, in some cases, both. How risk can
be assessed is considered later in this chapter.
Hence, three factors need to be included in the assessment of priorities:
. What is most important to do, based on the beneﬁts identiﬁed.
. What is capable of being done, based on the resources available.
. What is likely to succeed, based on the risks of failure of each
investment.
Hochstrasser16 suggests a way of calculating a ‘project priority value’
that includes an assessment of ‘potential barriers’ to achievement of the
beneﬁts. He also classiﬁes project types according to their strategic nature
and whether the beneﬁts can be aligned closely to the system itself or due
to complementary improvements.
Within the support segment, setting priorities should not be too
diﬃcult. Those with the greatest economic beneﬁt that use the least
resources should get the highest priority. This will encourage users to
express beneﬁts ﬁnancially and look for resource-eﬃcient solutions, like
software packages, to obtain a priority. Most organizations are experi-
enced in delivering support applications and, consequently, they tend to
be relatively low risk. The main consequence of failure is money wasted
rather than major business problems, hence any more detailed priority
assessment should be based on the relative ﬁnancial risks of the invest-
ments.
Within the strategic segment, the basic rationale is to give priority to
those applications that will contribute most to achieving business objec-
tives, and use the least resources in the process. To assess this, some form
of simple decision matrix, like that shown in Figure 9.3, can be useful in
assessing the relative strategic contribution or weighting of the competing
projects. Each application should be explained in terms of the degree to
which (high, medium or low) it is relevant to achieving each of the critical
success factors. It produces a ‘score’ or value for each potential invest-
ment based on the level of expected contribution to the current objectives.
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It should be noted that, while CSFs cannot be weighted (by deﬁnition),
the various business objectives can be ranked to indicate relative strategic
priorities.
Like all decision-support tools, it should not be used mechanistically: a
score of 25 is not necessarily better than 24, it means they are about
equally important. Again, by dividing the ‘score’ by the quantity of
limited resources required, the overall contribution from the options
available can be maximized, especially in the short term.
Often, the beneﬁts from strategic IS/IT investments are uncertain and
depend on future events, making priority setting even more diﬃcult. To
address this issue, a number of researchers have proposed real options
analysis as an alternative approach more appropriate to the nature of
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Figure 9.3 Strategic weighting via critical success factors
some IT investments, especially major infrastructure investments.17
Essentially, an option is the right, but not the obligation, to act at
some future date. The choice whether or not to act is dependent on
speciﬁc situations occurring in the future, but it is usually uncertain as
to which of the potential situations will actually happen. By taking an
option (i.e. making an IT investment today), the possibility is provided to
take some action(s) in the future when less uncertainty exists. While real
options can be used to make investment decisions, the approach is more
helpful in making choices among investment options available. In
relation to the portfolio, the approach is best used for strategic and
high potential applications where future uncertainty can be expressed
in terms of diﬀerent scenarios that can be subjected to ‘what-if ’-type
assessments.
Working with a mid-sized Austrian auto parts manufacturer, Taudes et
al.18 applied real options to the problem of deciding whether to migrate
from SAP ERP system R/2 to R/3. Even though the initial set of applica-
tions to be run under R/3 were the same as currently running under R/2,
the real options analysis demonstrated that the future opportunities to
introduce applications based on EDI, workﬂow management, document
management and e-commerce justiﬁed the introduction of R/3. The
higher implementation costs could be related to higher future beneﬁts
and the additional value provided by R/3 could be explained.
Setting priorities among key operational systems is more complex than
support, but involves less uncertainty than strategic applications. The
arguments for (i.e. beneﬁts of ) key operational investments will essen-
tially comprise:
. ﬁnancial;
. critical success factors (either directly or by enabling strategic devel-
opments);
. risk to current business (critical failure factors);
. infrastructure improvement.
Each of these beneﬁt areas must be given some form of relative weighting
based on the current business situation, to decide the preferred mix of
beneﬁts before looking at resource constraints. Then, the costs and/or
resources used by the project should be compared against its relative
importance in each of the four categories to establish overall priorities.
Economic beneﬁts are straightforward, and business objectives can be
assessed via CSFs. The view of ‘infrastructure’ implies providing
adequate technologies or improving the organizational capability to
utilize its IS/IT, or enhancing speciﬁc competencies to improve the
future business contribution from IS/IT. Risk to current business could
be assessed by describing ‘what risks are run if the project does not go
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ahead’, which should be expressed in terms of the impact on the business,
its probability of occurrence and an assessment of when the risk might
arise. Applications scoring highly in all four categories are obviously
higher in priority than those scoring highly in one, two or three cat-
egories, and those at each level in the ranking using fewer resources get
priority. It is a subjective method, but it does allow for the strategic,
ﬁnancial, business and IS/IT perspectives to be included.
Buss19 makes an important observation concerning, as he says, the
‘misconception’ that ‘a steering committee can decide the priorities.’ In
general, he suggests, politics will interfere, representation in discussion
will be unbalanced and the only common ground will end up as econom-
ics! He says the best way to set priorities is to make them the product of a
formal planning process at corporate or business unit level. The mech-
anisms to be employed can be agreed by a steering group, but it should
not be implemented as a meeting-based process.
Hochstrasser20 argues that these mechanisms must be applied consis-
tently across all projects, or the priority setting process will remain arbi-
trary and chaotic.
High potential applications are diﬃcult to prioritize and will tend to be
driven somewhat in the reverse of strategic applications: what resource is
available to do it and then which application might best employ that
resource? As discussed in Chapter 7, high potential applications are
often ‘individually’ driven, a champion usually exists; it is the secondary
resources that are the problem. While it sounds wrong to suggest that ‘he
who shouts the loudest’ or ‘has the most inﬂuence’ will obtain priority, in
this segment it may be the best way to allow priorities to be set because:
. the results will depend not just on the value of the idea, but also on
the force with which it is pursued;
. setting objective priorities on scant evidence is not very reliable
anyway.
If the idea potentially impacts many CSFs, it clearly stands out from
others and should be elevated above the general scramble for R&D-
type resources. In the discussion below, high potential applications are
not considered as being in competition for IS/IT funds, but are funded
from R&D general budgets. But, of course, they may well compete for
key skills or resources.
The remaining task is to set priorities across the segments of the
portfolio to decide how much resource to devote to the diﬀerent types
of application. This is not simple since the rationale for investment in
each is diﬀerent, as shown above. However, the approach recommended
for key operational applications can be extended to cover the whole
portfolio. Strategic applications will score heavily on CSFs, whereas
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support applications should deliver a good ﬁnancial return. Management
must decide the weighting they wish to attribute to each type of beneﬁt
and then rank the systems.
The relative weighting given to each will depend on a number of
factors, a few of which are listed in Table 9.1. In general, the greater
the conﬁdence senior management have in their business strategy and
collective judgement, without the need to be reassured by ﬁgures, and
the trust they have in the competencies of business users and IT profes-
sionals in developing eﬀective systems, the greater the weighting that will
be given to CSFs, etc., relative to ﬁnancial aspects. In a way, this is a sign
of maturity of the organization regarding how it plans and manages IS/
IT as described in Chapter 3. It also tends to reﬂect the relative strength
of the enterprise within its industry: the stronger the position, the fewer
IS/IT investments are expected (like other investments) to prove an
economic case in advance.
If the overall plan is developed and maintained in a priority sequence,
that reﬂects the ratio of beneﬁts to be achieved (adjusted for risk) to the
limiting resource consumed, then it helps both in short and long-term
planning decisions because:
. resources can be reallocated where necessary from lower to higher-
priority applications on a rational basis, with the agreement of line
managers;
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Table 9.1 Examples of effect on weighting of various factors (High, Medium, Low)
Objectives/ Business
FACTOR CSFs risks Infrastructure Economics
1. All types of investment have to be cost-
justiﬁed to meet strict ROI hurdles L L L H
2. Business is in weak position or in
decline—short-term proﬁtability L M L H
3. Business is in a high-growth market and
satisfying the market demand is paramount H H M L
4. Environment is very competitive and business
performance must be improved H H L M
5. Need for redevelopment of old systems.
Systems and/or technology are out of date
compared with competitors or peer
organizations L H H M
6. New systems are required to support major
business/organization change or rationalization M H M L
7. Technology cost performance enables lower
costs for existing systems if redeveloped L L H H
. appropriate resourcing levels for the future can be set, and action
taken to obtain the right type of resources to meet the demands,
based on a full understanding of the beneﬁts achievable.
It is quite possible then to produce a ‘planning system’, that should keep
the plans and resource utilization up to date. It is important to dissemi-
nate the current plan to all involved to aid understanding of the reasons
for the relative ranking of any particular project. Mystery or uncertainty
are far more destructive of strategies than the discussion and reconcilia-
tion of real problems.
Again, the above arguments may lack the precision ideally required for
setting priorities. Much subjective judgement is inevitably involved, but
‘rules’ for inclusion of the relevant factors can be established, to avoid
each priority decision being made on a diﬀerent set of criteria.
BENEFITS MANAGEMENT
One of the factors that diﬀerentiates successful from less successful com-
panies in their deployment of IS/IT, according to a number of surveys,21
is the management resolve to evaluate IS/IT investments before and after
they occurred. A survey of approaches to managing IS/IT beneﬁts in 60
major organizations22 revealed that only 26% of the companies always
reviewed projects after completion to determine whether beneﬁts were
delivered—a ﬁnding in line with earlier surveys. However, as with
previous surveys, most respondents believed that their organization’s
investment appraisal processes were not appropriate for the types of
investment being undertaken, and 45% admitted overstating the
beneﬁts to gain approval, in the full and certain knowledge that no
evaluation would be made after implementation! In the same survey,
76% of organizations believed there was signiﬁcant scope for improve-
ment in managing the beneﬁts of IS/IT projects, but only 10% had any
deﬁned process as a basis for management action to deliver the beneﬁts
on which investments are justiﬁed.
There is limited value in any sophisticated system of investment evalu-
ation and priority setting unless the ‘system’ is examined in terms of
whether or not it delivers the business improvements required. Some
form of post-implementation review must be carried out on a high
percentage of projects to identify whether (i) they were carried out as
well as possible and (ii) whether the beneﬁts claimed (or possibly diﬀerent
beneﬁts) were achieved or not. While preinvestment appraisal and post-
implementation review are obviously important, they are essentially
one-oﬀ ‘snapshots’ of the situation and, hence, insuﬃcient in terms of
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the actions needed to ensure that the maximum beneﬁts available are
delivered.
In a detailed study of 11 strategic IS/IT investments (varying in cost
from £5m to £100m) across a range of industries,23 a number of factors
that diﬀerentiated success from failure were identiﬁed. While some were
already well known (e.g. involvement of senior management throughout
the project life cycle), the successful investments were characterized by a
deliberate, comprehensive approach to managing the beneﬁts and
allocation of responsibilities to line managers for beneﬁt delivery (see
Figure 9.4). In addition, in highly-successful projects, management
treated the IT investment as a component of organizational change and
were able to use existing change management processes to ensure the
business maximized the value of the IT investment through associated
changes to business practices.
What is also clear from surveys and the study above is that it is
becoming increasingly diﬃcult, given the types of systems being imple-
mented, to predict all the beneﬁts that can be delivered. That increases
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Figure 9.4 Factors increasing the degrees of success in strategic information
systems
the importance of having a process that actively addresses the manage-
ment of beneﬁts throughout the investment’s life. In particular, any post-
implementation review should focus not only on what has happened in
terms of delivered beneﬁts but should also consider what further beneﬁts
could now be gained. These issues prompted an extended research
program at the IS Research Centre, Cranﬁeld School of Management,
in collaboration with major UK-based organizations, to develop new
approaches to improving IS/IT beneﬁt realization. Key aspects of the
approach resulting from that work, and now in use in over 100 organ-
izations, are described below. A Wentworth Research report24 described
the approach as one of the few that comprehensively addressed the range
of management issues associated with maximizing actual beneﬁts
delivered.
The Context of Beneﬁts Management
A major IS/IT development will consist of a large number of activities in
business areas and the IS function. Any particular development will also
rely upon an ongoing set of organizational competencies that enable new
systems to be devised, implemented and operated successfully. These are
not just technology competencies but also business competencies in
deﬁning its information and processing needs, managing the changes
that are required to gain beneﬁts from the technology and using the
systems successfully. In essence, therefore, any major IS/IT development
will consist of the mix of activities for which best practices and relevant
methodologies have been developed over the last 30 years.
Systems development methodologies such as SSADM (Structured
Systems Analysis and Design Methodology), DSDM (Dynamic
Systems Development Methodology) and SSM (Soft Systems Method-
ology) are processes and methods designed to ensure that the right system
is developed in the most appropriate way to agreed quality and perform-
ance requirements.
Project management methodologies like PRINCE (Project Management
in a Controlled Environment) are essential for managing the activities
and resources associated with a project to deliver the system and
complete the other tasks to agreed times and costs. Most organizations
now recognize that this is a shared responsibility between business and IT
management. Ultimately, it is the business that suﬀers the real conse-
quences of poor project management and business project managers
are often appointed for major IS/IT investments, although their roles
and responsibilities are not always clear.
As stated above, few organizations have a complementary process
focusing on identifying and managing the business beneﬁts required.
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Often, this is seen merely as part of the investment appraisal approach to
enable a valid business case to be developed. The results of the R&D
program described above suggest that investment appraisal should be
considered as one event (albeit an important one!) within an overall
process that can be deﬁned as:
Beneﬁts Management: the process of organizing and managing such
that potential beneﬁts arising from the use of IT are actually realized.
It would seem most appropriate that the business project manager should
be responsible for this particular set of activities. The ability to achieve
beneﬁts from a particular investment will depend largely on the organi-
zation’s experience and knowledge of what types of beneﬁt IS/IT invest-
ments can or cannot deliver and how they can be obtained.
Based on the diﬀerent objectives and rationale for the applications in
each segment of the application portfolio, it can be seen that the mix of
activities and their criticality to success will vary. Strategic applications
imply that signiﬁcant business changes will need to be made in associa-
tion with the new system to create the desired advantage. Equally, under-
standing and deﬁning the beneﬁts required will need considerably more
innovative thinking than, say, buying a new accounting package.
Figure 9.5 summarizes the generic sources of beneﬁt for the diﬀerent
segments in the matrix. These align closely with the ‘information econom-
ics’ concepts discussed earlier in this chapter.
While the Beneﬁts Management process is applicable across the whole
portfolio, its value increases as the issues associated with delivery of
beneﬁts become more complex. The inputs to the process provide a
ﬁrst understanding of the range of tasks involved. They essentially ask
three questions:
. Why is the investment being made—what is causing the organization
to change and how critical to its future is the successful management
of the changes? (the beneﬁt drivers)
. what types of beneﬁt is the organization expecting from the invest-
ment overall—to reduce costs, improve operational performance,
gain new customers, create a new capability, etc.? These need to be
understood in general terms before detailed analysis of potential
beneﬁts in relation to the extent of change required is undertaken.
. How will other activities, strategic initiatives, business developments
or organizational issues aﬀect the particular investment either to
facilitate or inhibit its progress and outcome? (the organizational
context)
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An assessment of these inputs provides the background to setting
objectives for the project and to identify the key stakeholders and their
potential role in and inﬂuence on the project. The Beneﬁts Management
process then enables the relationship between the enabling technology
and changes to processes, structures and working practices to be
assessed, in combination, to identify the best way of realizing the
maximum set of beneﬁts from the investment.
Since the purpose of any IS/IT investment is to deliver improvements
to business and/or organizational performance, it would seem logical that
the main ‘process’ around which others should ﬁt is beneﬁts management,
rather than the project management, investment appraisal or systems
development approaches. These should be adapted to match the types
of change involved in the investment and the range of beneﬁts expected to
be achieved. Figure 9.6 summarizes the context of the Beneﬁts Manage-
ment process described below.
THE BENEFITS MANAGEMENT PROCESS
In considering the activities required to manage the delivery of beneﬁts, it
has been assumed that the IT-based system is delivered to speciﬁcation
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Figure 9.5 Generic sources of benefit for different applications
(i.e. the technical part of the development is successful). However, as the
beneﬁts management process proceeds, it may cause revision to the spe-
ciﬁcation, and it is assumed that eﬀective change control processes can
deal with this. The other related set of activities are organizational
changes of many types that have to be made to deliver the beneﬁts.
The beneﬁts management process should be the driving mechanism for
these change activities. How to bring them about in detail is addressed
in the wealth of change management and organizational development
literature.
The model proposed here for a beneﬁts management process draws
heavily on total quality management philosophies and incorporates a
number of tools and techniques from diﬀerent sources to address par-
ticular aspects. The ﬁve steps in the iterative process are described in
outline in the following subsections (see Figure 9.7). Each stage is con-
sidered in overview from the viewpoint of the business management roles
and responsibilities, and key tools and techniques are brieﬂy described.
This description is a summary of the Best Practice Guidelines25 developed
for organizations to utilize the process.
Stage 1: Identiﬁcation and Structuring of Beneﬁts
Based on the outcome of the strategy processes, the overall business
rationale for a new or improved system will have been identiﬁed: the
nature of the types of target beneﬁt and extent of change involved to
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Figure 9.6 Benefits management context
obtain them will depend on their impact and criticality for the business
strategy which in turn determines whether the system is strategic, key
operational or support, as described in Chapter 7. If the nature of the
beneﬁts and/or how to obtain them is unclear, then the system should be
put through the R&D stage implied by the high potential segment until
they are better known. Hence, the whole beneﬁt management process
does not really apply to the high potential segment, but some of the
techniques can be used to enable the beneﬁts to be identiﬁed or
assessed in terms of how best to achieve them.
Identifying the target beneﬁts implies an iterative process of establish-
ing the investment objectives and the possible business performance im-
provements that the system and associated changes should or could
deliver. The achievement of each objective could well deliver a variety
of diﬀerent beneﬁts across the organization and also to trading partners
and customers: customer service improvements in one area could produce
new marketing or selling opportunities; productivity gains in administra-
tion may release resources for ‘front-oﬃce’ activities. The process is in-
evitably iterative since objectives may be modiﬁed and new beneﬁts
identiﬁed as ideas and options are considered in the ‘creative’ stage of
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Figure 9.7 A process model of benefits management
discussion, or perhaps rejected after more careful scrutiny. The beneﬁts
should also be tested against the ‘beneﬁt drivers’ in the organization
(i.e. the business strategy), to ensure they are relevant and that investment
to achieve them will be endorsed by senior management.
All business performance improvements are measurable, and hence so
are all the beneﬁts delivered by information systems. Some can be
measured directly in relation to the system (e.g. staﬀ headcount reduc-
tions due to automation, decrease in product rejects due to quality
control data, reduction in stock levels through a warehouse control
system). Many of these can also be easily converted into ﬁnancial
values; where this can be done, it should be, to enable an economic
appraisal to be made. In other cases, the measurement may be less
direct. Better timing and control of deliveries should lead to more satis-
ﬁed customers, which in turn may lead to increased sales or at least
avoiding lost sales due to delivery problems. The level of customer satis-
faction will need to be measured and some estimate made of the business
beneﬁts of improved delivery. These quantiﬁed beneﬁts may not,
however, be suitable to undergo rigorous discounted cash-ﬂow calcula-
tions. In essence, every target beneﬁt should be expressed in terms that
can, in due course, be measured, even if the measure will be subjective
(e.g. customer or staﬀ opinion). These measurable improvements will be
reviewed in Stage 4 of the process.
As an example, Frito-Lay,26 the snack-food manufacturer, decided to
equip its sales/delivery force with hand-held computers. The prototype
system showed that this saved about three to four hours of administrative
eﬀort each week. The sales managers were asked to decide what that time
saving could deliver as a beneﬁt. It was agreed that each sales/delivery
person should be able to increase their sales by between 3% and 10% per
week, given the increased selling time available and their diﬀerent
customer mixes. This became one of the target beneﬁts to be delivered
by the system, and after implementation this was measured. An average
of 6%, over and above general market growth, was achieved.
The ﬁnal part of this stage is the determination of where in the business
(or even in trading partners) each beneﬁt should occur and, hence, who in
the organization should be responsible for its delivery. This is a logic
often overlooked in bringing in new systems, but ‘ownership’ of each
of the beneﬁts and clear allocation of responsibility for delivery is essen-
tial to success. This is easy to identify if the system is mainly within one
function or area of the business, but it is more diﬃcult when the system
crosses functions, and especially when reorganization and rationalization
of tasks across functions are integral to the delivery of beneﬁts. Respon-
sibility may have to be shared, but then this must be made explicit. Given
that a manager is made accountable for the delivery of each of the
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intended beneﬁts, any beneﬁts lacking such ownership are removed from
the list!
In most organizations, given that the investment could now be costed,
etc., an investment proposal would be put forward at this point, but that
should not happen until after Stage 2.
Stage 2: Planning Beneﬁts Realization
Having identiﬁed and allocated responsibility for beneﬁts to individuals
(or perhaps teams), the next step is to determine the changes required for
delivery of each beneﬁt and how the IS/IT development will enable the
changes and beneﬁts to occur.
The output from this activity is described as a beneﬁt dependency
network, which relates the IS/IT functionality via the business and organ-
izational changes to the beneﬁts identiﬁed. Developing such a ‘cause–
eﬀect’ network is again an iterative process best conducted in a
workshop mode, since, as changes required are identiﬁed, a network of
interrelating changes and dependences will evolve, and the feasibility of
achieving some of the beneﬁts will be questioned. Equally, further
beneﬁts may well be identiﬁed. The overall structure of such a network
is depicted in Figure 9.8, showing its two main components: the beneﬁts
and objectives that argue the case for investment and the change manage-
ment plan required to achieve them. The changes are of two types—
business changes and enabling changes—which can be deﬁned as:
. Business changes are those changes to working practices, processes
and/or relationships that will cause the beneﬁts to be delivered (or
begin to be delivered). They cannot normally be made until the new
system is available for use and the necessary enabling changes have
been made; for example, allocating more sales time to potentially
high-value leads, identiﬁed by the new system, requires the system
and perhaps other enablers to be in place.
. Enabling changes are those changes that are prerequisites for making
the business changes and/or are essential to bring the new system
into eﬀective operation. These often involve deﬁning and agreeing
new working practices, redesigning processes, changes to job roles
and responsibilities, new incentive or performance management
schemes, training in new business skills, etc. (as well as the more
obvious training and education in the new system). They can often
be made, or have to be made, before the new system is introduced
(e.g. agreeing a new sales account management and incentive scheme
to ensure rewards reﬂect the attention to high-value customer needs).
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As with the beneﬁts, the ownership and responsibility for each change has
to be identiﬁed and agreement reached on how successful achievement of
the change will be determined.
Before the network and resulting beneﬁts plan can be ﬁnalized and a
sound business case proposed, a thorough stakeholder analysis is required
to check the feasibility of achieving all the changes (and hence beneﬁts)
on the network. The purpose of stakeholder analysis is to understand
those organizational (and possibly customer or supplier) factors that will
aﬀect the organization’s ability to achieve the required improvements.
The ﬁrst task is to establish who all the stakeholders are with respect
to the investment—this is often seen simplistically as whoever is paying
for it and the IT specialists! In reality, anyone aﬀected by the system or
the process of development is a stakeholder, and the view they take of the
investment may inﬂuence the outcome. It may have been possible to
identify all the relevant stakeholders at the start of the project and
involve them in creating the network, but this is not always feasible
and an analysis of stakeholder issues is needed.
The main objective is to address the ‘what’s in it for me?’ problem of
IS/IT investments. Often, projects fail because of the lack of cooperation
of parties who were not considered material to the system’s success, but
whose ability or willingness to accept change or otherwise is essential,
requiring their active cooperation in delivering the real business improve-
ments required. At the same time, potential ‘disbeneﬁts’ of the system
should be considered (i.e. what adverse impacts on the business, organ-
ization or particular stakeholder groups may result). Some of these may
be deemed unacceptable, and the objectives or scope of the system should
be revised or actions put in hand to ensure that these disbeneﬁts are
avoided. No one wants nasty surprises at the end of the implementation.
So, as far as it is possible, these should be anticipated and avoided by
action during the development process. The analysis should also enable
stakeholder views, which might cause potential negative eﬀects and hence
risks, to be identiﬁed and dealt with through other actions. The addi-
tional actions identiﬁed become further ‘enabling changes’ that should be
added to the network.
There are a number of techniques for carrying out a stakeholder
analysis, but the one that ﬁts most closely with the beneﬁts management
approach is an adaptation of an assessment technique devised by
Benjamin and Levinson.27 Figure 9.9 shows an example of the use of
the technique.
Each stakeholder group is considered in terms of the extent to which
they perceive the project produces beneﬁts for them, relative to the
amount of change they will have to undergo or endure before they see
the beneﬁts. Some form of resistance can be expected if they perceive the
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changes outweigh the beneﬁts and if they have to endure signiﬁcant
change for no beneﬁt. That resistance could cause major project risks.
Based on the current positioning of each stakeholder and the required
level of resources or support they are needed to provide, an action plan to
move their perceptions or deal with their concerns can usually be devised.
However, in some cases, the gap may be too great and the ambitions for
the project reduced to enable at least some of the beneﬁts to be realized.
Whether substantial additional action is justiﬁed, or it is better to reduce
the investment scope, depends on the number and value of the particular
beneﬁts that the stakeholder resistance may aﬀect.
The other reason for the analysis of stakeholder interests is to consider
aspects of business change outside the particular project and the possible
implications on achieving the beneﬁts. For instance, other business in-
itiatives, reorganization and possible changes in key stakeholders may
have a signiﬁcant impact. The purpose of assessment is to obtain owner-
ship and buy-in of relevant individuals and groups, and to identify organ-
izational factors that will enable or disable the achievement of the
beneﬁts, or otherwise signiﬁcantly aﬀect the outcome. Figure 9.10
shows an example of part of an actual beneﬁt dependency network for
a successful CRM project.
The essence of the ﬁrst two stages of the process can be summed up as a
series of questions that have to be answered in order to develop a robust
business case for the investment and a viable change management plan to
deliver the beneﬁts. These questions and their relationships are shown in
Figure 9.11. Only when this assessment has been completed and the
feasibility of achieving the target beneﬁts thoroughly tested should a
business case requesting funding for the IS/IT investment be developed.
Presenting the Business Case
How the case for investment has to be described to senior management
will depend on the processes and procedures in the organization.
However, based on the research, a format for presenting business cases
was developed that has proved to be more appropriate than many
others—based on its adoption in many organizations. Figure 9.12
outlines the basic format and logic of the argument for investment.
The case should start with the context within which the need for invest-
ment in change has arisen—the drivers. The objectives for the invest-
ment—the situation that should exist on a successful completion—
linked to the speciﬁc business drivers causing investment should follow.
The beneﬁts should be expressed in tabular rather than list form showing
(a) how they arise (the columns) and (b) how explicitly they can be stated
in advance (the rows).
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The structuring of the beneﬁts into columns based on whether they result
from innovation (doing new things), performance improvements (doing
things better) or reducing or eliminating unnecessary activities (stop
doing things) may appear simplistic, but it increases the understanding
of the nature of the changes that create the beneﬁts.
The structure of the rows needs some further explanation. In
constructing the network and beneﬁts plan, every beneﬁt needs to be
attributed with a measure or measures to deﬁne how its delivery will
be assessed. These may be speciﬁc, objective measures (i.e. it is
measurable) or informed, subjective assessments (i.e. it is observable).
Both imply suﬃcient is known about the current situation that it will
be feasible to assess how much the situation has improved following the
changes. This is, however, insuﬃcient to justify spending large sums of
money!
Quantiﬁable beneﬁts are those for which suﬃcient evidence or data
exists to forecast how much improvement should result from the
changes. For example, eliminating a cause of delivery failure to customers
will reduce customer complaints (due to that cause) to zero. To quantify
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Figure 9.11 The dimensions of benefit management
many of the beneﬁts may require further work; for example, detailed
study of particular activities, introducing new measures of current per-
formance, transfer of experience from similar projects, external bench-
marking or modelling of achievable performance improvements or even
running pilots or prototypes to test estimates or assumptions about the
eﬀects of new ways of working. This is worth the eﬀort if the potential
beneﬁt is signiﬁcant, both to produce a rigorous, arguable business case
and to reinforce the importance of the business change activities in the
beneﬁts plan. Once the levels of improvement can be calculated or esti-
mated, some of those beneﬁts should be able to be expressed ﬁnancially
by multiplying by a unit cost or value. Using the above example: delivery
failures may have led to customer attrition and the value of lost business
can be calculated, plus the additional cost saving associated with dealing
with returns and redelivery.
This reﬂects normal approaches to evaluating beneﬁts, but gives a
more explicit structure for their expression and forces more rigour
across the range of beneﬁts. If there are no quantiﬁable or ﬁnancial
beneﬁts that can be explicitly described, then either the investment is
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Figure 9.12 The investment proposal—making the case
not viable or the project is still high potential at this stage and further
R&D work is needed.
Support applications would be expected to produce ﬁnancial beneﬁts in
the ‘do better’ and ‘stop’ columns, since they address well-known tasks
and activities. At the opposite end, strategic investments should produce
new ways of doing business, the beneﬁts of which are more diﬃcult to
quantify and express ﬁnancially in advance as discussed earlier, as well as
a range of ‘do better’ beneﬁts, which may often be expressed ﬁnancially.
Key operational applications should produce a range of beneﬁts in the
‘do better’ column, some in the ‘stop’ and even a few in the ‘new’ column.
The rest of the business case is more traditional: detailed costings for
the investment and a high-level risk assessment identifying reasons why
the beneﬁts might not be realized, as well as actions to reduce or mitigate
the risks, or contingencies included to accommodate them. Risk assess-
ment and management is discussed in more detail later in the chapter.
Stage 3: Executing the Beneﬁts Plan
As with any plan, the next stage is to carry it out and adjust it as neces-
sary, as issues arise aﬀecting its achievement. Monitoring progress
against the activities and deliverables of the beneﬁts plan is just as im-
portant as for the IS/IT development plan, and the two plans are com-
ponents of the overall project plan. It may be necessary to establish
interim targets and measures to evaluate progress toward key milestones
or the ﬁnal implementation. It is the business project manager’s respon-
sibility to decide what action to take in terms of reviewing the scope and
speciﬁcation of the system or its business justiﬁcation. During this stage,
further beneﬁts may also be identiﬁed, and again the business project
manager should decide on appropriate action to plan for the beneﬁt or
defer it until Stage 5. Equally, it may become apparent that intended
beneﬁts are no longer feasible or relevant and the beneﬁts plan should
be modiﬁed accordingly, along with any consequent reduction in the IS/
IT functionality. Factors outside the beneﬁts plan itself such as changes
in the organization or problems in meeting the requirements at the
intended cost will, of course, initiate reviews of the project deliverables
and plan and, in turn, cause a reassessment of the beneﬁts plan and even
the business case.
Stage 4: Reviewing and Evaluating Results
Once the new system, business changes and the beneﬁts plan have been
implemented, there must be a formal review of what was and was not
achieved. This evaluation has two purposes:
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. to maximize the beneﬁts of the particular investment;
. to learn how to improve beneﬁts delivery from future investments.
All comprehensive project management, systems development and
change management methodologies include a review process following
implementation, and they should be carried out prior to the beneﬁt
review. The results of those assessments may provide explanations for
the non-delivery of intended beneﬁts, as well as knowledge to improve the
management of future projects or systems design. Such post-implementa-
tion reviews are often in place in organizations, but tend to be held
behind the closed doors of the IS function and are reviews of the im-
plementation process rather than the investment outcome. This review is
a business review aimed at maximizing the beneﬁts gained from the par-
ticular system and increasing the beneﬁts from future IS/IT investments.
The evaluation should involve all the key stakeholders and focus on
what has been achieved, what has not (or not yet) been achieved and why,
and identify further action needed to deliver outstanding beneﬁts, if
possible. The reasons for lack of beneﬁt delivery may be due to
problems in any of the earlier stages, hence they may have to be revisited
to correct the situation. Another aspect of this review is to identify any
unexpected beneﬁts that have arisen and understand how they came
about. This again may prove valuable input to the ﬁrst stage of the
process in future projects.
It is worth stating that any post-implementation review should not
become a ‘witch-hunt’; it must be an objective process with future im-
provements in mind, not a way of allocating blame for past failures. If it
is seen as a negative process, honest appraisal and a constructive critique
of what has happened become impossible and the whole process falls into
disrepute or is not carried out.
Stage 5: Potential for Further Beneﬁts
Much of the research referred to earlier has shown that it is often im-
possible to identify all the beneﬁts of a system in advance.28 Further
beneﬁts often become apparent only when the system has been running
for some time and the associated business changes have been made. If, as
has been suggested, more beneﬁts are actually identiﬁable after the event
than before it, where there is no review process these will probably never
be identiﬁed.
Therefore, having reviewed what has happened, it is equally important
to consider what further improvement could now be possible as a result
of implementing the system and associated changes. This should be a
creative process similar to Stage 1, involving the original stakeholders
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and any others who may be able to contribute, based on the knowledge
now available for new opportunities to be identiﬁed and fed into the ﬁrst
stage of a new iteration of the process. If this is not done, many available
beneﬁts may be overlooked. If maximum value is to be gained from the
overall investment in IT, beneﬁt identiﬁcation should be a continuing
process, from which IS/IT projects are deﬁned. Often, in the past, the
project was deﬁned ﬁrst then beneﬁts were ‘created’ in order to justify the
cost. IS/IT planning should be driven by the delivery of a beneﬁt stream
that improves business performance at the optimum manageable rate.
Beneﬁts Management: Summary
In the 1970s, it became clear that the activities involved in the IT aspects
of IS development could be brought together into a coherent approach or
methodology to improve the reliability and quality and reduce the costs
of the process. Most surveys show that two-thirds of IS/IT investments
fail to deliver the expected beneﬁts, and one of the reasons for this is that
little attention is paid to actually delivering the beneﬁts! Most organiza-
tions now recognize that, to get ‘value for money from IT’, they must
actively manage the value component as well as the costs. Understanding
the full range of issues involved in achieving the beneﬁts through IT-
enabled change is still incomplete. No framework is yet available that
will ﬁt the needs of all types of application, the wide variety of beneﬁts
they can deliver or the diﬀerent circumstances within which they must be
achieved.
The process described here, including further tools and techniques
involved in each stage, was developed by studying what actually
happened on a number of major projects in large companies. Some of
these were trying actively to manage the beneﬁts, others were not. Using
the beneﬁts management approach, it was possible to understand why
some projects were more successful than others in delivering beneﬁts. By
applying the approach to new projects, it was possible to both avoid the
‘loss’ of beneﬁts that were clearly achievable and, in most cases, to
identify and realize more extensive beneﬁts than had been identiﬁed in
previous, similar projects.
A secondary outcome of applying the approach is that IT costs can
actually be reduced for some investments. In the extreme case, the project
is cancelled because no beneﬁts can be delivered! But, more commonly,
the essential IT functionality required can be identiﬁed more explicitly in
relation to the beneﬁts the functionality actually produces, thus eliminat-
ing costs that deliver nothing of beneﬁt. It is also possible to reduce the
amount of IT functionality deployed by making more changes in business
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practices to utilize package software ‘oﬀ the shelf ’ or to reduce proce-
dural complexity rather than automate it!
Many organizations have realized that this approach to managing
beneﬁts is not peculiar to IS/IT projects and can be used to improve
the success of other change programs, business developments and strat-
egic initiatives. Of course, in more and more of these, IT is one of the
enablers of change, and many organizations have taken the stance that,
apart from infrastructure projects, there are now really no IS/IT projects
per se—there are only change projects that have signiﬁcant IS/IT com-
ponents. As one IT director explained, ‘introduction of beneﬁts manage-
ment improved the business–IT relationship more than any previous
initiative, resulting in IT being seen as integral to the business and a
major contributor to business performance.’
ASSESSING AND MANAGING INVESTMENT RISKS
As part of the appraisal of investment viability, it is essential to assess the
potential risks: both the risks of failing to deliver anything at all and,
more commonly, of failing to deliver some or all the beneﬁts. Extensive
research into the reasons for information systems investment failure by
Lyytinen and Hirschheim29 suggested that failure can occur in four
domains:
1. Technical failure—this is clearly the domain of IT, who are respons-
ible for the technical quality of the system and the technology it uses.
Technical failure is increasingly less common and is often the
cheapest to overcome.
2. Data failure—this is a shared responsibility between IS/IT profes-
sionals and the users who input the data. Obviously, good design,
processing integrity and sound data management practice are the
responsibility of IS, but not everything can be legislated for and
the eﬀectiveness of business processes and procedures and data
quality control fall clearly in the user domain.
3. User failure—while some blame for the users misunderstanding the
system may accrue to the IS/IT professionals, the primary responsi-
bility for ensuring users are trained to use the system appropriately
and to its maximum capability must rest with the business manage-
ment. A major weakness in many implementations is inadequate
training, and many systems become less eﬀectively used over time
as staﬀ change and ongoing training investment is insuﬃcient, even
non-existent.
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The risks that cause failure in these three domains are largely process or
content risks (i.e. risks due to poor understanding or deﬁnition of require-
ments or how they can be satisﬁed, or inadequacies in the process of
development and implementation). Most good software engineering,
systems development and project management methodologies have risk
assessment and management techniques that, if applied rigorously, can
deal with the majority of these causes of project failure.30
4. Organizational failure—systems may be satisfactory in meeting par-
ticular functional needs, but may fail because they do not satisfy the
organization overall, due to inadequate understanding of how the
system relates to other processes and activities. For example, a bud-
getary control system speciﬁed for and by accountants at the centre
may fail to meet the needs of line managers to plan and control
diﬀerent types of business expenditure. Responsibility here clearly
lies outside the IS/IT domain and must be shared by line and
senior management for not aligning systems with organizational
needs.
The Lyytinen and Hirschheim analysis considered only these four
domains, but a ﬁfth and increasingly more serious area of failure exists:
5. Failure in the business environment—the systems are or become in-
appropriate to external or internal business requirements due to
changing business practices instigated by others, or by not support-
ing the business strategy adequately, or simply by not coping with the
volume and speed of business process needs eﬀectively or economic-
ally. The responsibility for this is essentially senior management’s,
although, without active user and IT input, they cannot be expected
to identify or understand the problems, or be able to take action to
correct them.
In a study of ‘abandoned projects’, Ewusi-Mensah and Przasnyski31
conclude that economic and technical factors were not major factors in
contributing to management decisions to abandon projects before com-
pletion. Most were abandoned due to organizational factors such as loss
of management commitment and political and interpersonal conﬂicts (i.e.
these are serious areas of potential risk in a project). Interestingly, for the
majority of projects they studied, of which 40% were considered ‘strat-
egic’ and 60% were ‘urgent’, 85% were not seen as high risk at the start
and 64% were expected to deliver considerable beneﬁts. As with aban-
donment, major investment failure in Categories 4 and 5 above is due to
lack of understanding of the contextual factors that produce project risks,
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or the inability to identify or address emergent issues that introduce risks
of not achieving the required outcome. It is these types of factor, inherent
in the nature of the objectives of investment or in the organization’s
ability to manage change, that conventional risk analysis techniques do
not adequately address.
The riskiness of IS/IT was brought into sharp focus in the 1990s, with
the much-publicized and well-analysed failure of a number of large
projects32 such as those in the London Stock Exchange (TAURUS),
the London Ambulance Service, the Performing Rights Society, Pruden-
tial Europe’s Unite project (which aimed to allow near real-time proces-
sing of orders for new policies and pensions via the Internet), and a joint
Beneﬁts Agency and Post Oﬃce project.33 Despite all that can be done to
bring structure and certainty to the process of information systems devel-
opments, they are often still inherently risky adventures at times, as all
the evidence of poor success rates conﬁrms. The more strategic IS/IT
investments become, the greater the consequence of failure and the
more diﬃcult it is to foresee and deal with the range of risks involved.
The approach described here is the ﬂip side of the beneﬁts management
coin—factors aﬀecting the organization’s ability to deliver beneﬁts from a
system that technically, at least, works! The purpose in assessing risks is
to understand them, such that the investment scope can be amended to
avoid them or eﬀective action can be taken before or during the process
to deal with them.
The risks of each development need to be assessed in order to improve
the chances of success, but management need to understand the relative
risks of all the developments in the portfolio in order to set sensible
priorities, as mentioned on page 431. This means comparing the risks
of strategic, key operational and support applications in a consistent way.
(High potential systems are inherently very risky and the R&D approach
is used to minimize the consequences of the risk in business and ﬁnancial
terms.)
As described in Figure 9.5, the ‘generic’ causes of beneﬁt in each of the
other segments of the portfolio relate to the degree of business change
required in addition to the increasing uniqueness of the system from
support to strategic. The assessment approach described here is
intended to address the risk factors that are due to the nature and
degree of change involved, as well as the organization’s ability to
achieve those changes. It is additional and complementary to the risk
analysis and management techniques, embodied in existing formal meth-
odologies, that should also be used to address more traditional content
and process risk factors.
Clearly, from the above, the outcome of change in strategic projects is
less certain than in key operational or support, and the organization’s
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experience in managing the types of change involved in a strategic project
is likely to be less than for the other two. It is therefore almost certain
that strategic investments will ‘score’ more highly in any risk assessment
relative to, in turn, key operational or support. This ‘riskiness’ should, of
course, be oﬀset by the scale of the beneﬁts that will result if the invest-
ment succeeds. How to interpret the risks of projects in diﬀerent portfolio
segments is described later.
The approach builds directly on the creation of a beneﬁts dependency
network, which is in essence a cause–eﬀect network of relationships,
linking IS/IT functionality via enabling changes to business changes,
which, when implemented with that, will deliver measurable beneﬁts in
line with investment objectives.
Following the development of the beneﬁt management research, two
further research programs were undertaken at Cranﬁeld, to study a
number of major IT-enabled change projects. A new framework was
developed that identiﬁed success factors in each stage of the overall
process,34 and a further program of action research followed to test the
eﬀectiveness of the framework on large, complex, live projects.35 One
aspect of this study was to incorporate risk assessment of the change
aspects in the framework and evaluate its eﬀectiveness in identifying
and addressing those risk factors. Potential factors were identiﬁed from
both IT and business change literature36 and classiﬁed within four major
headings, posed as questions:
A. What kind of change will be involved?
B. How ready is the organization to accommodate the change?
C. How will the organization react to the change?
D. How dynamic is the context within which the change is to be eﬀected?
Under each heading, a number of factors (total 25) provide the basis for
assessing probable overall success and identifying particular areas for
management attention and action. Box 9.1 describes the factors and
the ﬁve-point scale used to assess the potential impact of each factor,
as well as the degree of overall risk in relation to each of the questions A
to D above.
The analysis should be undertaken by the project management team,
probably in a workshop mode to gain a consensus view. Having agreed a
score on each factor, a summary average score for each category can be
calculated. Any individual factor scoring 4 or 5 should cause relevant
aspects of the project to be reviewed in order to:
. identify the possibility of changing its scope or the development
approach to reduce the risk; or
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Box 9.1 IT-enabled change—risk-factor analysis
Factor Range
A.1 Business impact
A.2 Degree (scale, scope,
size) of change
A.3 Pace of change
A.4 Technology innovation
A.5 Novelty of business
solution
A.6 Clarity of vision of
intended outcome
Category A: Kind of change
B.1 Level of dissatisfaction
with the status quo
B.2 Strength of drivers and
constraints—balance
B.3 Business sense of
ownership
B.4 Agreement on project
objectives by key
stakeholders
1 2 3 4 5


Agreed Controversial
1 2 3 4 5


Strong Weak
1 2 3 4 5

Sharp Vague
1 2 3 4 5


Marginal Core
1 2 3 4 5

Low High
1 2 3 4 5

Gradual Rapid
1 2 3 4 5

Familiar Novel
1 2 3 4 5


Familiar Novel
1 2 3 4 5

Incremental
change
Radical
change
1 2 3 4 5


High Low
1 2 3 4 5


Positive Negative
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B.5 Senior management
stance
B.6 History of success or
failure—track record
B.7 Change management
capability
B.8 Technology
competency and
experience
B.9 Project management
competency and experience
Category B: State of readiness
C.1 Stakeholder commitment to
beneﬁts
C.2 Stakeholder willingness to
change
C.3 Stakeholder willingness to
contribute resources
C.4 Process and systems
interfaces
Category C: Likely reaction
D.1 Dependence of objectives
on current commercial
environment
1 2 3 4 5

Competent Weak
1 2 3 4 5

High
motivation
Low
motivation
Ready
1 2 3 4 5

 Against
1 2 3 4 5


Willing Anatagonistic
1 2 3 4 5


Low High
1 2 3 4 5


Supportive Disinterested
1 2 3 4 5

High
success
Low
success
1 2 3 4 5


Expert Novice
Competent
1 2 3 4 5

 Weak
1 2 3 4 5


Strong Weak
1 2 3 4 5


Few Many
1 2 3 4 5


Supportive Reactive
. agree actions that can address the underlying cause(s) of the
weakness; or
. establish appropriate contingencies to accommodate problems; or
. perhaps all three, in the case of a 5!
If the average for any category is 4 or 5 or 50% or more of the category
factors are 4 or 5, there is cause for considering whether the investment as
intended will succeed. However, the interpretation and alternative
courses of action vary according to the portfolio positioning.
Strategic investments are likely to score highly in Categories A and D.
Provided this is oﬀset by low scores in Categories B and C and action can
be identiﬁed per high-risk factor, as above, the project should still be
viable. However, if this is not the case, actions should focus on
reducing risk factors in B and C by reviewing the change components
of the beneﬁt dependence network to reduce the scale, severity or speed of
change to make it more manageable. Alternatively, some beneﬁts may
have to be forgone or postponed by accepting that not all the changes are
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D.2 Susceptibility to regulatory
and legislative changes
during project
D.3 Dependence on current
management structure
D.4 Dependence on other
projects
D.5 Dependence on key
personnel
D.6 Appropriateness of internal
control mechanisms
Category D: Contextual change
1 2 3 4 5


Low High
1 2 3 4 5


Low High
1 2 3 4 5


Low High
1 2 3 4 5


Low High
1 2 3 4 5

Supportive Obstructive
1 2 3 4 5


Passive Active
achievable at present. If the project scores highly in Category C, but low
in Category B, careful attention should be paid to particular stake-
holders’ issues to reduce the potential resistance, by focusing on the
speciﬁc Category C risks identiﬁed.
Key operational investments are similar to the strategic projects, except
that a high score in A is more serious. Given the potential impact on
existing operations, unless all other categories are low, the nature and
scope of the proposed solution should be considered carefully, with the
objective of ﬁnding a lower-risk, alternative way of delivering the set of
beneﬁts. Again, it may be possible to address particular risk factors by
speciﬁed action to reduce the overall ‘score’.
Support investments—a high score in Category A, C or D suggests that
the project is not support! and its expected contribution should be recon-
sidered. The main risk category is C and, if this scores highly, it implies
that essential changes will be resisted. While the application can still be
implemented, few, if any, of the beneﬁts will actually be realized and
attention to the detailed stakeholder concerns and the reasons for them
is needed.
This brief overview of this approach to risk assessment and its inter-
pretation is intended to demonstrate how it can be used to improve the
understanding of why projects can and do fail, but, more importantly,
how it directs management attention to aspects it must consciously and
explicitly address. The purpose is to increase the chances of success!
This approach is relevant to most IS/IT projects, although some,
because of their uniqueness or sheer size, incur additional risks. Griﬃths
and Willcocks37 have reviewed such projects and compared relative
success and failure in terms of the risks involved.
SUMMARY
The purpose of all investments in IS/IT is to deliver improvements in
aspects of organizations’ activities. Some may be in response to legislative
or regulatory requirements and must be done to avoid breaching laws or
regulations. Most, however, are discretionary—the money could always
be spent on other things—and IS/IT investments compete for the funds
available and, perhaps more signiﬁcantly, the time and priorities of
people in the organization. If the beneﬁts are to be delivered, the commit-
ment of resources and skills over an extended period is required.
Most of the literature in the ﬁeld focuses on ‘appraisal’, not ‘manage-
ment’. IS/IT investments are inherently risky, many fail to deliver the
intended beneﬁts—some because the beneﬁts were never achievable,
others because the risks were not identiﬁed or understood and many
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because the development was inadequately managed. This chapter has
attempted to describe an overall, balanced approach that can increase the
chances of success in both identifying and delivering the available
beneﬁts.
IS/IT investments are becoming increasingly complex in terms of the
way in which they impact an organization’s performance. Gaining the
beneﬁts from IS/IT is increasingly dependent on changes in business
practices, and even in organizational roles and structures. This chapter
has dealt with application investments, rather than infrastructure invest-
ments, which are considered in Chapter 11. Applications are the primary
channel through which infrastructure investments deliver business
beneﬁts, other than lower IT costs. Applications, therefore, must ex-
plicitly or implicitly justify most of the costs of infrastructure through
the beneﬁts they deliver.
Since the applications make diﬀerent contributions to a business, as
described by the applications portfolio, they need to be appraised in
diﬀerent ways. This is well understood, but, as yet, methods of invest-
ment appraisal do not adequately reﬂect this complexity and the
subtleties involved. The approach described here oﬀers some practical
guidance to the most appropriate ways of assessing the diﬀerent types
of investment.
Priority setting, while allowing for logical precedence of development
and key resource availability, should be based on the same principles as
investment appraisal to maximize the beneﬁt stream from the plan. Ob-
viously, the delivery of the ideal beneﬁt stream will be aﬀected by the
risks of the individual projects. Therefore, the risk assessment process
should be driven by the eﬀect of the risks on delivering beneﬁts, based
on the nature of the beneﬁts. Most of this is well known, if not always
practised successfully. However, what is far from common practice is the
proactive management of the beneﬁt delivery itself. A process and related
techniques, which have helped address this weakness in many organiza-
tions, have been described.
The importance of post-implementation reviews is also emphasized as
the means by which organizations can learn from experience, both good
and bad, and become more successful with their IS/IT investments. The
value of strategic planning is mainly in selecting the right things to do,
but poor implementation, which fails to deliver the beneﬁts of these ‘right
things’, can easily negate the value of planning.
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10
Strategies for Information
Management: Towards
Knowledge Management
The information management strategy is one of the areas of strategy that
lies behind the management of the application portfolio. Its aim is to
ensure that the organization obtains the greatest possible value from its
information resource and to enable its cost-eﬀective management and
protection. While the IS strategy addresses how the organization is
going to use information and for what purpose, it is critical to ensure
that the information that underpins the applications is managed
eﬀectively.
The nature of business information that requires managing has
changed in the last several years from primarily numbers and text to
now include images, pictures, graphics and multimedia. This shift from
‘lean’ to ‘richer’ information presents new challenges for the traditional
role of information management. Information management has also
become the basis for many new Internet-based business models—
ebay.com, Amazon.com, Betdaq.com and Covisint are obvious
examples here—highlighting just how strategic it has become.
Data are the raw material of information—the raw facts or observa-
tions—with information usually portrayed as ‘data in context’ or data
that have been given some meaning. Yet, a key challenge for all organ-
izations is to transform information into knowledge that can subse-
quently be utilized to eﬀect action and business results. Both
information and knowledge are, at the same time, related yet quite
distinct. Innovation, for example, demands not only information but
also the application of knowledge from a variety of sources. Information
can be considered as explicit knowledge, but much knowledge is tacit and
personal, rendering it particularly diﬃcult to identify, capture, store and
deploy. The increased recognition of the importance of knowledge for
competitiveness and the espoused relationship between information and
knowledge has seen many chief information oﬃcers (CIOs) and IT
directors being asked to either support or drive knowledge initiatives
within their organizations, particularly as technologies emerge that
support and enhance the management of knowledge. Yet, the nature of
knowledge means that a diﬀerent mindset is required in its management
compared with managing information—there is an argument that knowl-
edge per se cannot be managed, and that only its context can.
Information management embodies policies, organizational provisions
and a comprehensive set of activities associated with developing and
managing the information resource. Its eﬀectiveness relies on implement-
ing coherent policies that aim to provide relevant information of suﬃ-
cient quality, accuracy and timeliness at an appropriate cost, together
with access facilities suited to the needs of authorized users. At the
same time, it must be recognized that much of the information used by
employees in a business is not automated, and that while some informa-
tion can be tightly managed, users will gather information from informal
as well as formal sources. This informal information cannot be managed
in the same regulated way. An additional necessity is for an environment
within the organization that is conducive to promoting appropriate be-
haviours among employees regarding information.
This chapter explores information, knowledge and their management.
It begins by outlining the management agenda regarding the treatment of
information as an asset. It considers the acquisition, protection, utiliza-
tion, accessibility and dissemination of information, as well as the promo-
tion and management of initiatives to derive maximum beneﬁt from the
resource. It also examines the development, management and marketing
of an enterprise-wide information model, and the application of the
principles of Information Asset Management (IAM). The second part
of this chapter is concerned with knowledge, its use and management,
particularly in exploring the relationship between information and
knowledge. The challenges that the nature of knowledge poses for its
management are highlighted. The chapter also examines the role of tech-
nology in the management of knowledge.
INFORMATION AS AN ASSET: THE SENIOR
MANAGEMENT AGENDA
The importance of information1 as a key asset continues to grow, follow-
ing a period where its production, complexity, volume and demand have
rocketed, but where satisfaction of the real information needs of the
organization has been limited due to many obstacles. Often, this can be
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due to a lack of clarity in identifying business-driven requirements.
However, the IS/IT strategy process should point to major opportunities
from exploiting information. The challenge is to ensure that this informa-
tion is of the highest quality possible, particularly in terms of timeliness,
accuracy, completeness, conﬁdence in source, reliability and appropriate-
ness.
Many organizations are plagued by poor quality information. From
his work with telecommunications operator AT&T, Redman2 found
that:
. Many managers are unaware of the quality of information they use
and often mistakenly assume that because it is ‘on the computer’ that
it is accurate.
. At an operational level, poor information leads directly to customer
dissatisfaction and increased cost. Costs are increased as time and
other resources are spent detecting and correcting errors.
. Poor information quality can result in subtle and indirect eﬀects. For
example, signiﬁcant mistrust can ensue when the information from
one part of the business, say order entry, that is used by another,
perhaps customer billing, is unreliable.
. Inaccurate information makes just-in-time manufacturing and self-
managed work teams infeasible. The right information needs to be at
the right place at the right time. To illustrate the severity of this
problem, one manufacturer was still allowing customers to
purchase particular products that it was no longer making via its
website.
. Poor information in ﬁnancial and other management systems mean
that managers cannot eﬀectively implement business strategies.
Decisions are no better than the information on which they are
based.
In addition, a consequence of the Internet has been an explosion in the
volume of information that is available to employees. This information is
of varying quality, and one of the challenges that organizations face
today is assessing this quality. Information from the Net is not subject
to any review standards, policies or quality control procedures.
There is also a growing requirement for integration of information
ﬂows at individual and departmental/functional levels, and across pro-
cesses and organizational boundaries, which poses a variety of complex
challenges. Communications capability is expanding all the time, as local
and wide area networks ﬂourish and the number of external sources of
information swell. There is also a stimulus from technology ‘push’, inﬂu-
enced by the growing availability and improvement in tools such as
468 Strategies for Information Management
middleware, advanced data dictionaries, web design tools, database tech-
nologies, and computer assisted software engineering (CASE) tools.
In most instances, eﬀective information management is far from
straightforward, and there are many obstacles to navigate:
. Information resides in multiple electronic ‘libraries’ and proprietary
databases and on multiple technical platforms, which are not well
integrated or easily accessible. These are the legacy of many years of
uncoordinated, evolutionary development, and may result in poor
quality and inconsistent presentation.
. Some information is computer-based and well structured, stored in
centrally managed databases and applications; some is less struc-
tured, and stored in many independent and dispersed PCs or on
corporate Intranets; and there is still a huge volume of unstructured
and non-automated or unrecorded information.
. Information is created for diﬀerent purposes by diﬀerent people at
diﬀerent times and based on diﬀering deﬁnitions, resulting in many
conﬂicts and inconsistencies.
. There is both a backlog in meeting information requirements and
legacy systems, requiring integration with newly developed and
packaged applications.
. Complex information exchanges exist across organizational bound-
aries, comprising a mixture of electronic, paper-based and verbal
communication.
These varying contexts create an ‘information ecology’3 that, if not
managed coherently, can seriously undermine organizational perform-
ance. Addressing issues relating to information and its management is
not a task that can be abdicated outside managerial ranks or delegated to
the IS function.
In the UK, the Hawley Committee4 explored the role of the Board of
Directors in managing information. As its starting point, it took the view
that information is a signiﬁcant issue for Boards in fulﬁlling their respon-
sibilities and is the heart of supervising what an organization does.
Members of this Committee highlighted the diﬃculties they were con-
tinuing to experience at Board level in the direction and control of in-
formation and information systems. They also highlighted the fact that
misuse of information and damage to the systems that hold critical
information can seriously harm performance and reputations, and that
the Board itself may be hampered in carrying out its duties by poor
availability or poor presentation of information.
The Committee developed an agenda for Boards regarding informa-
tion and its management. While the report says little that is not said
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elsewhere, what is new is who is saying it. An outline of this agenda is
presented in Box 10.1. Tools were also developed by the Committee to
support Board members in managing their organization’s information
resources and a number of these are drawn upon in the chapter.
AN INFORMATION CULTURE
Essential for the success of any information management strategy is the
existence of an appropriate ‘information culture’.5 An information
culture can be deﬁned as the values, attitudes and behaviours that inﬂu-
ence the way employees at all levels in the organization sense, collect,
organize, process, communicate and use information. Marchand6 has
identiﬁed four common information cultures that exist in organizations
today. They are:
. functional culture—managers use information as a means of exercis-
ing inﬂuence or power over others;
. sharing culture—managers and employees trust each other to use
information (especially about problems and failures) to improve
their performance;
. enquiring culture—managers and employees search for better infor-
mation to understand the future and ways of changing what they do
to align themselves with future trends/directions;
. discovery culture—managers and employees are open to new insights
about crisis and radical changes and seek ways to create competitive
opportunities.
Each type of culture inﬂuences the way employees use information—their
information behaviour—and reﬂects the importance that senior manage-
ment attribute to the use of information in achieving success or avoiding
failure. However, establishing an eﬀective information culture can be a
challenge. Davenport captured this point succinctly when he noted that
‘eﬀective information management must begin by thinking about how
people use information—not with how people use machines’.7
Changing a company’s information culture requires altering the basic
behaviours, attitudes, values, management expectations and incentives
that relate to information. ‘Changing the technology only reinforces
the behaviours that already exist.’
Strassmann8 uses the word ‘politics’ when considering information
management, as he believes that this term, perhaps more aptly than
any other, captures what it is really about. He sees information manage-
ment seeking to answer the same questions as those raised in politics. He
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Box 10.1 Information as an asset: the Board Agenda
The Hawley Committee proposed that all signiﬁcant information in
an organization, regardless of its purpose, should be properly iden-
tiﬁed, even if not in an accounting sense, for consideration as an
asset of the business. It asserted that the Board of Directors should
address its responsibilities for information assets in the same way as
for other assets (e.g. property or plant). This implies a new approach
to how information should be treated and requires a Board to make
clear to management what actions it wishes to be taken and who is
responsible for action and compliance.
The Board should satisfy itself that its own business is conducted
so that:
1. the information it uses is necessary and suﬃcient for its purpose;
2. it is aware of and properly advised on the information aspects of
all the subjects on its agenda;
3. its use of information, collectively and individually, complies
with applicable laws, regulations and recognized ethical stan-
dards.
The Board should determine the organization’s policy for information
assets and identify how compliance with that policy will be measured
and reviewed, including:
4. the identiﬁcation of information assets and the classiﬁcation into
those of value and importance that merit special attention and
those that do not;
5. the quality and quantity of information for eﬀective operation,
ensuring that, at every level, the information provided is neces-
sary and suﬃcient, timely, reliable and consistent;
6. the proper use of information in accordance with applicable
legal, regulatory, operational and ethical standards, and the
roles and responsibilities for the creation, safekeeping, access,
change and destruction of information;
7. the capability, suitability and training of people to safeguard
and enhance information assets;
8. the protection of information from theft, loss, unauthorized
access, abuse and misuse, including information that is the
property of others;
9. the harnessing of information assets and their proper use for the
maximum beneﬁts of the organization, including legally protect-
notes that information management is the process by which those who set
policy guide those who follow policy. ‘Where control over information
changes the alignment of power, information politics appears. Whether
that turns out to be constructive is something that must be resolved
through information management. Who gets what data and who
converts data into information? Who balances the competing interests
of leaders and followers? Who beneﬁts from the ownership of in-
formation?’9
Marchand et al.10 have developed the concept of information orienta-
tion to represent a measure of how eﬀectively a company manages and
uses information. Their research indicates that IT practices, information
management practices and information behaviours all must be strong
and working together, if superior business performance is to be
achieved. The researchers have developed a methodology to assess in-
formation orientation, an overview of which is provided in Box 10.2.
IMPLEMENTING BUSINESS-WIDE
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
A well-managed information resource is arguably as essential as an eﬀec-
tive IT infrastructure. Back in the late 1980s, Drucker,11 in an article
titled ‘The coming of the new organisation’, predicted that the typical
organisation of the 21st century would be information based. He claimed
it would be ﬂatter, having drastically slimmed down its management size
and levels, and would be populated mainly by knowledge specialists,
working in ﬂuid interdisciplinary teams. Everyone would be responsible
for meeting their own information needs, and the organization as a whole
would be required to have a uniﬁed vision and an information architec-
ture, and to have abandoned former parochial views on information and
its role. His predictions can now be seen to be happening.
However, promoting the management of information as a corporate
resource does not imply building an all-embracing corporate database,
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ing, licensing, reusing, combining, re-presenting, publishing and
destroying;
10. the strategy for information systems, including those using com-
puters and electronic communications, and the implication of
that strategy with particular reference to the costs, beneﬁts and
risks arising.
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Box 10.2 Information orientation
In their research, Marchand and colleagues* identiﬁed 15 speciﬁc
competencies associated with eﬀective information management
and use. They were categorized under three headings:
. information technology practices—a company’s capability eﬀec-
tively to manage information technology (IT) applications and
infrastructure to support operations, business processes, innova-
tion and managerial decision making (four competencies);
. information management practices—a company’s capability to
manage information eﬀectively over the life cycle of information
use, including sensing, collecting, organizing, processing and
maintaining information (ﬁve competencies);
. information behaviours and values—a company’s capability to
instil and promote behaviours and values in its people for eﬀec-
tive use of information (six competencies).
The information orientation (IO) of a company measures its eﬀec-
tiveness in managing and using information. IO is calculated by
measuring performance across these three categories.
*D.A. Marchand, W. Kettinger, and J.D. Rollins, ‘Information
orientation: People, technology and bottom line’, Sloan Management
Review, Summer, 2000, 69–80.
IT practices
. IT for operational support
. IT for business process support
. IT for innovation support
. IT for management support
Information management practices
. Sensing information
. Collecting information
. Organizing information
. Processing information
. Maintaining information
Information behaviours and values
. Information integrity
. Information formality
. Information control
. Information sharing
. Information transparency
. Information proactiveness
Information orientation
but does support information independence. True information indepen-
dence is achieved when there is no relationship between how or where
information is stored and how it is accessed and applied by diﬀerent users.
It should be possible to vary requirements without impacting the storage
structure or eﬃciency of information access. Conversely, it should be
possible to restructure databases from time to time, without interfering
with access demands. This can occur when a business embarks upon a
comprehensive migration from one applications environment to another.
It may take years and comprise many intermediate stages. It can also
occur when organization-wide information needs change, such as when a
public utility becomes privatized and is required to focus on commercial
dictates and customer demands; or when corporate information manage-
ment policies or even basic information architectures change in line with
business evolution.
From an information management perspective, there are numerous
factors that need to be considered, some of which can be deduced from
a list of questions outlined in Table 10.1. By answering these and other
pertinent questions, a framework for implementing information manage-
ment can be established. This framework will deﬁne:
. a set of objectives and policies for eﬀective information management;
. a program for introducing information management to meet the
objectives;
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Table 10.1 Establishing the scope and purpose of information management:
sample set of questions
. What is the extent of information that the business is interested in?
. Why does it need the information, and what beneﬁcial impact can be
ensured?
. How much of it resides in centrally managed computer systems, dispersed
departmental or individual PCs, in paper-based forms or in people’s heads?
. How much of it is new or external information, currently not collected?
. Which information is used by a broad cross-section of the business and needs
consistent, coherent policies to avoid ambiguity and conﬂict?
. What information is strategic and linked to strategic applications?
. What high potential information is likely to become strategic?
. When and how can it be delivered, or made accessible, where it will be most
useful?
. How can it be veriﬁed, and what other information is required to turn it into
useful knowledge?
. Which information needs to be integrated across applications, and what
technical challenges does this pose?
TE
AM
FL
Y
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Team-Fly® 
. the creation and maintenance of the information architecture and
business or enterprise model;
. what information services should be provided, and how to organize
to oﬀer them in the most eﬀective way;
. what implementation issues exist, and how to tackle them.
Objectives of Information Management
The main objective of information management is to satisfy the demand
for information, and thus deliver value to the business. This demand is
expressed in the information requirements of applications, and the in-
formation access and delivery services required by users. Value is deliv-
ered through:
. enabling the business to make the right decisions;
. improving the eﬀectiveness of processes and their outcomes;
. providing timely and focused performance information;
. the preservation of organizational memory;
. improving the productivity and eﬀectiveness of managers and staﬀ.
Behind the main objective should be further objectives relating to the
quality, cost, accessibility, safety and stability of the information, and
others relating to the beneﬁts that can be delivered through shared in-
formation, common deﬁnitions, an enterprise model covering informa-
tion and processes, and a modelling capability. These objectives are
explored in some detail in the following subsections.
Delivering Value to the Business
Delivering value to the business is the key rationale behind an informa-
tion management strategy—to add value by exploiting information as a
core business resource. In meeting that objective, the potential value of
information, especially in the core competitive processes (the primary
activities in the value chain), will be harnessed to its fullest extent.
While Chapter 5 considered opportunities for gaining strategic advantage
through IS/IT, in setting out to manage information, it is presumed that
such opportunities have been examined and the information require-
ments conﬁrmed. This will have been documented clearly in the
business IS strategy, along with any other information requirements.
The Hawley Committee developed a framework to help in structuring
the value of diﬀerent types of information asset. Illustrated in Figure
10.1, it can be very useful in reaching agreement among senior business
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managers as to its impact on business value as well as to the consequences
of theft or damage.
Since information needs to be managed in line with its value to the
business, it is helpful to ‘weight’ areas within the total information set,
according to their required contribution. A similar portfolio model to
that used to categorize applications can be used to rank the information
portfolio (Figure 10.2).
Strategic
Information, both internal and external, that is crucial to strategic and
competitive business initiatives and principally associated with business
drivers, objectives or measures of success, represents the greatest poten-
tial value. Some but not all this information may exist within the avail-
able information environment in the business. Typical requirements are
shown in Table 10.2. These are all business-driven needs, demanding
ﬂexible and often high-performance response.
A number of diﬀerent types of response may be needed to meet strat-
egic information requirements:
. Implementation of newly developed or purchased applications to
satisfy new information requirements that cannot be met from
existing applications, which provides ﬂexible systems that can be
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Figure 10.1 Mapping the value of information assets (source: Information as an
Asset: The Board Agenda, KPMG/IMPACT, London, 1994)
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Figure 10.2 Value of information to the business
Table 10.2 Typical strategic information requirements
. Access to new information about markets, customers, competitors, suppliers
or other external bodies to improve competitiveness
. Establishment of electronic links with external bodies, to speed up and
improve communications and, in some cases, to lock in trading partners
. Access to external information such as market research databases or
database marketing facilities to gain external intelligence
. Restructured existing information in order to meet the critical success factors
of the business or its external partners
. Capability to integrate and utilize multimedia data
. Very fast access to integrated information so that visibility is provided from
end to end of the key processes and information-based services can be
delivered eﬀectively throughout the processes
. Access and ﬁltering mechanisms for unstructured information to satisfy
executive information needs relating to critical business issues
. Performance measures to monitor progress on strategic factors
. Modelling data to perform ‘what if ’ analysis on crucial business issues
. Better information about staﬀ to enable more eﬀective use of the human
resource
adapted as business needs evolve and assists in gaining sustainable
competitive advantage.
. Substantial initiatives to enable information to be shared in a con-
trolled manner across existing, newly developed and packaged appli-
cations, and to be able to ‘switch in’ and ‘switch out’ applications
with minimum disruption and risk. Examples of this are described
later in the chapter.
. Short-term interim solutions, depending on providing access to
‘locked-in’ information. This may be through either direct or inter-
mediate bases of easily accessible information. Appropriate tools are
required to deliver information to business users, or enable them to
extract it themselves. The aim is to obtain value from information in
existing, but inappropriate, data structures.
. Development of an enterprise model to facilitate decision making
such as:
—top-level business decisions consistent with the ‘declared’ IS
strategy;
—process redesign proposals or new development proposals resulting
from the IS strategy;
—as a basis for mapping various architectures (information, applica-
tion portfolio, technology, product), as described in Chapter 4 as a
tool for planning IT supply, evaluation and decision making.
These responses reﬂect the nature of resulting initiatives’ combining
application, information and technology developments. For example,
associated initiatives may be needed to expand the IT infrastructure,
to extend communications capabilities or to deal with multimedia infor-
mation.
High Potential
High potential information is generally new information, with unproven
value to the business. Its sources, structures and relationships may not be
fully understood, but, as potentially valuable systems are being clariﬁed,
their information requirements must be conﬁrmed in terms of deﬁning
the best way of satisfying business needs, so that they can be included in
the information management umbrella at the appropriate time. The
essence of operating in this quadrant is in rapid evaluation of a prototype
application or information acquisition, processing or dissemination
technology:
. Single-user systems need not necessarily be subject to corporate in-
formation administration, as long as the reliance placed on their
information is not greater than its integrity warrants.
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. In some cases, it may be the possibility of exploiting latent informa-
tion that is the driving force in exploring a high-potential opportu-
nity; for example, historical transaction information about customers
that could lead to more eﬀective targeting of marketing activity. In
others, it is the desire to improve business performance that prompts
the extension of information content and usage; for example, collect-
ing customer-speciﬁc requirements, so that customer satisfaction is
based on a more personal service in meeting these requirements.
. Other high potential activity could be the trial of some new technol-
ogy that relates to information management like desktop videocon-
ferencing. This could be driven by IT ‘push’ from the IS function, or
could reﬂect free market experimentation in a user area, as described
in Chapter 7.
Key Operational
The largest volume of information is probably associated with the key
operational systems, integral to core operational processes and essential
for their eﬀective day-to-day running. Requirements here are likely to be
driven by avoidance of disadvantage and may focus on greatly enhancing
value through integration across applications and processes, enabling
rapid and consistent communication, especially to the external interfaces,
where strategic requirements take over (e.g. production status informa-
tion relating to a customer order).
There could also be opportunities to improve business productivity,
and remove duplication and risk of misinformation. These opportunities
must nevertheless be assessed in terms of the beneﬁt they could deliver
against the probable high cost of implementation and the likely restric-
tions to developing related strategic applications in the short term.
Support
Information contained only in support systems, though necessary, is not
likely to contain much latent value. In some cases, it may even be a
burden on the organization when it is constrained by legislation or
bound by corporate instructions to supply or store information,
without any business beneﬁt being recognized. Eﬀort expended on in-
formation management or integration should be kept to a minimum,
consistent only with eﬃciency and necessity.
There is no assumption that, to deliver value, information must be
stored and transmitted via computer and communications technology.
It may be transmitted verbally as with face-to-face conversations, or in
hard-copy paper form in books, journals, directories, instruction leaﬂets
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and so on. On the other hand, emerging electronic information transfer
media such as videoconferencing, groupware, Intranet and Internet may
be introduced to improve the richness of the interchange.
Making the Most of Current Systems
Even if the long-term plan is to replace existing systems and databases, it
is very likely that they will continue to be used for some time as they
contain much of the necessary information and processing functionality.
It is therefore important to consider how to obtain the maximum con-
tribution from the information in current systems and those still under
development. This must be achieved by managing the existing informa-
tion contained within existing systems, which is frequently ‘imprisoned’
in multiple corporate ﬁles and databases, with considerable duplication,
obsolescence, inconsistencies, ineﬃcient linkages and poor exploitation.
They may have been poorly designed in the ﬁrst place. In addition,
employees are not very well trained generally to use information. These
factors can all lead to competitive disadvantage and must be rectiﬁed, if
the business case warrants this. If progress is to be made toward imple-
menting eﬀective information management, it is essential to provide eﬃ-
cient access to information in these existing databases. However, if
multiple versions of key subject databases such as ‘customer’, ‘product’
or ‘order’ exist, then it is no easy task to rationalize the various versions
and harder still to integrate them with any newly deﬁned databases, or
object databases, based on the corporate information architecture. Until
unique versions of subject databases, or identically maintained versions,
are available, managing information globally implies managing the
diﬀerences between actual database versions and consistent data diction-
ary deﬁnitions.
Typically, there is a huge investment in systems, and in most sizeable
organizations the cost of maintaining these can be as much as 70–80% of
the annual expenditure on systems and technology. Very rarely can the
investment be written oﬀ—and even if it could be justiﬁed, replacements
could not be found or implemented quickly. Nor can support and main-
tenance be abandoned. So, in planning the migration to a new system, it
is important to obtain maximum value from current systems. Meanwhile,
the provision of critical business information with the necessary quality
attributes in an appropriate set of target databases should be the objec-
tive of any migration and must still be justiﬁed against the business need.
This is likely to be a long, multi-step process of progression toward an
elusive goal.
It is essential to evaluate the contribution of information in existing
systems, with reference to business information needs. Sometimes,
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systems will already have associated information and process models and
some will be recorded in dictionary systems. Frequently, however, this is
not the case, and the structure and contents of individual systems need to
be identiﬁed if their value is to be assessed. The evaluation process serves
several purposes:
. Documentation of the information structure and processes, and
system linkages, which helps in plotting the migration path to the
desired systems and information architecture, and also in any initia-
tive that may be put in place to enable information sharing and
systems integration.
. Recognition of whether current systems are able to provide informa-
tion to satisfy business needs, either directly or after enhancement.
. Identiﬁcation of information that can be usefully transferred to an
intermediate base of consolidated information for subsequent access-
ing, perhaps to satisfy composite needs or unstructured enquiries.
Few tools are available for unscrambling the conceptual framework in
existing systems, but some CASE tools can provide reverse engineering
facilities that can backward-track and document components of existing
systems, capturing data deﬁnitions, data ﬂows and data and process
models.
Provision of a Stable Integrated Information Framework
In aiming to provide a stable information base, there are strong argu-
ments for it being integrated, at least throughout the core business pro-
cesses. Prompted by many factors in the business environment, it is
expected that there will continue to be a steady increase in the number
of knowledge workers, and growth in the volume and complexity of
internal and external information needed to meet a variety of demands.
This means more people wanting more access to more information that is
distributed more widely. These increased demands call for improved
gathering and dissemination across a wide area such as:
. exchange of information with trading partners;
. support within decision-making processes;
. ad hoc end-user enquiries;
. boardroom strategy and planning systems;
. creating new knowledge by combining specialist information;
. obtaining business intelligence through the Internet and external
databases.
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Widespread sharing of information from a variety of sources requires
considerable integration, based on a representative global information
model. All users can then look at the same or consistently related
models, with the same meanings and deﬁnitions and, by and large, the
same or copied occurrences of information. Assuming the model is
correct, some of the beneﬁts of a well-structured, stable, integrated in-
formation resource, which can be easily and quickly adapted, are listed in
Box 10.3.
For example, an organization may want to link information about the
services a particular customer has used in order to contain risk (e.g. a bad
debt in one area would constitute a bad risk in another), or to maximize
opportunities by being able to oﬀer the customer a complete range of
services. It is for this purpose that many ﬁnancial service institutions have
attempted to implement channel integration strategies to provide a
coherent view of the customer across all channels and products.
Opportunities exist in many other ﬁelds, including government depart-
ments. For example, the UK’s Department of Social Security may wish to
provide a potentially valid claimant with information and advice on a
range of beneﬁt entitlements, or alternatively to provide the authorities
with a better chance of detecting false claimants. In these and most cases,
the total view is needed at the business–customer interface, more so than
at the centre, since the contact takes place in distributed branches.
Rapid Response to Dynamic Business Needs
Rapidly responding to changing business needs is closely related to the
previous aim. Not only should the information framework be stable and
integrated but it should also facilitate a swift response to an unexpected
business need. The ‘window’ may only be open for a brief period. A
completely healthy systems and information architecture that can
enable a virtually instant response is a rare occurrence, but there is
much that can be done.
The business models derived from top-down analysis and based on
aligning business and information reﬂect the information-sharing
requirements of the business throughout its internal value chain, and
into adjacent organizations. During analysis of the value chain, and in
particular in examining the information logistics of primary activities,
opportunities for deriving competitive advantage by improving informa-
tion ﬂows will have been examined and built into the required architec-
ture. The ability to satisfy unexpected needs can best be provided if
consideration is given to them during the processes of information
planning. Applying informed second-guessing, potential information
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needs and their sources, relationships and ﬂows can be built into the
initial information architecture.
The most appropriate structure for an organization’s information and
systems is usually that which mirrors the organization itself. Thus, if the
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Box 10.3 Beneﬁts delivered by a stable integrated information
framework
. Businesses better equipped with information to respond as neces-
sary: to change direction, monitor market and customer needs,
competitor activity, build relationships with business partners,
and so on.
. Direct savings achieved in the long run: even though introducing
information management is costly, fragmentation is even more
costly when taking into account multiple duplication of infor-
mation capture, confusion caused by information inconsisten-
cies, and the frustration and chaos in reconciling diﬀerences. It
can be the cause of lost opportunities through lack of cohesive
information.
. Intraorganizational and interorganizational cooperation improved
by making information available across boundaries to a broad
community of authorized users: some of these may be external
users, having their own requirements for accessing information;
for example, customers placing orders, suppliers enquiring into
the status of manufacturing schedules to meet just-in-time
delivery requirements, ﬁnancial analysts collecting global
economic ﬁgures. In these cases, both user and (information)
supplier are beneﬁciaries.
. Support for managing businesses in a more integrated way:
traditionally, many businesses have been functionally orientated
and IT has supported individual business functions quite eﬀec-
tively. There is now a requirement toward integration along
business processes in order to be more customer and market
orientated, and thus more competitive. This demands taking a
horizontal view across the business; for example, linking all
activities relating to a customer and reorganizing information
in such a way that the whole of the customer’s relationship with
a business is logically brought together and presented at the
point of contact with the customer—face to face, on the tele-
phone, in concurrent processing, when a written order, query or
complaint arrives, or when electronic channels are used.
organization is divisionalized and highly decentralized, then the informa-
tion resources—both applications and information—are probably also
best disposed in that form. Determining how best to implement the
conceptual architecture is part of the IS/IT strategy process. Clearly, it
is also part of the process to look toward future business needs before
embarking on what could be very extensive development or redevelop-
ment of systems and information structures. The beneﬁts that can then be
delivered are swift responses to:
. identify and exploit an opportunity;
. identify and counter an unexpected competitive action;
. build pre-emptive defence against possible competitive threats;
. supply information to assess a business risk or the probability of its
occurrence.
Improved Eﬃciency and Eﬀectiveness of Information Processes
Improving information processes is an aim of many organizations, and
good information planning and management should play a substantial
role in meeting this aim. There are a number of factors that contribute to
improving eﬃciency:
. Initially, increased investment is required to create an appropriate
integrated infrastructure of ‘managed’ information. Thereafter, while
initial project development costs may be higher, beneﬁts are reaped
over a long period in reduced maintenance costs and greatly extended
eﬀective life and reliability of applications.
. Critical information is consistent across the business and not plagued
by incompatibility problems.
. If a well-constructed data dictionary is employed, fewer information-
related program errors are incurred.
. High-level languages, associated with advanced and reliable database
management systems (DBMSs), reduce programming eﬀort consid-
erably (e.g. in generating enquiries and reports).
In deﬁning the information architecture along with new applications,
many problems can be avoided. But, in considering the current portfolio,
it could be worthwhile seeking out long-standing culprits in the form of
obsolete information or unmatched needs and supply:
. Archived information held longer than needed.
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. Information disseminated when it is no longer needed. Where this
used to apply to hard-copy reports, it may now apply to ﬁles of
information distributed electronically, but never accessed by users.
. Useful information available, but not used.
. Ineﬃcient methods of capture, manipulation, storage or distribution.
. Duplication in several activities—capture, storage, transmission.
Duplication in one or another of these forms is very common. It is
usually a consequence of independent developments, and is often perpe-
tuated out of lack of trust between system ‘owners’. It is clearly a source
of potential errors when information is input more than once. It is not
uncommon to ﬁnd ten or even more diﬀerent customer databases, some
held only on PCs or personal digital assistants (PDAs), in an organiza-
tion where an extensive portfolio of systems has been built over a number
of years. Few, if any, of these will be identical in deﬁnition or content.
Overlapping is often extensive, even where the products or customers of
the enterprise diﬀer widely from division to division and thus from
database to database. The degree of overlap varies from case to case.
For example, publishers of journals and magazines will have one set of
customers who are subscribers and another who are advertisers. In this
circumstance, there may be little overlap, nor much potential for generat-
ing business from combining the two. Where multiple copies of informa-
tion exist, whether the physical information needs to be centralized or
distributed more widely is an implementation and operational issue.
Multiple databases, which have grown out of independent develop-
ments, can demonstrate a number of diﬀerences. They can contain
entirely diﬀerent coding structures and they may also incorporate diﬀer-
ent deﬁnitions of entities, ambiguous or conﬂicting meanings, and diﬀer-
ent logical relationships. In the worst cases, they imply polarization,
mistrust and a widespread lack of conﬁdence in combining and sharing
information. In these cases, the task is more than one of information
management; it requires major cultural change as outlined earlier in the
chapter. One of the objectives for introducing information management
practices involves gaining the conﬁdence of disaﬀected business users and
sometimes colleagues in the IS function.
The risks associated with duplication of information input and storage
can be greatly reduced by seeking to enter, update and store information
once only. Duplication risks thereafter will be linked to the number of
databases into which information is transferred and their distribution
around the organization. In systems integration, multiple updating
becomes part of the functionality of the integration.
Other factors aﬀect the eﬀectiveness of information processes and of
the users who depend on them, but most of these are tackled within the
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identiﬁcation of business IS demand and the resultant information archi-
tecture. Characteristics that then determine eﬀectiveness include the
availability of required information, ease of access by end-users, time-
liness, quality, integrity and consistency. These all fall within information
management policies and ‘service’ criteria.
THE PRACTICE OF MANAGING THE
INFORMATION ASSET
The practice of managing and marshalling the information asset is
often called information asset management (IAM), although there is no
universal agreement about its precise deﬁnition or constituents, its com-
ponent activities, scope, organizational focus, policies and tools. It is
additionally called by other names, ‘information resource management’
and ‘corporate data management’ being two favourite alternatives. It is
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from data administration or data management
applied at system or business-function level, having a much wider sig-
niﬁcance and value. In asset-management terms, IAM seeks to build up
the information assets of an organization at an acceptable cost, so that
they can be employed to deliver value to the business. A deﬁnition of
IAM and its constituents is given in Table 10.3.12
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Table 10.3 IAM and its constituents
. IAM is a holistic approach to the management of the information assets of
an organization. The emphasis is on integral, eﬃcient and economic manage-
ment of all the organization’s information. It means getting the right
information to the right people at the right time
. Data (information) administration is the identiﬁcation and classiﬁcation of
business information and associated requirements, development of a cor-
porate architecture, development of procedures and guidelines for identifying
and deﬁning business data (information)
. Data dictionary administration entails describing and cataloguing the in-
formation available
. Database administration involves design and development of a database
environment for recording and maintaining data (especially machine-read-
able data), development of procedures and controls to ensure correct usage
and privacy of data, operational timing, monitoring and housekeeping
. Information-access services ensure provision of support services and hard-
ware and software to enable end-users to locate, access, correctly interpret
and, where appropriate, manipulate the information available
In this book, IAM is assumed to include those activities and a number
of further components. It contributes a major element of the informa-
tion-related requirements, in pursuit of business targets. It supplies or
facilitates the business in providing a range of standards, guidelines,
deliverables and services, as indicated in Table 10.4.
Principles and guidelines for IAM
Principles and guidelines for IAM should be given careful consideration,
both when IAM is ﬁrst introduced and when it is reassessed and updated
to meet changing business needs. Aspects to consider include criteria for:
. determining the cost versus value of providing information;
. deﬁning standards of information quality, accuracy, security and
timeliness;
. responsibilities and allocation of ownership;
. satisfying the individual’s need for information;
. sources and types of information to be catered for;
. what levels and forms of information should be provided (e.g. raw,
unit, summary, etc.);
. how to determine the scope and methods for key practices (e.g.
enterprise modelling, information sharing);
. principles relating to making the user community aware of the scope
of IAM, and how to optimize their use of information;
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Table 10.4 Provisions of IAM
. Principles and guidelines, which form the charter for deﬁning IAM scope and
provisions
. Policies and procedures for deﬁnition, management and usage of information,
including its acquisition, protection, dissemination and disposal
. A business encyclopaedia of information deﬁnitions and usage
. An enterprise model and other business models referencing all types of
information
. Multimedia information in ﬁles, databases and in an information ‘warehouse’
. Services, methods and tools to enable IAM activities like information
administration, appropriate for the level of information management
required
. Services to deliver information to users, and tools for users to access
information directly
. Mechanisms for enabling information sharing
. Skills, competencies and knowledge in information management disciplines
and the information pertinent to the business
. what constitutes an issue that needs to be resolved, and the means to
do so.
Determining the Right Scope and Structure of Information to be
Managed and Modelled
A key issue in IAM is deciding what is the right scope for the ‘managed’
information environment and how it should be structured. The total
information environment does not stop at an organization’s boundaries;
it extends into the external environment, inhabited by customers, buyers,
competitors and other organizations and inﬂuences. This external en-
vironment is very volatile and can never be modelled completely, nor
can its contents be captured easily and made accessible. Internally, in-
formation is often fragmented and growing ever more so, as users of
personal computing have built up their own caches of information.
Systems designed to meet speciﬁc business needs are unable to commu-
nicate directly with one another, and are often unable to share, exchange
or combine information eﬀectively, because of inbuilt diﬀerences in
deﬁnition or usage. Figure 10.3 illustrates the various information envir-
onments associated with a typical business. A signiﬁcant portion of the
information may be automated, but usually only a small proportion is
managed.
The target scope of the managed environment is determined by
business needs and priorities. Typically, it will contain information that
must be accurate and reliable such as customer order information or
billing information. It is information used by a broad section of the
business and often by its external partners. Everyone uses a common
deﬁnition and, while there may be more than one copy of the informa-
tion, it is managed by procedures that ensure consistency and integrity.
Primarily, this is the information used by key operational applications.
For any business, IAM has its foundation in its business IS strategy,
where information needs are deﬁned and the information architecture for
each business unit is constructed. When several business units have devel-
oped their own IS strategies, either independently or collaboratively, they
may decide to compare and rationalize, and possibly combine all or part
of their information architectures or application portfolios. As long as
due consideration is given to likely long-term needs as well as to immedi-
ate requirements, it may make very good business, resource and
economic sense to collaborate in this way. Where two businesses have
entirely diﬀerent technology strategies, then the collaboration can extend
no further than the conceptual architecture level. More frequently, a
single business unit opts to introduce IAM within its own boundaries
and sometimes in even smaller subdivisions of the business.
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Questions of centralization and decentralization of decision making,
steering mechanisms, location of applications and resources, which were
discussed at some length in Chapter 8, can be applied in much the same
way in consideration of the ownership, location and management of
information, and the location of the supporting IAM resources.
Whatever the business scope in terms of business units, the information
architecture becomes the long-term implementation blueprint for IAM in
that business, although it is extremely unlikely that the whole set of
business information would be managed. At ﬁrst, only certain parts of
the architecture may be analysed beyond a global level, but piece by piece
the information relevant to the business’s key processes will be added
until an information blueprint is complete to an appropriate level. This
is likely to be a continuous process, and it will never be static, as
new information is taken into the managed resource and perhaps other
information is excluded as not having current signiﬁcance and not
warranting being managed under the IAM umbrella. Care needs to be
taken to prevent this becoming a case of permanent analysis, without any
value being delivered.
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Figure 10.3 Information environments
Remember, there is no suggestion that the information in the business
environment should be stored in a single comprehensive database. Far
from it—it is almost certain that there will be a number of separate
databases in use. However, every attempt should be made to retain
consistency of deﬁnitions across all databases and to conﬁne the entry
of information so that it is only input once. It is quite possible for there to
be several copies of the same database, depending on the systems integra-
tion approach taken for linking legacy systems, new applications and
packages.
Information Sharing
The ability to share information is a usual requirement when introducing
IAM. Sharing can encompass interfaces within one business unit, several
units, divisions or companies within the same group, and with external
organizations. In its simplest form, information sharing means that only
one copy of a piece of information is held and that all authorized users
have access to it. In practice, this is very diﬃcult to accomplish, because
the same information is often used by several legacy applications, each
with their own databases, and by installed packaged applications. Com-
plexity increases if multiple vendors, hardware platforms, operating
systems, DBMSs and network protocols are involved. In this case, it is
very diﬃcult to achieve a single source of information, and the complex-
ity and risk increase if the situation is volatile and frequent changes to the
environment and application portfolio are expected. Then a solution that
incorporates consistent copies of information must be found, which
enables information sharing and information management to be accom-
plished. This can be a very complex technical problem, well outside the
scope of this book. A ‘ﬂavour’ of the possibilities are considered in the
next few subsections.
Single Vendor Solutions
Here a large proportion of the application portfolio is covered by one
enterprise system supplied by one vendor, who also supplies the required
integration. This approach has the great advantage that all functionality
comes already integrated, but it is a feasible solution only if the organ-
ization is willing to lock into a single vendor, for one and possibly
multiple sites, and is also willing to sacriﬁce the existing applications,
covering this area.
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This may be successful when requirements are relatively uniform and it
meets information management and information-sharing requirements
internally, if not externally. But it tends to have a number of drawbacks
from other points of view:
. For most, except the simplest, businesses, no single vendor solution
will meet all requirements, and the shortfalls have to be procured
from other vendors and then integrated with the main applications.
Many organizations pursue a ‘best-of-breed’ strategy, actively
sourcing solutions from multiple vendors.
. Having to replace existing applications may produce a poor return
on investment for those applications, plus the high cost of new
software and training costs.
. The chosen solution may not be a good ﬁt for all strategic business
units (SBUs) if it is implemented across the whole organization.
. There is a higher risk in depending on a single vendor, who may also
charge higher-than-average rates for support and development of the
applications.
Point-to-Point Integration
Here tight connections are built between applications that need to share
data in an integrated environment. The approach is evolutionary, and is
relatively easy and low cost if only a small number of connections need to
be made. However, if the numbers of applications, operating systems,
DBMSs or interfaces are signiﬁcant, and changes happen frequently, then
it is both costly and high risk, as each interface is unique. Changing,
upgrading or adding an application, or making changes to the applica-
tion and network conﬁguration, can produce risks of failure at any point
in the business or technology environment.
Data Access
Data access means providing data access to users across the business
regardless of the location of the users or the source of the information.
This solution gives desktop tools to users for data manipulation, decision
support, ad hoc enquiry and report generation. Its main focus is the
provision of an information library or warehouse, refreshed with opera-
tional data on a regular basis, from operational systems, to perform
limited integration and analysis functions. A data warehouse requires
powerful servers to deliver high performance to all users.
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Integration Using Middleware
Middleware is software implemented in a distributed environment that
enables applications to ‘talk’ to one another and exchange information.
In support of IAM, it enables information sharing in a distributed multi-
vendor environment. Independent, but consistent, information is held in
each application, and the middleware controls the synchronization and
transmission of information between applications. There are various
types of middleware that support diﬀerent information integration
requirements. The concept of enterprise architecture integration (EAI) is
often encountered in relation to application integration, but is essentially
similar to middleware, diﬀering only in that it provides more sophisti-
cated functionality.
Preparation for information sharing entails:
. determining the business needs and beneﬁts—deﬁned in the business
IS strategy;
. deﬁning the technical requirements and the practicalities of the provi-
sion (access mechanisms, security, risk, communications capability,
centralization or decentralization, single or multiple copies of data
sets);
. describing the information to be shared and the community of
authorized users;
. deﬁning the interworking requirements across the applications;
. deciding how to overcome barriers brought about by diﬀerences
in management style and local values and culture within an organ-
ization;
. resolving issues of interdepartmental or company rivalry.
It is less likely that cultural factors will pose problems if the information-
sharing requirement is largely restricted to a single SBU and its commer-
cial partners in its value chain, than if the issues of shared information
straddle business units in a larger corporate organization, or inter-
national boundaries, as in multinational companies. Logical arguments
for sharing have to be weighed carefully against potential conﬂicts.
ACTIVITIES OF IAM
If IAM is being established at corporate level, then the main decisions
will be made by the executive steering group, and those aﬀecting the SBU
by the business steering group (as described in Chapter 8); if it is being
established at SBU level, then the business steering group for the SBU is
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the decision-making body. The activities and tasks involved are described
in Box 10.4.
Developing the Enterprise Model
The enterprise or business model is the highest level model that is
produced during the IS strategy process or within IAM. A business
model is illustrated in Figure 4.3. It may have several components,
which are described in more detail in Chapter 4:
. A global hierarchical process and activity model that mirrors the
current structure of the business. It is used to identify business activ-
ities, by decomposition from the highest level functions of the
business. It can be used to conﬁrm the content and boundaries of
the primary and support business processes.
. A global process model that shows the primary and supporting
business processes, their relationship and the principal information
and material ﬂows. It is usually possible to map this onto the value
chain model.
. A global entity model that includes all the high-level business entities
that are of crucial interest to the business.
. The activities and entities linked together in a matrix, which repre-
sents a conceptual information architecture, indicating the relation-
ships between the constituents and possible application areas.
The purpose of the enterprise model is as a basis for:
. Providing a coherent picture of the business, independent of physical
structures, as a communications and planning tool.
. Identifying essential changes to the business to meet business objec-
tives.
. Identifying major streamlining opportunities to the processes,
without having to consider organizational factors.
. Seeking innovative opportunities, like those described in Chapter 5,
around the value chain.
. Deﬁning the most suitable applications and information architecture
that would meet the business needs and would move the business in
the direction of an integrated and ﬂexible environment.
. Deﬁning the information entities that should be managed on behalf
of the whole business.
. As a benchmarking tool in the evaluation and selection of large
business software packages such as for enterprise resource planning
(ERP) or customer relationship management (CRM) in terms of
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Box 10.4 Tasks performed within IAM
Section 1: Data (Information) Administration Tasks
. Information planning, which is a top-down task started in the
strategic planning process and continued at a tactical level in
IAM, in association with prioritized business initiatives.
. Identifying business information requirements, also undertaken in
IS strategy process and business analysis.
. Setting information deﬁnition standards and procedures, including
naming and abbreviation conventions. This also entails:
—selecting the medium and methods for recording the
deﬁnitions, usually on a data dictionary, encyclopaedia or
repository;
—deﬁning procedures and communicating them to business and
IS/IT users;
—introducing monitoring procedures for compliance with stan-
dards;
—measuring their eﬀectiveness;
—assessing the impact of changes in information deﬁnition or
relationships, resulting from changes in the business.
Information administration and data dictionary administration
work closely together in this area.
. Managing the corporate information models, determining their
most appropriate form and their total scope, levels of decom-
position, where separate models are relevant, and how they
interface or overlap.
. Coordinating the solving of information-related problems. These
may range from promotion and implementation of a policy to
achieve a single source of information entry to internal disputes
over information sharing and access rights.
. Communicating with the business, which includes promoting
awareness of the role of information, and informing the
business what information it possesses, where it is located,
what its precise deﬁnition is in business terms, how it relates
to other information and so on. Some of this is in conjunction
with data dictionary administration.
. Establishing and implementing process, activity and information
analysis at a higher level than system level. The task involves
selecting methods, techniques and tools, and developing
standards and procedures for their use throughout the informa-
tion life cycle. They must integrate comfortably with systems
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development methods and end-user computing. Part of the re-
sponsibility is to promote their use and to provide advice,
training and assistance where necessary. There is also a quality
role, to ensure conformance and consistency of analysis deliver-
ables.
The deliverables are information models, process and infor-
mation ﬂow diagrams, activity decomposition diagrams and
architecture matrices, as described in Chapter 3. The level of
detail in the deliverables is determined by the type of analysis
being performed, which may be strategic (enterprise level),
overview (business process) and detailed analysis (application
area) levels. The top level is strategic analysis, and its aim is to
produce a global structured plan of the business information
and processes. Models at this level are necessarily lacking in
detail.
In practice, information administration takes responsibility
for the enterprise models, and where contention occurs—
when, for example, the scope of two overview areas overlap—
then this must be resolved by data administration.
. Establishing controls and procedures for information security and
recovery, privacy (ensuring compliance under the Data Protection
Act) and integrity.
Section 2: Data Dictionary Administration Tasks
. Providing an authoritative source of information to users and IS/
IT groups on information. It has the unique opportunity of
putting information in context for the business at large, but
the data dictionary must be clearly seen as a general manage-
ment communication tool and not as the preserve of IT. In
eﬀect, it is the glossary and dictionary of the business.
. Evaluating, selecting and implementing data dictionary manage-
ment software.
. Setting up and coordinating the data dictionary contents, the
meta-models of data and functions.
. Establishing standards and procedures for use of the data dic-
tionary and monitoring conformance.
. Working with information administration on information
deﬁnition and impact analysis, and with development and
database administration on application and database integration,
development and maintenance.
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Section 3: Database Administration Tasks
. Undertaking design, development, implementation and operational
tasks associated with the business’s logical and physical data-
bases.
. Setting technical standards, procedures and guidelines for
database activities, data input, update and access.
. Evaluating and selecting database management software to suit
the technical infrastructure speciﬁed to support the business,
implementing and maintaining the software, and implementing
change control procedures.
. Monitoring and controlling the environment and database
services to the business.
. Protecting the integrity of the environment and investigating
security problems.
. Undertaking periodic reorganization and restructuring, perform-
ance monitoring and tuning.
. Performing any necessary housekeeping tasks such as back-up,
archiving, recovery and restart.
. Working closely with data administration and data dictionary
administration to ensure policies are followed and the impact
of implementation issues is assessed.
. Keeping abreast of database technology, either new to the
industry or as yet unused by the business.
. Working with systems development in ensuring that database
usage is planned eﬀectively for new applications and existing
systems to give optimal user beneﬁt, while complying with
database standards and policies.
. Working in package selection teams to evaluate database designs
to ensure that they meet deﬁned standards of performance,
structure and integration requirements.
Section 4: Information Access Tasks
. Formulating, implementing and monitoring policies and proce-
dures relating to ownership, responsibility, security and access
rights.
. Promoting beneﬁts of information management, shared informa-
tion and appreciation of the value of information.
. Ensuring that high-quality information is available and accessible,
whether in operational databases, extracted information data-
bases or external information.
their conformance to the architecture. Further investigation is needed
to assess their conformance to other aspects of the principles, policies
and procedures of IAM.
The enterprise model must be owned by the business, particularly at
executive and business steering group levels. There are some problems
and risks associated with it. It may be diﬃcult to gain management
commitment to the modelling process and to its use thereafter. This
becomes a distinct possibility if the management group has had unsatis-
factory experiences at some stage. Another problem is in ensuring that
the level of analysis is contained at a high level, so as not to get over-
whelmed by detail or to lose sight of essentials.
POLICIES AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
Information planning at a strategic level demands top management in-
volvement, without which there could be an unhealthy IT orientation to
the plans. It is necessary for issues to be resolved at this level and the
outcome speciﬁed in policies. The types of policy that are established at
this level aﬀect the organization as a whole. A few relate to physical
issues, others to matters of central coordination, authority and responsi-
bility, enabling access and the scope of managed information. There may
also be a continuing need for marketing into the business community, to
raise the level of commitment for treating information as a core business
resource, and to educate the business about the inherent cost and value
characteristics of information. There will be other issues that reﬂect the
particular requirements of individual organizations.
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. Providing tools and techniques that enable users to access infor-
mation. This entails the provision of:
—software mechanisms that integrate the environment and
enable information sharing, as described earlier in this
chapter;
—delivery of information to users ‘ready for use’ or for further
local manipulation;
—tools and access to an information ‘warehouse’ of information
extracted from operational ﬁles;
—tools in the local PC, workstation or desktop environment to
access local or widespread information.
Extent of the ‘Managed’ Information
As indicated earlier in this chapter, the extent of the information resource
to be ‘managed’ must be broadly determined. Although it is unlikely that
a policy will lay down the precise boundaries of managed data, guidelines
are needed for information administration. However, hard-and-fast rules
would be inappropriate, since the status of information changes from
time to time.
At any one time, some user information will be corporate, mainly in
strategic and key operational applications, some will be personal, mainly
high potential and support, and thus excluded from formal information
management. Over time, the personal information may move into a
managed status (e.g. as it becomes more widely applicable, or as its
value grows and the application moves or is redeveloped for the strategic
or key operational segments). Sometimes, managed information becomes
‘unmanaged’ after it is extracted from the managed environment into a
local environment, as when applications move from key operational to
support segments, where information may be manipulated in non-
standard ways. There needs to be a method for identifying what informa-
tion is held by users that may have a wider usefulness. This can happen
frequently in a free market environment, where user areas are innovative,
and users develop their own applications and manipulate information
skilfully to meet their own requirements. The challenge is clarifying the
deﬁnition of each information element, ensuring that it ﬁts consistently in
the relevant models and recording the details in the data dictionary. Once
the criteria for setting boundaries have been determined, the task of
bringing information into a managed environment is relatively slow
and needs careful coordination and control.
Clearly, there is a cost associated with managing information and this
needs to be justiﬁed and then committed to, because the controls and
procedures must not be irksome or inhibit business ﬂexibility and creativ-
ity, but should be seen to be of value in themselves.
Organizational Responsibility for IAM
Responsibility for coordinating IAM activities in most instances needs to
be centralized, but certain elements may be delegated to one or more
business areas, responsible for client–server computing and access
matters, or to local IAM units in each SBU in a decentralized business.
In certain instances (e.g. where several SBUs have almost complete
autonomy), a central IAM function may not be desirable, and each
SBU may set up its own. However, if the corporate body has a signiﬁcant
say in SBU IS/IT policy, and if any attempt is made to standardize
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systems and information architectures across the company, then central
coordination is probably desirable.
A number of other organizational factors should be considered:
. Skilled specialists may be needed to set up and implement IAM and
to train the in-house staﬀ in the skills required.
. Other specialists may be needed to create the distributed and inte-
grated environment.
. Because it may be a continuous process, suﬃcient resources must be
allocated.
. There is no one organizational structure that is universally appro-
priate. It is possible to have a structure with all IAM activities
encompassed within the IS function, and managed at the same
level as IS/IT development, etc. This could represent either a cor-
porate or SBU structure. An alternative is for information manage-
ment residing outside the IS function, which retains only database
administration. In this case, the structure contains corporate infor-
mation management as well as information management at SBU
level. This would be repeated for each SBU.
Authority and Responsibility for Information
Criteria for determining ownership and the responsibilities associated
with this for acquiring, storing, maintaining and disposing must be
decided. Standards for maintaining quality, privacy, consistency and
integrity, and for providing the required levels of security, must also be
determined, and responsibilities assigned appropriately. In addition,
access rules should be laid down.
These criteria, standards and responsibilities have to be set by user
management with advice from the IAM group and communicated to
all users of information, along with details of what information is avail-
able and who has the responsibilities throughout the various stages of the
information life cycle.
It is, of course, vital to explain the beneﬁts of managed information to
the user community and to deliver them, otherwise a natural disinclina-
tion to part with ‘my’ information may turn into outright lack of co-
operation or even hostility. This is where top management commitment
combined with well-thought-out and implemented policies are needed.
Two-way trust is involved; users having faith in the integrity of the
data and data administrators trusting the users not to corrupt or
misuse it.
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Information Security
It is necessary to protect critical information from accidental or deliber-
ate destruction, corruption or loss. This is an issue that is growing in
importance since organizations are so dependent upon their information,
and its exposure to risk is so great. Computer hackers are a growing
breed of criminal.
Shared databases are prevalent and the number of terminals that can
gain access to information continues to expand, as does the awareness
of users. The risk of damage through physical failure or human
intervention is also growing and must be analysed and contained as
far as possible. The Data Protection Act in the UK and similar
legislation in other countries puts an onus on organizations to protect
private data.
Figure 10.4 presents a template describing major categories and levels
of risk against critical information assets developed by the Hawley Com-
mittee. They argued that it should be reviewed by the Board from time to
time along with the method of protection.
Measures to protect information should be implemented where
they are necessary and can be shown to be eﬀective. Barriers can be
designed and built into hardware and software, as can recovery proce-
dures. These can be supplemented by audit and other security monitoring
procedures.
Implementation Issues
For the introduction or extension of IAM to succeed, it must be linked to
speciﬁc business goals and tied to the achievement of desired business
beneﬁts, which could be stock reduction, new product development,
accelerated availability of information, staﬀ productivity, reduction in
errors or improved decision making. Eﬀective information management
targeted at a few critical items of information, especially those that
straddle internal or external boundaries, will repay the eﬀort and serve
as a good example for extending the ‘managed’ environment. Total in-
formation management is neither practical nor cost-eﬀective.
Naturally, there are problems associated with implementing IAM. One
of the most diﬃcult is in bridging the gap between ‘top-down’-deﬁned
databases and existing databases, and the resulting need to ‘manage’ or
reconcile the diﬀerences. There may also be diﬃculties in managing ex-
pectations. Some may view the process as a means of identifying applica-
tion opportunities, others a systems and information architecture, others
creating database designs. These expectations may all be relevant, but
they need to be pulled together under the business expectations of im-
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proving business performance over a long period through optimal ex-
ploitation of IS/IT.
Other issues that were noted by Goodhue et al.13 in 1988 and are still
relevant today are:
. Time and cost. If broadly-based IAM is being implemented, key
people have to commit themselves. This level of commitment is
diﬃcult to obtain and to keep. Total implementation is very expen-
sive and is a lengthy process. This level of expenditure will often be
resisted if current systems are performing eﬀectively and IAM is not
being implemented on the basis of developing new strategic systems
to support business objectives.
. Changes to business requirements may impact plans while informa-
tion planning and implementation is under way. This must be
expected and allowed for.
. Systems developed while IAM is being implemented take longer and
cost more, due to the inevitable learning curve and to increased
upfront analysis eﬀort. This is a problem for line managers who
want quick results and good return on investment. It is also diﬃcult
for IS managers who are resistant to allocating the extra eﬀort.
. Removal of local autonomy when information is allocated ‘managed’
status. Application packages can be diﬃcult to absorb within IAM
policies, and the integration of legacy and new applications and
databases is a complex issue.
. New skills are needed that are sometimes not easily acquired by
existing staﬀ.
MANAGING KNOWLEDGE RESOURCES
The investments that organizations are making in IT are generating huge
volumes of information. For example, CRM systems generate vast
amounts of transactional information about customers. A challenge
faced is creating knowledge and insight from this information to
inform business decisions. Even with eﬀective information management
strategies, most organizations are not succeeding in turning information
into knowledge and results. Even those that do are doing so only tem-
porarily or in a limited area of the business.14
One fact is without contention: knowledge is crucial for the competitive
success of all commercial organizations, and, like information, if they
desire to harness it to create business value, they must develop strategies
to manage it eﬀectively.15 Managing knowledge embraces not just its
exploitation but the acquisition, creating, storing and sharing of this
resource—all with a deep understanding of the business and strategic
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context. No organization, of whatever size, is immune to the requirement
for knowledge and the need to manage it eﬀectively. Even the smallest
enterprise needs to know about customers, competitors, pricing, new
products, etc. Consequently, the concept of knowledge management
(KM) has attracted much attention over the last decade, particularly as
IT is seen as enabling the management of knowledge resources.
Davenport and Marchand16 pose the question, ‘Is KM just good in-
formation management?’ They argue that there is a large component of
information management in KM and that much of what passes for the
latter is actually the former. Nonaka et al.17 contend that the ‘knowledge
management’ that academics and business people talk about often means
just ‘information management’, although Teece18 notes that the latter can
certainly assist the former. However, true KM goes well beyond informa-
tion management.
The recurring questions about knowledge management are, ‘How do I
do it?’ and ‘How do I ensure that my organization exploits its knowl-
edge?’ While the concept of managing knowledge is appealing, the
meaning of the term knowledge is elusive.19 Organizations are therefore
faced with the task of managing something that they recognize as being
vital, but yet have great diﬃculty in describing, particularly in a way that
assists them in creating business value.
What Is Knowledge?
The concept of knowledge has been the subject of study and debate since
the dawn of civilization. The creation of meaning, the role of language and
symbols and the process of creating knowledge—learning—have occupied
the minds of philosophers, educationalists, economics, neurologists, lin-
guists and psychologists, to mention just a few disciplines.20 What is
widely accepted is that knowledge is the result of human evolution, the
intelligent brain, and is a particularly human characteristic in that knowl-
edge is inseparable from the human being. While data and information
can arguably exist independently, knowledge cannot. It only exists in
humans. Consequently, a distinction is often made between the object—
the known—and the subject—the knower—of knowledge.
Although the terms ‘information’ and ‘knowledge’ are often used inter-
changeably, they are quite diﬀerent.21 While knowledge and information
can be diﬃcult to distinguish, they both involve more human participa-
tion than the raw data on which they are partly based. Information is
data that has been given structure and knowledge is information that has
been given meaning.22 In essence, knowledge is information that has been
interpreted by individuals and given a context. Thus, knowledge is the
result of a dynamic human process, in which humans justify personal
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information produced or sustain beliefs as part of an aspiration for the
‘truth’23 and can be portrayed as information combined with experience,
context, interpretation and reﬂection.24
The interpretation of information a person receives is relative to what
he or she already knows.25 It is suggested that man cannot grasp the
meaning of information about his environment without some frame-of-
value judgement. So, for knowledge to be created from information, a
belief system is necessary, as is a process of converting and interpreting
information to produce knowledge.
Furthermore, knowledge is not a static object, it is in constant ﬂux and,
from an individual’s perspective, this is where the concept of knowing
rather than knowledge is perhaps more relevant. Blacker,26 in a review
of the organization theory literature, contends that, ‘. . . rather than
talking of knowledge, within its connotation of abstraction, progress,
permanency and mentalism, it is more helpful to talk about the process
of knowing . . . [which] is situated, distributed and material.’ In distin-
guishing between knowledge and knowing, Cook and Seely Brown27 assert
that ‘knowledge is a tool of knowing, that knowing is an aspect of our
interaction with the social and physical world, and that the interplay of
knowledge and knowing can generate new knowledge and new ways of
knowing.’28 ‘If only our organisation knew what knowledge it has . . .’ is
another, more pragmatic expression of the problem!
The Concept of Knowledge Management
It is now regarded as axiomatic that the knowledge contained within an
organization is one of its most precious resources.29 Arguments, elo-
quently expressed elsewhere, and a basic tenet of resource-based
theory, assert that managing an organization’s knowledge may be the
sole factor that keeps it competitive because all other resources are to a
large extent imitable.30 It therefore follows that the management of such
a resource is crucial, especially creating the conditions for its beneﬁcial
deployment. Furthermore, the changing nature of the marketplace has
placed even greater emphasis on knowing how to operate competitively.
Being competitive in marketplaces that are increasingly global and de-
regulated requires that companies be innovative (a knowledge activity
itself ), not just in their products and services but also how they
compete in their chosen market. They therefore need to know in con-
siderable depth what their customers and competitors are doing or are
likely to do, and, furthermore, they must know how to leverage this
knowledge.31 As more and more products and services become commo-
ditized, the more ‘know-how’ about customers’ needs, preferences, etc.
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becomes the added-value an organization has to have in order to be a
chosen supplier, rather than straightforward ‘product excellence’.
There is an argument that KM is actually a contradiction in terms,
being a hangover from an industrial era when control modes of thinking
were dominant.32 If knowledge is information combined with experience,
context, interpretation and reﬂection, the use of the term KM, suggesting
that knowledge can be managed, is to misunderstand the nature of
knowledge. There is a suggestion that only the ‘context’ and conditions
surrounding knowledge can be managed. Some practitioners suggest
that knowledge sharing is a better description, while others prefer
‘learning’, as a key challenge in implementing KM is sense-making and
interpretation.
Notwithstanding these arguments, knowledge is key both to creating
competencies—including IS competencies as discussed in Chapter 8—and
in integrating them into an organizational capability.33 Knowledge of
what speciﬁc resources exist in a business is essential for the competent
management of its operation. A competitive capability requires a further
class of knowledge—knowledge of the market and the players in it, and
knowledge of how to exploit the competencies within the organization so
as to address the needs of the marketplace in a way that will distinguish it
from the competition.
Consider, for instance, a team of managers and specialists meeting and
working together to formulate a bid for a major international engineering
contract. The bid is a complex one involving not just product specialists
but also expertise in contractual law, international taxation, exporting,
global supply chains, complex sourcing, costing and ﬁnance. Further-
more, the bidding activity will not be the straightforward sequential
application of one expertise after another, but is more likely to be the
iterative exploitation of these expertises, since a change in one expert’s
input could have consequences elsewhere. In a gathering of such experts,
each will bring their functional competency to bear on the bid-making
activity set. However, to make a successful bid will need more than the
sum of the parts—what is needed is the managerial know-how necessary
to integrate these into a successful bid process. An organization that
develops such a competency is likely to win more business. Without
institutionalizing such a competency, the organization is likely to
respond to potential new business opportunities with a ﬂurry of
activity rather than deploying a coherent business process.
In these two contrasting approaches, it is worth noting the use of
knowledge. In the bid-as-an-activity-set approach, knowledge belongs
to each of the experts and exists as discrete packages within that expert
domain (e.g. tax law). In the bidding-is-a-business-process approach,
formal attempts are made to retain the knowledge that is diﬀused
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within the working team of how to integrate the contributions of several
experts in order to make a successful bid.
The DIKAR Model
A model that helps locate packaged knowledge34 and diﬀuse knowledge
within a business-related context is the DIKAR (Data, Information,
Knowledge, Action, Results) model (see Figure 10.5). Introduced in
Chapter 4, it illustrates the relationship between data, information,
knowledge, action and results. This model has also proved useful in
understanding and framing KM issues, and in helping to compare and
assess the diﬀerent perspectives that are being exercised by those pursuing
KM.
The conventional way of interpreting and using the model is to view it
from left to right as a value spectrum (i.e. to begin with basic data and
progress through a series of stages, each containing more business value
than the previous, culminating with the ‘right’ business results). As we
progress from left to right, the business value that the stages yield poten-
tially increases. The linkages between each of the stages are just as
important as the stages themselves. They represent the activities by
which the value is increased, typically including procedures, systems,
processes, organizational structures, administration, skills, etc. These
linkages characterize some of the organization’s competencies and will
vary even between very similar organizations—due to history, culture,
various constraints and, most importantly, management’s world view on
how business is done. Within any company, the nature of the linkages
between any two stages will also diﬀer. Basically the further to the left
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Figure 10.5 The DIKAR model (source: after Venkatraman)
(the data end) the more we can expect to see deﬁned procedures and the
extensive application of technology; while to the right (the results end)
what occurs will depend much more on people—as individuals, as groups
and as directed by management.
Using the DIKAR model in left-to-right mode is very useful in
understanding (in a knowledge and information sense) how business is
actually done. For an organization’s core processes, senior managers
should have a ﬁrm and detailed grasp on how DIKAR applies to those
processes (i.e. it is in essence their business model). The application of
experience, knowledge, technology and business acumen to the linkages is
likely to improve the overall core process in a targeted incremental
fashion. This has been the traditional approach in applying IT to
business processes.
However, when the organization steps outside its day-to-day processes
and instead sets itself new goals or new results targets, the left-to-right use
of the model cannot explain how to achieve them. Examples of this would
be how to launch a new competitive oﬀensive, how to break into a new
market, how to innovate or, indeed, to eﬀect any radical change in the
organization. In such circumstances, the data–information–knowledge–
action chain does not exist. The DIKAR model, however, can still be
helpful if we reverse its usage to right to left. In its RAKID direction, a
number of fundamental questions are posed: Given desired results what
actions are needed to achieve them? Given a set of actions what do we
need to know to perform the actions? What information and data are
required in order that we are in a knowledgeable position to design and
aﬀect action? Answering these questions all demand knowledge.
The linkages in the RAKID mode of the model are essentially inte-
grative—given an end point, what resources does an organization have to
bring together to get there and how does it bring them together? The
necessary resources will consist not just of the obvious such as money,
manpower, equipment and skills, but are likely to include processes,
structures, roles and knowledge—so-called intangible resources. It is
perhaps the knowledge of how to integrate such a range of resources
in a new way to achieve new results that is the most potent form of
KM.
Traditionally, businesses have focused more management attention on
physical resources and those resources that can be measured, which
usually means the intangible resources such as process, roles and knowl-
edge might never enter return-on-investment evaluations. But, in a com-
petitive environment, these are perhaps the most valuable since they are
diﬃcult to imitate and are also the vehicle for innovative approaches to
new challenges. The eﬀects of globalization, liberalization and deregula-
tion on markets has been generally to make those markets harder to
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survive and prosper in—there are potentially more competitors and sub-
stitute products and services competing for customers’ interests. The
appropriate response to this is unlikely to be to ‘turn up the wick’ on
the existing traditional resources and their deployment. Instead, com-
panies have to ﬁnd ways of making the marketplace aware of the new
capabilities that will distinguish them from existing or potential com-
petitors. These capabilities will arise only if the management is competent
in ways of integrating resources in new added-value ways. Hence, when
designing processes that include the sharing and transfer of knowledge
either explicitly or implicitly, the conﬁguration of roles in the process
should guide the strategy for information provision.
The role of KM in this ‘new results’ scenario is to marshal knowledge
and experience not just of all the necessary specialisms but also of how to
integrate them into a new capability that the market will place value on,
such as for the complex bid example as outlined above. Once achieved, a
capability should be retained and actively supported, including
technology support. In practice, however, bids like that described
above tend to be treated as a ‘one-oﬀ’ and as a task outside the
experts’ ‘normal’ day-to-day job. The experience accumulated in
winning or losing bids is not retained as corporate learning—so the
wheel is reinvented many times and no one is apparently alarmed by
this. Losing a bid tends to be attributed to more straightforward causes
such as price, lead time or what the value proposition was, rather than
examining how the organization went about creating and presenting the
value proposition.
The knowledge of each expert can in a sense be thought of as a knowl-
edge ‘package’—some of it even being capable of being codiﬁed. The
knowledge of acting together so as to create a new capability will be
much more diﬀuse and will reside within the bid team and will be
much harder to document let alone codify. However, the outcomes of
the team’s activities will be capable of being documented and these can
form the basis of learning. How to manage specialized ‘packaged knowl-
edge’ and how to integrate it with and manage ‘diﬀuse knowledge’ such
as exists in teams is one of the key goals of KM.
The Location of Knowledge and the Issues in
Managing Knowledge
The past few years has seen a number of organizations introduce chief
knowledge oﬃcers (CKOs) and knowledge managers as a formal step to
managing their knowledge assets.35 Referring to the DIKAR diagram,
such a manager, who would be naturally located in the centre ‘knowledge
508 Strategies for Information Management
stage’, can view the organization’s knowledge assets and their attendant
management issues from two perspectives: ‘downstream’ toward data and
‘upstream’ toward results.
Starting from the knowledge box in the DIKAR model and looking
toward data and information, the knowledge manager has a certain set of
issues to contend with that are diﬀerent from the ‘upstream’ view.
Knowledge in this circumstance can be thought of as a body of informa-
tion, formally written down and capable of being readily assimilated into
the company’s systems. The issues of KM here are identifying the knowl-
edge, its location, validating it and verifying its value, obtaining it in a
useful form, determining where it is most useful in the business and
making it available there in an appropriate form, using suitable technol-
ogy, and ﬁnally ensuring that the knowledge is used beneﬁcially.
Looking ‘upstream’, the knowledge manager is now operating with a
set of issues around the kind of knowledge that determines actions, and
actions that need certain knowledge—the domain of know-how. This
kind of knowledge is more diﬀuse and tacit, and invariably resides in
peoples’ heads. An example could be an organization that seeks to
move into a new overseas market—it will require somebody who
knows how to set up supply chains into that market quickly, knows
the business scene there, the relevant legal and tax factors, the culture,
etc. This is primarily experiential knowledge, although some of it can be
made explicit to a certain degree (e.g. customs regulations). Someone who
knows the working relationship between businesses and a country’s civil
servants has knowledge that is hard to codify. The knowledge manager
has to operate in a much more personal domain—the motivation to share
hard-won knowledge of the experiential kind is not usually high, the
individual is ‘giving away’ their value and may be very reluctant to lose
a position of inﬂuence and respect by making it available ‘to everyone’.
This situation and the inherent nature of knowledge can make it diﬃcult
to capture.
There is nevertheless a strong desire, almost a belief, that as technology
platforms get ‘more intelligent’ that this know-how can be captured (e.g.
with expert systems) and suppliers of ‘knowledge systems’ are keen to
advance the point. The assumptions underpinning this view are likely to
be too simplistic. While at one level it is clear that rules that have evolved
over time can be encoded, some behaviours owe more to ‘chaotic’ factors
than logical left-brain activity. The organic nature of knowledge high-
lights how ‘mind-maps’ and other such mapping techniques are more
appropriate than information architecture diagrams.36
A more complex variation on know-how is the ‘team’. Here knowledge
is distributed among a group of people, each contributing in diﬀerent
ways to this overall know-how. Furthermore, the team itself can create
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knowledge by its own activities. Teams also represent an eﬀective way of
generating learning, of marshalling knowledge and disseminating it.
Here the knowledge manager has to contend with facilitation of
team activities, providing frameworks for more formal knowledge
handling, and ensuring its recording so that learning can occur.
Typically, companies see the gradual build-up of knowledge repositories
that, if carefully constructed and subsequently used intelligently, can
help in moving up learning curves, and remove duplication and
reinvention.
These three ways of considering knowledge in organizations are sum-
marized in Table 10.5. This table contrasts the nature of knowledge
within each category as well as identifying both speciﬁc management
issues as well as those management concerns that transcend all categories.
Communities of Practice
A central lesson emerging from research is that if KM is going to be
successful, then organizations must concentrate on people. The impor-
tance of people as creators and carriers of knowledge is forcing organ-
izations to realize that knowledge lies less in its databases than in its
people.37 Davenport and Prusak38 note that when Ford wanted to
build on the success of the Taurus, the company found that the essence
of that success had been lost with the loss of the people who created it.
The knowledge required was not stored in databases, nor could it be.
Research shows that people most freely share experiences in informal,
self-organizing networks. Consequently, it becomes necessary for organ-
izations to create and promote those environments. Often labelled com-
munities of practice (COP), these are groups of people informally bound
together by shared expertise and passion for a joint enterprise.39 COPs
exist to build and exchange knowledge, and, in the process, develop the
capabilities of members. They diﬀer from project teams, who are
composed of employees assigned by management, in that they select
themselves. The ‘glue’ that holds the community together is the
passion, commitment and identity with the group’s expertise, while for
a team it’s the goals and project milestones.
In a study of a COP conducted by Breu and Hemmingway40 at a
commercial utility in the UK, they found that in being prepared to
accept the informal activities of its employees, the organization gained
signiﬁcant beneﬁts. Their ﬁndings support motivational theories that
advocate the human desire to make social contribution in the case of
the COP they studied, sharing knowledge and experience with other
members of this organizational community.
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The Role of IT in KM
There are two dominant and contrasting views of knowledge manage-
ment that can be gleaned from the above discussion: the engineering
perspective and the social process perspective (see Figure 10.6). The
engineering perspective views knowledge management as a technology
process. Many organizations have taken this approach in managing
knowledge, believing that it is concerned with managing ‘pieces of in-
tellectual capital’. Driving this view is the view that knowledge can be
codiﬁed and stored; in essence that knowledge is explicit knowledge and
therefore is little more than information.
The alternative view is that knowledge is a social process. As such, it
asserts that knowledge resides in people’s heads and that it is tacit. As
such, it cannot be easily codiﬁed and only revealed through its applica-
tion. As tacit knowledge cannot be directly transferred from person to
person, its acquisition occurs only through practice. Consequently, its
transfer between people is slow, costly and uncertain. Technology,
within this perspective, can only support the context of knowledge
work. Indeed, Walsham argues that IT-based systems used to support
KM can only be of beneﬁt if used to support the development and
communication of human meaning.41 One reason for the failure of IT
in knowledge management initiatives is that the designers of the knowl-
edge systems fail to understand the situation and work practices of the
users and the complex ‘human’ processes involved in work.42
While technology can be used with knowledge management initiatives,
it should never be the ﬁrst step.43 KM is primarily a human and process
issue. Once these two aspects have been addressed, then the created
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Figure 10.6 Mapping knowledge perspectives on DIKAR model (source: draws
on the work of K. Breu at Cranﬁeld School of Management)
processes are usually very amenable to being supported and enhanced by
the use of technology. This is certainly the case in global companies
where geographical barriers to knowledge movement and sharing are
large. The degree to which information technology can directly contrib-
ute to business activity attenuates according to left-to-right progression
across the DIKAR model. Around the knowledge point in the model,
the nature of the IT contribution alters. To the left, IT can actually
work directly on the data/information, even creating additional data/
information. In signiﬁcant knowledge exchange this is not the case.
Zack44 sees IT providing a seamless ‘pipeline’ for the ﬂow of explicit
knowledge enabling:
. capturing knowledge;
. deﬁning, storing, categorizing, indexing and linking digital objects;
. searching for (‘pulling’) and subscribing to (‘pushing’) relevant
content;
. presenting content with suﬃcient ﬂexibility to render meaningful and
applicable across multiple contexts of use.
As indicated earlier, knowledge sharing can be complex, personal and has
an organic aspect to it. The most eﬀective way of achieving sharing is the
face-to-face conversation where much more happens than the mere
exchange of words. However, this can be uneconomic especially for geo-
graphically dispersed companies. The role of technology alters to being a
facilitator of connectivity, and its success lies in how well it can emulate
the richness of the conversation channel. Desktop videoconferencing
currently comes closest to being such a channel. This is not the mere
provision of a facial image on a PC screen, but extends to include its
own procedural rules and is backed up by a high-bandwidth infrastruc-
ture carrying shared and concurrent access to data, images, video clips,
searchable documents, etc. BP Exploration has invested heavily and
successfully in this technology and claims signiﬁcant cost savings in
new drillings through shared learning around the globe.45
Other technologies that are making a contribution ‘on the right of
DIKAR’ are ‘interactive’ Intranets and the combination of document
management and workﬂow management systems. The latter is especially
useful in situations where large complex multi-part documents such as
contracts, regulatory submissions, etc. need concurrent attention from
several experts with these experts possibly residing in diﬀerent countries.
Seely Brown46 argues, based on his work in Xerox, that organizations
should be seen as ‘communities of communities’, and that new tech-
nologies such as Intranets are suited to provide support to the develop-
ment of eﬀective communication.
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Figure 10.7 positions a number of technologies on a schematic,
mapping the nature of the content against the mode of interaction.
Content can be considered along a continuum from lean to rich. Mode
of interaction refers to whether there is a reliance on technology or
people. Some technologies like videoconferencing are suitable for
exchange of rich content. Sales Force Automation (SFA) tools are
suitable for communicating ‘lean’ content such as customer details and
contact history.
Knowledge Has to Be Managed
There is little return in merely collecting knowledge, making it accessible
and then waiting for business activities to improve purely because of the
sheer abundance of knowledge. Management must intervene to leverage
the beneﬁts, and the appointments of CKOs often reﬂect this.
There are structural, cultural and managerial barriers to KM as well as
the usual issues of lack of time and money to mount such initiatives.
People are both the path and barrier to successful KM. While they are
the key to success, they also have the potential to frustrate KM plans and
programs. The root of this dilemma resides in the fact that knowledge
sharing is not natural—there is a reluctance to divulge years of hard-won
experience, especially if the divulgence is also associated with possible
redundancy or reduction of status. Furthermore, experienced ‘business-
winners’ such as senior consultants in a management consultancy or
senior partners in a law ﬁrm, while acknowledging the value of onward
transmission of their know-how to less experienced staﬀ, will generally
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Figure 10.7 Content and interaction in knowledge management (source: K.
Breu, Cranﬁeld School of Management)
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still rate one hour of fee-earning work well above one hour of knowledge-
sharing activity. Changing that belief is a ‘hearts and minds’ issue and not
a training issue.
In such circumstances, value has to be demonstrably placed upon
knowledge sharing and corporate knowledge creation and stewardship.
In most organizations, this will mean leadership by example from the top.
Reward structures need to be visibly in place—and these may not neces-
sarily be ﬁnancial rewards—as do formal learning loops and best-practice
sharing mechanisms like communities of practice.
Additionally, there is a need to have a senior executive overview or
policy on what KM is and what it means for the business and how it is
linked to business drivers and plans. Unfortunately, in many organiza-
tions, KM still resides outside mainstream management activity. And,
while it does, it will struggle to deliver any demonstrable tangible
beneﬁts. Mere assertions, however strongly delivered, that knowledge is
a vital resource and needs to be handled as such have little chance of
inducing the necessary changes for knowledge-leveraged beneﬁts to
appear.
Obstacles for Eﬀective KM
Research conducted at the Cranﬁeld School of Management has identi-
ﬁed culture as top of the list of concerns among organizations regarding
knowledge management.47 Turning a ‘we don’t do it like that’ attitude
into ‘who knows how to do it better?’ demands a sea change in working
practices and relationships. People and cultural issues dominate as both
the necessary means and the key inhibitor to sharing and exploiting
knowledge. The obstacles are summarized in Table 10.6.
People are either reluctant to change or to change quickly. Working
styles are often ingrained into organizations, and, in many cases, the
production and sharing of knowledge—as opposed to a more tangible
product—is still regarded as distracting or even career-threatening.
Schutze and Boland48 report the problems encountered in implementing
a new competitor intelligence system in a large US organization where the
democratization of information access and the open sharing of informa-
tion that the new systems facilitated was at odds with the competitive
intelligence analysts view of themselves as ‘anointed’ gatekeepers of this
information. An organization’s internal structures can act as inhibitors;
they are often inﬂexible, fragmented and separated into functional silos.
In addition, the evidence suggests that there is even greater reluctance to
share knowledge outside the company, among partners, suppliers and
customers—a reason why strategic alliances often ﬂounder.
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KM is an expensive undertaking and ironically, if a business is in
highly competitive markets, expensive not to do. Regarding the
DIKAR model, companies who have disparate infrastructure platforms,
who have not invested in information management and whose executives
have never seriously debated the role of information in their business
activities are unlikely to make headway in KM unless these issues are
addressed. There are some basic ﬁrst steps such as issues of codiﬁcation
of knowledge (most organizations report that this takes far longer than
estimated), education and sometimes changing the organization to value
knowledge sharing before any return on the investment can begin to be
realized. These basic requirements absorb time, money and, crucially,
senior management attention.
This means that KM initiatives must have leadership—knowledge
sharing must be demonstrated and rewarded by senior managers, other-
wise organizational ﬁefdoms will continue to prevail. Depending on how
territorial and how early in the KM process an organization is, the
aggregation of these costs may seem a price too high—but the evidence
suggests that there are no short cuts. Conversely, many global companies
who perceive their marketplace to be a highly competitive environment
have concluded that it is expensive not to do KM.
SUMMARY
The introduction or extension of information management must be
linked to speciﬁc business goals and tied to the achievement of business
beneﬁts. Beneﬁts such as stock reduction or improvements in staﬀ pro-
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Table 10.6 Barriers to successful knowledge management
People Management Structure Knowledge
Inertia to change The fear of giving Inﬂexible company Extracting knowledge
Too busy—no time up power structures Categorizing knowledge
to learn The diﬃculties of Fragmented Rewarding knowledge
No discipline to act passing on power organizations Understanding
Lack of motivation Challenging Functional silos knowledge
Constant staﬀ traditional Failure to invest management
turnover company style in past systems Sharing between key
Transferring Imposed constraints knowledge groups
knowledge to Lack of understanding Making knowledge
new people about formal widely available
Teaching older approaches
employees new
ideas
ductivity can be quantiﬁed easily; others are more qualitative such as
accelerated information availability and improved decision making due
to having pertinent information.
Eﬀective information management targeted at a few critical items of
information, especially those that straddle internal or external bound-
aries, will repay the eﬀort and serve as a good example for extending
the managed environment. Total information management is neither
practical nor cost-eﬀective. A sensible balance between short-term pay-
oﬀs and long-term achievement of a target information architecture is
needed.
Some cultural issues must be tackled with sensitivity:
. line management preference for short-term results and positive return
on investment, over building up value in the information assets;
. removal of local autonomy when information is allocated the
‘managed’ status;
. possible opposition from the IS function itself to IAM becoming the
‘IT’ focus of business attention.
Successful implementation of an information management strategy
means achieving maximum contribution to the business over an
extended period, at an acceptable cost and risk, and with the commitment
of the business community at large. IAM is one of the principal mech-
anisms put in place to aim continuously for optimizing this value. This
chapter has attempted to highlight the criteria that aﬀect obtaining the
right balance, and to address some practical issues associated with intro-
ducing new activities into the business, both inside and outside the IS
function.
The whole of the information environment throughout an organization
cannot be treated in the same way, and it is useful to categorize it in an
information portfolio, related to business needs and potential. The
starting point for implementing IAM may be having identiﬁed high-
level information portfolios for each business unit, aligned to their
respective application portfolios and their business needs. The aim then
is to bring information into the managed environment according to needs
and priorities, and the risks associated with not managing it. This entails:
. focusing on strategic information that must be managed;
. evaluating the key operational information in the current portfolio
and determining how best to exploit its potential, at acceptable cost
and risk;
. maintaining a watchful eye on high potential information that may
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become strategic, but where structures and relationships are as yet
hazy;
. perhaps choosing to ignore low-potential, support information that
does not warrant a high priority for being managed.
Figure 10.8 illustrates the diﬀering aims around the information port-
folio. In managing the information portfolio over time, there is naturally
an increase in the ability to integrate more information and thus to build
up the information assets of the business. A sensible balance must be
struck between the cost of integration, especially where old systems are
retained, and the overall cost to the business of not integrating them, as
well as between the freedom given to end-users to create and use informa-
tion innovatively and the disciplines imposed within the managed
environment.
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Figure 10.8 The information portfolio
Knowledge management is more diﬀuse and organic in its nature and
execution than information management. This is because knowledge
resides primarily within people, or groups of people, and thus has
complexities not found in straightforward procedural activities. Typic-
ally, knowledge sharing has aspects of trust and politics associated with
it, and requires an appropriate culture, reward system and managerial
approach to be developed.
The personal nature of knowledge ownership has to be understood and
accommodated before it can be managed. Where communities of practice
have been constructed, success is only achieved when mutual respect for
everyone’s actual, rather than possible, contribution occurs; anything less
and they begin to degrade as employees feel their eﬀort is not being
matched by others causing a retreat to more selﬁsh, old behaviours.
Leadership by example appears to be key in achieving a truly open
knowledge environment. As an emerging topic of study within the ﬁeld
of IS, we have much to learn about how knowledge can be eﬀectively
‘managed’ before we can understand how best to deploy IT to improve
the processes involved.
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Managing the Supply of
IT Services, Applications
and Infrastructure
This chapter considers a number of strategic aspects of organizational IS/
IT competencies that have not been covered in preceding chapters. The
focus is on competencies in the ‘Deﬁne the IT Capability’, ‘Supply’ and
‘Deliver Solutions’ components of the model described in Chapter 8—see
Figure 8.10. In particular, to complement the discussion of the manage-
ment of demand-side IS strategies, this chapter discusses the equivalents
on the supply side, but from a managerial not technical perspective.
Overall, the supply side or IT strategies can be considered as a number
of IT ‘services’ that the organization uses to enable deployment and
exploitation of IS/IT. Those services can be provided by an in-house
organization or an external supplier or, most commonly today, by a
combination of the two. The nature of those services is ﬁrst explored
and then considered in terms of the diﬀerent types of service management
strategy that can be adopted.
Within the range of IT services, application development, or perhaps
application provision given the move to buying or renting rather than
building systems, is discussed in more detail since it is the ‘service’ that
has the greatest impact on business development through IS/IT. Chapter
9 discussed the management of IS/IT investment and risk, with the
assumption that the application development and implementation itself
is successful, enabling the organization to realize the expected beneﬁts.
This chapter considers some of the issues to be addressed to ensure the
development or provisioning process works eﬀectively.
Planning for, justifying and managing investments in IT infra-
structure has always been problematic, due to the large ‘gap’ between
infrastructure provision and investment and the visible return for the cost
involved. Some important considerations in managing infrastructure
development are discussed in this chapter. Finally, an ever-increasing
percentage of organizations’ IT services are being provided by external
parties—outsourcers—in order to both improve IT economics and obtain
skills, competencies and resources that cannot easily be provided in-
house.
As discussed in Chapter 8, outsourcing has been a major IT strategy
topic over the last 10–15 years, yet it has existed since organizational
computing began in the 1960s. Many companies started using IT via
bureau services provided by computer manufacturers, often supplemen-
ted by network and time-sharing services. Using package software is a
form of outsourcing, not only of the development of that software but
also of the design of the process models for the business activities
covered. Subcontracting of both commodity programming and specialist
design and implementation skills has been a common practice since the
1970s and many organizations have also employed IT consultants in a
range of roles. ‘Facilities Management’ companies took over the running
of many organizations’ data centres in the 1980s. Outsourcing is therefore
not new, but now almost any aspect of IT supply can be outsourced,
including the provision of services traditionally delivered by applications,
and the marketplace for such services is both considerable and inﬂuential.
Outsource service providers like EDS and Internet Service Providers
(ISPs) like AOL are now the largest buyers of IT equipment from the
manufacturers. Strategic aspects of outsourcing, both decision making
and management are considered toward the end of this chapter.
The scope implied by the chapter title is enormous, and there is no
intention to provide full and comprehensive coverage of all possible
areas. Instead, important strategic management aspects are covered in
overview and the reader is referred to other texts that cover the subjects in
much greater depth.
IT SERVICE STRATEGIES
In the late 1980s, it was observed that the role of the IS function in many
organizations had changed from a production mode to mainly a service
mode of operation.1 Production (or construction) implied designing and
developing application software and delivering operational systems—
combinations of hardware and software to the business users. Adopting
a service orientation, while including the delivery and support for appli-
cations, implies a wider range of approaches to enabling the business
users to obtain and utilize information, systems and technology to
meet their needs, as and when requirements arise. In the 1980s, organ-
izations established ‘Information Centres’ that supported ‘end-user com-
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puting’ on PCs and provided access to centrally held information and
also external sources. It is estimated that 70–80% of IT costs in most
organizations are now spent on services, rather than the development or
purchase of application software or IT hardware.
That the IS function was providing a range of services has been re-
cognized in Service Level Agreements (SLAs) for aspects of IT such as
network uptime, response times and help-desk support for many years.
However, two issues have driven the need to be more explicit about
service management. First, many businesses now deliver some aspects
of their product or service to customers via IS/IT, or via service centres
that are totally dependent on IS/IT, implying that the quality and per-
formance of IT services are visible not only internally but externally and
aﬀect the business performance and customer relationships directly.
Second, as more and more aspects of service have been outsourced,
contracts with suppliers deﬁning service availability, performance and
cost have become integral to IS management. If outsourcing decisions
are to be based on objective, comparative data, then applying the same
rationale for measuring service performance delivered by in-house re-
sources is essential. While there is considerable literature on establishing
service-level agreements and measuring service performance, there is very
little concerning developing ‘IT service strategies’—strategies that are
linked closely to delivering and enhancing overall business performance.
This is due in part to the diﬃculty in understanding and measuring the
organizational beneﬁts delivered from services. It is easier to measure
service deﬁciencies and costs.
However, there is a considerable body of literature, based on studies of
service businesses, that can be used to understand and classify types of
IT service, help select appropriate service strategies and address issues in
the development and delivery of such services. Using that literature on
customer services, a more strategic and business-driven approach to IT
service management can be deﬁned. An overview of how that can be done
is described below. Once the nature and business contribution of IT
services can be understood more clearly, decisions on sourcing can be
made more objectively. The need to integrate the development of
IT service strategies with application management strategies to produce
a distinctive ‘IS capability’ for the business is considered further in the
last chapter.
TYPES OF IT SERVICE
The activities to be managed with regard to IT service provision in an
organization were introduced in Chapter 8 (see Table 8.4). These can be
classiﬁed in a number of ways according to the nature of the service
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provided (as in Table 8.4) and how customers or clients utilize the service.
Most classiﬁcations of IT services take a supply-side view, but, by using
models from operations management and customer service, a user or
demand-side view can be developed. First, however, some of the char-
acteristics and nature of services in general and IT services in particular
need to be considered:
. The service user is, to some extent at least, involved in the delivery
process and inﬂuences the performance of the service. Diﬀerent users
have diﬀerent expectations of the service and varying knowledge of
how to use it. However, based on their general experience, service
users now expect a high quality of service (availability, responsive-
ness, ﬁrst-time problem resolution, etc), as they perceive it, whenever
they avail of any service, whether it be internal or external. Measur-
ing service performance is primarily about measuring user percep-
tions of the service delivered against their expectations.
. Services are, to a large extent, produced and consumed simul-
taneously based on a user request to be served. This implies that it
is diﬃcult to build an inventory of work and schedule activity and
resources due to the uncertainty of demand. Equally, idle service
capacity cannot be reused unless resources are ﬂexible and can be
deployed across a range of services or the work proﬁle can be
balanced across demand-driven and ‘oﬀ-line’ or developmental activ-
ities.
. However ‘technical’ the service, people and the role they play are
critical to the perceptions of the service received—the ‘service experi-
ence’. Proﬁciency and eﬃciency in satisfying the need are essential,
but service quality will equally be judged on the nature of the
personal interaction between the user and provider, at the point of
delivery.
. The more the user understands what is involved in the service
delivery process, its complexity or otherwise, the more their expecta-
tions of performance will match what can actually be achieved.
Equally, if users can see the ‘queue’ for the service they require,
the more ‘reasonable’ they become in their expectations. Often, the
queue for IT services is not visible to the users, unlike in a physical
environment such as a fast-food outlet or a sophisticated call centre,
which informs callers of their queue position.
. There is often a diﬀerence between the user of the IT service and who
pays for it, implying diﬀerent perceptions of service value. This is
similar to business-class or ﬁrst-class travel, where the traveller may
enjoy the convenience and quality of treatment, but the company
may not see the very signiﬁcantly higher cost as justiﬁed. The IS
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budget holder may not be a signiﬁcant user of IT services, and
those who do use the service may be unaware of the costs of its
provision.
As discussed in Chapter 8, one way of classifying IT services is based on
their relationship to the supply and delivery of IT components such as
hardware and application software to the business. In essence, this
approach describes the service in terms of the IT-based activities
involved, rather than the nature of value derived by the business or the
service process required to meet users’ needs. It is the latter view that
creates an understanding of the range of service attributes needed,
enabling the service to be designed and then operated to meet business
requirements.
Classifying services according to the technical similarities of activities
(e.g. technology delivery and maintenance services, application develop-
ment services, strategy and planning services) is helpful from an IT
resourcing and sourcing perspective. However, it tends to reinforce any
user perceptions that, to obtain an eﬀective service, the user has to know
how and where to ﬁnd the solution as well as how to deﬁne the problem!
It is a view that considers the eﬃciency and organization of the IS
function ﬁrst and the eﬀectiveness of service provision and the needs
of the user second. Even within the broad categories described in Table
8.4, diﬀerent components will need quite diﬀerent service delivery
processes to meet the users’ needs (e.g. capacity planning versus
business analysis).
A Service Process-based Classiﬁcation
From the literature on service management, a matrix based on two
key dimensions of the customer view of services can be developed (see
Figure 11.1) that is relevant to the majority of IT services. The
dimensions are:
. the nature and extent of user–provider contact involved; and
. the degree to which the service is customized to each user or user
interaction.
This enables the development of four broad categories of service pro-
cesses: ‘Service Factory’, ‘Job Shop’, ‘Mass Service’ and ‘Professional
Service’.2 Both the perceived and actual value delivered by the service is
diﬀerent in each of the four quadrants, highlighting that diﬀerent man-
agement issues must be addressed in each category. Service processes with
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a high degree of customer contact are more diﬃcult to control and
standardize than those with a low degree of customer contact. In a
high-contact system, the customer availability and priorities aﬀect the
timing of demand, the eﬃciency of resources used in delivering the
service and the quality, or perceived quality, of service since the
customer is involved in the process.
Service Factory: relatively low user contact and a low degree of custo-
mization. Obvious examples are many of the ‘back-oﬃce’ services such as
security, capacity and network maintenance, software release/upgrades
and installation of basic desktop facilities. Changes to applications to
deal with statutory or compliance requirements (e.g. the Euro) would
also be included in this category. Performance measurement can be rela-
tively objective, based on supply-side delivery to agreed service levels,
rather than the perceptions of particular service recipients. Key manage-
ment issues in providing the service are: deﬁning service-level agreements,
scheduling service delivery and forecasting demand to avoid overload and
promote ‘oﬀ-peak’ usage. Clearly, these types of service are the most
amenable to outsourcing.
Job Shop: low user contact, but high customization, where much of the
work is again done in the back oﬃce, but in response to particular, and
possibly one-oﬀ, user needs. Software development, technical product
evaluation and vendor assessment would be typical of this segment.
While the service requests will vary in nature, some consistency in the
approach or methodology is needed in order to estimate the time and
resources needed and evaluate performance and quality of service across
the range of customized tasks performed. User perceptions of their
satisfaction with the outcome of each request will be in relation to the
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Figure 11.1 Generic service models
‘contract’ agreed for the particular request. Accurate estimating of the
work involved and ensuring schedules, as well as output quality, are met
are essential to achieving customer service expectations. Many of these
aspects of services can also be outsourced, but only after the task and
service requirements are clearly deﬁned for the eventual supplier. Man-
agement issues include: task prioritization and resource scheduling,
ﬂexible resourcing (internal and external), quality and consistency of
‘back-oﬃce’ service processes and methods, and deﬁning meaningful per-
formance measures.
Mass Service: considerable user contact and interaction, but low cus-
tomization. Typically, help desks and essential IS/IT skills training would
be in this quadrant, given the ‘one-size ﬁts all’ rationale to deliver con-
sistent quality of service economically, either from internal or external
resources. The attributes of the service staﬀ are critical to the user percep-
tion of the performance, hence the development of appropriate inter-
personal and communication skills will be as important as their
‘technical’ knowledge. Given the high degree of user interaction, it has
to be clear to both recipient and provider how much of the service is
prescriptive and how much discretion is allowed to customize (to a
degree) the delivery to the needs and circumstances of the recipient. In
many organizations, ‘expert users’ are established, and it is important
that the individual providing the service understands whether they are
dealing with the expert or a relative ‘novice’. While some ﬂexibility is
essential to accommodate the varying levels of user knowledge, a lack of
clear service boundaries can produce a drift toward the professional
services box. Equally, a lack of interpersonal skills and an overly-
prescriptive approach will make the service ‘feel’ more like the service
factory described above.
Measurement of service performance has to be a balanced view
between actual performance against the ‘contract’ plus the recipients’
perceptions of the service received. While, once more, these can be out-
sourced, softer, cultural issues, rather than just economic and technical,
need to be considered in choosing the service supplier. The management
issues include those for the service factory, but, in addition, involve
establishing service parameters and boundaries (degrees of discretion
versus prescription), developing staﬀ with the necessary combinations
of personal and technical competencies and matching resource levels to
the cycles in demand.
Professional Services: while these are highly customized and involve
considerable user contact, they are also typiﬁed by relatively few, but
complex, ‘transactions’ with any particular user. Considerable judgement
and discretion is implied in the provider, to understand and respond to
the user requirement and identify the best way to satisfy the needs, or not,
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if the requirement does not justify this type of service. To a large extent,
how the ‘transaction’ evolves will rely on either the service user being able
to articulate the needs or facilitation to enable the articulation. Equally,
the availability of user resources and the knowledge they have about how
to use the service eﬀectively will have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the service
provision. Strategy development, consultancy, business analysis and
systems, and process design are services that are normally in this
category. Measurement of service performance is essentially subjective,
based on how well the perceived need was met, the eﬀectiveness of the
process and the nature of the interaction with the service provider. It is
not really feasible to set Service Level Agreements in this area, but each
‘transaction’ will need agreement on schedules, deliverables, costs, etc. if
perceptions of performance are to be satisfactorily reconciled with
expectations.
The management issues in this quadrant include those of the job shop,
but, in addition, the knowledge, personal skills and resourcefulness of the
individual staﬀ involved will be crucial to satisfying the users. Obviously,
discretion, rather than prescription, will generally be required, implying
staﬀ with the understanding and experience of accurately eliciting and
then translating requirements through planning to delivery, probably
using a range of resources, are essential.
The management issues are summarized in Figure 11.2. Although it is
tempting to allocate each of the IT service activities to a ‘box’, the
organization has choices about the way it wishes the services to be
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Figure 11.2 Service models: some key management issues
operationalized. Many of the service archetypes can be provided to
diﬀerent people through diﬀerent processes. Training, for example, can
be bespoke and tailored to an audience, and thus considered a
professional service, or provided as a standard training course, in
essence a mass service. If the course is delivered over the Web, it is
more correctly positioned as a service factory. In a large pharmaceutical
company, for economic reasons, it was decided to centralize application
support within the large technical help desk. ‘Traﬃc’ volumes were low,
very few application users phoned or emailed the help desk, preferring
still to consult a local IT person on site, who then could contact the help
desk if necessary. The reason was that the real value to the users were the
‘workarounds’ that the local IT person, with in-depth application
knowledge, could suggest while the problem was being ﬁxed. It is
important to understand how users derive value from the service before
deciding how to provide it.
Examples of types of service that would frequently sit in each quadrant
are given in Figure 11.3. Application development or provisioning, which
is discussed in the next section, might use a number of the services,
located in diﬀerent quadrants, during the project.
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Figure 11.3 Service models and IT services—examples
IS/IT Service Quality
Considerable research has been done to develop approaches to deﬁning
service quality and measuring both the technical and ‘emotional’ (i.e. how
the user experiences the service) quality.3 That literature is too extensive
to describe in detail here, but an overall framework for structuring and
developing an IT service is shown in Figure 11.4. It also forms the basis
for measuring the service components in terms of performance to speci-
ﬁcation and perceived performance by the users. It does rely on the
service consumers being able to deﬁne the value they expect to obtain
from the service—a diﬃcult concept. Often, this has to be in terms of the
negative consequences of service unavailability or underperformance, to
justify the cost against failure of the business to operate ‘normally’.
Establishing more eﬀective and relevant ways of describing and then
measuring the value derived by both individual users and the organiza-
tion in total is a major challenge for future IS strategy development, as
discussed in the ﬁnal chapter.
Many IS functions carry out customer service satisfaction surveys, but,
if not well constructed, the results can be misleading. Before asking a user
to evaluate a service, or its more detailed attributes such as availability or
responsiveness, the importance or otherwise of the service or service
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Figure 11.4 An overall service framework
attribute to the user needs to be understood. ‘Importance’ is a surrogate
for service value in terms of how dependent the user is in carrying out his
or her role and tasks on the quality of service received. Evaluating
services, in achieving the required performance for those who depend
on it, is more important than satisfying those for whom it is of no
great consequence. Therefore, any satisfaction survey must ﬁrst deter-
mine the context within which the user is judging performance.4
However services are assessed or measured, users will continually
expect improvement, for it to be ‘perfect’ on every occasion. Of course,
there will always be ways, at a cost, of improving any aspect of the
service. However, it may not be worthwhile to expend more resources
to deliver the ultimate expectations, and an assessment of whether ‘gaps’
in service delivery are worth overcoming or whether actions to change
user expectations are more valid. Work by a number of researchers5
studying the nature of gaps that can occur in IT service delivery, based
on general service management, is very helpful in understanding why the
gaps exist and to select the best options for closing them. Figure 11.5
shows the basic model for assessment.
The causes of the gaps (1–5) are as follows:
1. Not understanding what users expect or value due to:
—a lack of user needs analysis;
—ineﬀective communication by either or both parties;
—excessive bureaucracy in the IS function.
2. Setting the wrong IT Service Standards due to:
—lack of commitment to IT services by IS management;
—perceptions of infeasibility in meeting user demands;
—inadequate task deﬁnition and standardization or inadequate
resourcing to standards set;
—absence of objectives for the service to achieve and/or inappropri-
ate performance measurements.
3. Underperformance of the service due to:
—role ambiguity, including the user’s role in service delivery;
—lack of resource availability;
—lack of actual or perceived controls;
—lack of teamwork and inappropriate resource use, or inappropriate
use of the service.
4. Poor communication of what the service is and can deliver due to:
—a propensity to overpromise and/or overreact to ‘complaints’;
—inconsistent communication across the user communities;
—lack of visibility of the service process.
5. Expectation versus perception gap due to:
—not understanding user requirements and reasons for them;
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—users not understanding the service process and the implications of
their demands;
—user expectations actually being impossible to satisfy!
Regular and balanced assessment of service performance is required to
detect emerging problems and issues, the causes and consequences, in
order to adjust the appropriate components of the service framework.
Failure to do so will directly or indirectly impact business performance,
resulting in a poor perception of the role and value of IS/IT in the or-
ganization, and diﬃculties for the IS function to obtain resources and
investment to deliver the IT strategy. While most assessment of perform-
ance is carried out to enable pertinent improvements to be made, the
assessment may well reveal areas of apparent overperformance! If the
perceived performance is judged by users to be high but, in reality,
compared with similar organizations, actual performance is poor, the
business is suﬀering a degree of ‘delusion’ if it believes it is using IS/IT
successfully!
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Figure 11.5 The gaps in the IS service delivery (source: based on the work of
Parasuraman, Berry and Zeithaml)
In the context of outsourcing decision making for IT services, Lacity
and Hirschheim6 provide a simple yet eﬀective matrix for summarizing
perceptions of the inevitable trade-oﬀ between the service delivered and
the cost to the organization of the service provision (see Figure 11.6).
Senior management will pay attention to the costs of IT, but are probably
minimal users of services, whereas users themselves are very aware of the
quality of services, but probably unaware of costs. Ideally, to satisfy
both, providing a premium service at minimal cost is the objective, but
rarely achievable in every aspect of service.
Choices have to have been made on objectives for each of the other
segments—whether the strategy should be to maintain the services at
existing levels and ﬁnd more cost-eﬀective means of meeting them or
whether to improve the services by justiﬁable investment. This must be
made explicit to both business users and senior management or once
more expectations will not be aligned. If users perceive a service as
poor and management deem it expensive—the Black Hole—it may be
too late for IS management to retrieve the situation and alternative
service suppliers may be considered without reference to the IS manage-
ment! Outsourcing strategies and the associated issues are considered
later in this chapter.
APPLICATION DEVELOPMENT AND
PROVISIONING STRATEGIES
As stated earlier, application development might be better labelled
application ‘provision’, in the sense that many applications are now
bought in rather than custom-built in-house. The proportion of applica-
tion software custom-built versus purchased packages varies across
industries. In ﬁnancial services, 80% of all applications were custom-
developed even in 2001, whereas the ﬁgure for manufacturing industries
is much lower.7
The emergence of Application Service Providers (ASPs), providing
rented software via the Internet, is the latest development in this area;
the role and potential of ASPs is considered later in the chapter, under
outsourcing. Although less application software is produced in-house,
custom-built software is often developed by third parties, and most
large software packages require extensive conﬁguration and even some
customization before they are implemented. The trend for more and more
of an organization’s applications to be designed and developed by major
software houses or ‘business solutions’ companies is likely to continue. It
is not the purpose of this section to consider all aspects of application
development and implementation. There are many good texts covering
systems design and development methods and their applicability,
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software engineering, database design and project management.8 The
intention here is to consider a number of strategic issues that have to
be addressed in the context of enabling the desired application portfolio
to be realized successfully, leading to the delivery of the desired beneﬁts.
The challenges for application development or provisioning have
become more demanding as IS/IT has become integral to business per-
formance. At the same time, the business environment has been changing
more quickly and dramatically, producing increased uncertainty and the
need for ﬂexibility and adaptability of processes and systems. The main
issues for application development can be summarized as:
. providing new applications more quickly in response to changing
business demands;
. more cost-eﬀective production or acquisition of more types of appli-
cation and reduce ongoing maintenance costs;
. increasing the quality and reliability of the software as it becomes
integral to the business processes;
. developing more customer-focused applications that can be used
easily by untrained people;
. devising more ﬂexible or adaptable applications than can be
enhanced or modiﬁed quickly at low incremental cost;
. providing eﬃcient, seamless integration of business activities across
diﬀerent applications from the desktop;
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Figure 11.6 IT cost/service trade-off (source: M.C. Lacity and R. Hirschheim,
Beyond the Information Systems Outsourcing Bandwagon: The Insourcing Re-
sponse, John Wiley & Sons, Chichester, UK, 1995)
. ensuring maximum value can be gained from the information assets
of the organization.
In other words—faster, cheaper, better, more ﬂexible and easier to use!
Few of these are new demands, except perhaps customer-centric designed
systems, but the history of IS/IT has been one of increasing expectations
of what can be done ‘relatively easily’, promoted largely by the IT
industry, counterbalanced by the inherent diﬃculties of designing and
implementing complex computer-based systems in complex and
evolving businesses.
ALIGNING THE DEVELOPMENT APPROACH TO THE
APPLICATIONS PORTFOLIO
The use of the applications portfolio as a guide to the overall approach to
key issues in applications management was discussed to some degree in
Chapter 7. Within the principles described there, this section considers in
more detail the approaches to development or providing the applications,
especially the diﬀerences across the portfolio.
Strategic Applications
For strategic systems, speed of development and ﬂexibility of design are
essential, and cost is less important especially when the goal is gaining
and sustaining competitive advantage. The ‘window of opportunity’ may
be short-lived or uncertain. They are best achieved through a close part-
nership between business users (preferably senior managers who under-
stand the emerging business needs) and very experienced IS/IT business
analysts, to ensure that the business needs are analysed and met in the
most eﬀective way. This is especially important when the system has
external linkages to customers or suppliers and is delivering beneﬁts to
both parties. There is often a need for incremental development, since
new options and needs will be discovered as implementation proceeds.
Typically, the system is not automating an existing business process, but
changing or creating one.
Few organizations have developed successful strategic systems without
ﬁrst having established coherent business application and information
architectures for key operational systems. Strategic systems frequently
use information from a number of diﬀerent existing systems. The infor-
mation in the strategic application will often need to be vertically inte-
grated with these underlying systems and may also import information
536 Managing the Supply of IT Services
from outside sources. An example of this comes from some ﬁnancial
institutions, which are now able to oﬀer integrated current, savings and
loans (like mortgages) netting oﬀ the interest accrued in each and
minimizing the amount held in the current account. This required
taking data from the underlying diﬀerent product systems, which are
account-orientated, linking all the accounts together by individual
customer, then managing the customers’ accounts accordingly. Where
the underlying product systems have evolved in a piecemeal fashion
with relatively little thought toward the total view of the relationship
with the customer, this has proved diﬃcult, but new ‘online’ banks
have been able to design the systems from a customer viewpoint.
To create eﬀective new applications, easy access to relevant informa-
tion is very important and often best served by advanced database tech-
nology—relational or object-oriented—associated with a sophisticated
data dictionary. Another approach may be to apply a component-
based development to produce a set of key objects, stored as reusable
modules in a repository. Some objects may be created by ‘shrink-
wrapping’ software modules taken from key operational systems. Both
relational and object databases containing the principal elements of the
corporate model give the necessary ﬂexibility in terms of viewing, manip-
ulating and accessing information.
Strategic systems are likely to be complex or will become complex as
functions are added incrementally. They are also required to be devel-
oped quickly, and the application may have to be ‘generated’ many times
as it is changed. A Dynamic Systems Development Methodology
(DSDM) incorporating prototyping is most eﬀective here in clarifying
needs and options, and building components and applications. Speed,
ﬂexibility and complexity all lead to problems of controlling the devel-
opment, and a DSDM combines time boxing and deliverables/version
management to avoid subsequent expensive rework or maintenance.
Continuity in terms of the development team, both business and IT
members, will be critical to managing the evolving knowledge in an en-
vironment that will not encourage accurate documentation, adherence to
standards or the best in quality-control processes. Those standards
should not be ignored, but business expediency will have to overrule
technical idealism in many cases, especially if adherence could extend
the development time and perhaps miss the business opportunities.
This need would also argue for the use of integrated development
environments employing Rapid Application Development (RAD) tools.
The initial analysis and design can be performed using automated tools
that would then produce code, which, though not particularly eﬃcient,
will at least be very quickly developed and enable changes to be identiﬁed
and implemented rapidly.
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The speed of development of the application is on balance more im-
portant than its cost of operation, but high performance, especially if the
system is used by customers, could be a critical success factor. Eventually,
these applications will probably become key operational, when they may
need to be reimplemented in order to make them more eﬃcient and less
costly in their operation. Interconnectability, often via middleware
rather than full integration, may be the initial goal, in order to assess
the value of the strategic system while protecting the installed base of
key operational systems. Many front-end consumer Web applications
were initially interfaced with core processing systems to ‘test the
market’, but the most successful were those that were quickly integrated
with those core processes to deliver end-to-end responsiveness to the
customer. The Internet ﬂight-booking systems of easyJet, Ryanair and
Southwest Airlines, compared with more traditional airlines, are good
examples.
As these systems are taking the enterprise into new areas, there will
often be a need for new business processes, competencies or operational
skills as well as technical knowledge. For example, in the use of data
warehouses and data mining, knowledge of advanced statistical
analysis techniques would be required. A customer relationship manage-
ment system may require customer service staﬀ to develop selling skills.
User management must ensure that these essential business skills are
developed or the application will fail to be exploited to advantage.
It is unlikely that available software packages will provide all the
requirements for this type of application. Signiﬁcant advantage cannot
accrue from generally available software, unless the business adds value
to the package (e.g. by considerable enhancement, ﬁnding a new use of
the package or changing business practices in an innovative way). In
these cases, the package becomes a unique application and, as such, it
must be supported as if it were tailor-made. Alternatively, a short-lived
advantage could accrue from being the ﬁrst user of a new package—but
success could be very quickly and easily copied. It is also high risk to be
the ﬁrst user of an externally supplied package that would normally be
tried out in the high potential segment. Fundamentally, sustained advan-
tage comes from the uniqueness of the application, which others cannot
easily replicate or improve upon.
Key Operational Applications
These are generally the ‘workhorse’ systems, carrying out the main opera-
tional processes of the business (e.g. customer order entry and fulﬁlment
should be well designed both in business process and technical terms).
Key operational systems need to be eﬃcient and robust, to deliver cost-
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eﬀective and problem-free use over an extended period. Since they often
have to be integrated with other primary business process systems, they
beneﬁt from adhering to information management standards and from
complying with the evolving long-term systems and information archi-
tecture. They can often be met by application packages or third-party-
developed software, but further development may be needed to provide
eﬀective integration, resource sharing and information management. By
selecting a comprehensive package (e.g. ERP), the additional work can be
avoided, but some user needs may have to be compromised. When
developed in-house, they are usually produced using traditional project
management (e.g. PRINCE) and formal structured methods (e.g.
SSADM), automated with software and information engineering tools.
In most cases, key operational ‘developments’ are replacements for old
systems and design and construction, or conﬁguration in the case of a
package, must be comprehensive and precise if business operations are
not to be adversely aﬀected on implementation. There is always a trade-
oﬀ to be made between the system functionality provided and the extent
of the business change that can be made to reduce process complexity,
especially with large software packages. Therefore, it is important to
understand which core process is most critical to success.
Often, bringing in a package is the best way of achieving integration of
application requirements among the various departments or functions,
who would otherwise attempt to satisfy their own needs without regard to
the eﬀects on others. ‘Making the package work’ can often override
localized objectives, although, if badly managed, it could become a
target for every department to engineer its failure! Unlike support-type
packages, however, a key operational package will probably need con-
siderable IS professional support to ensure that integration and eﬀective
operation are achieved.
Key operational applications will tend to be functionally complex,
have integrated interfaces and dependencies and should satisfy require-
ments with minimum compromise of the user’s main needs. Even where a
package is selected, it may have to be customized, despite the risks
involved—and this will require a thorough technical understanding of
how the package works as well as what it does. Whether a system is
developed or a package modiﬁed, an accurate speciﬁcation of what it
has to do and how it has to do it will have to be established. A structured
logical model of the system must be developed to enable the application
to be engineered accurately. That model, documented or simulated via
software engineering tools, and supporting data dictionaries, etc. must be
maintained and updated whenever the system changes. Strict change-
control procedures must be in place to prevent errors being introduced,
when amendments and upgrades are implemented. These errors may not
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be easy to predict since they may only manifest themselves in downstream
systems.
Because this type of system will require ongoing modiﬁcation in order
to avoid falling behind the business requirements, there should be a high
level of technical support skills available for both emergency action and
changes. If a package is used, it can present diﬃculties to the organization
when new releases of the underlying application package need to be
implemented (i.e. changes may have to be made even if the business
does not require them). Worse still, if the package has been heavily
customized, valuable new functionality that becomes available may not
be able to be adopted. For many of these systems, a dedicated support
team is required after implementation, consisting of both users and IS
professionals. It is important to develop skills related to the speciﬁc
system, not just employ generalists to correct and amend the system
when available. Releases of new versions of the system software must
be carefully tested, updated user training carried out and reviewed in
terms of the eﬀective use of the new functionality.
Support Applications
If new support applications are required or existing ones are to be
replaced, the most appropriate solution is to buy in sound standard
proprietary packages that meet the business requirements as closely as
possible. The package should not be customized: business processes and
procedures should be amended to ﬁt the package. Very rarely can an
organization justify the allocation of valuable skills and resources to
developing support systems for themselves or the future costs of modify-
ing every new package release to satisfy their business idiosyncrasies.
The resources required to implement a package for both key opera-
tional or support environments are frequently underestimated. Require-
ments still need to be carefully analysed and documented, and the
evaluation process undertaken must be linked to the justiﬁcation, prior-
itization and beneﬁt management processes. Even if no tailoring of the
package is necessary, there are often interfaces to be built to existing
systems and databases, and there may be considerable work needed to
conﬁgure package parameters, undertake user training programs,
develop adequate testing material, convert existing data and implement
the system. An allowance of resources may also be needed for the work
involved in vendor management relating to supply and service activities.
Even if the ‘databases’ in the packages are not ideally suited to the
organization’s information architecture, integration of information is
often less critical in support applications than the ability to transfer
information. Meeting the task requirement in the overall most eﬃcient
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way is essential to success, therefore packages should not be ruled out just
because they cannot be integrated. User needs are paramount in the ﬁnal
choice, but the IS function’s veto of certain options must be allowed if
they cannot provide support for the required technical environment,
otherwise overhead cost build-up will oﬀset the direct eﬃciency
beneﬁts. Equally, it is best to adopt a low risk or conservative
approach, only selecting packages with a well-established base of cus-
tomers, rather than be the ﬁrst user of a new package, however good
its apparent features. A package selection checklist can easily be drawn
up to help users to deﬁne requirements and decide on options.
Support systems, because they are not critical to success, are prime
candidates for outsourcing to a third party, especially if the system is
using up resources that are needed on more important applications and,
in addition, the organization needs to develop diﬀerent skills.
High Potential ‘Applications’
As discussed in Chapter 7, the term ‘applications’ is perhaps inappropri-
ate in the high potential segment, since it is the research and development
(R&D) activity enabling new technology to be tried out to ascertain its
potential applications for the organization, or to explore the potential of
technology in relation to an innovative business idea. The need is for
independent, rapid, low-cost development of prototypes and even pilot
implementations that, if they fail, can be abandoned without wasting
signiﬁcant resources. Since risk is high and success is far from certain,
eﬀective cost control is essential.
As has been said before, these R&D-type activities should be separated
from mainstream systems, to enable them to be evaluated on their merits.
The main objective is to evaluate the business potential of applying any
technology, but in some cases the potential may not only be where the
initial use of a new technology is tried. This may mean splitting the
prototyping objectives into those that are application-speciﬁc and those
that are for more general learning. Equally, the potential of the technol-
ogy should not be explored in abstract without some application in mind.
This is a recipe for pouring money down the drain. Clear terms of refer-
ence or objectives should be established at the start, but they may need to
be consciously (and overtly) modiﬁed as knowledge is acquired.
The most obvious danger is that users and even senior management
become so enthusiastic about a successful prototype that it becomes a
fully operational system, even though it is made of ‘string and glue’ and
has not been designed for use on a large scale. Many good ideas, es-
pecially for Internet applications, have proved less than successful
when implemented, since the required performance or reliability could
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not be achieved in operation. An example is boo.com’s clothing website,
which was far too slow in loading complex graphics. This frustrated
potential customers and probably contributed to the company’s demise.
Often, the organization will have to acquire or develop new techno-
logical skills to develop the applications and support the process of evalu-
ation. Some skills may have to be acquired through the vendor or outside
experts, but it is important that eﬀective knowledge transfer occurs
during the evaluation phase, to avoid future dependence on technical
skills only available outside.
While high-potential applications should be evaluated in association
with a particular technology, it may be that more than one option exists
for evaluation. It can be advisable to carry out parallel, competing R&D
projects focused on one business application, especially if the potential
beneﬁts appear very high, if speed is of the essence and/or competitors are
carrying out similar evaluations. However, in this case the eventual
decision criteria must be clearly spelled out or the process will only
leave more uncertainty at the end than there was at the start!
Figure 11.7 summarizes some of the key issues in managing application
developments in each of the segments of the portfolio.
THE SPECIAL CASE OF ‘ENTERPRISE SYSTEMS’
The 1990s saw the extensive implementation of Enterprise (or Enterprise-
wide) Systems (ES) across many industries. The best known are probably
the Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) packages provided by a range of
vendors, initially for the manufacturing sector. Since then, versions of
ERP have been developed for other industries such as logistics, utilities,
health care, retail and even education. ES systems, either package based
or custom built, have been developed across most industrial and com-
mercial sectors, ranging from Customer Relationship Management
(CRM), Call Centre Management, Supply Chain Management (SCM),
Policy Administration (in insurance) to Electronic Patient Records in
health care. Their chief characteristic is that they aﬀect a large number
of organizational processes and functions, standardizing and integrating
information and activities. Few are truly enterprise-wide in the sense that
they deal with all the business information needs, but all have a signiﬁ-
cant inﬂuence on the overall IS strategy of the organization. ES do not
normally ﬁt into any one of the four portfolio segments, given the activ-
ities covered and the range of potential beneﬁts available. Therefore, they
often involve a combination of all the portfolio issues, the mixture being
dependent on both the intent of the investment and the current situation
across the activities.
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While part of the reason for the growth in their use has been the
development of comprehensive packages by the software suppliers, ﬁve
other issues have accelerated their adoption:
. replacement of existing systems to satisfy the Y2K requirements,
more cost-eﬀectively than amending all the existing applications;
. replacement of non-integrated legacy systems by integrated applica-
tions and data bases to reduce long-term costs and provide higher-
quality systems that incorporate industry ‘best practice’;
. increasing legislation and regulation in many industries has made
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Figure 11.7 Development approaches and characteristics
‘compliance’ a major issue, and buying comprehensive ‘compliant’
software can help avoid the serious consequences of failure to satisfy
the regulators;
. provision of application architectures and business processes, to
enable quick and eﬀective moves into electronic commerce and
internal adoption of e-business practices;
. in multinational or global organizations, the need to expand the
business by rapid replication of existing business models, to use
resources and knowledge ﬂexibly across products, services and
markets as well as to deal consistently and eﬀectively with large
global customers.
Overall, whatever the particular type of ES, the main diﬀerences from
more traditional IS developments are the ambitious intentions, the ap-
plication complexity and cross-functional scope, the range of diﬀerent
stakeholders involved, and extent of business and organization changes
needed to accommodate the new business models inherent in the ES.
Oh! and the possibility of bringing the business to a grinding halt if it
fails!
In the late 1990s many papers and books were written to provide
understanding of these issues, their interrelationships and how to
address them.9 Most writings to date have been based on the now ex-
tensive experience available from ERP implementations, but the lessons
are equally valid for other ES developments. The main ones are summar-
ized here.
While ES implementations are, based on their scope and potential
impact, major organizational change initiatives, many default to
become ‘software projects’. In a survey of the success criteria10 for
ERP projects, 89% were judged successful—the software worked and
the project was delivered close to time and cost forecasts. But only
25% had achieved the intended business beneﬁts. The example in
Table 11.1 perhaps summarizes the main reasons for this. The
company concerned implemented an ERP package twice! The ﬁrst time
was unsuccessful, but they realised why and had the courage to try again
and this time succeeded.
This company’s experience is not unusual—many organizations are
reimplementing such systems to gain the beneﬁts that were not
achieved the ﬁrst time. A major pharmaceutical company implemented
an ERP system worldwide in the 1990s across all its manufacturing units,
but allowed considerable degrees of freedom to each unit in how it
‘customized’ and utilized the package. As a result, the major supply-
chain beneﬁts that were expected did not accrue. The reimplementation
is more standardized and requires the units to change their practices to
544 Managing the Supply of IT Services
TE
AM
FL
Y
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Team-Fly® 
improve the performance and agility of the supply chains for all the main
products.
One general theme from research11 into ES implementations that has
emerged reﬂects this recurring two-phase approach. Phase I involves
creating a coherent link between the future business vision and how the
ES either creates that vision or enables it to happen. Unfortunately, that
vision often ignores or minimizes the current problems and constraints
that limit the organization’s ability to implement the ES successfully. A
more appropriate approach to the ﬁrst phase is to establish an overall
vision for how the business will operate once the full beneﬁts of the ES
can be realized, but set an initial intent that delivers a ‘new baseline’
where the problems and constraints have been removed. Phase I imple-
mentation should deliver this new baseline, often via a basic, even limited,
standard (or ‘vanilla’) implementation of the software with associated
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Table 11.1 Implementing ‘Enterprise Resource Planning’ systems—one
company’s experience (source: Achieving the Beneﬁts from Software Package
Enabled Business Improvement Programmes, Best Practice Guidelines,
IMPACT, London, 1998)
First attempt—failure Second attempt—success
IS led, with insuﬃcient knowledge of Business Function led, by a newly
the business function concerned recruited manager, experienced in the
function, supported by IS
Belief that the requirements were simple Site visits and reviews of other
and already known—just use the companies procedures to establish
package to automate the current best practice and system
processes requirements
Belief that this was a low-risk and Knowledge that this would require
straightforward implementation some major changes
Lack of business buy-in led to both the New procedures completely replaced
new and old (mainly manual) system the previous system and all staﬀ were
remaining in place, and little move by required to use them; facilities for the
the business to adopt the new system old system withdrawn
Little business change Organizational and business process
changes
Bespoke amendment of package. Minimal changes to the package, and
Longer and more complex system build, innovative use of built-in facilities.
and diﬃculty applying upgrades Shorter delivery timescale and easy
future upgrade paths
Costs, no beneﬁts Beneﬁts have exceeded expectations
essential business practice changes. Studies12 show that business perform-
ance often deteriorates immediately after implementation, and contin-
gencies to allow for this are needed—increased inventories, more
resources and informing trading partners of expectations. A ‘shakedown’
phase normally follows in which an understanding of:
(a) how to optimize performance through further changes to business
practices and software reconﬁguration; and
(b) how further beneﬁts can now be achieved by using more capabilities
of the software and by more radical or extensive business and organ-
izational changes.
A new vision (hopefully not much reduced from the original!) is then
needed to develop new objectives and plans to achieve innovations in
business processes and practices based on the ES capability now available
to the business. A model, based on the results of a number of studies but
using much of the terminology of Markus et al.,13 is shown in Figure 11.8.
The two stages can be summarized as ‘problem based’ to achieve a new
starting point from which ‘innovation-based’ development can be
546 Managing the Supply of IT Services
Figure 11.8 Enterprise systems—the two-stage view of implementation
launched. At the start of such a large, ambitious project, it is diﬃcult to
get suﬃcient consensus on what the future will look like and how to get
there, when a wide variety of current issues and problems are the focus of
day-to-day management attention across the organization. Removing
those problems releases the organizational ability to envisage and agree
how new ways of conducting business can be created.
As was said earlier, the implementation of an ES is a business trans-
formation program, not an IS/IT project. Very few fail because of the
inadequacies of the technology. When they do fail, the reasons are organ-
izational and, in many cases, due to diﬀerent perceptions of the intent
and beneﬁts and extent of changes required between senior executives
and operational line management and among the line managers in dif-
ferent functions or units. Evidence from one study14 is that successful
implementations have been carefully, even slowly, planned to gain the
understanding and commitment of the majority, if not all, the stake-
holders to the beneﬁts and establish how best to implement the
changes in each area, followed by rapid implementation. Often, two-
thirds of the project duration was eﬀectively ‘planning’ and one-third
was implementation. Many failures resulted from a short planning
phase, during which few of the diﬀerences in perceptions were addressed
or reconciled, followed by an interminable implementation phase!
As was also said earlier, there has been considerable literature pub-
lished in the last 5 years on this topic; Table 11.2 contains a summary of
some of the particular key issues that need to be addressed in relation to
the ‘special case’ of ES. There are, of course, further speciﬁc issues
associated with the type of ES involved (e.g. ERP and CRM systems).
Details can be found in some of the publications referenced in the end-
notes.15
STRATEGIES FOR MANAGING THE IT INFRASTRUCTURE
This section is concerned with the management of the technology infra-
structure from a strategic perspective and, in particular, the issues aﬀect-
ing investment in its development and its contribution and alignment to
the business strategy.
Deﬁning IT infrastructure and its components is becoming more diﬃ-
cult as technology evolves and becomes increasingly a business utility.
Perhaps the best deﬁnition is ‘the enabling base of shared IT capabilities
which provide the foundation for other business systems.’16 This
deﬁnition by McKay and Brockway includes the managerial expertise
to provide IT services as well as the technology itself. Many authors17
include ‘services’ in the IT infrastructure, since it is diﬃcult to separate
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the issues of infrastructure management associated with its procurement
from those aﬀecting its use in services and applications. IT infrastructure
is therefore considered to comprise:
. Physical infrastructure, which consists of a range of network,
hardware and base software products and services, deployed to
enable applications and the general purpose use of technology to
function successfully. A component is considered as being part of
the infrastructure if it is used by more than one application (e.g.
middleware) or by a wide range of people. Hence, software such as
groupware to enable knowledge sharing and collaborative working is
part of the infrastructure, since it has many applications. It can be
argued that Enterprise Systems software packages, once installed, are
essentially part of the infrastructure, given the range of activities they
support and the inﬂuence they have over the business and IT
architecture.
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Table 11.2 Key issues in Enterprise Systems implementation
. To succeed, business models will have to change and so will business and
organizational structures and relationships. The drivers and need for change
must be understood throughout the organization.
. Corporate IS/IT initiatives are often distrusted by the business units or
functions due to increasing control and loss of autonomy.
. There must be explicitly identiﬁed beneﬁts both to the corporation and to
most, if not all, the units/functions involved, to enable the business changes
to be made: but implementing an ES will rarely deliver suﬃcient immediate
beneﬁts to justify the cost and eﬀort. Exploiting the new capability will
deliver further beneﬁts, which need to be identiﬁed at the start and
actioned once the basic implementation is completed.
. It is the business changes enabled by the Enterprise Systems (ES), not the
software, that produces the major and lasting business beneﬁts.
. The technology is rarely the cause of failure, it is normally the result of
organizational or cultural issues being unresolved or a poor implementation
process.
. A strong, empowered, multidisciplinary, business-led team using sound
project management principles is essential to success.
. Changing the performance measures (and even reward systems) to reﬂect the
interdependencies resulting from the new business model are essential, if
behaviours are to change.
. Poorly deﬁned or ineﬀectively communicated business vision and strategy
will reduce the ES to a technology project only, owned by the IS function!
. Most organizations realize (after the event) that more resources and expertise
should have been devoted to change management!
. Architectures, which describe the physical infrastructure and show
the current and, where possible, future conﬁgurations. As well as
models of the physical infrastructure and where it is located, etc.,
these also include models of information, processes and organiza-
tional structure. The technology architecture is a representation of
a set of hardware and software components, described in terms of
how they support the applications and information requirements of
the business.
. Policies and standards, which cover technology aspects to determine
how the infrastructure, its acquisition, deployment and support are
managed. These address matters such as sourcing, contracts, service
levels, back-up and recovery, contingency plans and, increasingly
importantly, security and access controls.
. Management processes to ensure investments in infrastructure are
coherently planned and justiﬁed, and relationships with technology
suppliers and outsourcing providers are appropriate for their role in
enabling the business strategy.
The nature of IT services and the related strategic issues were discussed
earlier in this chapter, and the management of outsourcing is covered in
the last section of this chapter. The purpose of this section is to deal with
infrastructure strategy from a general management, not a technical per-
spective—references to more comprehensive texts on particular aspects
are provided.
LINKING THE IT INFRASTRUCTURE WITH
THE BUSINESS STRATEGY
Business Objectives of Technology Management
The purpose behind the overall management of the technology infra-
structure is to provide an appropriate set of technology, resources,
processes and services to meet the evolving needs of the business and
the organizational ability to apply them eﬀectively. Speciﬁcally, this
means underpinning the application portfolio and general-purpose use
of IT tools in the short and medium term, and undertaking investments
to make justiﬁed improvements to the infrastructure to meet longer-term,
but uncertain organizational and business needs. This implies a contin-
uous migration plan to move from the current technology infrastructure
to the most appropriate set of components to match systems and infor-
mation architectures, probably passing through multiple stages over a
number of years.
In response to business drivers pulling the IT supply strategy, such as
cost-eﬀectiveness, ﬂexibility and responsiveness, remote working, global-
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ization and employee productivity, there will be a number of speciﬁc IT
objectives to be met, as illustrated in Table 11.3. However, it may not be
possible, for ﬁnancial, technical or human reasons, to be able to provide
an ideal infrastructure at any given time. At best, the technology infra-
structure can evolve at the rate demanded by the business and IS plans,
but, if necessary, these plans may have to be modiﬁed to a rate deter-
mined by the evolution of technology or the economics of acquiring and
using it.
Business Basis for Managing Technology
Most of the issues that have to be addressed by business managers with
responsibility for technology are business issues. In order to manage
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Table 11.3 Examples of objectives for developing the IT infrastructure
. Provide an appropriate infrastructure to sustain the performance of current
applications and development or enhancement of business applications
deemed to be critical to meeting business needs.
. Maximize the use of current information and facilities available in the
existing applications and technology.
. Provide suﬃcient integration and consistency across the infrastructure, to
minimize cost, maintain quality, and to enable internal and external inter-
connectivity.
. Facilitate an increase in the productivity of users and their business pro-
cesses, by equipping them with desktop tools and oﬃce software, accessibility
to the information they require, and the networking capability to commu-
nicate internally and externally as needed (e.g. via Intranets and the Internet,
groupware, email, videoconferencing and desktop applications).
. Facilitate rapid application development by providing a modern tool set, and
training for users and IS developers.
. Reduce complexity and non-standardization so as to ensure ﬂexibility and
responsiveness to change at all organizational levels and locations, and
enable staﬀ mobility and consistency of user knowledge required across
the organization.
. To build and manage an infrastructure, to serve the whole group, that can
handle high-volume multimedia communications within the group and
enable communications with customers and suppliers in a consistent and
economic way.
. To provide the ability to change business and organization structures
without major delay, cost or disruption due to IT constraints. This might
also include the ability to minimize the costs and complexity of mergers,
acquisitions and divestments.
. To have an infrastructure that is compatible and comparable with other
organizations in the industry to gain full beneﬁts from industry IS/IT
developments.
technology eﬀectively, it is not necessary to get deeply involved in tech-
nical details. This chapter does not attempt to do so either, except in so
far as it is necessary to explain the concepts or address the issues raised by
technology. Technology changes so quickly; it is beyond even most tech-
nical people to keep up to date, and even more diﬃcult and less valuable
for business managers to attempt to do so. However, more business
managers are required to have enough understanding of the strategic
issues to improve their decisions concerning technology: a set of princi-
ples by which they can assess the various issues, to ensure a well-rounded
decision-making basis and increased likelihood that the long-term best
interests of the business are upheld.
Managers responsible for planning, developing and managing the in-
frastructure are expected to provide a continually improving and expand-
ing service to the business, in response to the demands of the business
strategy and any organizational evolution. Additionally, they need to
keep abreast of new and emerging technology and current competitive
usage of IT, and put forward suggestions as to how technology might be
deployed to gain advantage or create new business options. Two particu-
larly enduring problems of IT infrastructure management, in combina-
tion, create a number of diﬃculties for organizations:
. it must be developed as a base for future, uncertain use of applica-
tions rather than merely matching current business functionality18
(i.e. keeping ahead of the needs);
. it is diﬃcult to deﬁne the value derived from IT infrastructure19 (i.e.
it is seen as a cost).
The prime diﬃculty, therefore, is making investments to meet uncertain
needs in something that has no explicit value! Therefore, it is important
to link infrastructure development to relevant parts of the business
strategy. Most organizations could identify current business problems
that would result from inadequate infrastructure, but it is more diﬃcult
to foresee the future problems that would result from failure to invest in
its development. So, some of the issues to be faced are:
. Linking technology investments to business needs—how to relate the
speciﬁc requirements for investment in technology to the business
needs, and to determine the implications of gaining or not gaining
approval, and how to make sure that the proposed development is
the best way of obtaining the indirect beneﬁts. While per unit costs of
technology are going down, spending on IT is still increasing, with
investments in new applications both for business systems and indi-
vidual or group working, and in the automation of more activities,
Linking the IT Infrastructure with the Business Strategy 551
like workﬂow management. This seems to be acceptable because of
the growing belief and some evidence that an eﬀective IT infra-
structure enables organizational responsiveness and employee
ﬂexibility20—all critical characteristics in most of today’s busi-
nesses—and facilitates coping with growing complexity. This is
endorsed by individuals, who, by and large, enjoy the increased
power they can obtain from IT. However, all the evidence does not
point at realized productivity gains in all uses of IT. Reports
suggest21 that white-collar productivity has not actually improved
during the ‘desktop’ era and there is some evidence that misuse or
inadequate skills have caused negative eﬀects on productivity. Justi-
ﬁcation of infrastructure investments is considered brieﬂy below,
within the overall rationale for IS/IT investment covered in detail
in Chapter 9.
. Identifying technical opportunities—although business managers do
not need an in-depth understanding of technology, they do need
suﬃcient understanding of its capability to achieve the business re-
quirements, in terms of its ability to: (i) improve or radically change
the products and services of the business, and develop electronic
trading capabilities, (ii) improve the productivity and eﬀectiveness
of business processes and people and (iii) impact the economics of
the business.
. IT investments by others—how existing and potential competitors,
customers and suppliers are using or could use technology to
improve their competitive positions and the likely consequences in
terms of (i) impact on the market and customers, (ii) changing re-
lationships and cost structures within the value chain and (iii) threats
or opportunities created by new IT-based entrants in the industry.
Business managers need the knowledge to assess the situation, under-
stand the options available, assess their implications and be able to
respond accordingly in terms of commissioning the investments or
provisioning by outside parties.
. Technical implications and ‘hype’—most business managers are
required to make important business decisions, or required to recom-
mend strategies to the overall management team. They are unlikely
to have an in-depth understanding of how the multitude of tech-
nologies work, but must know enough to be able to ask sensible
questions and not to be confused by the advice of potential suppliers
or ‘in-ﬂight’ magazine articles and even TV adverts! However, they
will need to rely on technical management and specialists to explain
and interpret the essentials for them. Technical management also
need to be suﬃciently business aware to extract the relevant,
factual information from the supplier pressure and hype, so that
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they do not fall into line with the technology vendors themselves in
promoting the ‘solutions looking for problems’, based on technically
irresistible oﬀerings, rather than business need and sound assess-
ments of performance, cost and risk.
. Business and technical awareness—the CIO or IT director not only
has a responsibility to instil business judgement and awareness in
his technology experts but also to implant a sound, albeit high-
level, understanding of technology and technical issues in general
management.
. How to make decisions about IT resources—this includes the sourcing
and, where appropriate, outsourcing of infrastructure products and
services.
One major issue for senior management to address is the determination
of the degree to which they wish the organization to function as an
integrated whole or as separate entities. This decision will have a signiﬁ-
cant inﬂuence on the type of infrastructure that is developed and its
overall cost, especially in multi-unit organizations. A model developed
by Keen22 and shown in Figure 11.9 can help management form an
opinion on the need for commonality and connectivity across the IT
infrastructure. Keen describes two dimensions:
. reach—the extent to which the infrastructure must enable connec-
tions across systems and platforms among internal and external
users;
. range—the breadth of services, and variety and volume of diﬀerent
types of information, documents, images, etc. that will be shared
among internal and external parties.
In considering how to meet integration requirements, a business needs to
deﬁne an architecture that delivers the essential levels of capability, reach
and range, and plan to migrate to it gradually. It should determine key
parameters; for example, the required responsiveness, speed and eﬃ-
ciency in terms of connectivity and access across the community, and
the current and future processing and communication capacity it
expects to need.
A study of 26 major international ﬁrms by Broadbent et al.23 con-
ﬁrmed that those seeking and achieving inter-unit business synergies
had invested in infrastructures that produced high levels of reach and
range. This also tended to include common application packages using
common databases. The study also found that the ﬁrms who had inte-
grated business, IS and IT planning processes had more extensive IT
infrastructure capabilities in both of Keen’s dimensions. Interestingly,
the study conﬁrmed, as perhaps expected, that generally the ﬁrms
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where information was a major component of the product or critical to
the value-adding processes, such as oil exploration or research, had
invested most in infrastructure as a ‘capability’ (i.e. centrally planned,
coordinated investments with strong controls on IT expenditure).
JUSTIFICATION OF INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENTS
Infrastructure contributes to the delivery of business beneﬁts in a number
of diﬀerent ways, and the justiﬁcation of expenditure, either for procure-
ment of capital items or purchasing software licenses or network or
hardware capacity from third-party suppliers, needs to be presented on
the basis of the particular contributions being made. These can be de-
scribed under ﬁve headings as depicted in Figure 11.10.
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Figure 11.9 Reach and range (source: from P.G.W. Keen, Shaping the Future,
Harvard Business School Press, Boston, 1991)
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1. Application-speciﬁc—infrastructure costs can be justiﬁed in part on
the basis of the beneﬁts delivered by applications that will use the
infrastructure, and the relevant costs should form part of the business
justiﬁcation for those applications. This implies a link between the
planned applications portfolio developments and the infrastructure
required to enable them. This can be done via a composite Beneﬁts
Dependency Network, a technique described in Chapter 9, showing
infrastructure components as the enablers of the applications,
business changes and beneﬁts.
2. To reduce costs of running and supporting existing applications, by
using more cost-eﬀective technology—this is most likely to arise in
relation to support or some key operational applications as well as
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Figure 11.10 Justifying infrastructure investments
personal productivity and communications usage. The justiﬁcation
will depend on cost savings, mainly in the IT budget, but there may
be business cost savings, especially by providing easier-to-use
desktop tools or lower-cost means of communication. Included in
this category is the ‘forced’ need to replace a technology that is or
is becoming obsolete (i.e. it will no longer be supported or is no
longer available because the vendor has ceased to supply the technol-
ogy or even gone out of business!). As with any technology invest-
ments that involve supporting existing applications, it is prudent to
question whether each application is still necessary to the business. If
it is, there may be several options:
. transferring the application to other existing technology already
in use in the business, which may be a less eﬃcient solution, or
through replacement with new technology more in keeping with
IT policies relating to nominated platforms and standardization
across the business;
. modifying or redeveloping the application to take advantage of
more cost-eﬀective technology, either existing or new;
. cutting down the functionality of the application to the essentials
and delivering them by one or other of the above means.
3. To enable growth in the volume of business transactions, both internal
and external, or to accommodate the changing mix of transactions,
(e.g. customers switching to Internet ordering from the call centre).
The growth in transaction volume may be due to changing business
practices rather than genuine business volume increases. Customers
are tending to move to just-in-time satisfaction of requirements and
more single-line ordering rather than consolidating purchases,
causing further increases in internal transactions, but still expect
rapid response and high service levels. In combination, these create
increasingly high-peak loads as well as overall increases in transac-
tion volumes. At the same time, more information is being trans-
ferred in many of the transactions (e.g. in the form of multiple
large attachments to emails, complex images and video), requiring
further network, processing and storage capacity increases. In terms
of beneﬁts, it is important to consider three diﬀerent types of
argument for increased capacity:
. that required to deal with increased business activity (i.e. real
growth), which leads to increased revenue;
. that needed to accommodate the changing mix of transaction
types, which should be oﬀset by savings to be made elsewhere.
The increasing move to electronic as opposed to paper transac-
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tions should produce cost savings associated with printing and
paper handling; and
. that required to deal with increasing use of capacity for purely
internal reasons. Whether this is of net beneﬁt to the organiza-
tion needs to be determined in terms of the changes in business
practices that are emerging, rather than being planned. For
example, centralizing corporate information on an Intranet can
produce reduced costs and beneﬁts due to accuracy and consis-
tency, provided its content is managed eﬀectively. If every user is
extracting and storing the information they require, along with
other pages of information downloaded from the Internet,
demands for increased network and server capacity are not jus-
tiﬁed costs. Equally poor user practices in dealing with accumu-
lations of emails may lead to signiﬁcant, unjustiﬁed capacity
increases.
4. Changes in working practices—this means deliberate changes as
opposed to emergent changes as in Item 3 above, although
improved practices developed informally should be extended and
built on, based on the beneﬁts that have resulted. Such changes
may be associated with speciﬁc applications, in which case the
beneﬁts should be related via the application to the associated infra-
structure. However, increasingly, changes in processes and practices
can be made via the use of the infrastructure without major applica-
tion investment. For example, a bank, having set up its ‘product
catalogue’ on an internal website, stopped sending product update
information on paper to its several hundred branches. Two beneﬁts
resulted: a large paper cost saving and fast, consistent, up-to-date
information to customers in the branches. ‘Filing’ the mass of paper
received in the branches was a problem, often leading to delays in
staﬀ having the latest information at the counter.
Another signiﬁcant area of potential beneﬁt, which was discussed
in the previous chapter, is associated with knowledge sharing within
and across organizations. While research24 has shown that knowl-
edge sharing is driven by people not technology, communities of
interest and/or practice—the main conduit of sharing—work best
when the management encourages and facilitates their development
and provides the necessary resources, including technology. Again,
where extended infrastructure to support content-rich media (e.g.
desktop videoconferencing), is put in place to enable organizational
knowledge management, the intended and resulting beneﬁts can and
should be speciﬁcally identiﬁed and measured. Equally, ﬁndings from
other research25 suggest that ‘workforce agility’ or organizational
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ﬂexibility, to respond quickly and eﬀectively to changes in the market
place, is increased by the provision of a consistent, high-quality,
integrated IT infrastructure supporting all users and all applications.
5. To create a new business capability that is required for the future
business strategy, an explicit strategic intent or a particular strategic
initiative. While the details of how the intent will best be met may as
yet be unclear, a demonstrated connection between the IT infrastruc-
ture implicit in achieving the strategy can often be made. For
example, an energy company stated that one of its strategic inten-
tions was ‘to become location independent’, enabling its technical
and professional staﬀ to perform their jobs wherever in the world
they happened to be. This was the main justiﬁcation for a major
investment in network capacity and portable workstations,
although beneﬁts in other categories were also delivered.
In the UK, the concerted move to e-government—the electronic
access and delivery of government services to the public and others—
has led many local authorities to justify the major infrastructure
investments required as an integral part of their future strategies.
The argument is that the IT infrastructure is, over the long term, a
replacement for the traditional infrastructure of local government—
based on an extensive ‘oﬃce coverage’ of the authorities’ geography.
As the infrastructure to enable ‘online’ access and mobile working by
professional staﬀ is implemented, savings in the capital and operating
cost of existing oﬃce and depot sites are used to oﬀset the IT costs.
The reduction in these traditional ‘delivery channels’ is then planned
and implemented, to realize the savings as early as possible, and the
net cost reduction achieved is continuously monitored by both man-
agement and the elected council.
Overall, any infrastructure investment should be assessed against all of
these ﬁve criteria to identify the contribution, if any, it is expected to
make in each and the direct or indirect beneﬁts that should be realized. It
has been argued that ﬁrms need to consider their IT infrastructure more
as a ‘capability’ than merely a ‘utility’, or cost of doing business, in order
to align the use of technology with the business strategy.26 As mentioned
in Chapter 9, some authors have proposed the use of real options analysis
to address the inherent uncertainties in investments in IT infrastructure,
especially in the last of the categories above. Bulasubramarian and col-
leagues27 have developed a formal methodology based on real options to
evaluate and compare diﬀerent IT infrastructure investments along with
other alternative investments. Their experience in using the approach is
that it not only inﬂuences the outcome of the decision but also improves
understanding of how to align business drivers with the business capabil-
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ities that can be developed from an appropriate IT infrastructure. This is
likely to be increasingly important as more aspects of IS/IT will become
part of the ‘infrastructure’, either purchased as an ‘integrated set’ or
provided by outsourcing vendors of one form or another. Many organ-
izations are seeking to obtain their infrastructure from outsourcers, to
reduce their need for scarce technical expertise in-house and to be able to
buy what they need incrementally rather than as higher risk, expensive
capital purchases. Outsourcing strategies are considered at the end of this
chapter, but outsourcing of IT infrastructure and service provision does
not absolve management of the responsibility for deﬁning its role in the
strategy or justifying the investment involved.
TECHNOLOGY STRATEGIES IN A MULTI-BUSINESS
UNIT ORGANIZATION
Throughout this book, there has been a focus on achieving a coherent IS/
IT strategy for a business unit, because each business unit should seek to
maximize the beneﬁts from its information, systems and technology, and
it is most feasible to achieve that coherence at business unit level.
However, most corporations consist of a number of businesses and
there is a need to consider the strategic management of technology
supply and services across the businesses to obtain the maximum cor-
porate and business unit beneﬁts.
This corporate dimension has been considered in previous chapters in
terms of the factors that drive the degree of beneﬁcial central coordina-
tion and control over and above the business units. The main factors
aﬀecting the technology strategy can be summarized as business-driven
factors, including the following:
. degree of intercompany trading;
. similarity of products and business processes;
. coherence of markets served, channels of distribution used and main
suppliers;
. similarity in scale of operation;
. industry maturity and competitive situation of units;
. geography, especially in international companies;
. how corporate management exercises its control over the units’
business strategies and activities;
. the rate of business and organizational change.
They can also be summarized as IS/IT supply-driven factors, which
include:
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. the economics of processing and procurement;
. availability of skills and human resources;
. availability of technologies and vendor services in diﬀerent countries
and areas;
. the existing IS/IT investments in the diﬀerent units.
Often, however, these ‘logical’ factors can become obscured by organi-
zational and political factors due to the way the business units have been
developed or acquired and/or the degree of real trust that exists between
the corporate centre and the units. This desire for conformity or inde-
pendence often manifests itself more emotionally over the control of IT
than many other business issues, especially in companies that grow by
acquisition, where IT environments often pre-date the organizational
relationships. Based on the above factors, there appears to be a struc-
tured way of addressing these issues, which is consistent with the earlier
discussion of achieving application, information and organizational co-
herence and synergy to the degree required by the business relationships.
It is important that the degree of IT conformity or divergence reﬂects the
business, organizational and cultural characteristics of the organization,
not the preference of IT specialists, or it will fail in the long term to
deliver corporate beneﬁts.
The extent to which the corporation should direct the technology
architecture and the selection process cannot be prescribed, but there is
perhaps an escalating scale of corporate intervention that can be consid-
ered. At the lowest level, this can provide beneﬁt even if the organization
is a conglomerate, buying and selling businesses and operating in many
industries with companies of varying sizes and diﬀering business situa-
tions. At the highest level, the beneﬁts will be far greater in a corporation
that has a number of companies in the same overall industry. The three
levels are described in Box 11.1.
This three-level approach is obviously somewhat simplistic, but it is an
attempt to reﬂect in technology management terms the likely business
and corporate cultures that will prevail across the spectrum from a
‘ﬁnancial conglomerate’ to a highly-focused and organically-developing
corporation. Essentially, it suggests an increasing need for central coor-
dination across business units as the intention to gain economic and
application or process and information and knowledge beneﬁts
becomes more important. The progression follows a rationale from the
support, via the key operational to the strategic/high potential quadrants
of the portfolio, in terms of increasing potential gain from central co-
ordination of technology strategy in order to gain the business beneﬁts
both corporately and in each part of the business. It also reﬂects the need
to transfer technology knowledge across the organization to gain the
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Box 11.1 Managing technology in a multi-business-unit organiza-
tion
Level 1: Lowest level of control by the corporation over the SBUs—
Technology Economics
Centralization of technology control will be mainly an economic
issue to exploit corporate buying power with suppliers and ensure
that resources are not unnecessarily duplicated. This will have most
eﬀect at the ‘commodity’ end of technology—in data communica-
tions, processing power and basic operational software as well as
related technical skills to support IT operations. Even if the com-
panies have diﬀerent application requirements, establishing a target
environment based on supply economics can enable selection de-
cisions in each unit to consider a preferred set of options. These
will not be mandatory, but will be expected to be adopted, unless
the local economics are poor, perhaps due to the unit’s size or
because its application needs cannot be adequately satisﬁed. Some
centralized resources and skills will then be available to support the
companies’ implementation and operation of the main hardware,
operating systems and networks, and even application packages.
This can make the preferred solutions more attractive to the units,
provided the charge-out of costs from the centre is equitable. The
central resource can also act as the main point of contact with
suppliers to ensure that the corporation obtains the best value
from group purchasing, and monitor centrally the vendor perform-
ance against agreed service levels as and when problems arise
anywhere in the organization.
In most, even diverse, organizations, telecommunications manage-
ment is usually centralized to provide the necessary skills, manage
the capacity, deal with major vendors and ensure costs are not
unnecessarily incurred.
Level 2: Moderate level of control by the corporation over the SBUs—
Application Beneﬁts
If the corporation has a number of businesses operating in diﬀerent
industries, but of a limited number of types (e.g. several manufactur-
ing businesses as well as some distribution and/or service com-
panies), there may be opportunities for further beneﬁts at the
corporate level or at a subgroup level, over and above those men-
tioned at Level 1. For instance, manufacturing companies may all
need some form of Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system or
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each SBU may operate in similar supply chains or trade in similar
ways. There is probably some similarity in the type of applications
required for comparable internal and external processes, therefore
beneﬁts will exist if application software knowledge and even re-
sources are shared among the units. This will add weight to the
need for consistency of basic operating environments, otherwise
the beneﬁt of application knowledge will be reduced by the need
to support diverse implementations on diﬀerent hardware and
operating systems, and deal with a large variety of suppliers. The
beneﬁts are not purely economic, although obviously the ability to
replicate business beneﬁts is a ﬁnancial gain. The beneﬁts also accrue
by enabling companies of perhaps diﬀerent sizes and in diﬀerent
stages of maturity to develop applications ahead of their own local
ability to develop the necessary skills. Similarly, applications may
even be run centrally and hence be able to be upgraded as the
hardware and software base changes with less cost and disruption
to the units.
The potential downside is that the units do not develop their own
business application and technical expertise, to move beyond using
IT for essentially support and key operational applications. Too
much centralization of IT control can lead to reduced innovation
at a unit level, and, if there is no unit or group level management or
IS/IT business steering mechanism, merely satisfying the ‘lowest
common denominator’ of needs can stiﬂe overall and local progress.
Level 3: Highest level of control by the corporation over the SBUs—
Information Asset Management
Where companies are in the same industry and/or trade with one
another and/or deal with a similar customer or supplier base, there is
probably business advantage to be gained from strong coordination
of technology management at corporate level. Not only are there
economic and application supply-side beneﬁts but also signiﬁcant
beneﬁts from sharing information and knowledge as well as its
proﬁcient and consistent processing throughout the company and
in systems linking the company to its trading partners. For
example, they may use a common Customer Relationship Manage-
ment (CRM) system and share a common customer database. Here,
it is worth ensuring that the technology environments are consistent
to the level of data management software, communications stan-
dards and some application software, even if to any one unit
company the ‘overhead’ may appear uneconomic. The beneﬁts of
greatest and earliest return from IS/IT competencies possessed by the
organization, wherever they exist.
OUTSOURCING STRATEGIES
A selective or smart sourcing approach using multiple vendors is an
increasingly popular strategy to minimize risks, maximize beneﬁts and
reduce costs28 and is likely to be the preferable choice of the future.
Willcocks and Sauer29 report that selective and in-house sourcing had
success rates of 77% and 76%, respectively, but only 38% of total out-
sourcing deals (80% or more of IT activities outsourced) were successful,
35% failed and 27% had mixed results.
Many organizations have chosen a ‘best of breed’ approach to their
outsourcing strategy, contracting with a variety of vendors for the
delivery of IT services. For example, British Petroleum (now BP) con-
tracted with three suppliers under an umbrella contract obliging the
suppliers to work together. According to BP’s IT director at that time,
John Cross, ‘[w]e decided against receiving all our IT needs from a single
supplier as some companies have done, because we believed such an
approach could make us vulnerable to escalating fees and inﬂexible
services. Instead, we sought a solution that would allow us both to buy
IT services from multiple suppliers and to have pieces delivered as if they
came from a single supplier.’30 BP reported that this sourcing strategy
reduced IT staﬀ by 80% and reduced IT operating costs from $360
million in 1989 to $132 million in 1994.31
While the risks of using a single vendor are mitigated with a multi-
sourcing strategy, they are replaced by the additional time and resources
required to manage multiple suppliers. The key to a successful multi-
sourcing arrangement is vendor coordination and management.32 To
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strong central direction and hence support in terms of skills and
resources may again be negated if innovation is stiﬂed. A corporate
mechanism to deal with strategic and high potential areas of devel-
opment must be in place. Equally, the corporation may need to fund
part of the cost of technology in the units to encourage common-
ality. This implies that the units may have to compromise some
requirements, and the consequences of such compromise must be
understood. The compromise may not always be worthwhile—
meaning that the corporate architecture must evolve and develop
with the needs and not become a force for business stagnation due
to the limited options it allows.
achieve this requirement for seamless service delivery, BP appointed one
of its three vendors as the primary contractor at each of its eight business
sites. The role of the lead vendor was to coordinate the services provided
by all three suppliers to the businesses supported by that site.
We have also seen joint ventures between vendors and clients being
established where risks and rewards are established. These include
vendors buying client’s shares or vice versa, or both parties taking a
stake in a new entity,33 illustrating that their fortunes are bound up
together. General Motors took an equity stake in EDS, with EDS eﬀec-
tively operating as a subsidiary of the car manufacturing giant, although
since 1996 it has been free to pursue its own strategies. The Swiss Bank–
Perot Systems $6.25 billion deal saw both partners agree to sell solutions
to the banking industry, with the bank having an option to buy up to
25% of equity in Perot Systems.
One of the largest outsourcing vendors EDS introduced the concept of
‘co-sourcing’ to refer to contracts where there is a strong element of ‘win–
win’ between the parties. Payment to the vendor is based in part on the
performance achieved by the customer. These performance-based con-
tracts (as opposed to fee-based) are proving popular, particularly as
experience with outsourcing has been mixed. For example, in 1998, US
truck manufacturer Freightliner Corporation outsourced to Debis for IT
services in a $70 million, ﬁve-year deal. This amount was based on what
Freightliner estimated it would have spent over that period on the IT
operations that it outsourced. However, Freightliner pays Debis only a
baseline amount to cover the vendor’s costs. Any proﬁt depends solely on
Debis generating savings. When Debis saves Freightliner money by per-
forming IT services at less cost than Freightliner’s original IS function
estimate, the two companies split the savings based on an agreed
percentage.34
Risks Associated with Outsourcing
Many companies are disappointed with their results from having
outsourced IT activity, and research consistently demonstrates that,
despite the growing maturity of vendors and their clients, the practice
of outsourcing continues to be a high-risk process. A survey conducted
by UK magazine Computing revealed that just one-quarter of IT directors
would use their main outsourcing vendor again.35 Research36 has
identiﬁed the following risk factors:
. Treating IT as an undiﬀerentiated commodity to be outsourced. This
risk is more a reﬂection of management’s view of IS/IT than anything
else, failing to see the contribution or potential contribution that IS/
IT could make regarding competitive applications. Proponents often
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see outsourcing as an opportunity to oﬄoad headcount. Yet, IT is
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diﬀerent from other areas of the business: it evolves rapidly, the
economics of supply continually change, IS penetrates all areas of
the business and switching costs are high.
. Incomplete contracting. This risk is a reﬂection of the environment
within which IT outsourcing takes place, particularly the diﬃculties
in constructing and agreeing long-term contracts in the face of rapid
business and technical change. Who, for example, in the early 1990s,
could have foreseen the impact the Internet would have on commerce
and the opportunities it would provide?
. Lack of active management of the supplier on (a) contract and (b)
relationship dimensions. Vendor performance must be continually
monitored; it has not been unknown for the vendor to devote their
attention to winning new business once the contract has been signed.
Relationships with vendors require continual development if they are
to add value—this requires considerable management time. Later in
this chapter, the process of building relationships with vendors is
explored.
. Power asymmetries developing in favour of the vendor. This is one of
the big risks, particularly for long-term contracts. Vendors may
attempt to reinterpret the contract, particularly as they often look
to recoup investments in the later years of the contract and seek
opportunities to make higher charges for services not covered in
the original contract. Vendors may themselves subcontract work
and may not manage the relationship any better than the client
could, but at a signiﬁcantly higher cost.
. Inexperienced staﬀ. Even the biggest vendors experience the same
problems as an internal IS function in recruiting experienced staﬀ.
And, the reality of many outsourcing deals is that the original staﬀ of
the IS function, outsourced to a vendor, often end up back working
for the client! In addition, it is important to ensure that vendor staﬀ
skills and knowledge are continually updated rather than be allowed
to remain relevant to the ‘legacy’ that (most often) has been out-
sourced.
. Outsourcing for short-term ﬁnancial restructuring or cash injection
rather than to leverage IT assets for business advantage. Managers
often engage in outsourcing because they do not perceive any value
from their IT expenditures and consequently wish to minimize the
costs. While outsourcing to cut costs has an appeal, the longer-term
downside can be serious. As Nigel Morris, president of US credit-
card group Capital One, succinctly noted, ‘If you have a business
that churns out products, then outsourcing makes sense. But . . . IT is
our central nervous system . . . if I outsourced tomorrow I might save
a dollar or two on each account, but I would lose ﬂexibility, and
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value and service levels.’37
. Hidden costs. Proponents of outsourcing argue that IT costs are more
clearly deﬁned with outsourcing. However, there can be many hidden
costs. The severance package for terminated or transferred employ-
ees may be a hidden cost of outsourcing. In a survey of 76 organiza-
tions that had a total of 223 contracts, Willcocks and Fitzgerald38
found that hidden costs were the biggest outsourcing problem. One
recommendation is to establish if and where the vendor makes a
proﬁt.39
. Managing multiple vendors. It is diﬃcult enough managing a single
vendor, but the management of multiple vendors adds additional
complexity, particularly regarding coordination. One tends to ﬁnd
that each has their own agenda and intention to increase their
business with the client. A number of strategies adopted by com-
panies to minimize any risk were highlighted earlier.
. Loss of innovative capacity. Once a signiﬁcant part of IT has been
outsourced, there is a danger that the organization can lose the
competency to identify innovation-based opportunities from IS/IT.
Chapter 5 has highlighted the importance of actively seeking IS/IT
opportunities in developing a competitive strategy. Earl40 notes that
much learning about the capability of IT is experiential, a key point
particularly when exploring competitive impact opportunities.
. Cultural incompatibility. It is important to ensure that the organiza-
tional culture and work practices are compatible with those of the
vendor.41
Willcocks and Sauer42 recommend a prudent approach to such issues as
IT outsourcing contracts, supplier claims, the risk behind disguised
multi-supplier contracts, supplier capabilities and resources, single-
supplier and long-term deals. From their research, they have developed
a risk analysis framework highlighting the various risks that can arise
over time. Illustrated in Figure 11.11, it highlights the contextual risk
factors, risks associated with contract construction and post-contractual
risks. Organizations must ensure that they consider all these factors in
making the outsourcing decision in constructing any subsequent con-
tracts and managing the contract during its lifetime. Generally, selective
sourcing to multiple suppliers—on relatively short-term, detailed and
regularly revisited contracts—has been the eﬀective approach to mitigat-
ing the risks of IT outsourcing.
GUIDELINES FOR OUTSOURCING DECISIONS
Although there are no simple rules in making outsourcing decisions, a
number of lessons can be deduced from general experiences to date. Such
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guidelines will help the decision makers on various issues such as whether
to outsource or not, whether to employ one or more vendors or how to
cluster the services under contracts.
Managers should not make a one-time decision whether to outsource
or not. Instead, they should create an environment in which potential
suppliers, external vendors as well as the internal IS function, are con-
stantly competing to provide IS/IT services. Organizations should choose
to outsource carefully selected, non-core activities that can be accom-
plished quicker, cheaper and better by vendors. Earl43 argues that com-
panies should ﬁrst ask why they should not insource IT services. Indeed,
actual outsourcing or, at the very least, the threat of outsourcing is often
the symptom of the problem of demonstrating the value of IS.44
DiRomualdo and Gurbaxani’s45 research indicates the importance of
understanding the diﬀerent types of strategic intent for IT and the role
that outsourcing can play before making any decision. They highlight
three strategic intents driving outsourcing:
. IS improvement—‘Do IS better’;
. business impact—‘Use IT to achieve better business results’;
. commercial exploitation—‘Exploit IT assets externally’.
Each type of strategic intent for IT outsourcing requires diﬀerent ap-
proaches and tactics to be successful. The nature of the strategic intent
also drives the type of contract, payments and incentives, pricing provi-
sions and performance measures. Deciding on a sourcing strategy should
be based on a combined assessment of business, economic and technical
factors,46 the relative importance of each being determined by the strat-
egic intent.
Business Factors
In assessing the business factors relating to the outsourcing decision, two
separate dimensions of business contribution should be considered: com-
petitive positioning and business operations. The competitive positioning
view considers the type of contribution made by an IT activity, whether it
is a ‘commodity’ or a ‘diﬀerentiator’. An IT activity will be a commodity
if it is not expected to distinguish the business from its key competitors,
whereas diﬀerentiators are IT activities that are expected to provide the
capability for the business to achieve competitive advantage. The
business operations dimensions can be assessed as either ‘useful’ or
‘critical’:
. Critical diﬀerentiators. IT activities that are not only critical to
business operations but also help to distinguish the business from
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its competitors. Organizations should look to insource such activ-
ities, although they may avail themselves of third-party expertise.
These activities would normally be ones that are directly related to
creating and sustaining strategic applications, plus the related R&D
activity required to identify and prove that diﬀerentiation can be
achieved.
. Critical commodities. IT activities that are critical to business opera-
tions, but fail to distinguish the business from competitors (key
operational application areas). Here, organizations should ‘best-
source’, but, because of the risks, assessment should be based on
clear evidence that the vendor can meet stringent operational require-
ments.
. Useful commodities. The myriad, mainly support, IT activities that
provide incremental beneﬁts to the business, but fail to distinguish it
from competitors. The strategy here is generally to outsource, as
third-party vendors are likely to have achieved low cost through
economies of scale and standardization.
Technical Factors
Technical factors guide the choice of supply source and the form of
supply arrangements. Two issues need assessment: the degree of technol-
ogy maturity (i.e. level of maturity in use of technology), and degree of
technology integration (i.e. whether IT services require a high or low
degree of integration). The latter often limits the options for multiple
sourcing if highly integrated services are essential and if the organization
is mature or advanced in its technologies—there may be fewer vendors
capable of providing services to match the in-house alternatives, even
where costs are high. It may not be possible to achieve cost reductions
without reductions in the technical quality obtained.
Economic Factors
From their research, Lacity and Hirschheim47 concluded that the cost
eﬃciency of vendors largely depends on adoption of eﬃcient manage-
ment practices and, to a lesser extent, economies of scale. In addition,
they also found that the internal IS function often possesses equivalent or
superior economies of scale to vendors for many activities. Table 11.4
compares costs between the internal IS function and outsourcing vendors
across a number of cost drivers.
In a longitudinal study of evaluation practices in 26 organizations in
the lead-up to making IT sourcing decisions, Willcocks and colleagues48
found that existing internal IT evaluation processes often made it diﬃcult
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to make objective economic comparisons with outsourcing vendor bids.
Diﬃculties in evaluating and then comparing in-house performance
include evaluating total IT contribution, identifying full costs, bench-
marking and external comparisons, the role of charging systems and
the adoption of service-level agreements by the in-house operation.
While it is important to make the most beneﬁcial economic choice, it is
even more important to ensure the outsourcing decision is in alignment
with the overall IS/IT strategy.
In making sourcing decisions, a company’s primary objective should be
to maximize ﬂexibility and control so that, in the provision of IS/IT
services, the organization can pursue diﬀerent options as it learns more
or its circumstances change.49
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Table 11.4 Theoretical economies of scale (source: from M.C. Lacity and R.
Hirschheim, Beyond the Information Systems Outsourcing Bandwagon: The
Insourcing Response, John Wiley & Sons, Chichester, UK, 1995)
Source of IS costs Internal IS function Outsourcing vendors
Data centre operating costs Comparable to a vendor Comparable to large IS
for 150–200 MIP range function. Inherent
advantage over small IS
functions
Hardware purchase costs Large companies: volume Volume discounts
discounts comparable to comparable to large IS
a vendor function. Inherent
advantage over small
companies
Software licensing costs Comparable due to group Comparable
licenses
Cost of business expertise Inherent advantage
Cost of technical expertise Inherent advantage
Cost to shareholders (the Inherent advantage
need to generate a proﬁt)
Research and development Inherent advantage
costs
Marketing costs Inherent advantage
Opportunity costs Inherent advantage
Transaction costs Inherent advantage
Contractual Issues
Any decision to outsource will generally result in a contract been drawn
up between the organization and the vendor. One of the biggest mistakes
companies make is signing suppliers’ standard contracts. Such contracts
usually contain details that not even a company’s legal staﬀ can always
understand, especially if the company is outsourcing a technology with
which it is not familiar. Interestingly, research indicates that, when com-
panies decided to outsource, detailed contracts were more likely to be
successful than relational contracts.50 Should it ever come to a dispute,
only three things matter: the contract, the contract and the contract!
Another way to maintain control over outsourcing arrangements is to
split an IT operation between two or more suppliers, thus establishing a
threat of competition. According to Lacity and Hirschheim,51 most of the
companies that outsourced emerging technologies experienced disastrous
results because they lacked the expertise to negotiate sound contracts and
evaluate suppliers’ performances. The diﬀerent contractual issues can be
categorized further:
. Length of contract. An organization should try whenever possible to
sign short-term contracts. Short-term contracts are desirable because
they ensure that the prices stipulated will not become out of step with
market prices. For economic reasons, companies often look to
contract for 10 years or more and to establish a strategic relationship
with the supplier. However, contracting for IT services for such a
length of time is very risky. As John Cross, IT Director at BP
Amoco, pointed out in 1999, ‘in the course of ﬁve years we experi-
enced two generations of technology.’
. Service deﬁnition. Services should be deﬁned in a relevant manner
according to their purpose and critical business factors. The
deﬁnition should include the aim and scope of the service and, if
applicable, any elements speciﬁc to the client’s organization. The
contract should include regular reviews of service deﬁnitions accord-
ing to changing business needs and technical imperatives.
. Service-level requirements speciﬁcations. Service-level requirements
and the performance metrics must be developed and expressed in
both business and technical terms wherever possible, to ensure
their relationship to business success factors is clear to both
parties. Targets or target ranges for each metric should also be
speciﬁed.
. Service-level measurement and veriﬁcation. In short-term transac-
tions, the client or a third party should carry out measurement,
veriﬁcation and reporting of the service-levels delivered. In long-
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term contracts, the vendor should also report the achievement of
service level targets. In either case, the client must also institutiona-
lize periodic or contingent review and veriﬁcation procedures.
. Incentives for service-level attainment. The purpose here is to set up
the necessary positive and negative incentive systems that ensure that
performance targets are met. Long-term relationships between client
and vendor are characterized by stronger reputation eﬀects, which is
in itself an eﬀective incentive mechanism for the vendor. Positive,
reward-based incentives can be employed when the target is
volatile (indeterminate in advance) or when it is hard to achieve.
Deterrent incentives and penalties can be employed when the
service is critical to the business or when the target is easy to
achieve. The conditions for extreme situations such as termination
and/or change of vendor should also be clearly speciﬁed.
. Coordination and communication mechanisms. A steering committee
and/or review board should be set up. This should comprise member-
ship from both parties for top-level direction and corrective adjust-
ments to the relationship and the contract. The information collected
through monitoring and measurement must be fed to the decision-
making bodies for continuous review of performance and to set
relevant targets for improvement. It may be advisable to involve
an independent third party in the review board to advise or even
arbitrate where problems arise, or, perhaps more importantly, to
pre-empt disputes.
In negotiating any contract, a negotiating team should be formed,
headed by the top IT executive, and include a variety of specialists.
The negotiating team should include in-house technical experts, an
IT outsourcing consultant and a contract lawyer specializing in IT
who can detect hidden costs and clauses in contracts. Further, in
negotiating contracts, there are a number of lessons listed in
Table 11.5 that have been gleaned from the practical experience of
organizations.
Post-contract Management
During the lifetime of the contract, the following are important principles
to remember:
. Collect ﬁnes for non-compliance. Some companies see a vendor per-
formance shortfall as an opportunity to extract non-monetary
payback, extracting some free service on the side in lieu of penalty
charges. While such a compromise may be expedient, it sends the
wrong message to vendors and undermines the company’s position.
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. Don’t be afraid to confront the vendor. Many companies ﬁght hard to
win penalty provisions from vendors only to ﬁnd themselves averse
to levying charges or forcing a dispute of any kind. Indeed, conﬂict
avoidance is one of the most common scourges of outsourcing
relationships. Ultimately, the company itself is responsible for
user satisfaction; so, when a vendor doesn’t deliver, it’s a client’s
responsibility to let them know. And go to the top when necessary:
involving the senior management of the vendor is often the easiest
way to resolve disputes that can otherwise become bogged down in
‘technical’ arguments.
APPLICATIONS SERVICE PROVIDERS
The convergence of software and IT infrastructure to an Internet-centric
environment has enabled the application service provider (ASP) concept
to emerge. In its simplest form, an ASP is a third-party service ﬁrm that
deploys, manages and remotely hosts a pre-packaged software applica-
tion through centrally-located servers in a ‘rental’ or lease arrangement.
In exchange for accessing the application, the client renders rental-like
payments (see Figure 11.12). An early example of an ASP is Hotmail
(www.hotmail.com), which provides an email address, with storage and
access from any web browser. Individuals with a Hotmail account can
access their email and send email from any location as long as they are
connected to the Internet. Software is evolving from custom-coded, pro-
prietary applications to pre-packaged or oﬀ-the-shelf applications and
now to the development of net-centric applications.
No matter how the ASP is structured, the ultimate objective is a
‘seamless’ service, in which the client interacts only with the ASP. The
most signiﬁcant elements of a ‘seamless’ integration of services include
providing the hardware and software, integration and testing, a secure
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Table 11.5 Lessons gleaned from practical experience of organizations
. Discard the vendor’s standard contract
. Do not sign incomplete contracts
. Measure everything during the baseline period
. Specify escalation procedures
. Beware of ‘change of character’ clauses
. Include cash penalties for non-performance
. Include a termination clause
. Take care of your people post-contract
network infrastructure, reliable mission-critical data centre facilities and
a highly qualiﬁed team of IT experts managing the entire solution. The
primary categories of services ASPs are providing to date are:
. Applications provisioning—essentially providing an information-
handling capability, either through proprietary applications such as
property management, specialized health-care patient record keeping
or analytical/mathematical services or widely-used software packages
from the leading ERP and CRM vendors.
. Infrastructure operations can include provisioning the customer’s
desktop environment, as well as operating data centres to host the
applications. Data centre operations include the full range of
hardware/systems software management, security and disaster
recovery as well as the necessary back-oﬃce systems such as service
usage, monitoring, accounting and billing.
. Network connectivity—providing connections to the Internet for end-
customers or the application provider (essentially acting like an ISP).
Reliability, performance and security of network communications
are potentially weak links in the chain.
. Supporting services—providing hardware installation and mainten-
ance services at customer sites or end-to-end management services
for all aspects of implementation and operations across the entire
ASP delivery chain for the duration of the ASP contract.
Currently, ASPs are primarily targeted at small or medium-sized enter-
prises (SMEs) that cannot aﬀord their own IS functions or computing
infrastructures. They provide a fully functioning, ‘big-time application’
(e.g. such as enterprise resource planning software), accessed via the
Internet or a private network without having to pay for the installation,
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Figure 11.12 Schematic of application service provider
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the hardware or the software. Price per user per month (PUPM) has
emerged as the standard pricing method for ASP services. The roots of
this model stem directly from user-based license pricing for applications.
As with user-based applications pricing, the PUPM model allows ASPs
to manage pricing based on number of users as well as by categories of
users. User categories include designations such as ‘power user’ or
‘inquiry or casual user’, which refer to access privileges and functionality.
In the future, we are likely to see transaction-based pricing such as billing
(price per invoice), e-commerce (price per purchase) and e-marketplaces
(price per item bought or sold). The future beneﬁts of the ASP model are
seen as:
. Reducing ‘costs of ownership’. Although costs and service levels vary
widely according to the types of application service provided, studies
have indicated that, by renting an application from an ASP, a
company can save between 30% and 60% over purchasing and
managing the hardware and software for the application themselves.
. Providing more predictable costs with less ﬁnancial risk. Pay-as-you-
go pricing takes the economic burden of buying software and atten-
dant hardware and transfers it to the ASP.
. Flexibility to exit or radically change operating scale. ASP contacts
are typically one year with minimal or no exit fees. Many ASPs
represent multiple software package vendors, and clients are gener-
ally free to add or change services as needed.
. Quicker deployment of new applications and IT capabilities. There
can be a signiﬁcant reduction in the overall cycle time to put a new
information system into productive operation.
. Signiﬁcant reduction in technology complexity. Buying software has
always meant having to buy at once all the technology necessary to
support it—networks, hardware, support software. ASP’s remove
that complexity from the equation—theoretically, at least—by pro-
viding all the supporting technology themselves. The organization
buys a business service rather than a software application and all
that goes with it.52
The ASP model is relatively new and unproven, and the initial forecasts
of its impact as with e-business and e-marketplaces have proven over-
optimistic, mainly because the economics of the model are dependent on
customer volumes. At this stage, customers seem wary of making use of
ASPs either due to the, as yet, few proven advantages as well as a lack of
clarity as to the value-added of ASPs and their diﬀering service oﬀers. In
selecting an ASP, the checklist in Table 11.6 should be used to clarify
what is or is not oﬀered.53
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Scott McNealy, CEO of Sun Microsystems, is typical of the enthusiasts
in the industry who are promoting the ASP service model: ‘Five years
from now, if you’re a CIO with a head for business, you won’t be buying
computers anymore. You won’t buy software either. You’ll rent all your
resources from a service provider.’54 In 2002, the customers remain to be
convinced, but much can happen in ﬁve years in the IT world.
SUMMARY
This chapter has attempted to describe strategies for managing technol-
ogy in line with previous strategic approaches to resourcing, information
and applications. As such, it has dealt with the strategic issues that need
to be managed, issues associated with acquisition, sourcing and applica-
tion of technology and related services rather than by the speciﬁc
problems of deploying certain types of technology. The key issues tend
to be similar across technologies and have to be considered as part of the
overall strategic IS/IT management process and understood by those who
are not intimately familiar with any particular technology. Technology
strategy should never become the exclusive domain of technologists,
although obviously their input to the general management process is
very valuable and must be able to be incorporated eﬀectively. Four
points are worth reiterating in summary:
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Table 11.6 Checklist for selecting ASP
. Failsafe back-up servers to ensure 24 × 7 × 365 application uptime
. Automatic load balancing to ensure accessibility
. Functional access limited by highly conﬁgurable application-level security
. Automatic oﬀ-line data back-up scheduling
. Service level agreements (SLAs) to ensure performance levels are maintained
. Secure Internet access to application servers, via VPN (virtual private
network), etc.
. Support for non-public electronic transaction transmissions like EDI
. System set-up function templates to speed implementation
. Simple sign-up to make adding new users easy
. User statistics logs showing user activity by application
. Automatic data upload/download from applications
. Email delivery of user alerts, application reports, etc.
. Online FAQs (frequently asked questions), manuals, training courses
. Online support via email, self-service helpdesks, real-time Internet chat
1. The theme of the technology strategy should always reﬂect how it can
be deployed to add value to the business. Future business success will
occur because today’s technology is well used and managed. No
sensible organization will assume that future technology will
resolve current problems in due course—it is more likely to exacer-
bate them.
2. The organization must be aware of how technology is being deployed
and for what purpose by others in the industry, and even in other
industries. The inﬂuence of what others—customers, suppliers and
competitors—are doing and the technology they are using will
become a signiﬁcant factor in determining strategic technology
options in the future, especially for ﬁrms that cannot easily adopt
a leading role in their environment. A responsive ‘following’ strategy
can be very successful, but it requires accurate monitoring of devel-
opments elsewhere. Even then, there is a considerable organizational
learning process to manage.
3. It is in the technology that an organization is vulnerable to undue
outside pressure from IT suppliers, whose interests will not always
coincide with those of the business. That is only to be expected, but it
means that the organization must adopt a coherent procurement
approach, as it would with any set of critical suppliers. As such, it
should also exploit the knowledge and resources of those vendors
who are also supplying many other organizations, even some in the
same industry. Almost every IT vendor will claim to be providing
‘business solutions’. It is important to ﬁnd out how eﬀective those
‘solutions’ are elsewhere and, in particular, how they are aﬀecting the
industry. The organization would be unwise to rely exclusively on its
own judgement of particular technologies without a broader under-
standing of the business context in which they are being deployed.
Many companies ignore this and are led up many blind alleys. Estab-
lishing mutually-beneﬁcial business partnerships with a number of
key IT suppliers can be very important, provided the management of
the business remains in the driving seat!
4. The approach, role and skills of the IT specialist need to change, as
the role of technology becomes increasingly ubiquitous and its
control becomes ever more decentralized, for example, to:
. demonstrate business acumen and think creatively about how
technology could add new dimensions to the competitive
success of the business as well as deliver performance improve-
ments across many business and organizational activities;
. make sure the infrastructure supports responsiveness and ﬂex-
ibility, and investment in its development not only delivers best
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value from the sourcing options available but is aligned with the
long-term strategic intentions of the business;
. evolve the infrastructure so that it supports a wider range of e-
business based activities, both internal (e.g. knowledge manage-
ment) and external (e.g. e-commerce);
. obtain understanding and commitment from business managers
to the increasingly critical role that IT infrastructure fulﬁls in the
organization and develop a coherent investment plan with a clear
rationale that is understood and supported by business
managers.
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Strategic Planning for
Information Systems:
Quo Vadis?
By now, it should be clear that information technology (IT) has today
assumed great prominence in most organizations. Thanks primarily to
the hype that has accompanied the Internet, particularly that surround-
ing e-commerce and the dot.com phenomenon, IT has become an im-
portant item on the agenda of senior business management. Following
the run-up to the millennium, which was dominated by investment to
deal with the ‘Y2K’ problem, a combination of latent demand and
Internet-based opportunism resulted in a very signiﬁcant increase in
spending on IT as management bought into anything with the ‘e’ label.
However, for many organizations, the economic returns from this
spending have not been forthcoming. The recent McKinsey1 study of
IT and productivity noted that ‘contrary to conventional wisdom, wide-
spread application of IT was not the most important cause of the post-
1995 productivity acceleration.’ The report went on to note that ‘where
IT did play a role, it was often a necessary but not suﬃcient enabler of
productivity gains. Business process changes were also necessary to reap
the full productivity beneﬁts . . .’ Clearly, technology on its own, no
matter how leading edge, is not enough, which may seem an obvious
statement to make, but this lesson has yet to ﬁlter through to many
management teams. There is now a danger in some organizations that
IT may lose its position on the management agenda as it is seen, yet
again, as having failed to deliver on its promise.
Rangan and Adner2 diagnosed this prevailing situation when they
noted, ‘while the powerful technology of the Internet opens the way to
new opportunities (new markets, new customers, new products and new
ways of doing business), it carries in its wake the threat that the pursuit of
opportunity will be driven by what is technologically feasible, rather than
what is strategically desirable.’ This, unfortunately, is often what has
been occurring and lies behind many of the problems that organizations
have been experiencing regarding their IS/IT investments. Buying tech-
nology solves no problems; in fact, it tends to create more. It does enable
new opportunities; but those opportunities can only be realized from its
business application within a strategic context.
The high-proﬁle failure of online sports and fashion retailer boo.com is
illustrative of the ‘irrational exuberance’ that surrounded IT investment
in the late 1990s. As The Economist observed at that time, ‘boo.com went
bust not because it was a dot.com, but because it was a badly run
business. Its management was inexperienced, over ambitious, guilty of
serial execution errors and uninterested in controlling costs. On-line or
oﬀ-line, that is a rap list long enough to sink most ﬁrms.’3 So, despite
using some very sophisticated technology, boo.com failed for fundamen-
tal business and management reasons.
While business imperatives must dominate most decisions regarding
IS/IT, there is one constant that ensures that organizations will never
remain static: that is change. No matter whether the economy is shrink-
ing or growing, and regardless of industry sector, organizations will
always be under pressure to change. For many years, it was enough for
IS/IT investment to keep up with business change and for the IS function
to provide eﬀective support services to the business. In the mid-1980s, the
strategic information systems era arrived with the emergence of the use of
IT for competitive advantage. Yet, nearly 20 years later, competitive
advantage from the use of IT has proved elusive for most organizations.
The majority, however, through lack of IS/IT investment, are at a com-
petitive disadvantage. As we have illustrated throughout this book, the
roles of IS/IT, the IS function and the CIO have also changed signiﬁ-
cantly during this time. The IS function and the CIO must not only keep
up with business strategy but are increasingly expected to inform, and
even drive, strategic thinking.
In this book, we have shown that the conventional view that business
strategy drives IS strategy, which in turn drives IT strategy, is not suﬃ-
cient for this expanding role of IS/IT. Such a perspective eﬀectively
ensures that IS/IT investment will always lag behind business strategy.
It can also limit strategic options by denying senior managers insight into
either the opportunities oﬀered by new technology or the reality of what
IS/IT can actually deliver. If IS/IT is to make a genuine contribution to
business strategy, a diﬀerent model and logic is required that allows the
capabilities of IS/IT to be an intrinsic component of strategy rather than
one of its consequences. While we have presented an approach and tool
kit for IS strategy development and emphasized that it is a continuous
process, there is still a danger that it is seen as a once-oﬀ activity and that,
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once completed, senior managers can get on with their ‘real’ jobs. In
addition, the approach presented also shows how organizations can
seek out opportunities for IS/IT—a strategic information systems era
perspective. Even with well-thought-out IS/IT strategies, we have seen
organizations fail to deliver business beneﬁts. The strategic management
of IS/IT must therefore be expanded. Our research is pointing us toward
the emergence of a fourth era in the evolution of IS/IT in organizations.
But, before elaborating on this emerging new era, a resume of some of the
key ideas from the earlier chapters follow—to summarize the situation
today. It also considers what has happened in the past six years, since the
second edition of the book, and how these developments have aﬀected
the IS/IT strategy ﬁeld.
A BRIEF RESUME OF SOME KEY IDEAS
As a signiﬁcant organizational activity, strategic planning for IS/IT is
now 20 years old. Whatever processes are being successfully developed
and adopted today have to be considered against the backdrop of an
erratic evolution of IS/IT in most organizations, the increasing business
pressures faced by organizations, and the opportunities and constraints
presented by the technology and our understanding of how to use it.4 All
these are changing faster than ever before, hence the IS strategy process
and management approaches need to evolve and respond to a more
challenging environment and organizations need to learn from experience
how best to develop an IS/IT strategy and execute the plans. Carrying out
IS/IT strategic studies can help reorientate the IS/IT strategy process in
many organizations, but, as has been said already, IS/IT strategy for-
mulation and planning is an ongoing process, not an event, and repeated
studies do not oﬀer a smooth path to success.
Comparing the development of IS strategies to the development of
business strategies oﬀers some insight. Tools and techniques of business
strategy are continuing to develop and processes are changing—especially
in devolving to and involving more of the business expertise and knowl-
edge that is spread throughout the organization. At the current stage of
IS/IT development, organizations still have to think explicitly and overtly
about IS strategy, and, for all the understanding of the need for integra-
tion with the business strategy, it seems it may still be some time before it
becomes intuitively included in day-to-day strategic thinking. The IS/IT
strategy process must continue to evolve to become a natural part of
business strategic management both in concept and in practice. This
needs to happen soon, given that, in most industrial, commercial and
public sector environments, IS/IT is steadily but surely changing the
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products and services, trading structures and relationships of ﬁrms in
many industries, and the nature of business activities, organizational
structures and how people work.
During the 1990s, theories of business strategy and competitive advan-
tage also evolved. As described earlier in the book, resource-based
theory, when compared with previous theories, perhaps oﬀers a better
explanation of why some organizations achieve and sustain advantage
over an extended period. This is of particular relevance to the role of IS/
IT, given that it is an increasingly signiﬁcant business resource, available
to more and more organizations as technology economics improve.
Throughout this edition, the basic tenets of resource-based theory (as
well as research ﬁndings from others who have explored its relevance
to the subject) have been referred to in order to explain, where
possible, why the strategic management of IS/IT is more successful in
some organizations than others. The latter part of the chapter returns to
this theme when the future of IS/IT strategies is considered.
It is unrealistic to attempt to summarize all the contents of the 11
preceding chapters. However, there are some basic ideas or models that
are core concepts in any approach to IS/IT strategy formulation and
planning. Foremost is its relationship with the business environment
and business strategic management. As Figure 12.1 shows, there are
ﬁve key relationships, as described in Chapter 1, and can be summarized
as follows:
a. technology can support the strategy of an organization (alignment of
business and IS/IT strategies);
b. technology can also deﬁne the business, shaping the business strategy
(competitive impact of technology);
c. competitor moves inﬂuence and aﬀect the organization and the
markets in which it competes;
d. strategic plays made by the organization inﬂuence the market and
competitor moves;
e. technological innovations can have a disruptive impact on industries,
often redeﬁning the boundaries of traditional industries.
Understanding the implications and achieving the appropriate impact
is obviously a complex and diﬃcult process due to the need to react
quickly to a range of changing circumstances, and to plan ahead to
actually obtain and implement the applications and supporting infra-
structures. Organizations have limited resources and the key to eﬀective
strategy is deploying them on the activities that deliver most value to the
organization.
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In order to enable an ongoing IS/IT strategy process that allows
for evolving circumstances, the main inputs—the external and internal
business and external and internal IS/IT environments—have to be
reviewed continually. The importance and implications of each have
been discussed in Chapter 3. The eventual result of the assessment and
analysis of these is the application portfolio required or possessed at any
point in time by the business. That portfolio of business applications and
its supporting information and IT infrastructure will be contributing
more or less successfully to the business in relation to its environment
and its strategy. This implies that applications should be managed ac-
cording to their value or contribution to the business. One important
feature of the portfolio approach is that it allows for the products of
both ‘top-down’, formal strategic analysis and creative, informal strategic
thinking. By managing the whole portfolio in relation to the way the
contributions of applications can change (a life-cycle view), the best
aspects of formal and informal planning are blended together. In
practice, this reconciles the views of those who argue the merits of
strategy ‘formulation’ (by analysis) or strategy ‘formation’ (by
emerging synthesis).
Any IS/IT strategy process must be capable of rapid and partial
reuse to interpret changes in any of the inputs and adapt the strategy
appropriately. This implies a framework for quick and accurate inter-
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Figure 12.1 The inﬂuence and impact
pretation, in IS application terms, of changes in the environment. The
framework is eﬀectively the ‘logical’ steps in the strategy process whereby
techniques can be adopted and applied in a coherent yet focused way.
Following discussion in Chapters 4 and 5 of the various techniques—
derived from IS/IT and business strategy formulation and planning
approaches—such a framework is described in Chapter 6.
The portfolio merely represents a target for the business, how it can be
delivered needs to be expressed in more detail, in terms of the develop-
ment and beneﬁcial operation of applications, and the provision of re-
sources and technology. Without doubt, the most important and hence
challenging area of the portfolio for business management is the strategic
quadrant. The nature of strategic information systems was described in
Chapter 1, where the new management challenges involved in these
applications were outlined. Strategic applications involve changing the
way business is conducted, either externally or internally, and conse-
quently require a degree of involvement by senior management not
traditionally expected and not easily made possible. How the organiza-
tion chooses to organize and govern the IS activities and how roles and
responsibilities are allocated will have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on whether or
not it can devise and achieve the optimum set of applications, as dis-
cussed in Chapter 8.
The other major components of IS/IT strategies, each of which has to
be managed eﬀectively within the overall strategy, were considered in
more detail in the latter part of the book. These components, the 3i’s—
investment, information and infrastructure—were each considered within
the overall concepts of the portfolio. High-level, ‘generic’, IS/IT
application management strategies were described in Chapter 7; they
provide the guiding principles that lead to consistent decision making
and relevant ways of managing each of the 3i’s above, once more regard-
ing the existing or intended contribution to the business. These imple-
mentation ‘strategies’ can be related sensibly to the diﬀerent approaches
to planning that are likely to deﬁne the need for applications (see Figure
7.6). This suggests a natural alignment between the means by which
decisions are made on what is required and how best to satisfy the
requirement.
Any IS/IT strategy will be the result of many compromises. The issues
that aﬀect where and how those compromises should be made will change
due to external, as well as internal, factors and the processes of IS/IT
strategic management must ensure that the net eﬀect of these compro-
mises is not detrimental to the business strategy. As organizations
become more dependent on IS/IT for business success and development,
the compromises will be made less and less due to supply-side issues,
although the problem of compromising the long-term plans to satisfy
586 Strategic Planning for Information Systems: Quo Vadis?
short-term business issues will remain. The decisions are business deci-
sions and the strategy should provide at least the basis of understanding
the implications and guidance as to the best trade-oﬀ.
IS STRATEGY FORMULATION AND PLANNING IN
THE 1990s
If the 1980s were characterized by the emergence of desktop computing
and the acceptance that IS/IT could deliver competitive advantage, the
1990s could be characterized by:
. An emphasis on alignment between IS/IT and business management
across a number of dimensions, as described by Venkatraman and
others, in order to balance the inﬂuence of IS/IT on business devel-
opment with the need to deploy IS/IT to improve performance. The
inﬂuential Venkatraman and Henderson alignment model, described
in Chapter 1 (Figure 1.8), is reproduced again as Figure 12.2.
. The rapid increases in connectivity available through IT at all
levels—global, industry, interorganization and within organizations
and between people—has made providing, accessing and exchanging
information easier or cheaper than ever before, opening up new
options for every organization and creating opportunities for com-
pletely new organizations to enter industries and provide new infor-
mation-based products and services. Although many had ﬂawed
business models or little competency outside building web applica-
tions, the dot.coms created an enormous awareness of the potential
Figure 12.2 The strategic alignment model
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of IT (or ‘e’) among business managers. As we write, business-to-
business (B2B) e-marketplaces or e-hubs are having less actual
impact than pundits predicted in 2000, mainly because the forecasts
were quite ridiculous, but also because the potential improvements to
industry performance take time to be understood, in addition to the
not insigniﬁcant time required to implement new processes and
systems among trading partners and assimilate the changes.
. Equally, rapid developments in the IT ‘supply chain’ are enabling
more and more of an organization’s requirements for IS/IT to be
sourced from external suppliers. Increasing the options available is
only an advantage if the organization knows what it is trying to
achieve and why, otherwise how it does it will be a constraint to its
strategy, whether its IS/IT requirements are sourced internally or
externally. Smart sourcing is easy to prescribe, but not that easy to
achieve successfully, as discussed in the previous chapter.
. The widespread implementation of business re-engineering initiatives
in organizations recognized that, potentially, more beneﬁts from IS/
IT investment would emerge through the redesign of processes to
make use of the capabilities provided by technology, compared
with simply deploying IT to improve existing processes.
During the 1990s, some writers expressed scepticism about the value or
even the feasibility of producing strategic IS plans in the increasingly
dynamic IT and business environment. Much of that scepticism was
based on the apparent lack of success in many organizations of imple-
menting the strategies they had developed. However, the reasons for this
‘failure’ could be due to three factors:
1. the appropriateness of the IS/IT strategy formulation and planning
process given the particular circumstances of the organization;
2. the feasibility of achieving the objectives of the IS/IT strategy
process;
3. the relevance of the output from the process to the business situation.
It is the last of these that can be observed and described in terms of
success and failure, but it is wholly dependent on the other two factors,
which is where the problems usually lie. The quality of the output will
only improve if expectations are based on achieving a realistic IS strategy
from an appropriate process. The real need is to manage IS/IT strategic-
ally over an extended period, ensuring that IS/IT delivers the maximum
possible beneﬁt to the business. IS/IT strategy formulation and planning
is only one component of strategic management. It would seem unwise to
suggest that IS/IT strategy formulation and planning is not valuable,
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based on the often overambitious objectives set and the inappropriate
processes that many of the organizations have employed. Earl’s work, in
particular, demonstrates the need for an ‘organizational’ approach to IS
strategy formulation and planning in the complex environment of today.
The research evidence available shows that only a minority of organiza-
tions appear to have adopted an adequately ‘organizational’ approach to
IS strategy.
It has also been argued that the IS strategy process has not kept pace
with the impact, complexity or expectations of information systems and
technology. Some have likened the early ‘formulative’ IS planning
methods to ‘structured methods’ for IS development and they suﬀer
from similar limitations. Fink,5 Ciborra,6 Checkland7 and others
suggest that, just as ‘soft systems’ methods oﬀer a more ‘organization-
friendly’ counterbalance to structured methods, an equivalent ‘softer’,
iterative organization-wide ability to think and learn about the impact
of IS/IT is needed to complement more technique-based planning pro-
cesses. The issues of IS strategy development, as discussed earlier, can be
separated into impact and alignment aspects. Since many of the impact
issues will need more dispersed, organic and iterative processes for assess-
ment, this also has implications for improving the alignment of IS/IT
strategies, both in their development and their implementation.
When the second edition of the book was published in 1996, the ﬁnal
chapter attempted to predict how IS/IT strategic planning might develop
in the coming years. In particular, two emerging themes were explored:
. organizational development based on IS/IT;
. industry development based on IS/IT.
While these have proved to be important to many organizations, the
detailed evolution has not perhaps followed the predicted path. Some
further implications of these still-evolving aspects of the role and
impact of IS/IT are considered below.
ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT BASED ON IS/IT
Perhaps the predictions of Drucker,8 embodied in a quotation from his
thought-provoking article, are, to some degree, occurring in almost every
organization. He wrote: ‘we are entering a period of change—a shift from
the command and control organisation, to the information-based organisa-
tion—the organisation of knowledge specialists . . . it is the management
challenge of the future.’
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The downsizing and delayering that has occurred during the past
decade has changed the nature of organizational structures, with an
emphasis on matrix or ‘team-based’ structures in the deliberate intent
of both achieving ‘more with less’ and changing the way the business is
operated and managed. Whether this can be said to be based around the
‘organization of knowledge specialists’ is less clear; however, these
changes have in turn produced signiﬁcant eﬀects on the way IS/IT is
used and managed.
In parallel with these changes to structure, brought about primarily by
economic and competitive pressures, many of the forecast implications of
the changes in the economics and capabilities of IT put forward by
Zuboﬀ 9 and others have also occurred. Zuboﬀ talked about ‘informat-
ing’ the workforce, whereby job scope is extended due to the information
available to the clerical and professional staﬀ, ‘empowering’ them to
make more decisions without the need for functional separation and
control of activities. This again leads to team-based structures rather
than hierarchical ones. The combination of an infrastructure of
powerful workstations on every desk, now also in most briefcases and
homes, and mobile personal digital assistants (PDAs), linked through
web-based networks—both ﬁxed and wireless—in addition to advances
in software functionality and ease of use, have made new ways of
working possible. They are not, however, always to the beneﬁt of the
individual who is now able to stay connected to his or her work 24 hours
a day, leading inevitably to organizational expectations of staﬀ working
longer hours.
Handy10 considered the whole subject of how future organizations will
be ‘structured’, if at all! Like others, he suggested that ‘intellectual
capital’ is the critical strategic resource of many organizations in achiev-
ing advantages.11 The technology employed in systems of information
and knowledge management will be the key enablers to release this new
‘capital’. He correctly predicted that IT would change what people do,
where and how they do it and the organizations they do it for or in! IT,
combined with social changes, changing demographics and the economic
consequences, will mean that organizations will have to use information
systems and organizational knowledge better, not only to remain com-
petitive but also to be able to obtain and keep highly skilled staﬀ.
Both Handy and Drucker suggested how organizational structures will
continue to change, becoming ﬂatter, more federal and more ﬂexible,
comprising a management or professional critical core of people, a
largely subcontracted set of specialist skilled resources and a ﬂexible,
part-time distributed low-skilled workforce, all linked through IT-based
systems to plan, allocate and control the work to be done.
All this implies that businesses and organizations may be built around
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information structures rather than IS being used to make a business or
organization structure work more eﬀectively. It could therefore be argued
that ‘organizational design’ rather than ‘organizational ﬁt’ should be a
key consideration in IS/IT strategy.12 Strategies for dealing with the
organizational relationships, job and people issues will become more
important. In current IS/IT strategies, the potentially far-reaching
implications on organization structuring and job roles are only really
just being considered. However, many reorganizations of structures, ac-
tivities and the roles of individuals have destroyed information and
knowledge structures, and have meant that IS/IT investments are
prematurely obsolete and have to be replaced or simply decay into
uselessness.
Others suggest that reorganization is less feasible because of con-
straints imposed by systems (or even technology), which is at least a
realization that IS/IT and the organization are interrelated. Obviously,
IS/IT use can be made more responsive to organizational and personnel
changes by better design. However, in the future, management should
consider how it can develop the organization to exploit IS/IT before
making the changes. This will require a far better understanding of the
impact of IS/IT on organizational relationships, job roles, use of knowl-
edge, etc., which in time will provide new techniques of analysis to add to
the strategic tool kit. While organizations seem willing to invest large
sums in technology, they seem less willing to invest in educating and
training their staﬀ to use it eﬀectively.
While rapid advances in IT have enabled more and more types of
information (documents, images, voice, video, etc.) to be captured,
stored and processed and exchanged more eﬃciently and usefully, the
plethora of ways in which IT is employed could either reduce the
overall beneﬁt or even create signiﬁcant future business problems. A
word of warning was sounded in the conclusions of the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology’s ‘The Corporation of the 1990s’ research
program.13 Two of the conclusions were:
1. integration, both internally and with external partners, provides
the main opportunities for improving business eﬀectiveness
through IS;
2. information (asset) management will remain a major problem and
limit the rate at which business changes can be made.
This implies that major challenges remain for IS/IT strategy if maximum
organizational and business beneﬁt is to be obtained from IS/IT.
Managing the ‘information (and knowledge) assets’ of an organization
has emerged as an area of signiﬁcant concern, as discussed in Chapter 10.
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Industry Development Based on IS/IT
As early as 1987, Robinson and Stanton14 proposed a developmental
model of the increasing opportunities presented by what has become
known as e-commerce. They identiﬁed four main types of potential
beneﬁt:
1. process automation (e.g. exchange of orders, invoices, etc.);
2. boundary extension—integrating processes carried out among trading
partners and probably changing the way these processes are carried
out internally in each partner;
3. service enhancement—sharing more or diﬀerent types of information
with trading partners to improve the performance of the value chain;
4. product innovation—providing products and services that customers
require based on information.
We have, of course, seen all these opportunities extend to business-to-
consumer (B2C) relationships with the commercialization of the Internet.
The consequence of this is that organizations are now focused on
developing new relationships with both customers and suppliers; imple-
menting customer relationship management (CRM) systems being one
example of this trend. Rockart and Short15 suggested that ﬁve forces are
causing organizations to enter mutually-dependent relationships that—
without eﬀective support from IS/IT—will not always be successful. The
forces are:
. globalization—in terms of both markets and sources of supply;
. time to market—the ability to develop and deliver new products
quickly requires cooperation with suppliers and channels of distribu-
tion;
. risk management—in order to understand and share risks across
trading partners by sharing information about changing market
demand;
. service—being able to provide service excellence by bringing together
resources and knowledge to meet more demanding customer expecta-
tions;
. cost—carrying out essential value-adding processes at the lowest
cost, based on where in the industry the tasks can be carried out
most economically.
They argued that IT provides the essential ‘wiring together’, or connec-
tivity, of individuals and organizations to meet these demands. This
becomes ever more important as organizations focus on ‘core competen-
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cies’ and rely on others to provide the complementary resources and
services required. They also recognize that this ‘value chain integration’
of external information-based relationships requires internal changes and
a realignment to external-facing processes from functional structures.
This in turn requires a reorientation of internal systems and (from yet
another direction!) the need for systems to support team working—both
internal and in collaborative teams with people in other organizations.
All of this implies that a key role for the IS function is to establish the
infrastructure to make this possible, by working closely with their
counterparts in partner organizations.
Many of the predictions of Malone and colleagues16 regarding elec-
tronic marketplaces are turning into reality, albeit more slowly than
predicted. They argued that electronic markets will make fundamental
changes to how some ﬁrms conduct their business. They predicted that
ﬁrms would move away from vertical integration within the value chain
and toward specialization in one process within the value chain. Trading
exchanges between consumers and the ﬁrms in the chain, as well as
among those ﬁrms, have become more widespread and more eﬃcient,
reducing the potential economic advantages of the ﬁrm carrying out a
number of processes in the chain. The focus on organizational ‘core
competencies’ as a source of advantage also suggests a similar evolution
for perhaps diﬀerent reasons.
An obvious conclusion that can be drawn is that a key input to many
organizations’ business strategies should be the potential changes in
business relationships and market and industry structures that IS/IT
investments are creating. This increases the importance of including IS/
IT in the earliest stages of business strategic thinking, to understand the
potential impact. Given the relatively unpredictable way electronic
markets and electronic commerce have evolved to date, it becomes
even more important to have a process that enables new strategies to
emerge and be blended together with existing strategic intentions, as
described in Figure 3.2.
THE ORGANIZATIONAL COMPETENCIES TO MANAGE
IS/IT STRATEGICALLY
In previous editions of this book, a structural model of the relationships
among business, IS and IT strategies was at the core of the alignment
concerning what had to be done and how it could be done. That model
(see Figure 1.6) is still important, given that many organizations fail to
realize that the IS strategy is the essential link between business strategy
and the use of IT. However, it does not really represent the continuous
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nature of strategy formation and its implementation. As has been said
earlier, having strategies is not enough—the organization must be able to
deliver the beneﬁts those strategies predict, to all relevant stakeholders
and be able to adapt the strategies quickly and eﬀectively as circum-
stances change. This implies the existence of organizational competencies
that enable continuous interaction among the key components of strat-
egic management—establishing the strategic vision and direction,
planning and implementation. These are no longer sequential steps but,
particularly in the case of IS/IT, need to interact and be changed as
options or constraints emerge.
Based on our research, which, as described in Chapter 8, built on
the work of others who have studied information, systems and
technology-related competencies, a more appropriate model that repre-
sents the world of IS/IT strategy was described. That model is reproduced
in Figure 12.3.
This model illustrates the organizational competencies required for IS/
IT to make a sustained contribution toward strategic objectives and
continuously deliver value to the organization. The strategy competency
is the ability to identify and evaluate the implications of IT-based oppor-
tunities as integral parts of business strategy. Deﬁning the IS contribution
refers to the ability to translate business strategy into an IS strategy. This
includes the ability to plan process and systems changes in such a way
that they match business priorities. Deﬁning the IT capability involves
translating strategy into information architectures and IT infrastructures
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that will serve business needs eﬀectively over the long term. Exploitation
is the competency to maximize the business beneﬁts realized from IS/IT
investments through the eﬀective utilization of business information,
software applications and IT services. Delivering solutions is the organi-
zation’s capacity to develop, implement and operate IS/IT solutions for
the business that exploit the capabilities of available technologies.
Finally, the supply competency involves creating a resource capacity
and supply chain for maintaining business information, applications
and IT infrastructure.
The main purpose of the model as a strategic management tool is to
enable an organization to identify the reasons why it is more or less
successful in managing IS/IT. Those reasons are based on its ability or
otherwise to carry out, consistently well, each and all of the 26 IS com-
petencies described in Chapter 8. The view presented in this model
balances the need to have resources from both the IS function and the
rest of the business deployed in a way to both identify the best IS/IT
investments and gain the full beneﬁts from them. In today’s environment,
and we believe even more critically in the future, any organization that
does not possess the full range of competencies, in-house or provided by
proﬁcient external suppliers, will be seriously inhibited from gaining
many of the beneﬁts available from IS/IT.
While there has been much criticism of the ‘competencies’ of IS func-
tions and IS/IT professionals by many writers, other studies show that
merely improving the quality and calibre of IS/IT resources achieves little
if the organization is not capable of utilizing them eﬀectively. The
example quoted in Chapter 8 and depicted in Figure 8.12 is typical of
the situation found in many organizations.
In a recent survey,17 a cross-section of IT directors/CIOs and business
managers, from a range of industries, were asked to assess their organ-
izations’ actual level of performance of each area of IS/IT competency, in
relation to the level essential to achieve long-term sustained success.
While not generalizable, the results were unerringly consistent across
all the organizations in the survey. Only those competencies that 50%
or more respondents deemed inadequate are included in the list below,
with the top three being deemed inadequate by over 80%. Figure 12.4
shows the positioning of the areas of weakness on the competency
model:
1. business strategy—an inability to ensure that business strategy for-
mulation identiﬁes the most advantageous uses of information,
systems and technology;
2. beneﬁts delivery—an inability to monitor, measure and evaluate the
beneﬁts delivered from IS/IT investment and use;
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3. managing change—an inability to make the business and organiza-
tional changes required to maximize the beneﬁts without detrimental
impact on stakeholders.
4. information governance—an inability to deﬁne information manage-
ment policies for the organization and the roles and responsibilities
of general management and the IS function;
5. beneﬁts planning—an inability explicitly to identify and plan to
realize the beneﬁts from IS investments;
6. business performance improvement—an inability to identify the
knowledge and information needed to deliver strategic objectives
through improved management processes;
7. information asset management—an inability to establish and operate
processes that ensure data, information and knowledge-
management activities meet organizational needs and satisfy
corporate policies;
8. prioritization—an inability to ensure that the portfolio of investments
in applications and technology produces the maximum return from
the resources available.
It could be argued that these are the ‘eight imperatives’ for strategic IS
management in the same way that others have proposed ‘eight impera-
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Figure 12.4 Information systems ‘in competencies’
tives for the IS function’! It is not a coincidence that, in this book, large
sections of many chapters are devoted to approaches and techniques of
direct relevance to these particular eight competencies. Interestingly, all
the competencies in the framework under the heading ‘exploitation’ were
deemed to be inadequate (i.e. Beneﬁts Planning, Change Management
and Beneﬁts Delivery).
The respondents to this survey were predominately from the IS
function, thus giving an unbalanced view. However, having carried out
IS competency assessments in many organizations when business and IS
managers evaluated their situation together, the same eight areas of
relative ‘incompetency’ are consistently in the top ten.
Of course, there are interrelationships among both competencies and
incompetency. A lack of ability in one competency can produce inabilities
elsewhere, and it is important to identify these relationships. For
example, in a large bank, it was concluded from the analysis that the
inability to set and sustain priorities was the root cause of many apparent
inabilities elsewhere. No processes or mechanisms existed for agreeing
and setting priorities and the almost continuous reprioritization, and
the organizational conﬂict that resulted, undermined the overall
strategy and disrupted many major investment programs. In a travel
company that had ventured into selling on the Web via an almost in-
dependent Internet channel, it was concluded that serious problems in the
Information Asset Management competency, resulting in higher costs
across all retail channels, were preventing any net beneﬁts from the
new channel. Eventually, a reorganization was deemed the only way to
reintegrate information management both across all channels to market
and with core operational systems. In a telecommunications company, it
was agreed among business and IS/IT executives that incoherent
Information Governance was creating serious ambiguities in roles and
responsibilities across the business and IS function. In particular, respon-
sibility and accountability for beneﬁt delivery was seen by business
managers as the responsibility of the IS function—clearly something
they could not achieve. New governance mechanisms combined with
new investment management, beneﬁts planning and delivery processes
were introduced to achieve more appropriate, clearly-deﬁned roles and
responsibilities.
These are just a few examples of how an analysis of the level of IS/IT
competency or incompetency can identify key problem areas and be used
to instigate corrective action. Our conclusion is that organizational in-
ability to make eﬀective use of IS/IT and the associated resources is as
much a result of inadequate competencies in the business functions as the
calibre of the IS/IT resources it has available. Greater understanding of
the organizational causes of these inabilities, and how they can be
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remedied, is an aspect of IS/IT strategic management that has only just
begun to be explored.
A BUSINESS CHANGE PERSPECTIVE OF IS/IT
A core observation from this discussion is that one way of thinking about
the strategic potential of IS/IT is to view it as requiring IS competencies
that can be leveraged to deliver strategic business initiatives. From this
perspective, the strategic contribution of IS/IT will emerge from senior
management’s awareness of how diﬀerent IS competencies in the organ-
ization can be exploited to satisfy market needs and how the IS compe-
tencies themselves contribute to enabling new strategic initiatives.
Creating business awareness and understanding of IS competencies is
something that the IS function itself must learn to do. Recent research
conducted at the Information Systems Research Centre at Cranﬁeld
School of Management suggests that this understanding is best
achieved by viewing IS/IT in the context of integrated change projects,
where IS competencies are deployed alongside the other essential ingre-
dients of organizational change. This requirement to shift emphasis from
‘IT projects’ to ‘change projects’ and programs, if business beneﬁts are to
be forthcoming, is a recurring ﬁnding from our research.
The extent and calibre of an organization’s IS competencies will either
increase or limit its options for change from the use of IT. From this
perspective, the IS competencies deﬁne the organization’s ability to
identify and deliver successfully IS/IT-related changes, in relation to
the demand-side drivers that cause the changes the organization has
to make or wants to make (see Figure 12.5). ‘Incompetency’ in any
aspect of IS/IT management can severely impact an organization’s
ability to determine, make and assimilate IS/IT-enabled change. Devel-
oping a realistic strategy involves managing supply and demand so that
change initiatives work toward a common direction and competencies are
developed according to business requirements.
The ﬁrst part of this book addressed the issue of engagement in the
strategic ‘conversations’, and the latter part considers the development of
the competencies required to enable the results of those discussions to
bear fruit.
Matching the development and availability of IS competencies with the
business’s demands for change requires understanding of the underlying
philosophies of strategic decision making. Although the nature of strat-
egic decision making varies among organizations, there are some broad
similarities. In the Anglo-American business culture, strategic change has
tended to be target driven. Typically, this begins with a deﬁnition of
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desired outcomes—the ends—and then works backward to ﬁnd ways of
achieving them and to determine the competencies and resources required
(see Figure 12.6). This approach assumes that, regardless of the demands
made by strategic change projects, the business will be able to ﬁnd the
necessary ways and means to achieve them. When this proves impossible,
a change project will, at best, be only partially successful. The strong
focus on measures in relation to strategic objectives can also create
problems in the Anglo-American model. In particular, if the links
between objectives and measures are not entirely clear, people will
tend to focus on what is being measured, sometimes to the exclusion of
equally critical but hard-to-measure elements of the change project or
program.
The Japanese model of strategic change has traditionally been the
reverse of the Anglo-American version. Rather than working top-
down from a strategic plan or vision, strategy has been driven bottom-
up by identifying opportunities to exploit existing competencies and
resources—the means. Consensus is reached as to what is possible from
the existing resource base—Japanese manufacturing techniques are good
examples here. While this has proven eﬀective in outmanoeuvring com-
petitors over the short to medium term, the lack of long-term vision and
objectives created its own problems, as the stagnation of the Japanese
economy during the 1990s and into the 2000s demonstrates. Evolving
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Figure 12.5 Strategy as the management of change (*Shaping CIO Agendas in
an ‘E’ World, GartnerGroup, Stamfort, Connecticut, 2002))
competencies and resources on a tactical basis, without some form of
long-term direction, can prevent organizations from developing new
competencies required in a changing environment.
The European model diﬀers again. It is driven primarily by implemen-
tation—the ways—rather than objectives or available resources. The
focus on implementation as a way of reconciling means and ends
probably makes this model better suited to today’s environment of
rapid and unpredictable change related to either ends or means. As
business conditions change and new enablers of change emerge, the im-
plementation emphasis of the strategy process provides continual balanc-
ing of change capabilities and demands for change, while remaining
responsive to short-term opportunities.
IT is a key resource of today’s organizations—a key enabler of
change—as are the skills and competencies it has to use the technology.
The ways an organization chooses to deploy technology and the asso-
ciated resources (the means) are the strategies, which in turn will deter-
mine the results (or ends) the organization can achieve. It is suggested
that the focus of IS/IT strategic management should ﬁrst be on the ways
the organization can conduct its business using IS/IT and the ways IS/IT
can enable it to change—rather than business objectives or the capabil-
ities of IT. For example, customer relationship management (CRM)
software is a resource; how an organization decides to deploy the
software and change the ways it manages customer relationships will
determine what it can actually achieve.
IS Competencies and Organizational Dimensions
The diﬀerences between the three strategy philosophies show that eﬀec-
tive and workable strategy arises from a balanced understanding of ends,
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ways and means. The traditional Anglo-American model, however,
places most of its emphasis on the ends (i.e. business objectives). Far
less attention is paid to understanding the resources and competencies
available and the level of change that can be used to either eﬀect or
achieve. Understanding IS competencies and their potential contribution
to deﬁning and implementing strategic change can help, provided the
organizational reasons for the relative levels of competency can be
understood.
In addition to the six areas of competency described earlier, this model
shows ﬁve organizational dimensions that, from our research, aﬀect
either the development of a competency or its deployment. As illustrated
by the ﬁve ‘organizational ingredients’ in Figure 12.7, problems with any
of the competencies may be associated with leadership, structures and
processes, roles, relationships and behaviours—these aspects were intro-
duced in Chapter 8. An analysis of the inadequate IS competencies in
relation to these ﬁve factors can reveal causes of the lack of competency
in an organization and, consequently, what action can be taken to
overcome those weaknesses and improve the ability of the organization
to deliver a visible and signiﬁcant business contribution from IT-enabled
change programs. Again, from our experience in applying the assessment
technique in many organizations, inappropriate structures and processes
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Figure 12.7 Information systems competencies and the organizational
ingredients
and roles are most commonly the root cause of weaknesses, although
ineﬀective leadership is often not far behind. The other two dimen-
sions—issues in relationships and behaviours—are rarely the cause of
problems, but are often the visible eﬀects of problems elsewhere.
The IS/IT Contribution: Creating Business Value
Any organization ultimately makes investments in IS/IT to create value
for its stakeholders, whether they are shareholders, customers, employees
or others with a vested interest in sharing in its success. In the late 1980s
and early 1990s, studies reported a ‘productivity paradox’18 and fueled a
quest for economic analysis to determine whether links existed between
IT investment and productivity and IT investment and proﬁtability. A
signiﬁcant body of research has explored the relationship between IS/IT
investment and business performance—between the means and ends—
and the results have been diverse. At an industry level, results have been
inconclusive. At an organizational level, where the ﬁndings are more
meaningful for management, the results have illustrated the obvious:
some organizations have achieved beneﬁts from their investments,
while others failed to achieve much from their spend! Conducting this
type of research is fraught with diﬃculty, as it is a complex task to isolate
the IT variable and determine whether or not it actually contributed
directly to the outcome.
Even if a positive relationship between IT investment and performance
improvement can be demonstrated to provide the case for making an
investment, it gives little guidance regarding the value-creation process.
Indeed, it does caution against placing too much emphasis on investment
proposals that only deﬁne the expected return on investment. Whether
beneﬁts that justiﬁed the investment actually occur is less certain; an issue
that the Beneﬁts Management process introduced in Chapter 9 seeks to
resolve. Moreover, IT value does not occur at a point in time, but rather
unfolds over time through the eﬀective use of the applications and the
infrastructure.
Economic studies, although valuable in illustrating the apparent pay-
oﬀ or otherwise of IT, provide inadequate explanations of how IT value
is actually created—the ways. One thing is certain: business value is
derived from business change, whether through better processes,
improved products or services, access to markets, enhanced decision
making, greater eﬃciency or better resource utilization. More recent
research19 has suggested that investments in complementary assets (e.g.
management skills and user knowledge) are critical to delivering the
return on IT investment. Investments in other areas such as training,
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process redesign and change management programs enable the beneﬁts
from IS/IT to be obtained.
The most helpful theoretical model to date explaining the steps
involved in IS/IT value creation (i.e. linking IS/IT investment to
business performance) has been proposed by Soh and Markus.20 Illus-
trated in Figure 12.8, the model captures the major ingredients of the
recipe for transforming IS/IT investments into improved organizational
performance. The recipe suggests the necessary processes and the
sequence that leads to success: organizations spend on IS/IT and,
subject to varying degrees of eﬀectiveness during the management of
IS/IT, obtain IS/IT assets. ‘Quality IS/IT assets, if combined with the
process of appropriate use, then yield favourable impacts. Favourable
IS/IT impacts, if not adversely aﬀected during the competitive process,
lead to improved business performance.’
Most previous IS/IT strategy research has focused on the ﬁrst and last
parts of the model, essentially the means and ends. The middle process of
Figure 12.8, connecting IT assets to their impacts—the ways—is the least
well understood, particularly in areas such as deﬁning what constitutes
appropriate use, how use diﬀers depending on the type of IT investment
and the organizational competencies in using IT. These are essentially
implementation issues.
Establishing the value derived from IS/IT spend remains an enduring
question and one that has yet to be satisfactorily resolved. ‘Value for
money’ from IT has traditionally focused on the money spent, which is
relatively easy to calculate, rather than the value derived. There has been
considerable study of the ‘total cost of ownership’ of IT, but only recently
has the emphasis shifted to ‘total beneﬁts of ownership’. We have already
noted that organizations are spending an increasing percentage of their
IT budgets on IT services, rather than on traditional hardware and
software. However, calculating the business value derived from these
services still proves elusive. Further research is needed in this area if we
are to be able to understand and assess the ‘total beneﬁts of ownership’.
A FOURTH ERA: THE IS CAPABILITY
We believe that, as IS/IT assumes even greater signiﬁcance in every
organization’s day-to-day operations and its future strategy, the strategic
information systems era introduced in Chapter 1 is being superseded by
the requirement for a distinct IS capability. An IS capability was deﬁned
in Chapter 1 as the ability of an organization to deliver business value
from investments in IS/IT continuously and suggested that this is
now heralding the emergence of a new fourth era—what we call the IS
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capability era. It is not necessary for all investments made in IS/IT to
deliver business advantage—some may, others may just yield a good
return from the level of investment being made, improving the perform-
ance of ‘key operational’ and ‘support’ processes.
This IS capability goes beyond seeking alignment or searching out for
competitive opportunities from IS/IT. It is something that is built into the
very fabric of the organization to enable it continuously to identify,
obtain and sustain the beneﬁts available from astute IS/IT investment.
The closest analogy is perhaps the focus on quality that has become
ingrained in the activities of many manufacturing and service organiza-
tions; it is just not questioned and occurs automatically and is part of the
ethos of the company.
We saw in Chapter 1 that, while some organizations have managed to
gain advantage from IS/IT, very few have achieved it on a continuous
and ongoing basis. Technology is no longer proprietary and is ‘freely’
available in the open market to all ﬁrms competing against each other.
Competitors will soon catch up through imitation or even overtake the
organization either through a more innovative application or by deploy-
ing newer and cheaper technology for a similar purpose. There is now a
perpetual requirement to innovate with IS/IT to eﬀect change and to
adapt business processes and practices to respond to change created by
others.
By combining four views of how IS/IT contributes or otherwise to
organizational performance, we suggest that the concept of an IS cap-
ability can become more than just a conceptual concept. The character-
istics of an ‘excellent capability’ can be distinguished with a view to
understanding and assessing the IS capability in an organization and
ﬁnally, but not perhaps yet, deﬁning strategic development routes to
creating and improving this capability. The four views that we suggest
can be synthesized are:
. the process theory of how IT can be used to create business value;
. the IS competencies required to enable a distinctive capability;
. the ‘European’ strategic philosophy that the ways in which we choose
to manage and utilize IS/IT deﬁne what we can achieve and the
resources required;
. the resource-based theory of the ﬁrm (which was described earlier in
Chapters 1 and 2).
From our research, we see this capability as having three central dimen-
sions: fusing business knowledge with IS knowledge, a ﬂexible and
reusable IT platform, and an eﬀective use process (see Figure 12.9).
These three dimensions must be working in harmony. The capability in
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turn is underpinned by the IS competencies. These three dimensions are
discussed in more detail before examining the links between IS com-
petencies and the IS capability.
Fusing IS knowledge and business knowledge to ensure the conception
of strategies to utilize technological innovation, to seize opportunities
quickly and to implement these strategies successfully, including
managing change and making appropriate technology-sourcing deci-
sions. It also involves knowing the extent of change that the business is
capable of absorbing.
Managing IS/IT and delivering business beneﬁts is essentially a knowl-
edge-based activity. The management of IS is not one activity but a
complex and multidimensional set of tasks and processes, incorporating
many diﬀerent but interdependent aspects. It involves integrating and
coordinating knowledge from many diﬀerent individuals coming from
diﬀerent disciplines and backgrounds, with diﬀerent experiences and ex-
pectations, located in diﬀerent parts of the organization. This obviously
demands a close partnership between IS staﬀ and business staﬀ, each
bringing their own knowledge and experiences to bear.
Of course, the wider the knowledge base being integrated, the more
complex are the problems of creating and managing underpinning com-
petences. Grant21 believes that this integration is not possible without a
structure for organizational competencies. This structure does not corre-
spond with the organizational structure or hierarchy. Grant points out
that the uniqueness of an organization’s knowledge base makes it im-
possible to oﬀer a speciﬁc form of organization for exploiting knowledge.
However, organizations of diﬀering knowledge bases and diﬀerent struc-
tures can compete equally well.
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Figure 12.9 IS capability
In their research on outsourcing, Lacity et al.22 found that ‘numerous
companies consider outsourcing partly for the access to greater IT
knowledge it would bring.’ But the challenge such organizations face is
in integrating this knowledge with other internal resources, and perhaps
it is the inability to exploit this combined knowledge base that explains
why many organizations have experienced disappointing results from
their outsourcing decisions. Indeed, Scarbrough23 argues that outsourc-
ing decisions could be usefully viewed in terms of the organization of
knowledge. As noted earlier in the book, Earl24 suggests caution
regarding outsourcing when he noted that much learning about the
capability of IT is experiential, and that organizations tend to learn to
manage IS by doing, not appreciating the challenges until they have
experienced them.
A ﬂexible and reusable IT infrastructure provides the technical platform
and resources needed to have the ability to respond quickly to competitor
moves as well as the capacity to launch innovative IS applications
supporting new process designs or business initiatives. This infrastructure
is the technical ‘supply side’ component of the IS capability. Through the
deployment of knowledge and skill, some of which may be bought in, the
organization ‘creates’ an IT infrastructure that inﬂuences future options
and speed of response and has a degree of permanency attached to it. So,
if the senior IT management team of an organization changes for
example, the infrastructure that they may have been responsible for
shaping remains behind.
We have seen in Chapter 11 that the IT infrastructure provides the
shared foundation of the organization’s ability for building business
applications. While many software applications are built to serve one
speciﬁc business purpose, other applications and most hardware,
networks, operating systems and databases are designed to be shared
and to serve many business purposes. Yet, a major problem with IT
infrastructure is that it is usually not adequately planned for. The IS
function has generally been ‘obliged to grow its IT infrastructure clan-
destinely, by small increments hung on the shirt-tales of particular appli-
cations for which a direct beneﬁt can be demonstrated.’25 It is generally
accumulated rather than built to serve the business in times of change;
consequently, it is often fragmented and technically incompatible.
As also discussed in Chapter 11, the IT infrastructure only deﬁnes
the technological capability required to support the business and its
strategy, if it adequately addresses the need for ﬂexibility to deal with
changing business priorities. Indeed, one of the reasons organizations
often choose outsourcing is the belief that the vendor will provide them
with this ﬂexibility; research ﬁndings show that this may not always be
the case.26
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An eﬀective use process to link IS/IT assets with value realization,
through the application of the technology as well as creating an environ-
ment conducive to collecting, organizing and maintaining information,
together with embracing the right behaviours for working with in-
formation.27 The use process has two aspects: using the technology and
working with information.28
Technology by itself has no inherent value; this value must be
unlocked, a task that can only be achieved by people. While it might
seem somewhat superﬁcial to state, technology must be actually used
for beneﬁts to be delivered! This use takes place within business and
management processes. Exploitation of the technology by deploying it
to deliver business beneﬁts requires knowledge and skills. Some threshold
level of IS use must be achieved, before an impact can be observed, but,
beyond that level, more use does not necessarily lead to more or better
impacts.29
The use process is also concerned with information itself. We saw in
Chapter 10 that Davenport30 recommends organizations to place more
emphasis on ‘human-centred information management’ or ‘people-
centred management activities’ aimed at improving behaviours and
values for more eﬀective information use and at improving the way
people behave with information. This line of reasoning softens the temp-
tation of organizations to focus solely on technology implementation.
A MODEL LINKING THE IS CAPABILITY WITH IS
COMPETENCIES AND RESOURCES
From our work with a number of organizations, we have constructed a
model to represent the components of the IS capability. Illustrated in
Figure 12.10, the model has three levels: the resource level, the organizing
level and the business level. The resource level denotes the resource com-
ponents that are the key ingredients of the IS competencies. In managing
IS, resources are essentially people and their skills, knowledge and beha-
vioural attributes. The organizing level is concerned with how these
resources are mobilized and marshalled via structures, processes and
roles to create IS competencies. It is, however, only at the business level
that the capability actually manifests itself and is ultimately recognized in
superior organizational performance. All organizations have an IS cap-
ability. For some, however, it is weak and severely aﬀects that organiza-
tion’s ability to aﬀect or assimilate IS/IT-related strategic change. Those
with a strong IS capability can both leverage IS/IT-enabled change for
business advantage and also absorb change.
In order to illustrate the link between resources and the IS
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capability, we ﬁrst develop the relationship between resources and the IS
competencies.
From Resources to IS Competencies
In an organizational context, competencies are embedded in organiza-
tional processes31 and ‘business routines’32 and are bounded by the struc-
ture of the organization.33 The expression of a particular competency in
an organization depends on people applying their knowledge, integrating
their knowledge, interacting with others and coordinating their actions—
this they do by performing roles in processes. Consequently, people, as the
receptacles of knowledge, are central to a particular IS competency man-
ifesting itself, assuming that a conducive environment exists in the organ-
ization. Figure 12.11 illustrates that collective performance of IS/IT
competencies contributes to the expression of the IS capability, highlight-
ing that people, as resources, can contribute to a number of the IS/IT
competencies.
Processes
The perspective of a process presented in this book suggested that
viewing a process as ‘a set of activities’ has emerged out of manufacturing
industry and is a fairly rigid viewpoint of the concept and may not be
either appropriate or indeed applicable in all situations, particularly in
knowledge-oriented environments. In such contexts, we have argued that
it is more appropriate to view the concept of process in terms of roles, as
Figure 12.10 From resource to capability
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well as activities, with a process portrayed as ‘a collection of roles colla-
borating and interacting to achieve a particular goal.’ Such a view is of
particular relevance in complex tasks or processes, where bringing
together speciﬁc knowledge and skills is critical to the ability of the or-
ganization to perform the task.
Roles
The concept of roles and role theory is useful in understanding the be-
haviour of individuals in both groups and organizations. The history of
role theory dates to the 1930s, when sociologists and anthropologists
studied roles as a key to explaining the origins of social behaviour.34
Since then, role theory has emerged as a recognized discipline. Building
on the sociological roots of role theory, Graen35 developed a ‘role
systems model’ in which behaviour in a particular role is the result of
organizational demands, social demands and personal demands. Katz
and Kahn36 applied similar ideas to their organizational role theory,
which emphasizes organizational factors, interpersonal factors and attri-
butes of the person.
In an organization, an employee’s primary role is indicated by a
position title and speciﬁed by a ‘job description’. However, employees
are likely to have to perform diﬀerent roles at diﬀerent times. In order
that the organization can achieve its goals and objectives, the work of
individual members must be linked into a coherent pattern of activities
and relationships and this is achieved through the ‘role structure’ of the
organization.37 While roles can be tightly or loosely deﬁned and have
diﬀerent degrees of discretion associated with them, they do encompass
the expected behaviours attached to a position or job. Individuals may
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Figure 12.11 Resources and competencies
perform many roles, operate within a number of processes and conse-
quently contribute to many IS competencies.
Human resource management theorists describe a range of factors that
distinguish the ability38 of an individual to perform a particular role.39
These are:
. Skills—know how of the job, which implies the physical ability to
produce some action. This might be the ability to program in Java
or draw data ﬂow diagrams.
. Knowledge—know what of the job, the ability to understand what
the role demands of the person. For example, knowledge of what is
involved in constructing an IS strategy or in building relationships
with vendors.
. Behaviours and attitudes—know why of the job, the personal attri-
butes or aptitudes that make knowledge useful and enable skills to be
acquired in the ﬁrst place. Personal characteristics are important and
indeed may be crucial in service-oriented roles; for example, IS staﬀ
having empathy with users in delivering many IS services, particu-
larly those with a high degree of user contact.
Structures
Both processes and roles are framed by the organization structures.
Structure is traditionally seen as being concerned with the systematic
arrangement of people, departments and other subsystems in the organ-
ization. The structure of the organization can aﬀect the performance of
processes, particularly those that cross departmental or functional
boundaries. The concept of business process re-engineering emerged as
a consequence of the problems of functional organizations and called for
a greater focus on process in designing organizations. We have already
argued in Chapter 8 that resource elements of IS competencies are
not located solely in the IS function, but are spread throughout the
organization.
From IS Competencies to IS Capability
It is only at the business level that the IS capability actually manifests
itself, reﬂecting the organization’s ability to achieve sustained superior
performance through IS/IT. As has been argued above, this requires
fusing IS knowledge and business knowledge, establishing a robust and
ﬂexible technical platform and instituting an eﬀective use process.
The extent to which IS competencies contribute toward the IS
capability is dependent on two aspects: the strategy and investment
decisions. Both deﬁne whether the IS capability is a source of competitive
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advantage, a mere necessity for competitive parity or, indeed, whether it
is placing the organization at a competitive disadvantage. Although
having an IS capability is a business imperative today, diﬀerent organ-
izations may choose to resource it in diﬀerent ways, but almost all rely
on a combination of internal and external resources and even some
externally provided competencies.
Barney40 refers to competencies as organizational characteristics that
‘enable an organization to conceive, choose and implement strategies.’ A
ﬁrm could potentially identify an advantage by conceiving an innovative
strategy that depends on IT, but successfully implementing such a
strategy will be dependent on the current status of the IT infrastructure,
the organization’s ability to successfully deploy appropriate resources as
well as to implement and operate new processes and systems.
Similarly, succeeding with Enterprise Systems (ES) is not as dependent
on the technology and applications as much as it is on the organization’s
capacity to implement and manage change.41 As discussed in Chapter 11,
the ﬁrst implementation of an ES normally involves recognizing current
problems and constraints to progress that more integrated processes and
systems will eliminate. This will undoubtedly cause many existing IS
competencies to be reassessed and improved to enable the organization
to be operated and managed as an integrated whole, using information
and systems in new and quite diﬀerent ways. As the end of the stage, if
successful, the organization will have an improved business and IS cap-
ability that, through further changes in business practices in addition to
innovative extensions of its systems, can produce new strategic opportu-
nities. As outlined in Chapter 11, the evidence from research suggests
that, while the problems and constraints exist, it is very diﬃcult for
organizations to envisage the potential that an ES-based capability
provides.
From Capability to Improved Business Performance
An IS capability only delivers actual value through implementation, in
terms of the way it is used in improving business performance. Both the
intended improvement in performance and the way IS/IT delivers or
creates that improvement should be explicitly stated in the business and
IS strategies. Figure 12.12 illustrates how we see IS competencies ﬁtting
within an overall model of the organization and its performance. It illus-
trates the relationship between business strategy, IS/IT strategy, IT op-
erations and services, business operations and performance. This model
emphasizes that business performance ultimately derives from business
operations—the conﬁguration of people, processes, structure, manufac-
turing, etc.—not directly from IT, even though technology may be a core
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component without which business operations could not be performed
successfully.
Direction and purpose for business operations is given by the business
strategy, which, while shaping the IS/IT strategy in terms of deﬁning
requirements, is itself impacted by opportunities provided via IS/IT. As
we outlined in Chapter 1, the IS/IT strategy determines the what and how
of IS/IT, and provides the blueprint for IT operations and services.
The IS competencies impact all four areas of the model. They deter-
mine the extent to which IT opportunities are incorporated in business
strategy, the eﬀectiveness of business operations, how well the IT infra-
structure is designed and resourced, and the level of performance
achieved by IT operations and the quality of IT services.
A weakness in any area of IS competency aﬀects the overall IS cap-
ability and directly or indirectly impacts the business operations and
ultimately aﬀects business performance. We believe that the new IS align-
ment is concerned with how well the organization develops and utilizes its
IS competencies in each of the four areas of the model. This implementa-
tion-based view contrasts with the traditional view that just considers the
alignment of the business and IS/IT strategies or the structures and
processes of the IS function and activities in relation to the business
organization.
In a global reinsurance brokerage where we undertook research, the
eﬀectiveness of this new alignment was clearly evident. From our
analysis, all the company’s IS competencies were extremely strong
relative to what was required given its business strategy, even though
many of the resources and IT supply competencies were sourced exter-
Figure 12.12 The relationship between IS competencies and business per-
formance
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nally. The company has recognized the value of information and its
eﬀective management to its competitive success. The IT director is a
member of the Board of Directors and has a very strong partnership
with the group CEO. They regularly attend IT conferences together.
He is a key player in the business strategy decision-making process;
one colleague noted, ‘I think that he is forward-thinking enough to be
looking at new technologies and that he is brave enough to take the
decision to go with things,’ and this often means driving the business
strategy. A quote from its IS/IT strategy document best illustrates how
IS/IT is deployed in the company: ‘Information systems cannot aﬀord to
wait for a clear and detailed speciﬁcation of ‘‘strategy’’ from the business
and customers it is trying to serve. It is more a question of applying IS/IT
foresight to the situation, in order to make reasoned assumptions to an
appropriate course of action.’
There is also a close partnership between the IS function and the rest of
the business. Indeed, this is probably helped as the IT director is respons-
ible for both IT operations and most of the business operations (the
exceptions being marketing and risk management). Roles are clearly
speciﬁed, particularly in the delivery of IT services. The philosophy of
the IS function was described by one IT manager as ‘we help you to help
yourself’, in reference to the fact that they work closely with the business.
The company has not set out to develop and nurture the 26 IS compe-
tencies explicitly, but they are present and they do provide an explanation
of why the company has probably been the most successful player in its
industry over the last 20 years and recognized by its peers as being
innovative regarding the deployment of IT.
CONCLUSION
The discussion of a proposed ‘fourth era’, where an organization’s per-
formance will be signiﬁcantly dependent on its IS capability, recognizes
that IS/IT now plays an integral role in the majority of business opera-
tions. In previous eras, the focus of IS strategy was on selecting the most
beneﬁcial set of IS/IT investments to make and managing them success-
fully through to implementation. This in itself became more challenging
as applications became both more complex and more strategic, demand-
ing innovative thinking about IS/IT use and the ability to make increas-
ing degrees of business change to deliver the beneﬁts. However, there was
an implication that any organization could achieve this by excellence in
developing its strategy—excellence in the sense of astute assessment of
the impact of IS/IT and accurate alignment of IS/IT strategies with
business strategies.
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The concept of an IS capability suggests that an organization will not
be able continually to achieve both of them unless it has a track record of
successful implementation, through which it develops a full set of IS
competencies. This in turn implies a focus on the ways it decides on
and deploys IS/IT, learning from success and failure, rather than con-
centrate on what technology can do (the means), or try to align IS/IT use
to business objectives (the ends) that often arbitrarily, set the investment
and change agenda.
Perhaps fueled by the hype that continually surrounds IT, management
seem to be still hoping for the ‘silver bullet’—that merely possessing a
technology will deliver untold beneﬁts. The recent relabeling of IS/IT as
‘e’ seemed to reignite that dream. The stock market boom in technology
stocks and unsubstantiated claims for the ‘new economy’ increased that
misplaced conﬁdence for a time. However, to requote the Microsoft
chairman, Bill Gates: ‘I have a simple but strong belief. The most mean-
ingful way to diﬀerentiate your company from your competition, the best
way to put distance between you and the crowd, is to do an outstanding
job with information. How you gather, manage and use information will
determine whether you win or lose.’42
Taking advantage of all that technology oﬀers requires an enduring
ability within an organization to understand how systems and informa-
tion use can improve its performance and create new options. This
requires sustained investment in developing IS competencies that, once
in place, enable the organization to exploit the technology, systems and
information it has and with the knowledge acquired make further invest-
ments, each of which delivers explicit, measurable value. Balancing the
need to innovate in IS/IT use with the need to exploit fully the organi-
zation’s IS/IT resources and assets is one of the main reasons for having
an IS/IT strategy. Strategic management is about making informed
choices based on an understanding of the relative beneﬁts of diﬀerent
options and having the ability to deliver those beneﬁts.
Perhaps this book would be better entitled The Strategic Management
of Information Systems since much of the content is not solely about
devising a strategy but also about making it work. What is certain is
that, although ‘IT fads’ will come and go, the use of IT will pervade
more and more aspects of organizational activity and people’s working
and personal lives. It is here to stay. Therefore, if organizations are to
enjoy the beneﬁts that can be realized from its adept application and
avoid the problems its inept use can produce, they will need to develop
IS/IT strategies that are fully integrated into the business strategy and
capable of being implemented successfully. There is still much to learn,
and we have already commenced this quest as we prepare for the fourth
edition!
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